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The main aims and objectives of my thesis are to test the various conflicting hypotheses 
developed in the previous literature to explain firms’ dividend policy, focusing 
specifically on IPOs and cross-country analysis. In particular, I explore the theoretical 
links in the context of the important dividend theories including signalling, agency costs, 
lifecycle and catering and then empirically test the hypotheses by using a very large 
dataset of UK IPOs from 1990 to 2010, which is extracted from offering prospectuses. 
The first empirical study focuses on two aspects of post-IPO decision-making: 
the decision to initiate dividends and the timing of dividend initiation. I develop the 
testable hypotheses by linking the dividend decisions of IPOs with a number of firm 
characteristics and IPO-specific factors in the context of the theories relating to 
dividends and IPO. I find a strong negative relation between underpricing and the 
propensity of dividend initiation. This finding is in line with the implications of 
Dividend Discount Model and Rock’s (1986) “winner’s curse”. My results show that the 
likelihood of initiating dividends is positively associated with managerial ownership, 
underwriter reputation, firm size, profitability and long-term debt ratio. In addition, the 
results show that the initiation propensity is negatively influenced by a serial of factors 
including the length of lockup period, VC backing, managerial stock option, growth 
opportunities of IPOs, technology intensity, and selection of growth stock exchange (i.e. 
AIM). Finally, I find that the IPOs issued in the years when the market put a price 
premium on dividend paying payers are more likely to pay dividend after IPO and 
initiate dividends earlier. Overall, my results show that IPO characteristics relate to 
dividend decisions of IPOs through miscellaneous mechanisms of dividends. The most 
homogeneous results are associated with the life cycle and catering theories. There is 
also some empirical evidence in support of signaling and agency theory.  
The second empirical study examines the determinants on the dividend policies 
stated in IPO prospectuses. At the stage of preparing for IPO, pre-IPO financial status is 
very likely to influence the initial dividend policies. My results provide strong evidence 
that IPOs that experienced superior performance in profitability and cash inflow from 
operating activities during pre-IPO period tend to make active dividend policies 
relatively, consistent with the implication of Lintner (1956) and Benartzi, Michaely and 
Thaler (1997). My results also show that IPOs with higher turnover ratio and lower 
capital expenditures tend to choose more active dividend policies when going public, 
consistent with residual theory and free cash flow hypothesis. In addition, the possibility 
of choosing relatively active dividend strategies at IPO stage is negatively associated 
with VC backing, length of full lock-up restriction period, stock option, technology 
focus, and institutional ownership. In contrast, IPOs with more reputable underwriters 
tend to declare relatively active dividend policy in prospectuses. The evidence relating 
to long-term debt ratio and managerial ownership is weak. Moreover, IPOs issued in the 
‘internet bubble’ period or in 2000s opt for relatively conservative dividend strategies. 
The overall results in this empirical chapter support lifecycle theory, substitution 
assumption-based agency theory and free cash flow hypothesis, while the evidence on 
signaling and catering theories is mixed. 
Furhtermore, my results support the conjecture that IPOs with active dividend 
policies release sufficient information through dividend policies declared in offering 
prospectuses and therefore their formal dividend initiations fail to shock the market. I 
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find that dividend-paying companies outperform non-dividend paying counterparts 
during three post-IPO years, indicating that non-dividend initiating IPOs rather than 
dividend-initiating ones account for the decline in long-run underperformance. 
Additionally, I find evidence in support of the conjecture that the dividend policies 
stated in prospectuses communicate the information, and thus reduce the possibilities 
that outside investors are overoptimistic over the prospect of the invested companies 
and that managers overstate the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. 
The third empirical study examines the trends in dividend policies across seven 
western countries: U.S., Candada, U.K., Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong. In 
general, the proportion of dividend paying firms fell significantly from 1989 through to 
the early 2000s, with the exception of Japanese firms. Thereafter, the percentage 
reverted slightly in the US, Canada, Japan and in Hong Kong, but continued to decrease 
in UK, France, and Germany. In contrast, the aggregate amount of dividends increased 
continuously across countries and firms retained stable dividend payout ratios, and total 
payout ratios relatively. Share repurchases took over from dividends as the dominant 
payout method in the US and the increasing importance of repurchases is observed in 
Canada and in the UK as well. A declining propensity to pay dividends is seen in all the 
sample countries apart from in Japan, controlling for key firm characteristics.  
I find that the likelihood that firms payout dividends or repurchase shares 
positively correlates with firm’s size, profitability and the ratio of earned/contributed 
capital, and negatively related to long-term debt ratio. The impact of growth 
opportunities on payout decisions is not uniform across countries, in line with Denis and 
Osobov (2008). There is some evidence that cash holdings have a negative relation with 
the probability of paying dividends and a positive relation with the probability of buying 
back shares. There is also some evidence that R&D expenditure and technology 
intensity have a negative influence on a firm’s tendency to pay dividends, but such 
influence is country-dependent. The effect of M&A on the incidence of payouts is 
highly country-dependant. For example, US acquirers are reluctant to pay dividends 
while UK acquirers are more likely to pay dividends.I also examine the determinants of 
the amounts of corporate payouts. Profitability, growth rate of total assets, and retained 
earnings are important positive factors in determining dividend amounts. Market to 
book ratio have a significantly positive effect on both dividend amounts and the 
repurchase amounts, consistent with Lee and Suh (2011), Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012). 
Finally, the empirical tests using Lintner model indicate that the link between cash 
dividends and earnings has weakened, in support of Choe (1990) and Brav, Graham, 
Harvey, and Michaely (2005). In line with Eije and Megginson (2008), the data 
demonstrates that dividends are still responsive to earnings. Overall, the evidence in this 
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Dividend policy is considered in various textbooks (e.g., Damodaran, 2010) to be one of 
the main corporate finance decisions, together with investment and financing decisions, 
firms have to make. According to the latest Financial Times dated 29 June 2012, 
dividends represent 3.74% of the total market value of the 606 UK quoted companies 
that form the FTSE All Share Index, which is also the return in the form of dividends 
that companies generate to their shareholders, and 39.8% of earnings generated by these 
companies. The academic literature is still not clear as to whether, when, why and how 
companies pay dividends, and whether dividends create or destroy value (see below and 
Allen and Michaely, 2003; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Skinner, 2008, for extensive reviews). 
This controversy stems from the fact that dividends are not only the cash distributed to 
shareholders, but they are likely to have strong impact on the financing and investments 
decisions, the agency conflicts between managers, shareholders and debtholders, the 
information asymmetries between firms and the financial markets, and on the after-tax 
returns firms generate to their shareholders. 
All listed firms are faced with the choice between using their profits to finance 
future investment opportunities and distributing part of the available cash as dividends. 
The task of maximizing shareholders’ wealth often prompts the management of a listed 
firm to treat dividend strategy as an important concern since dividend policy interrelates 
closely with investment decisions and financing decisions (Pruitt and Gitman, 1991; 
Allen and Michaely, 2003). Previous field surveys have highlighted how company 
directors believe that their dividend policy influences the value of their firm (Baker and 
Powell, 1999; Baker, Powell and Veit 2002; Dhanani, 2005, Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely, 2005). Dividend policy is important for investors because extensive empirical 
tests have confirmed that dividend increase (or decrease) announcements are usually 
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followed by positive (or negative) abnormal returns (Pettit, 1972; Charest, 1978; 
Aharony and Swary, 1980; Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Michaely, Thaler and Womack, 
1995；Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002). In addition, corporate dividend 
policy plays an important role in the survival and progress of listed firms. As a result, a 
substantial amount of research has been undertaken in the area that aims to answer a 
diverse number of questions posed by all kinds of market participants such as dividend 
policy makers, shareholders and researchers. Some of the questions asked include, what 
are the factors that drive firms to pay dividends? How much cash should firms return to 
investors? When should firms start paying/omitting dividends? Why do firms change 
their dividend policy? How do firms choose their method of payout, namely between 
cash dividends and stock repurchases? 
It was Lintner (1956) who laid the foundations of dividend theory. Using a 
survey of US Chief Finance Officers, he uncovered three main stylized facts that lead to 
a standard model of dividend payout: (i) firms have long term target dividend payout 
ratios; (ii) managers focus more on dividend changes than on absolute levels; (iii) 
dividends changes follow shifts in long-run, sustainable levels of earnings rather than 
short-run changes in earnings; and (iv) managers are reluctant to make dividend changes 
that might have to be reversed. This suggests that firms smooth their dividends. 
Consequently, the empirical evidence shows that dividends at particular year can be 
explained by current earnings and lagged dividends. Over the years, these two factors 
which constitute what is known as the Lintner’s model, has become the gold standard of 
dividend theory, and has been developed and supported by a relatively very large 
number of subsequent studies (e.g.Fama and Babiak, 1968; Lasfer, 1996; Baker and 
Powell, 1999; Garrett, Priestley, 2000, 2012; Dhanani, 2005; Brav, Graham, Harvey, 
Michaely, 2005). The implications of this model is that dividends act as a signal of past 
as well as future firm’s prospects. 
Further progress in the field of dividend theory occurred when Modigliani and 
Miller (1961) claimed that investment policy rather than dividend policy influences the 
value of firms under perfect capital market conditions, without taxation, transaction 
costs, agency conflicts, information asymmetry, or institutional constraints. They 
suggested that dividend policy is irrelevant for stock investors because any mix of 
dividends and retained earnings can be homemade in a perfect capital market freely. 
The main breakthrough of this theory is the definition of the conditions under which 
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dividends become relevant. Thus, this theory implies that dividends are likely to be 
affected by information asymmetry (signaling), managerial private benefits (agency 
costs), taxation, and investors’ preference of dividends (behavioral finance).   
The relaxation of the Modigliani and Miller’s assumptions has resulted in the 
development of relatively very large number of theoretical models and empirical 
investigations of the impact of each of the factors. While dividends will results in an 
increase in value when shareholders like dividends, or when dividends operate as a 
signal of future prospects, and/or mitigate the agency conflicts between managers and 
shareholders, they will reduce value if there are tax disadvantaged relative to capital 
gains. These conflicting roles of dividends lead to a number of controversies that can 
summarized in Black (1976) famous “dividend puzzle” argument when he questioned 
why firms pay dividends, and why investors are concerned with dividends if it is indeed 
the case that dividend are irrelevant or tax disadvantaged. In particular, he questioned 
the practice of paying dividends at the time when the US capital gains are taxed at lower 
rate1
The main dividend theories will be discussed in detail in the Literature Review 
that follows in the next chapter. However, it is important to note that the influence of 
taxes and clientele on dividend policy will not be dealt with in this thesis, as a 
discussion of this subject matter is beyond the scope of my research. However, these 
areas might be a suitable topic for further research. 
 and, thus, firms should not pay dividends, as they will benefit their shareholders by 
deferring tax payments if they chose to realize capital gains by selling their shares. 
More recently, Fama and French (2001) added to this controversy by showing that 
dividends are “disappearing” as the proportion of US firms that pay dividends decreased 
substantially from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999, and this decline cannot be 
completely explained by some firms’ fundamental factors defined in the conditions of 
Miller and Modigliani (1961) or by the practice of share repurchases. 
 
1.1 Gaps in Previous Research 
In spite of the extensive research undertaken into dividend policy, gaps in research 
remain, from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. These gaps are noted by Allen 
                                                 
1 This lasted until the Bush tax cut took effect in May 2003 (Julio and Ikenberry, 2004; Chetty and Saez, 2005). The Bush tax cut 
lowered the dividend tax marginal rate from 35 percent to 15 percent, to be the same as the tax rate of capital gains. 
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and Michaely (2003) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2008) amongst others. In 
particular, any attempt to achieve a consensus or to find a universal solution to certain 
dividend problems may not be attainable because dividend policy operates in a real 
world environment that is multivariate and complicated. Baker, Saadi, and Dutta (2008) 
note this difficulty of developing a one-size-fits-all explanation for dividend policy, and 
they explain that factors such as legal regulation, corporate governance, and firm 
characteristics vary across countries. Frankfurter and Wood (1997) suggest that the, 
‘Dividend-payment patterns (or what is often referred to as “dividend policy”) of firms 
are a cultural phenomenon, influenced by customs, beliefs, regulations, public opinion, 
perceptions and hysteria, general economic conditions and several other factors, all in 
perpetual change, impacting different firms differently. Accordingly, it cannot be 
modeled mathematically and uniformly for all firms at all times.’ (p.31) 
This thesis will focus mainly on the dividend policy of IPOs and the impact of 
cross-country differences on dividend payments of a large sample of firms to shed some 
light on the decision of newly listed firms to initiate dividends and to identify the forces 
that shape corporate dividend policy across major western countries. My research is 
primarily motivated by the following gaps that existed in previous dividend research:   
 
(1) There is limited previous research that focuses on the dividend behaviour of Initial 
Public Offering (IPO) firms. Recent empirical studies that focus specifically on IPOs 
(Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu, 2006; Jain, Shekhar and Torbey, 2009; Kale, Kini and 
Payne, 2012) have not completely identified the theoretical links between IPOs and 
post-IPO dividend decisions, and the evidence produced is often contradictory. For 
instance, Michaely and Shaw (1994) argue that firms who underprice less tend to pay 
higher dividends, but this contradicts Allen and Faulhaber’s (1989) hypothesis in 
respect of IPO signaling, and Kale et al. (2012) do not find that underpricing affects 
dividend initiation decisions in their multivariate regression analysis.  
 
(2) The influence of IPO-related elements, such as lock-up agreements, managerial 
owership, institutional ownership, and managerial option plans, have also not been 
examined in detail, although previous studies have hinted that these ignored factors 
have potential for explaining the dividend behaviour of IPOs. For example, previous 
studies (Courteau, 1995; Gale and Stiglitz, 1989; Brav and Gompers, 2000; Espenlaub, 
et al, 2001; Brav and Gompers, 2003) aregue that lockup agreement serve to address 
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information asymmetry and agency conflicts, but the impact of lockups on dividends of 
IPOs has so far been undertaken by comprehensive studies.  
(3) Previous research on dividend policy of IPOs has been undertaken predominantly on 
the US basis. Although the US and the UK are relatively similar in terms of governance, 
there are various institutional settings, including regulation, competition, and tax rules 
that are different. For example, Faccio and Lasfer (2000) identified a number of 
differences between the UK and US governance systems relating to the number of 
companies quoted in each exchange, shareholder activism and differences in the 
categories of shareholders. Moreover, the corporate governance requirements are 
relatively stronger in the UK as firms have to split the roles of the CEO and the 
chairman. Therefore, the testing of the empirical hypotheses on the determinants of 
dividend policy in a relatively more regulated market such as the UK, but where 
companies may suffer from the same free cash flow problems as their US counterparts 
will strengthen the evidence provided to-date. Moreover, although IPO firms in the UK 
are required to state their dividend policies in their prospectuses, in accordance with 
disclosure law, existing studies about dividend policy have not examined what factors 
influence how a firm shapes its dividend policy at IPO stage.  
 
(4) The existing literature does not test for the impact of the pre-IPO financial status on 
the announcement of dividend policy in the IPO prospectus. Previous studies focus on 
seasoned firms and analyze the determinants of and the market reaction to dividend 
initiations (e.g. Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Healy and Palepu, 1988; Christie, 1990), 
partly because of data collection problems and gaining access to accurate data about 
IPOs. Such dividends initiations are less likely to be foreseen by outside investors and 
their announcements lead to significant excess returns to reflect the dividend surprise. 
However, some IPO do state in their prospectus the dividend policy they will adopt in 
the post-IPO period. This issue is not explicitly analyzed in previous studies that focus 
on dividends of IPOs. I will use the pre-IPO accounting information disclosed in the 
prospectuses, profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flow to 
assess the determinants of dividend policy as stated in the IPO prospectuses. 
 
(5) In the last paper, I re-examine the disappearing dividend phenomenon by using a 
very large dataset across western countries. The review of the literature shows that 
incremental evidence is required for researching international trends in dividend 
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payments. Fama and French (2001) argue that there is a declining trend in the 
propensity to pay dividends, after controlling for company characteristics2
 
 and Denis 
and Osobov (2008), Eije and Megginson (2008) and Ferris, Sen and Unlu (2009) 
confirm this trend using the same method. However, Denis and Osobov (2008) find that 
this declining propensity to pay dividends is not as significant as some research leads us 
to believe, and they do not rule out the possibility that the trend is limited to newly 
listed firms. In addition, the method of Fama and French (2001) in measuring the 
propensity of paying dividends is sensitive to the selection of benchmark period, control 
variables, the corrections of standard errors for panel data. For example, the sample 
benchmark period used by Denis and Osobov (2008) and Eije and Megginson (2008) is 
1989-1993 and this can be compared to the benchmark period of 1994-1997 used by 
Ferris et al (2009). Eije and Megginson (2008) do not control for the ratio of retained 
earnings to total equity as when estimating baseline model, but Denis and Osobov (2008) 
and Ferris et al (2009) do in their analyses. Fama and French (2001) and Denis and 
Osobov (2008) utilise Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) procedure as correction of standard 
errors, but Ferris et al (2009) do not specify what method they use.  These controversies 
motivate my analysis. 
(6) Non-US evidence in respect of the substitute relation between dividends and share 
repurchases is limited. For example, Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008) 
show that US listed firms are gradually substituting repurchases for dividends to 
distribute residual cash flow, and Brav et al. (2005) report that managers favour 
repurchases as a more flexible method of payout. In contrast, Ferris, Sen and Yuiet 
(2006a) find that the number of repurchases in the UK is small in 1990s. Although Eije 
and Megginson (2008) observe that the number of repurchases increased across fifteen 
European countries from 1989 to 2005, their analysis treats different countries as one 
entity rather than looking at individual countries.  
 
(7) Recent comparable multination-based studies (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ferris et al, 
2009) focus more on examining whether firms pay dividends and the propensity to pay 
dividends. More dividend behaviors such as dividend changes, dividend initiation and 
omission have not been empirically investigated using multinational data.  Examining 
                                                 
2 Refers to firm size, profitability and growth opportunity 
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various dividend behaviors contributes to the complete understanding towards global 
dividend policies. In addition, dividend policies adopted by companies across countries 
can be driven by far more factors such as cash holdings, technology focus, R&D 
expenditure, M&A factor and de-listing risk. Eije and Megginson (2008) find that cash 
holdings have negative effect on cash dividends and positive effect on repurchases, but 
they do not detail the theoretical argument. The free cash flow theory predicts that 
technology intensity and R&D expenditure and reduces the residual capital and will 
adversely affect corporate payouts. To my knowledge, the previous literature did not 
analyse the effect of M&A factors and delisting on dividends. Jeon, Ligon and 
Soranakom (2010) only discussed how the pre-merger dividend policies of acquirer and 
target affect the choice of payout method between stock takeover and cash takeover. 
 
1.2 Research Objectives  
The research objectives set for each empirical chapter of this research are devised from 
the gaps as stated above and by means of a full investigation of previous studies in 
respect of corporate dividend decision making, as outlined in the literature review 
chapter. In particular, I use a very large dataset of UK IPOs from 1990 to 2010, which is 
extracted from their prospectuses. I explore the theoretical links in the context of the 
important dividend theories including signalling, agency costs, lifecycle and catering 
and then empirically test the hypotheses by employing a number of IPO-specific factors 
and fundamental firm characteristics as proxy variables. In addition, I assess the impact 
of pre-IPO financial status on the dividend policy stated by these IPOs in their 
prospectuses. Moreover, I expand previous studies that test the disappearing dividends 
across countries and look at the extent to which repurchases play a role in dividend 
policy. I investigate the determinants on not only whether firms pay dividends or 
repurchase shares but also the amount of dividends and repurchases. I also analysis the 
firm characteristics associated with various dividend behaviours. 
The main aims and objectives of my thesis are to test the various conflicting 
hypotheses developed in the previous literature to explain firms’ dividend policy, 
focusing specifically on IPOs and cross-country analysis. I summarise below the main 
issues analysed and I provide in the forthcoming chapters detailed discussions.  In order 
to investigate and answer the research question posed, this research is divided into three 
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separate empirical chapters, and each considers three separate but interrelated topics.  
1.2.1 Research Objectives for Chapter 3 
This chapter focuses on examining two aspects relating to the dividend behavior of UK 
IPOs: the likelihood of IPOs to pay dividends and the timing of dividend initiation. I put 
emphasize on developing testable hypotheses which theoretically link the IPO 
characteristics and the dividend behaviour of IPOs in the context of signalling, agency 
costs, lifecycle and catering theories of dividends. Existing research has not provided 
clear theoretical links, hence, this chapter aims to address this problem. I test the impact 
of information asymmetries and agency conflicts on the decisions of IPOs to initiate 
dividends. I also assess whether mature firms have stronger willingness to initiate 
dividends in comparison to young firms in light of lifecycle hypothesis. In addition, the 
inclusion of dividend premium as an explanatory variable allows the tests to provide 
new evidence for catering theory. The chapter details statistical evidence relating to the 
trends in the likelihood of UK IPOs to pay dividends, and the timing of dividend 
initiation over the sample period chosen.  
The chapter investigates the IPOs’ propensity to pay dividends by using a large 
number of proxy variables for the main dividend hypotheses. There are two categories 
of explanatory variables: IPO-specific factors and fundamental financial accounting 
variables. IPO-specific factors include: underpricing (i.e. first-day returns), directors' 
ownership, length of lock-ups , the percentage of locked-up agreements, managerial 
stock options, institutional ownership, venture capital participation, underwriter 
reputation , dividend catering (dividend premium), high technology firm dummy data, 
and AIM dummy data. Financial accounting variables include: firm size, profitability, 
growth opportunity, leverage, sales, R&D, capital expenditure, and working capital. 
The sample used in Chapter 3 comprises 1707 Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) 
listed on the main market and on the Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the 
London Stock Exchange with an official admission date of between January 1st, 1990 
and December 31, 2010. The information about the list of IPOs is gained from the New 
Admissions Summary3, DataStream and offering prospectuses4
                                                 
3 It is publicly accessible from the official website of London Stock Exchange and contains data from June 27, 1995. 
. The raw data on IPO-
specials is hand-collected primarily from the offering prospectuses supplied by Perfect 
Filings, and raw data on financial variables is sourced from DataStream and London 
4 It is supplied by Perfect Filings database. 
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Stock Exchange statistics. 
1.2.2 Research Objectives for Chapter 4 
This chapter examines the determinants of the initial dividend policies as stated in IPO 
prospectuses. In prospectuses, the issuing firms do not use a standard format to state 
their post-IPO dividend policies. In other words, dividend policies stated in the 
prospectuses differ from firm to firm. This chapter attempts to identify the theoretical 
links between these influential factors and dividend policies at IPO stage within the 
context of signaling, agency costs, life cycle, and catering theories of dividends. 
At the stage of preparing for IPO, the preliminary dividend policy is likely to be 
directly influenced by its pre-IPO financial status. Therefore, different from previous 
studies that focus on seasoned firms, this part of study investigates the relation between 
pre-IPO financial performance and the dividend strategy of IPOs when going public. 
Additionally, the IPO-related factors which had been used in Chapter 3 are employed as 
influencers in analysis.  
To compare the key firm characteristics and IPO-related factors between IPO 
groups with different preferences at IPO stage, my study classifies sampled firms into 
four sub-groups according to the decision makers’ attitudes toward dividend payment, 
as follows: Type 1 firms declare the most positive dividend policies, stating that they 
would definitely start dividend payments after admission. Type 2 firms pursue an active 
or progressive dividend policy5
The sample used in Chapter 4 comprised 932 Initial Public Offerings IPOs listed 
, but relative to Type 1 firms, they are more likely to 
default dividend payments if their financial status cannot reach the expected standard. 
Type 3 firms clearly express that they have no intention to pay dividends in the near 
future, and Type 4 firms even do not state any information about future dividend policy. 
One may argue that Type 3 firms resemble Type 4 firms in terms of their style of 
dividend policy. Therefore, I track the post-IPO dividend patterns of IPOs in the sample 
and find that the incidence of initiating dividends of Type 3 IPOs is higher than that of 
Type 4 IPOs in medium term (2-5years). Further, to mitigate the influence of this issue, 
I pay attention to observe if the empirical results are sensitive to such classification and 
execute robust tests to check the influence of this issue on the conclusion. 
                                                 
5 In IPO prospectuses, firms frequently use the phrase, ‘progressive dividend policy’ to indicate they that have positive and active 
attitude toward paying dividends. In this study, Type 1 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type 2, Type 3 and Type 
4 IPOs. Accordingly, Type 1 and Type 2 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type 3 and Type 4 IPOs. 
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on the main market and AIM of London Stock Exchange during the 15 years from 1996 
through to 2010. Historical financial records relating to pre-IPO financial performance 
are collated manually from profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and statements of 
cash flow for 3 consecutive pre-IPO years as shown in the offering prospectuses. The 
raw data includes: total assets, profits for the financial period, net cash inflow from 
operating activities, increase in cash in the financial period, total turnover, long term 
debts / debts due after more than one year, net cash outflow from capital expenditure. 
1.2.3 Research Objectives of Chapter 5 
This chapter examines global trends in dividend policy across seven developed 
economies, including US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong, 
between 1989 and 2010. Moreover, I focus on the extent to which repurchases play a 
role in dividend policy. This chapter aims to answer a series of questions posed in 
previous studies about international dividend trends, such as, has the percentage of 
dividend-paying companies been declining across countries over the past 20 years? Has 
the percentage of dividend-paying companies started to recover in the recent ten years, 
as hypothesized by Julio and Ikenberry (2004)? What is the evolution of aggregate 
dividend amounts in each country? What is the evolution of payout ratios in each 
country? Have companies substituted stock repurchases for dividends worldwide? 
Using a model suggested by Fama and French (2001), this chapter investigates 
the propensity of firms to pay dividends across countries. I test the hypothesis that the 
decision to pay or to change dividends is affected by the key firm characteristics such as 
firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, ratio of retained earnings to total equity 
and leverage. I also use a wide range of additional variables including firm age, cash 
holdings, R&D expenditure, catering proxy, high-technology dummy, M&A factor and 
delisting risk to explain whether firms pay dividends or repurchase shares and the 
amounts of dividends and repurchases. I compare the firm characteristics between firms 
take place various dividend behaviours such as dividend increase, dividend decrease, 
dividend unchanged, dividend initiation, dividend omission and dividend continuation. I 
follow Skinner (2008) and Eije and Megginson (2008) to examine the relationship 
between dividend payouts and earnings, and adjustment speed of dividends by using 
Linter (1956) model. Moreover, following models suggested by Skinner (2008) and Eije 
and Megginson (2008) this chapter examines the relationship between dividends and 
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earnings and the speed of adjustment of dividends. Finally, following a method 
proposed by Grullon and Michealy (2002) I use the transition matrix to examine the 
changes in payout methods in my sample countries. 
The initial sample data includes all non-financial, non-utility firms registered in 
my sample countries. Of the countries sampled in this research, the US, the UK, Japan, 
Canada, Germany, and France are also included in the research of Denis and Osobov 
(2008), but this study adds Hong Kong to the list because it is an influential well-
managed Asian economy, subject to common law jurisdiction, has sufficient dividend 
payers and nonpayers as observations over my sample period. Hence, the inclusion of 
Hong Kong strengthens the representativeness of the sample and allows me to observe 
the primary tendency in international dividend patterns. I mainly collected the relevant 
data from Worldscope via DataStream.  
 
1.3 Methodology  
The specific methods of empirical analysis used in this research, including equations 
formulated for analysis, are explicitly detailed in each relevant empirical chapter. The 
main methodologies used can be summarised as follows:  
 
(1) Univariate Analysis  
Univariate analysis primarily provides descriptive information of data and basic 
quantitative results, which are then used to compare with those obtained from various 
multivariate tests. Variables are compared between control groups then the means, 
medians and t-statistics of the differences in means are reported. T-statistics are 





       +𝜎22
𝑁2
                                                                                                                      (1 − 1)                             
In this equation, where 𝑀1and 𝑀2 are mean values of the indicator variables for two 
types of IPOs, 𝜎12 and 𝜎22 are the variances of the indicator variables, and 𝑁1  and 𝑁2 
relate to the number of observations.  
 
(2) Cross-Sectional Binary Logistic Model 
Cross-sectional binary logistic model is a multivariate method used for investigating 
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events of interest with two possible outcomes, e.g. pay dividends vs. does not pay 
dividends. The formulation is as below: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 �
𝑃(𝑦𝑖=1|𝑋𝑖)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖=0|𝑋𝑖)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                             (1 − 2)                                                                                   
The dependent variable 𝑦𝑖 takes on the value of 1 to indicate if a certain event happens 
and the value of 0 otherwise. Xi represents the vector of control variables that defined 
and ‘i’ indicates the number of control variables in each model. The probability of event 
such as paying dividends, (𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑥𝑖) = 11+𝑒−(𝛽0+𝛽𝑖𝑥𝑖)  . The nature of logit model 
determines that the probability of event has an upper bound of 1 and a lower bound of 0. 
Cross-sectional logistic regressions are estimated using software Stata that is able to 
produce pseudo R2
𝑝𝑠𝑒𝑢𝑑𝑜 𝑅2 = 1 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿
𝑙𝑜𝑔 𝐿0
                                                                                                     (1 − 3)                                                                                       and chi-squared statistic. 
In equation (1-3), 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿 is the log-likelihood and 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿0 is the log-likelihood when the 
regression only has the intercept. The null hypothesis of chi-squared statistic is that all 
explanatory variables have the coefficients of 0. Thus, chi-squared statistic indicates the 
explanatory power of model. 
𝐶ℎ𝑖 𝑥2=2log 𝐿
𝐿0
= 2(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿 − 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝐿0)                                                                                (1 − 4)                                                                    
 
 (3) Cross-Sectional Ordinal Logistic Models  
When an event of interest can be classified into more than two categories, and when the 
values of each category had a meaningful sequential order, an ordinal rather than a 
binary model is used. For example, when investigating the timing of dividend initiation, 
the time taken to initiate dividends is categorised into three groups: the “Within 1 year” 
group, the “Between 2 and 4 years” group, and the “After 4 years” group. These groups 
were in turn given the value of 1, 2 and 3 respectively, and this enabled all observations 
in this sample to be ordered according to the timing of dividend initiation. The formula 
used is as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑃𝑗� = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                                            (1 − 5)                                                                                                     Xi  corresponds the vector of control variables. ‘i’ indicates the number of control 
variables and ‘j’  indicates the critical values (i.e. 1 and 4 for the current example). 
Notably, the number of odds equals the number of categories minus one. 
𝑃𝑗 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒≤𝑗)1−𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑣𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒≤𝑗)                                                                                   (1 − 6)                                                                              
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The terms βj  are similar to the intercept term in binary logistic model. However, the 
coefficients βi   are the same for all odds.  
  
(4) Cox’s Proportional Hazards (CPH) Model 
Cox’s Proportional Hazards model has been extensively applied in previous research 
because of its ability to estimate factors that influence the timing of events on censored 
observations (Shumway (2001)). CPH model is a semi-parametric model (Horowitz 
1996).  The fundamental formulation of Cox’s model is: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒(𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+⋯+𝑏𝑘𝑥𝑘)                                                                                     (1 − 7)                                                                                  
In Equation (1-7), ℎ(𝑡) represents the hazard function, which can be estimated as the 
proportion of individuals that experience the event of interest, e.g. dividend initiation, in 
a certain time interval (Allison, 1984; Le Clere, 2000). h0(t) represents the baseline 
hazard or the hazard for an individual when all the covariates are equal to 0. 
Coefficients of the proportional hazards model are estimated by maximizing the partial 
likelihood. Efron (1977) suggests that partial likelihood estimation is efficient, 
especially when being applied to the analysis of a large sample.  A positive estimated 
coefficient indicates that the hazard rate increases with the independent variable, and 
consequently the event of interest takes place earlier.  
According to Allison (1995), a hazard ratio indicates the percentage change in 
the hazard of an event caused by a unit increase in the control covariate when 
controlling for other covariates.  Therefore, Relative Hazard Ratio can be formulated as: 
ℎ(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡) = 𝑒(𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+⋯+𝑏𝑘𝑥𝑘)                                                                                             (1 − 8) 
When the hazard ratio exceeded 1, the associated covariate indicated a greater hazard of 
incidence of dividend initiation. Contrastingly, a hazard ratio of less than 1 indicated 
that the associated variable causes a decline in the possibility of dividend initiation. 
 
 (5) Logistic Panel Regression Model 
The cross-sectional logistic regression model does not capture the effect of time-varying 
factors on corporations’ dividend initiation decisions. Panel data analysis has an 
advantage over cross-sectional data for capturing the dynamics of variables because it 
analyses two dimensions: the cross-section and the time series. Additionally, panel data 
provide efficient econometric estimation by increasing the number of data points (Hsiao, 
Mountain and Ho-Hillman, 1995). If not every cross-section has the same number of 
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observations along the time series, the data represents an unbalanced pool sample 
(Wooldridge, 2002).  
The dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which assumes the value of 1 
if a firm initiated dividends in a year and 0 otherwise. Therefore, the formulation of the 
multivariate binary model is as follows: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 �
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡=1|𝑋𝑖𝑡)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡=0|𝑋𝑖𝑡)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                          (1 − 9)  
In equation (1-9), Xit represents the vector of control variables. For each individual ‘i’ 
in the population, there is a binary response 𝑦𝑖𝑡 applies for each sample year.  
The time-series correlated standard errors for the logistic panel model should be 
validated (Wooldridge, 2002; Petersen, 2009). Skinner (2008) and Eije and Megginson 
(2008) estimate pooled regressions with robust standard errors clustered across firms. 
Ferris, Jayaraman, and Sabherwal (2009) estimated panel regressions with clustered 
standard errors in two dimensions of firm and year. According to Petersen (2009), I 
estimate panel logistic regressions with clustered standard errors in two dimensions of 
firm and year in Chapter 5 of this thesis.  
Petersen (2009) also points out that the bootstrap method is an alternative 
solution for addressing standard errors in a panel data set (e.g. Efron and Tibshirani, 
1986; Horowitz, 2001; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). Testes conducted by Cheng, Nagar, 
Rajan (2005), Petersen (2009), and Greene (2010) show that the bootstrapping 
procedure are efficient in detecting and correcting the clustered standard errors. In 
addition, Bulan et al. (2007) and Kale et al. (2012) apply the method of bootstrapping6
 
 
to estimated standard errors in probit or logit panel regressions. Therefore, I use the 
bootstrapping method with 200 iterrations to deal with the time-series clustering in 
logistic regressions in Chapter 3 of this thesis. 
 (6) The Linear Probability Models (LPM) 
By using the Linear Probability Model (LPM) model with OLS, Newey-West method, 
Generalized Least-Squares (GLS) 7
                                                 
6 Bootstrapping is a popular re-sampling method and Monte Carlo simulation. It can be used as an alternative to using asymptotic 
approximations for detecting standard errors, confidence intervals, and p-values for test statistics. Computer simulations can be used 
to estimate complicated non-linear models when traditional optimization methods are not effective (Wooldridge 2000). The equation 
for Bootstrap Estimation of Standard Error is: 
, or Fama-MacBeth procedure, the results gained 
from the logistic panel model tests can be verified. The formulation is as the following: 
𝑠𝑒�𝐵�𝜃� ∗� = � 1
𝐵−1
∑ (𝜃�(𝑏) − 𝜃� ∗����)2𝐵𝑏=1 , where 𝜃� ∗����= 1𝐵 ∑ 𝜃�(𝑏)𝐵𝑏=1  
7 Petersen (2009) suggests that researchers can use GLS to check the efficiency of model specifications. 
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𝒚𝒊𝒕(𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝟎,𝟏) = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                                                  (𝟏 −
𝟏𝟎)  
In Equation (1-10), 𝒚𝒊𝒕 is the qualitative dependent variable and this assumes a value of 
0 or 1.  𝑿𝒊𝒕  represents the vector control variables and  𝜺𝒊𝒕 is the error term. 
 
(7) Event Study 
A standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985; Mackinlay, 1997)8
where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 represent abnormal return, actual return and expected return. 
Follow previous dividend studies
 is 
used to measure the market reaction to dividend initiation announcements. The 
abnormal return for firm i and a single observed day t in the event window is computed 
as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                                                              (1 − 11) 
9
𝑅𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑇                                                                                                   (1 − 12)  
, expected return (𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡) is estimated by market model 
in which the market portfolio selected is FTSE All-Share Index. 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑇 and 𝑅𝑚𝑇 stand for the returns of individual stocks and of market portfolio 
over the estimation window respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑇 is the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 and 
𝛽𝑖 are then used to calculate 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 with using the actual market return 𝑅𝑚𝑡 over the event 
window. 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                                                                            (1 − 13)  
The average daily abnormal return at the event date t is the mean across the 
observations: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡����� = 𝑁−1 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1                                                                                                        (1 − 14)  
The cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (t1, t2) can be calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡�����𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1                                                                                                        (1 − 15)  
The t-value of CARs (Rubac, 1982; Bonnier and Bruner, 1989; Mackinlay and Hamill, 
1997) is:  
𝑡�𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2� = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2
�(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡1,𝑡2(𝐴𝑅𝑡�����)+2(𝑡2−𝑡1)𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡1,𝑡2(𝐴𝑅𝑡�����,𝐴𝑅𝑡−1���������)                                (1 − 16)  
 
(8) Long-Run Adjusted Return 
According to Ritter (1991) who propose the original method to measure long-run 
                                                 
8 Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) developed earlier seminal method of event study. 
9 Compbell and Wasley (1993); Lasfer (1995); Lipson et al. (1998); McCaffrey and Hamill (2000); Jain, et al. (2009) 
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performance of IPOs, each sampled event month comprises 21 successive trading days. 
The market-adjusted return for stock i in event month t is defined as:  
𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑚𝑡                                                                                                                  (1 − 17)  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 represent the actual return for stock i in event month t and the market 
return in event month t respectively. The average benchmark-adjusted return for each 
event month t is computed as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 1𝑛 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖=1                                                                                                               (1 − 18)  
and the t-statistic for 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is computed as: 
𝑡-𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡×�𝑛𝑡𝜎𝑡                                                                                                                 (1 − 19) 
Where 𝑛𝑡  and 𝜎𝑡  represent the number of firms trading in event month t and the 
standard deviation of 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 respectively. The cumulative average market-adjusted return 
for the event window between the first month and the event month is defined as:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡=1                                                                                                              (1 − 20)  
and the t-value for 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 is computed as: 
𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇×�𝑛𝑡�𝑡×𝑣𝑎𝑟+2×(𝑡−1)×𝑐𝑜𝑣                                                                                     (1 − 21)  
where t is the event month, var is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months, 
and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the 𝐴𝑅𝑡 series. 
 
 (9) Ordinary Linear Square (OLS) Panel Regression Model 
As same as logistic panel regression model, OLS panel regression model has the 
capability to capture the effect of time-varying factors on response variables.  The 
model specification of OLS pooled regression model is given by 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                         (1 − 22) 
In equation (1-5), the dependent variable  yit is the dividend ratio which is the cash 
dividends paid scaled by total assets, or the repurchase ratio which is the share 
repurchases scaled by total assets10. Xit represents the vector of control variables for 
each firm-year observation.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved random factors including firm-
specific and time-specific shocks 11
                                                 
10 Aivazian and Booth (2003), Lee and Suh (2011) and Alzahrania and Lasfer (2012) have used the same measure to investigate 
dividends or repurchases. 
. Again, as suggested by Petersen (2009) the 
clustered standard errors for the two elements of firm and year, are corrected in the 
estimations. 




(10) Measuring the Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Chapter 5 of this thesis looks at a firm’s propensity to pay dividends. The basic 
methodology used is that proposed by Fama and French (2001), which has been widely 
used in previous studies (Eije and Megginson, 2008; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Ferris et 
al., 2009). When estimating logistic panel regressions it is essential to find a way to 
overcome clustering problems. As Petersen (2009) states, in panel data regression 
analysis the clustering of residuals across firms or across time is very likely and will 
lead to biased standard errors. Therefore, this research corrects two-dimensional 




(11) Examining the relationship between dividend payouts and earnings, and 
adjustment speed of dividends using the Linter model 
Following models suggested by Skinner (2008), and Eije and Megginson (2008), 
Chapter 5 employs the Lintner’s model to assess the extent to which earnings and 
lagged dividends explain current dividends. The implied speed of adjustments and 
optimal payout ratios are then compared across countries. My expectation is that these 
factors will be country specific and will be affected amongst other things by the 
corporate governance system in each country.  
 
 (12) Transition matrix of payout methods 
In order to track changes made in payout methods by the firms sampled, in Chapter 5 of 
this thesis, a transition matrix is used in order to examine the dynamics of corporate 
payout methods occurring in the sample countries. This method was first developed by 
Grullon and Michealy (2002) and has recently been used by Lee and Suh (2011). 
Moreover, previous studies do not consider the effects of some important IPO-specific 
factors, such as lock-ups, the proportion of shares retained by insiders, post-IPO 
institutional ownership, and managerial option plans on the dividend decision in the 
post-IPO period. 
 
                                                 
12 Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) use a similar method in their panel data analysis. 
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1.4 Summary of the Main Findings 
1.4.1 Chapter 3 – When Do IPOs Start Paying Dividends? 
The first empirical study, Chapter 3, contributes to identifying the theoretical links 
between dividend decisions and IPO characteristics by combining dividend policy and 
the various theories underlyining IPOs. Recent studies (Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu, 
2006; Jain, Shekhar and Torbey, 2009; Kale, Kini and Payne, 2012) have not 
completely identified these theoretical links. In developing the testable hypotheses, I 
focus on the signaling, agency costs, life cycle and catering theories of dividends.  
I contribute to the previous literature by answering two fundamental questions, 
namely: Has the probability that an IPO firm starts paying dividends been shifting over 
time? When do IPO firms start to pay dividends? The results show that during the 
sample period 1990-2000, the percent of dividend-initiating IPOs is 46.8%, but IPOs 
issued in 2000s are generally more reluctant to initiate dividends than those issued in 
the 1990s (70.8% vs. 32.6%, respectively). The results also indicate that more than half 
of dividend-paying companies start to pay dividends within the first year after their IPO. 
The primary contribution of this study is to investigate the influential factors in 
the decisions of whether IPOs pay dividends and the timing of dividend initiation, 
which have theoretical implications for the relation between the IPO decision and 
dividend policy. First, my results can be related to information asymmetry and signaling 
theories. My results provide robust evidence that the level of underpricing is negatively 
associated with the probability of dividend initiation and the early dividend initiation. 
This result is in line with Michaely and Shaw (1994) who find that firms who 
underprice less tend to pay higher dividends. Kale, Kini and Payne (2012) also find the 
level of underpricing for dividend initiating firms is on average higher than that for non-
dividend initiating firms using univariate method but this finding is not supported by 
their multivariate regression tests. The tests of Kale et al. (2012) may suffer from multi-
collinearity which causes biased estimation since they include more than twenty 
variables in a single regression. I undertake a number of model verifications to reduce 
any similar risk. The negative effect of underpricing on dividend initiation cannot be 
explained by Allen and Faulhaber’s (1989) IPO signaling high-quality IPO firms 
arrange low offer prices so that they are able to interpret future high dividends more 
favorably. Instead, this result is in line with the implication of the Dividend Discount 
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Model and Rock’s “winner’s curse” model (1986). Specifically, paying no dividends or 
postponing the dividend payment suggests that the information asymmetry is substantial, 
so the issuing firms would intentionally lower the offer price to compensate the 
uninformed investors. 
Consistent with the dividend signaling theory, I show that managerial ownership 
is positively associated with the IPOs’ propensity to pay dividends. This result is not in 
line with the findings in preceding studies such as Eckbo and Verma (1994), Lasfer 
(1996), Chen and Steiner (1999) and Faccio et al. (2001). But Kale, Kini and Payne 
(2012) also find the dividend initiating firms on average have higher managerial 
ownership than non-dividend initiating firms although their multivariate regression tests 
do not support this finding. My finding suggests that informed managers of high-quality 
IPOs tend to retain a large fraction of shares (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) and 
wish to signal positive information by distributing dividends. Similarly, underwriter 
reputation is positively associated with IPOs’ propensity to pay dividends. This result is 
comparable with Jain et al (2009), Kale et al. (2012) who find similar relation in 
univariate analysis. This finding implies that prestigious underwriters provide 
certification for “good” firms (Booth and Smith, 1986) who have strong motivation and 
capability to initiate dividends.  
By contrast, my results show that VC backing has a negative impact on the 
propensity to pay dividends for IPOs, in line with Jain et al. (2009). Also, a strong 
negative relation between the length of full lock-up restriction period and dividend 
initiation inclination is found in my tests. Prior studies do not provide direct empirical 
evidence relating dividend policy to the lock-up covenant, with the exception of Brav 
and Gompers (2003) who find that the IPOs with longer than median lock-up length 
have lower frequency of dividend initiations than counterparts but the associated 
significance in their test is small. In information equilibrium, these results suggest that 
IPOs substitute their dividends for these factors as signaling device since these factors 
are shown in previous studies to mitigate the level of information asymmetries (Booth 
and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Espenlaub et 
al., 2001; Courteau, 1995; Brau et al., 2005). For example, we may argue that the 
information asymmetry would become more serious if no dividends are paid out and in 
such case the more restrictive lockup provisions will be required. Moreover, I find no 
evidence the institutional ownership has significant influence on the decision to initiate 
dividends of IPOs.  
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My results can be discussed in the context of agency costs theory of dividends. I 
develop the substitute assumption and complement assumption to interpret the link 
between dividend policy and corporate governance. The logic of substitute assumption 
is similar to that of the “substitute model” given by LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies 
that weak corporate governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts. Rozeff 
(1982), Jensen (1986), Smith and Watts (1992), and Gaver and Gaver (1993) also 
follow the line of argument when they analyse the relation between two devices that can 
reduce agency costs. The logic of complement assumption is similar to that of “outcome 
model” of LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that strong corporate governance leads to 
higher demand of dividend payouts. Both Fenn and Liang (2001) and Grinstein and 
Michaely (2005) follow the similar argument line. The results can be summarised as 
follows. 
I find that that the propensity of paying dividends is negatively influenced by the 
full lockup restriction period, VC backing and managerial stock option provide support 
for the substitute assumption of agency costs which suggests that weak corporate 
governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; 
Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 2000; Officer, 2006). 
For example, IPOs with longer lockup restriction periods find it less necessary to reduce 
their potential agency costs by paying dividends, because the lockup agreements bond 
the interests of directors and investors (Brav and Gompers, 2003). These results are in 
accordance with results from some previous studies. Jain et al. (2009) find that VC 
backing affects negatively the likelihood to initiate dividends. The documented negative 
effect of managerial options (OPTION) is consistent with findings reported by Smith 
and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner (2000), and Fenn and Liang (2001). 
Moreover, the finding in respect of managerial options is consistent with the argument 
of Lambert, Lanen and Larcker (1989) who suggest that executive stock options 
motivate managers to reduce dividends because they are not “dividend protected”. In 
contrast, the results regarding managerial ownership and leverage lend support for the 
complement assumption of agency costs which suggests that strong corporate 
governance accompanies higher dividend payment (LaPorta et al., 2000; Fenn and 
Liang, 2001; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). Both proxy variables are positively 
associated with the inclination of IPOs. 
My results also show the strong evidence that IPOs’ preference to initiate 
dividends is adversely influenced by the growth opportunities and technology intensity. 
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Furthermore, firms issued on AIM, a stock market for small and high growth firms, are 
more reluctant to initiate dividends relative to those issued on main market. These 
results are consistent with free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). 
My results can also be analysed in the light of lifecycle theory. I find that VC 
backing and lockup agreement have negative effect on the dividend policy of IPOs. 
These results are consistent with the life cycle theory in which mature firms are in a 
better position to pay dividends. Previous literature (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; 
Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2000, 2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004; 
Cumming and Johan, 2008 and Krishnan, 2011) suggests that venture capitalists prefer 
to invest into early-stage companies that are small, young and technology-focused. 
Likewise, Brav and Gompers (2000, 2003) find that young firms are associated with 
longer lockup periods. The other explanation for the negative effect of VC backing can 
be that venture capitalists prefer short-term capital gains to long-term future dividends 
stream (Lerner, 1994 and Field and Hanka, 2001). 
The results also show that large IPO firms with higher profitability and lower 
growth opportunities are more likely to initiate dividends and pay earlier, in line with 
previous studies (Fama and French, 2001; Bulan, et al., 2007; Denis and Osobov, 2008; 
Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009 and Kale et al., 2011).  In addition, the 
findings that IPOs from high technological industry and AIM are reluctant to initiate 
dividend coincide with life cycle hypothesis since these firms are commonly considered 
as young and high growth. In addition, the positive relationship between dividends and 
leverage is consistent with life cycle hypothesis because high leverage may simply 
indicate that firms are in mature stage (Eije and Megginson, 2008). However, the 
negative relationship between R&D Expenditure and Capital Expenditures, and 
dividends that is consistent with the lifecycle hypothesis, can only be found in 
univariate analysis. Finally, IPOs issued in the years when markets put a price premium 
on dividend paying payers are more likely to become dividend payers and tend to 
initiate dividends earlier, consistent with the implication of catering theory (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004). 
Overall, common firm characteristics and IPO-related factors can affect 
corporate decisions of whether IPOs initiate dividends and of when IPOs initiate 
dividends through miscellaneous mechanisms. The most homogeneous results are 
associated with the life cycle theory and catering theories. There is also some empirical 
evidence in support of signaling and agency theory. The empirical tests do not negate 
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any of the major dividend theories. 
1.4.2 Chapter 4 – Determinants of Dividend Decisions at IPO Stage 
The second empirical study, Chapter 4, contributes to investigating the determinants of 
dividend decisions at stage of IPO using hand-collected data from IPO prospectuses. In 
particular, the influence of the pre-IPO financial status on the preliminary dividend 
policy is examined. All the sample firms are classified into four control groups 
according to the decision makers’ attitudes toward dividend payment. Specifically, in 
offering prospectuses, Type 1 firms declare the most positive dividend policies, stating 
that they would definitely start dividend payments after admission. Type 2 firms pursue 
a progressive dividend policy, but relative to Type 1 firms, they are more likely to 
default dividend payments if their financial status cannot reach the expected standard. 
Type 3 firms state that they will not declare a dividend in short or medium term, but 
they will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy, and Type 4 firms 
even do not state any information about future dividend policy. One may argue that 
Type 3 firms resemble Type 4 firms in terms of their style of dividend policy. To 
mitigate the influence of this issue, I check the robustness of the results by using a 
different setting of dependent variables. Key firm characteristics are then compared 
between the groups using unique categorical analyses, cross-sectional binary logistic 
regression and ordinal logistic regression analyses. 
In line with the previous chapter, the theoretically-based testable hypotheses are 
developed in the context of the main dividend theories including signaling, agency costs, 
life cycle and catering. In addition to the variables relating to pre-IPO financial status, 
most of the IPO specific characteristics used in Chapter 3 are retained as explanatory 
variables in Chapter 4. I expect the variables that are used in both chapters to have the 
same impact on IPO’s dividend policy as they do in previous chapter. For example, in 
Chapter 3, high technological firms are hypothesized to have lower likelihood to pay 
dividends and delayed dividend payment. In Chapter 4, high technological firms are 
also hypothesized to undertake relatively conservative dividend policies at the time of 
IPO. My results demonstrate that the effects of underwriter reputation, VC backing, 
length of full lock-up restriction period, stock option, technology focus, selection of 
exchange (AIM), and dividend premium do not change when comparing with the results 
in Chapter 3. The findings for such factors are not reported below to avoid repetition. 
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The new findings in Chapter 4 are presented as below. 
Relative to the counterparts with conservative dividend policies, IPOs with 
active dividend policies are more profitable, more likely to experience growth in 
earnings and to maintain positive earnings during pre-IPO period. All these results are 
strongly robust using various methods. This finding is particularly consistent with 
Lintner (1956) model in which dividend policy follows the shifts in long-run, 
sustainable levels of earnings and managers are expected to be highly prudent when 
initiating dividends in order to prevent from reversing dividend changes in future. These 
findings are also consistent with Miller (1987), Healy and Palepus (1988) and Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) who document that there is a strong link between changes 
in dividend policies and past earnings. In this sense, the dividend policy presented in 
IPO prospectuses signal the past financial performance of firms. 
My results show that lower institutional ownership is associated with stronger 
propensity to choose relatively active dividend strategies for IPOs, in line with the 
expected relation derived from signaling by Kale et al. (2012). In detail, IPOs tend to 
express an intensive willingness of paying aftermarket dividends when the current level 
of institutional ownership is lower than what it should be, in order to attract informed 
institutions that prefer firms with dividend payments. 
Additionally, the results from binary and ordered regressions show that the 
relation between the preliminary dividend strategy of IPOs and the level of underpricing 
is generally not robust. However, the results from univariate comparison are consistent 
with the hypothesis that issuing firms would compensate uninformed investors who are 
unable to extract sufficient information from released dividend policy by discounting 
offer prices. Similar to underpricing, an expected positive relation between managerial 
ownership and IPO’s willingness to pay can only be found in univariate comparison.  
My results show that IPOs with higher turnover ratio, higher cash flows and 
lower capital expenditures tend to choose more active dividend policies when going 
public, consistent with the predictions of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Lang 
and Litzenberger, 1989; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002) and residual 
hypothesis. My results also show that IPOs with active dividend policies are more likely 
to experience growth in cash inflows and to maintain positive earnings during pre-IPO 
period, intensifying above finding. But, the evidence relating to leverage is mixed as the 
corresponding coefficient is only significantly negative in ordinal logistic regression 
rather than binary logistic regression. In addition, IPOs issued in the ‘internet bubble’ 
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period opt for relatively conservative dividend strategies, and IPOs issued in 2000s are 
less likely to adopt active dividend policies than those issued in the 1990s.  
Furhtermore, I find that Type1 IPOs have lower cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) to dividend initiation announcements compared with non-Type1 counterparts, 
supporting the conjecture that Type1 IPOs release sufficient information through 
dividend policies declared in offering prospectuses and therefore their formal dividend 
initiations fail to shock the market. While TYPE2 has the significant CARs over the 
major event windows, neither TYPE3 nor TYPE4 has the significant CARs in term of 
statistics. A possible explanation is that investors do not regard the dividend 
disbursement made by firms which are more likely technology focused companies 
(TYPE3 and TYPE4) as good news. I find that dividend-paying companies outperform 
non-dividend paying counterparts during three post-IPO years, indicating that non-
dividend initiating IPOs rather than dividend-initiating ones account for the decline in 
long-run underperformance. The additional remarkable finding is that Type1 IPOs do 
not exhibit the expected declining long-run performance. The cumulative average 
market-adjusted returns for Type1 IPOs remain positive during the 36 holding months 
after IPO. Long-run performance descends orderly from Type1 to Type4 in the most of 
observed post-IPO months. This finding supports the argument that the dividend 
policies stated in prospectuses function to communicate the information, and thus 
reduce the possibilities that outside investors are overoptimistic over the prospect of the 
invested companies and that managers overstate the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. 
Overall, my results suggest that common firm characteristics and IPO-related 
factors can affect dividend decisions of issuing companies at IPO stage through 
miscellaneous mechanisms of dividends.  The most homogeneous results are associated 
with the life cycle theory. There is also some empirical evidence in support of signaling 
and agency theory. However, the evidence supporting catering theory is mixed. The 
empirical tests do not negate any of the major dividend theories although the evidence 
supporting the complement assumption of agency costs is relatively weak.  
1.4.3 Chapter 5 – Trends in Dividend Payments: International Evidence 
The third empirical chapter primarily contributes to examining the international trends 
in dividend payment across seven developed economies from 1989 to 2010. Meanwhile, 
I also provide relevant evidence on repurchase policy in order to provide a relatively 
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complete pitcture of dividend decisions. this study goes further to investigate more 
dividend behaviors, including dividend increases, dividend decreases, dividend 
unchanged, starting dividend payments, terminating dividend payments, and dividend 
continuation. In analysis, more variables that are comprehensive are included to 
examine the determinants of dividend policy among international markets. The specific 
findings can be generalized as follows: 
My study with the most recent data confirms some findings in the respect of the 
evolution of dividends and repurchases provided by previous studies. First, over the 
duration of the sample period, these sampled markets enlarged materially and the 
number of firms that paid dividends did not decline, except for in the UK. Second, the 
overall proportion of dividend paying firms falls significantly from 1989 through to the 
early 2000s, with the exception of Japan. After that, consistent with Julio and Ikenberry 
(2004) who find that dividends reappear in the US, the percentages of payers revert 
slightly upwards in the US, Canada, Japan and Hong Kong. However, the ‘reappearing 
dividends’ trend as described by Julio and Ikenberry (2004) is not evident in the UK, 
France, or in Germany. Third, in accordance with the findings of Grullon and Michaely 
(2002) and of Skinner (2008), share repurchases have taken over from dividends as the 
dominant form of payout by most US corporations, in terms of absolute amounts. The 
increasing importance of share repurchases can also be observed in the UK, while a 
large fraction of corporate payouts is still distributed in the form of dividends, consistent 
with Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011). Share repurchases only counted for a small 
fraction of corporate payouts in other countries including Canada, Germany, France, 
Japan, and in Hong Kong. Fourth, as previous studies (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije 
and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al, 2010), the aggregate amount of dividends paid 
continuously increased in each country during the sample period. 
In contrast, several findings about trends in dividend payment are innovative or 
not completely as same as existing evidence. First, the proportion of newly listed firms 
that pay dividends decreased in all countries between 1989 and 2010, supporting Fama 
and French (2001), and Denis and Osobov (2008) who attribute a reduction in the 
percentage of dividend payers to the soaring number of newly listed firms that do not 
pay dividends generally. Second, all countries retained stable dividend payout ratios and 
total payout ratios during the sample period. In general, the significant changes that 
were seen in percentages for dividend paying firms cannot be seen in respect of the 
evolution of payout ratios. This finding is comparable to Eije and Megginson (2008) but 
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distinguishable from Ferris et al (2009) who measure dividend ratios differently. 
As the initial step of examining the propensity to pay dividends, I use a vector of 
conventional firm characteristics as indicator variables of logistic panel regressions to 
investigate the determinants of whether companies pay dividends. The likelihood of 
paying dividends is positively related to firm size, profitability and earned equity. The 
finding of highly strong effect of earned equity supports DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2006), and Denis and Osobov (2008), but contradicts Eije and Megginson (2008). In 
line with Denis and Osobov (2008), the evidence relating to growth opportunities is 
somewhat mixed. Market to book ratio and rate of change in total assets are not 
demonstrated to be significant and negative in all sample countries as expected. 
Moreover, consistent with Eije and Megginson (2008), leverage is an important 
influential factor having adverse effect for the decision to pay dividends for the majority 
of sample countries. 
Controlling for the firm characteristics stated above, the declining propensity to 
pay dividends is confirmed in all sample countries apart from Japan. Both UK and 
Germany underwent greater turbulence in the propensity that pays dividends over the 
forecast period 1996-2010 compared with the US and Japan. Contrary to the conclusion 
of Denis and Osobov (2008), an implication of the test is that there should be 
unobserved factors influencing the dividend patterns because the actual percent of 
dividend payers are more volatile than the expected percent of dividend payers.  
As suggested by some existent theories, some additional explanatory variables 
are used to explain: (1) the decisions of paying dividends; (2) the decisions of 
repurchasing shares; (3) the amount of dividends; (4) the amount of repurchased shares. 
The majority of variables have significant time trend. More importantly, explanatory 
variables also include M&A factors and delisting risk, which have not been considered 
in international research on payout policy. The most pronounced results are below. 
Both the decision of paying dividends and the decision of repurchasing 
dividends are similarly affected by the conventional firm characteristics including firm 
size, profitability, growth opportunities, earned equity and leverage in general. The 
difference is that the repurchases regressions have smaller number of statistically 
significant coefficients than dividends regressions. These findings are similar to Eije 
and Megginson (2008). Older companies are in general associated with higher 
likelihood to pay dividend and repurchase shares. There is some evidence that cash 
holdings are negatively related to the decision to pay dividends but positively related to 
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the decision to buy back shares, partially in line with the finding of Lee and Suh (2011). 
R&D expending is a factor with strongly negative influence on the propensity to pay 
dividends, however its effect on the propensity to repurchase dividends is diverse for 
different countries. Similarly, high technology intensity has generally negative influence 
on the decision of whether to pay dividends and mixed effect on the decision of whether 
to repurchase shares. 
Fama and French (2001) conclude that M&A practices have no important impact 
on US markets over their sample period 1978-1999. My tests show that the effects of 
M&A on the incidences of payouts are highly heterogeneous in different countries; 
therefore, to look at this issue more clearly it would be better to concentrate more on the 
US and the UK in which a great number of M&A observations are available. The US 
acquirers appear to be reluctant to pay dividends probably because acquisition as a form 
of investment actually reduces the excess cash. In contrast, the opposite relation in the 
UK can be explained by the fact that acquirers have good financial conditions in a long-
term period before they launch the M&A plans. I conjecture that the gap between the 
US and the UK in this issue might have resulted from the different frequencies of M&A. 
The target firms both in the US and in the UK are more likely to pay dividends. The 
possible explanation is that companies pay dividends when they lack positive NPV 
projects and thus confront increasing chance of being taken over. In addition, I find that 
acquirers in the US and in the UK are likely to have greater incidence of repurchasing 
shares, suggesting that they need some flexibility in the way they distribute cash to their 
shareholders. Relatively, there is homogeneous evidence that firms facing delisting risk 
have lower likelihood to pay dividends, in line with DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) 
and DeAngelo et al. (1992). Moreover, I find weak evidence that the payout decisions 
are affected by the market sentiment as argued by Baker and Wurgler (2004a). 
Moreover, I find that in most sample countries firms that repurchase shares tend to be 
dividend payers at the same time, suggesting that dividends are complementary not 
substitutes. 
I use dividends ratios (cash dividends paid scaled by total assets) and 
repurchases ratios (share repurchased scaled by total assets) as dependant variables to 
examine the determinants of the amounts of corporate payouts. Once again, the 
repurchases regressions have smaller number of statistically significant coefficients than 
dividends regressions. Market to book ratio is the only explanatory variable that has 
significant effect on both the amounts of dividends and share repurchases. The 
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associated coefficients of market to book ratio are positive and significant, in line with 
Aivazian and Booth (2003), Lee and Suh (2011), and Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012) who 
use dividends ratios or repurchases ratios as dependant variables as well. .  I document a 
relation between cash holdings and the amount of dividends, similar to the findings of 
Lee and Suh (2011) and Eije and Megginson (2008).  Another interesting finding is that 
large US companies are less likely to pay high dividends. Similarly, Aivazian and Booth 
(2003) also find a negative relation between firm size and dividend amount in several 
countries such as Korea, India and Turkey. This may imply that large US firms are 
distributing substantial amount of cash flows in the form of repurchases. On the contrary, 
firm size still positively affects the dividend amount of UK companies. In addition, I 
find that profitability, growth rate of total assets and retained earnings remain as the 
important factors in determining the dividends amount, and the associated signs are 
same as those in the decision of paying dividends.  
I also examine the determinants of changes in dividends and share repurchases. I 
find that firms that increase dividends are larger, more profitable, and have higher 
growth opportunities, retained earnings as well as cash holdings than firms that do not 
change dividends and firms that decrease dividends. An interesting finding is that the 
number of high-tech dividend-increasing firms is greater than that of high-tech 
dividend-decreasing firms. This indicates that techonogy focused firms will experience 
the convertion from a non-dividend payer to a dividend payer. In the US, dividend 
increasing firms are more frequently be acquirers and less likely to be M&A targets 
within 3 years. Dividend-increasing firms have lower delisting rate. Overall, the most 
remarkable finding is that dividend-increasing companies have growth opportunities 
and cash holdings than dividend-decreasing companies.  The only consistent evidence to 
catering theory is that the US dividend-increasing group has greater value-weighted 
dividend premium than dividend-decreasing group. 
Firms that start to pay and firms that stop to pay differ in a series of life cycle 
related characteristics like firm size, growth opportunities and earned equity. This might 
be due to the age differences with the control groups. In addition, there are several 
robust findings. Firms that omit their dividends are likely toi have a higher leverage 
compared to firm that initiate dividends, confirming the expected opposite relation 
between leverage and dividends. Dividend iniating companies are more likely to be 
from technology industry, but less likely to delist. In the US, dividend iniating firms are 
more likely to experience M&A. 
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Using Lintner (1956) model, I find that the dependence of dividends on earnings 
has been going down across countries, in line with Skinner (2008) and Eije and 
Megginson (2008). In addition, US companies rather than companies of other countries 
actually speed up the adjustment of dividends within the recent two decades. The partial 
reason can be that repurchases account for larger proportion of corporate payout, 
especially play the predominate role in the US. 
The transition matrices of payout channel suggest that corporate decision makers 
pursue stable payout channel. Dividends are long-term and stable while repurchases are 
relatively temporary. Dividends and repurchases are not perfect substitutes at least and 
they may serve as complements. The substitute relation of dividends and repurchases 
are prominent among the U.S. and Canada new payers that have not dividend history. 
Overall, for the US, share repurchase is essentially a substitute of dividend payout and 
actually predominant the corporate payouts. Share buybacks have become increasingly 
popular among the UK and Canadian companies, but dividend payment is still the most 
important payout channel. This implies that the surge of share repurchases plays a 
crucial role in shaping the dividends pattern of the US companies. Increasing share 
repurchases may also contribute to the recent dramatic decline in the incidence of 
dividend payers in Canada and UK. For other sample countries, the effect of 
repurchases on dividends is limited.  
 
1.5 Structure of the Thesis 
The Literature Review presented in Chapter 2 details the main dividend theories and 
empirical research relating to the research question and it will discuss the theories on 
which the principles of hypothesis testing is based for this research. Chapters 3, 4 and 5 
comprise the three empirical studies. Chapter 3 focuses on the likelihood of IPOs to pay 
dividends and the timing of dividend initiation. Chapter 4 analyses the factors that drive 
IPOs to choose different dividend policies as stated in their offering prospectuses, and 
Chapter 5 studies trends in dividend payments across seven representative advanced 
economies. Additionally, Chapter 5 observes the role of share repurchases as an 
alternative payout method used by firms.  The main findings and conclusions of the 














































This chapter presents a comprehensive literature review on research related to corporate 
dividend policies. The systematic review of previous research not only helps clarify our 
current understanding of corporate dividend policy but also enlightens future research. 
Since the advent of seminal research, such as Lintner (1956), and Miller and Modigliani 
(1961), a great number of theoretical and empirical studies on dividend policy have 
been accumulated. Allen and Michaely (2003) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Skinner (2008) 
provide a review of the majority of prevalent dividend theories over the past 40 years. 
The literature review presented in this chapter only covers the perspectives that closely 
relate to the issues focused on by the thesis, rather than presenting a complete overview 
of modern dividend studies. Therefore, in order to focus on the impact of information 
asymmetries and agency costs, which are inherent in IPOs, I do not cover extensively 
nor test the effect of taxation. 
This chapter starts by reviewing the seminal dividend studies that have 
extensively affected subsequent research. The next section considers in depth the most 
debated dividend theories. For each theory, the original theoretical models will be 
introduced, and then the main arguments critically presented. In the following section, 
the main empirical evidence will be reviewed. Finally, I summarize the important 
theoretical and empirical issues on this theory. The remainder of this chapter is 
organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews seminal studies on dividend policy. Section 
2.3 reviews information asymmetry. Section 2.4 reviews residual theory. Section 2.5 
reviews agency cost and free cash flow hypothesis. Section 2.6 reviews life cycle theory. 
Section 2.7 reviews catering theory.  
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2.2 Seminal Studies on Dividend Policy 
2.2.1 Lintner (1956) 
Lintner (1956) interviews managers from 28 selected companies. He finds a number of 
important stylized facts underlying the decision to pay dividends, which can be 
summarized as follows: 
a) Firms have long-term target ratios of dividend payout.  
b) Managers focus more on dividend changes than on absolute levels.  
c) Dividend changes follow shifts in long run, sustainable levels of earnings rather 
than short-run changes in earnings.  
d) Managers are reluctant to make dividend changes that might have to be reversed. 
 He further built up a theoretical model of corporate dividend behavior that embodies 
these findings. 
 𝐷𝑃𝑆∗ =  𝛾 × 𝐸𝑃𝑆                                                                                                               (2 − 1) 
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡  −  𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡−1 = 𝜆(𝐷𝑃𝑆∗ − 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡−1)                                                                         (2 − 2) 
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡 = 𝛼 +  (𝜆𝛾𝐸𝑃𝑆) + (1 − 𝜆)𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑡−1                                                                      (2 − 3) 
where γ is the target payout ratio, λ is the speed of adjustment towards the target payout 
ratio, α is a constant expected to be positive to reflect the propensity of firms not to cut 
their dividends. DPS and EPS are for dividend per share and earnings per share, 
respectively. 
Equation (1) indicates that the target dividend is a function of the target payout 
ratio, as indicated in the survey results (a). Equation (2) states that changes in dividends 
should reflect the difference between the target dividends and the actual dividends that 
firm paid in the previous period. The target payout ratio is the long-term desired ratio of 
dividends to earnings. However, since firms adjust to their target through time, this 
difference is multiplied by λ, the speed of adjustment, which measures how quickly 
managers adjust dividends to close the gap in their dividend towards their target. If we 
rearrange Equation (2) we obtain Equation (3), which states that dividend at time t is a 
function of two main variables: earnings at time t and lagged dividends, and by two 
firm-specific parameters: target payout ratio and speed-of-adjustment.  
This model has been extensively tested in many studies and the results are strong. 
(See Allen and Michaely (2003) for a review). Generally, Lintner (1956) incorporate 
two important implications. First, firms set long-term payout ratios so that current 
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reported earnings determine the current dividend amounts and desired dividends are 
realized by partially adjusting dividend payment in each year. This finding suggests that 
the level of earnings is the most important determinant of change in dividends (Allen 
and Michaely, 2003). Second, firms are concerned with the stability of dividends. 
Managers tend to maintain conservative dividend policies and thus pursue dividend 
smoothing. In other words, the operated dividends are sticky, tied to long-term 
sustainable earnings, and smoothed from year to year (Brav, Graham, Harvey and 
Michaely, 2005).  
A large number of subsequent studies provide strong support for this model. 
Amongst the earlier studies, Fama and Babiak (1968) use data for 392 major industrial 
firms over the period 1946 through 1964. They find that managers increase dividends 
only after they are reasonably confident with the earning level in the future. 
Subsequently, Kalay (1980) concludes that the dividend decision is a credible signal to 
stock market since managers are reluctant to cut dividends once they decide to initiate 
dividends or lift dividend payout ratio. Lasfer (1996) examine the impacts of taxation 
on dividend policy by incorporating tax exhaustion and tax discrimination variables into 
Lintner’s  (1956) model and find tax burden affects corporate dividend decisions while 
tax-induced dividend clientele is not evident. Furthermore, Allen, Bernardo, and Welch 
(2000) offer the other explanation to dividend smoothing. Dividend payments attract 
untaxed13
2.2.2 Miller and Modigliani’s (1961) Dividend Irrelevancy Proposition  
 institutional investors who have the relative advantage in detecting high firm 
quality and in maintaining the corporate governance, so that dividends are valuable to 
firm value from time to time. Thus, the action of cutting dividends may cause the loss in 
firm value since it may imply that firms paying dividends have the intention to reduce 
the institutional ownership. Brav et al. (2005) conduct the other field investigation by 
interviewing 23 listed firms and find managers still tend to avoid dividend cuts while 
the connection between earnings and dividends has weakened. 
Prior to Miller and Modigliani (1961)14
                                                 
13 For simplicity, Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) assume there are just two clienteles and call them "untaxed institutions" and 
"taxed individuals." 
, there was a lack of the literature of a complete 
and reliable theoretical model of the effect of a firm's dividend policy on the current 
price of its shares. MM (1961) are the first to challenge the belief that a higher dividend 
14 Thereafter, Miller and Modigliani (1961) is referred to as MM (1961). 
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payout translates into higher firm value. They conclude that only investment policy 
rather than dividend policy determines firm value in an ideal economy. Dividend policy 
merely establishes a tradeoff between dividends at one date and dividends at another 
date because both the corporations and the individual investors can create any cash 
inflow stream by making homemade dividends. It means that any desired stream of 
payments can be replicated by appropriate purchases and sales of equity. Thus, investors 
will not pay a premium for any particular dividend policy.  
The net payout can be considered as the difference between the wealth generated 
from preceding investment and the amount of capital required by the future opportunity 
of growth, and is simply a residual. Dividend irrelevancy proposition has the 
implication that firms should never give up a positive NPV project to increase a 
dividend since the investment policy of the firm is set ahead of time, and firm value is 
not changed by changes in dividend policy.  
In order to grasp the spirit of MM’s (1961) dividend irrelevancy proposition it is 
necessary to understand correctly the basic assumptions of perfect capital markets, 
rational behavior, and perfect certainty. Dividend policy does not affect firm’s value, but 
it could matter when one of these assumptions is violated. In perfect capital markets, no 
participant (buyer, seller or issuer) of trading transaction has the power to control 
completely stock prices. There is no asymmetrical information on the traded stocks 
among the participants of stock trading. There are no transaction costs in any forms 
such as brokerage fees and transfer tax. There are no tax differentials between dividends 
and capital gains. The assumption of rational behaviour means that investors pursue 
wealth maximization all the time and view income in the form of dividend payment and 
capital gains as equivalents. The assumption of perfect certainty implies the analysis 
disregard the difference between stocks and bonds as financial sources.  
The most important insight of MM (1961) dividend irrelevancy proposition is 
that it identifies the situations in which dividend policy can affect firm value. Hence, the 
MM (1961) framework has formed the foundation of subsequent work on dividends and 
payout policy in general. Each of imperfections might lead an investor to have a 
systematic preference between current dividends and current capital gains. But Miller 
and Modigliani also emphasis that such imperfections are at best only necessary but not 





2.2.3 Black’s (1976) Dividend Puzzle  
In the post MM (1961) period, a large number of studies focus on how dividends in the 
real world behave when the conditions underlying the MM (1961) are relaxed. The 
major controversy emanates from the contradictory implications of these assumptions. 
While the information asymmetry and the agency costs will make dividends increase 
the value of the firm, the existence of the tax differential between dividends and capital 
gains will result in firms destroying value when they pay dividends. 
This controversy led Black (1976) to discuss primarily two questions on 
dividend policy: Why do firms pay dividends? Why do investors buy stocks paying 
dividends? Miller-Modigliani irrelevance theorem suggests that a firm without dividend 
payments has the same value as it would have if it paid dividends under the conditions 
of frictionless world. However, this conclusion contradicts the fact we can observe in 
real world that firms pay many dividends. Why are announcements of dividend 
increases typically followed by stock price increases (Miller, 1986b)? Moreover, why 
are dividend cuts or eliminations often followed by price falls? Early studies of this 
phenomenon include Pettit (1972), Aharony and Swary (1980), and Asquith and 
Mullins (1983). The puzzle for MM’s (1961) dividend irrelevance theorem is obvious: 
Why would stock prices react to dividend changes if payout policy is truly irrelevant? 
With tax, the dividend picture appears to be more complicated since once one 
introduces payout taxes into an otherwise frictionless model in which payout policy is 
irrelevant, investors are always better off under a low or no dividends. Feldstein and 
Green (1983) echoed that it is questionable that companies pay dividends on condition 
that dividends are taxed more heavily than retained earnings15
                                                 
15 Feldstein and Green (1983) state that, until 1982, the capital gains are taxed at rate below 40% while dividends are taxed 
averagely at 40% and up to 70%. 
.The transaction costs of 
selling shares cannot explain why dividends exist as the corporations can avoid such 
costs by buying back stocks. The dividend changes do not necessarily convey the 
forecasts of company’s prospect. For example, the dividend cut does not indicate the 
future performance will degenerate, favors tax saving for stockholders instead. If a 
corporation omits its dividends, it has less needs of relatively more expensive external 
capital when high quality projects turn up. The assumption that increase in dividends 
hurts creditors is not reliable either because the negotiation mechanism between the 
corporation and creditors can help relief the potential conflict. In conclusion, Black 
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(1976) argues that the corporate policy of paying substantial dividends seems like a 
puzzle.  
The existing literature advances several explanations for this puzzle. Various 
theories stipulate that factors such as taxes, information asymmetries, and contract 
incompleteness determine a firm’s payout decision. The practice of distributing 
dividends may demonstrate that corporate payout policies do matter if the assumptions 
of perfect capital markets are relaxed.  
 
2.3 Information Asymmetry and Dividend Signaling  
2.3.1 Theoretical Models 
As reviewed above, Lintner (1956) suggests that firms have long-term target ratios of 
dividend payout and that dividend changes follow shifts in long run, sustainable levels 
of earnings rather than short-run changes in earnings. This suggests that firms smooth 
their dividends. The implications of this model is that dividends act as a signal of past as 
well as future firm’s prospects. Under the perfect capital market conditions described in 
the Miller and Modigliani (1961) dividend irrelevance proposition, all market 
participants have the same information about the firm, so a firm’s dividend payments 
will have no effect on the value of the firm’s stock. However, the absolute information 
symmetry does not exist in actual markets. The market imperfection of asymmetric 
information is the basis for the signaling theory of dividend policy. MM acknowledged 
that dividend changes influence stock prices and attributed this phenomenon to the 
“information content of dividends.” stating:  
“The dividend change provides the occasion for the price change though not its 
cause, the price still being solely a reflection of future earnings and growth 
opportunities.” While the irrelevance of dividends can hold, the market has good 
reasons to measure the value of stock by taking account of changes in dividends because 
this indeed reveals earning information not previously known to the market. 
Signaling models were first developed in the late 1970s and early 1980s. Akerlof 
(1970) explains the cost of asymmetry information by applying the market for used car 
as a pooling equilibrium in the absence of signaling activities. Next, using a scenario in 
the employment market, Spence (1973, 1974) carries out a formal partial equilibrium 
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analysis of market signaling. Spence’s (1974) signaling model has been extensively 
used by some researchers to study financial models of signaling. Ross (1977) develops a 
formal one-period incentive-signaling model in the context of capital structure; 
assuming that managers have private information about the firm’s future cash flows. 
High-quality firms have an incentive to use leverage, as a signaling device to outsiders 
since increasing leverage brings higher market value with it. At the same time high-
quality firms are capable of supporting a signal in the form of raising leverage. In 
contrast, low-quality firms do not have an incentive to send such a signal because 
managers are aware that a higher debt ratio is not sustainable and will eventually result 
in bankruptcy.  
Bhattacharya (1979) structured a two-period signaling model following Ross’ 
model (1977), showing that under conditions where outsider investors have imperfect 
information about firms’ profitability and the tax rate is higher on cash dividends than 
capital gains, changes in dividends transmit the information of managements’ views on 
future prospects to the market. In this two-period model, at the beginning of the first 
period, the firm announces that it will pay a high-level dividend at the end of this stage 
for relaying management’s confidence in the forthcoming investment. If the project 
cannot realize the expected returns to cover the announced dividend payments during 
the first period, the firm is forced to finance externally to meet the dividend decision. 
After the dividends are paid, part ownership will be transferred to new shareholders who 
receive the payoffs generated by the firm at the end of the second period. Because 
issuing new securities is assumed costly, firms with less favorable investment projects 
will face higher expected financing costs for the same level of dividend payments. The 
transaction cost of new stock issue discourages the low-quality firm to imitate the 
dividend policy adopted by the high-quality firm. In line with Ross (1977), 
Bhattacharya’s model (1979) contains the fundamental argument that dividend payment 
is a costly signal, and thus only good firms can afford to declare them. Therefore, firms 
with pessimistic prospects are not capable of using dividends to imitate such a signal, 
and investors readily bear a higher tax burden associated with dividends because they 
believe that a higher dividend rate puts a premium on firm value for an all equity-
financed firm and the benefits of dividends exceed the tax disadvantage. Other studies 
(Rozeff, 1982; Eades, 1982; Crockett and Friend, 1988) also suggest that firms 
announcing higher dividends have to bear the risk of raising external capital and 
receiving the subsequent monitoring from external financial markets if the actual 
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investment returns are not as good as initially expected.  
On the basis of Ross’s (1977) and Bhattacharya’s (1979) framework of dividend 
signaling, Talmor (1981) developed a multi-period signaling equilibrium model in 
which several valuation parameters are included and in each period different financial 
decisions are determined simultaneously by taking into account both the intrinsic value 
of the firm and a real impact on the firm's cash flow. Talmor show that dividend 
payment plays the role of information device to signal a firm’s future cash flow.  
Hakansson (1982) contributes to the dividend-signaling framework by proposing 
three mutually exclusive conditions under which dividend policy is informative. These 
three conditions include heterogeneous beliefs among investors, an incomplete financial 
market and non-time additive utility. In this model, the informative function of 
dividends is pronounced. Myers and Majluf (1984) posit that insiders have superior 
information about the company’s prospects and an incentive to release this information 
indirectly may be lacking through unexpected changes in dividend policy to convey this 
information to shareholders.  
Miller and Rock (1985) construct a two-period signaling equilibrium model with 
the assumption that the firm’s managers have superior information about the state of 
firm that outside investors do not have. In their model, at time zero firms invest in a 
project, the profitability of which cannot be observed by investors. Investors cannot 
observe either earnings or the new level of investment. At time 1, the project produces 
earnings and the firm uses these to finance its dividend payment and its new investment. 
Financing announcements with respect to earnings, dividends, and other financial 
changes are mutually related under the model’s assumptions. They tie the question of 
dividend payout and external financing to the concept of net dividends, implying that 
both dividends and financing are opposing sides of the same topic. This concept views a 
financing announcement as a negative dividend announcement, while negative values of 
net dividends may be viewed as financing. They state that an unexpected change in 
earnings has the same impact on firm returns as an unexpected change in dividend 
payout. In addition, current dividend payment trends, rather than the dividend itself, are 
the basis of the market’s future earnings projections. Unlike Bhattacharya (1979) in 
which the dissipative cost of signaling is the transaction cost of issuing new stock, In 
Miller and Rock’s (1985) model dead-weight costs arise from a non-optimal investment 




John and Williams (1985) developed a signaling model with multiple equilibria 
in an adverse environment where dividends are taxable. Managers are supposed to 
behave in the interest of current shareholders and possess superior information that 
outside investors do not have, retaining the true status of the firm. Under the framework 
of John and Williams’ signaling model, only shareholders in firms that are sufficiently 
undervalued will benefit enough from their higher fractional ownership to make it 
worthwhile bearing the tax cost of the dividend payment. A “bad” firm will not find it 
profitable to mimic the actions of the “good” firm because shareholders will lose on the 
fractional share retained when the overvaluation is corrected. The model suggests that 
firms expecting higher future operating cash flows optimally pay higher dividends, and 
that the optimal dividend is larger when the tax disadvantage of dividends relative to 
capital gains is smaller. In equilibrium, increased shareholder tax liabilities and 
constrained firm liquidity that arise from paying higher dividends are offset by the 
increase in firm value. Firms with lower cash flow levels are expected to pay lower 
dividends. Dividend payments are costly to shareholders, who must pay tax on them. 
However, there are two benefits: (1) the shareholders sell their shares at a higher price, 
and more importantly (2), the shareholders maintain a larger fraction of the firm’s 
equity.  
John and Williams (1985) provide an answer to the question of why firms pay 
dividends, even when there are alternative methods of distributing cash to shareholders, 
such as share repurchases. They develop a model in which the personal tax disadvantage 
of dividends represents the “cost” of signaling the firm’s future prospects to the market. 
John and Williams’ model explains why firms do not repurchase shares to avoid taxes. 
The signaling tool must be costly. This model can also explain why firms sometimes 
pay dividends and issue new equity securities in the same period. In this case, dividends 
are used to reduce the underpricing of new securities issued to rise outside financing. 
The authors also point out that different tax brackets along with different demands of 
liquidity would induce stockholders to opt for dividends.  
What is the relation between dividends and other information communication 
channels such as earning announcement? Further developing John and Williams (1987), 
Ambarish, John and Williams (1987) analyzed the role of dividends in signaling 
equilibrium and argued that, with the aim of maximizing the shareholder’s wealth, 
optimal signaling equilibrium must minimize the signaling cost through an efficient mix 
of different signal instruments such as dividend policy, earning announcements, 
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investment announcements, share buybacks, and equity issues. There is a trade-off 
between different signaling mechanisms. For example, as long as the cost of paying 
dividends is more than using earning announcements then dividend payment should be 
rejected. Myers (1977) argues that announced dividend policy reflects the managerial 
discretion on future earnings compared with earnings announcements so the market is 
more likely to absorb dividend information rather than earning information as an 
efficient signal. Hausch and Seward (1993) propose that the absolute risk aversion 
conclusively affects firms’ choice between two common forms of cash disbursements: 
dividends and repurchases. They show that the relative cost of a stochastic disbursement; 
repurchases, is lower for firms with decreasing absolute risk aversion since more 
internally generated funds are available. In contrast, the low quality firms prefer to 
choose a deterministic disbursement, dividends, due to their increased risk aversion.  
To sum up, the prominent dividend literature (Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and 
Rock (1985), John and Williams (1985) explains the mechanism by which dividends 
can be utilized by “good” firms to differentiate themselves from “bad” firms. In other 
words, as John and Williams commented, “In a repeated game with reputations, 
dividends might reveal corporate characteristics to outsiders, completely or partially, 
with or without dissipative costs”. Managers of dividend paying firms are confident of 
returning sustaining cash flows to shareholders even though they burden the costs of 
possible external financing, underinvestment and higher tax rate. In contrast, less 
successful firms cannot afford the costs that dividends generate. The investors accept 
dividend payment as a kind of credible signal, ensuring future profitability and stability 
because they believe that managers intentionally choose a costly way of distributing 
surplus cash in order to convey favorable interior information. More importantly, 
corporate managers and investors who bestow a privilege upon dividend payments hold 
the viewpoint that the disadvantage of the dividend can be offset by the increase in 
capital gains in signaling equilibrium. Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) provide an 
innovative approach to looking at the signaling role of dividends. Under their model, 
institutional investors are assumed to prefer dividend-paying stocks because of the 
advantage of dividend tax and the restrictions under prudent man rules. Good firms like 
to pay dividends in order to attract institutional investors who are better informed and 
are more likely to disclose firm quality. Low-quality firms do not like their true firm 
value to be revealed by institutional investors, so they endeavor to avoid dividend 
payments. Therefore, high-quality firms opt for paying dividends to convey information 
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on their value to market by adjusting the investors’ structure. 
2.3.2 Empirical Evidence 
The dividend signaling hypotheses lead to three important implications that have been 
extensively tested in literature (Allen and Michaely, 2003). First, dividend changes 
should be followed by subsequent earnings changes in the same direction. Assuming the 
firm’s investment is given, dividend announcements may convey information about 
current earnings and even about future earnings. On condition that the level of corporate 
earnings has not been completely unveiled, the managerial signaling theory predicts that 
shareholders usually react positively to the announcements of dividend increases and 
initiations, and negatively to the announcements of dividend decreases and omissions. 
Second, unanticipated dividend changes should be accompanied by stock price changes 
in the same direction. The abnormal returns of shareholders can tell us whether the 
market absorbed the information contained in the dividend change. Third, the market 
participants should revise the market’s expectations of future earnings in the same 
direction as the dividend change. The first prediction that earnings changes will follow 
dividend changes is the most fundamental expectation to verify the signaling hypothesis. 
The remaining two predictions concentrate on how the market will react to information 
on dividends and shed more light on the efficiency of informational conveyance. Thus, 
if no evidence about the positive relation between dividend changes and following 
earnings can be obtained, we cannot decide the potential of dividend signaling. 
 
(1) The Relationship between Future Earnings and Dividend Changes 
Researchers have tried to find evidence that dividend increases are reliable signals of 
future earnings increases. Watts (1973) find no significant relationship between current 
unexpected dividend changes and future earnings during the period of 1946-67. 
Gonedes (1978) reaches the same conclusion. Penman (1983) also finds that after 
controlling for management’s future earnings forecast, there was not much information 
conveyed by dividend changes per se. Interestingly, Penman also reports that many 
firms with improved future earnings did not adjust their dividends accordingly.  
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and Benartzi, Grullon, Michaely, and 
Thaler (2002) do not find any significant evidence that dividend changes contain 
information about future earnings growth. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) find a 
42 
 
clear pattern of earnings increases in the two years following the dividend cut, and 
dividend omissions tend to be followed by earnings increases, contrary to the signaling 
hypothesis. Healy and Palepu (1988) find similar results, but Benartzi et al. (1997) also 
find that firms that increase dividends are less likely to experience a decline in future 
earnings than firms that do not increase them, and the year 1 and year 2 earnings 
changes are not statistically influenced by the change in dividends at year 0. Using a 
sample of firms that changed their dividends by more than 10%, Grullon, Michaely and 
Swaminathan (2002) negate the implication of the signaling hypothesis by showing that 
not only do future earnings not continue to increase, but that the level of firms’ 
profitability decreases in the years following announcement of dividend increases.  
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (1996) examined 145 firms whose annual 
earnings growth declined in year zero, after at least nine years of consecutive earnings 
growth. Managers who expect the growth stoppage to be temporary should have strong 
incentives to use dividend increases to assuage investors’ justifiable concerns about 
future earnings. Their test focused on the year zero dividend decision, which could have 
conveyed lot of information to outsiders by helping the market to assess whether the 
decline in earnings was permanent or transitory. They show that dividend changes are 
not useful in predicting future earnings changes, even in situations where signaling 
motives are strong. The dividend-increasing firms did not experience positive earnings 
surprises in subsequent years in absolute terms, and their earnings performance was no 
better than those firms that did not change their dividends. Overall, there was no 
evidence that dividends had provided a useful signal of future earnings. 
The view that dividend announcements convey information about the 
persistence of earnings changes is thus well supported qualitatively, although the 
quantitative impact of dividend increases on earnings persistence remains an open 
question. The results reported by Brickley (1983), Guay and Harford (2000), 
Jagannathan, et al. (2000), Koch and Sun (2004), and Lie (2005a) are consistent with 
this view. Although Brickley (1983) finds significant earnings increases in the year of 
and the year after the dividend increase, his results are not strong in sense of statistics 
because they are likely to suffer from sample selection bias as they are based on only 35 
firms that increased their dividends by more than 20%. Most notably, somewhat more in 
line with the theory are Healy and Palepus’ (1988) results. For their sample of 131 firms 
that initiated dividend payments, earnings had increased rapidly in the past and 
continued to increase for the following two years. However, for their sample of 172 
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firms that omitted their dividends, the results are not in line with what signaling theory 
predicts. Earnings declined in the year in which the omission announcement took place, 
but then improved significantly in the subsequent years. 
Nissim and Ziv (2001) offer yet another look at this problem by showing that 
dividend changes are positively related to earnings changes over a two-year period 
subsequent to the dividend change once “normal” earnings are adjusted for mean 
reversion in reported profits. They add the ratio of earnings to the book value of equity  
as an additional explanatory variable for improving the expectation of earnings. 
Furthermore, they test for robustness by using dividend changes that occur in the first 
quarter of year t+1. The dividend coefficient becomes significant in about 50% of the 
cases when next year’s earning is the dependent variable. When they use the more 
conventional methodology, it is significant in only 25% of the years. 
Grullon, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2005) find that dividend payment is 
not the useful signal of future earnings when normal earnings are estimated using the 
partial adjustment model of Fama and French (2000) rather than a model with a uniform 
rate of mean reversion, such as Nissim and Ziv’s (2001). This conclusion is confirmed 
by Michaely and Roberts (2012) using a sample of UK firms. DeAngelo et al. (2009) 
comment that “Our view is that Grullon et al. (2005)’s conclusion is the more 
reasonable one, and not just because Nissim and Ziv’s findings are not robust to the 
functional form of mean reversion. Simply put, if investors must conduct sophisticated 
statistical analyses of linear versus nonlinear reversion patterns to isolate the signaling 
content of dividend changes, then dividend changes are surely not an effective 
communication device.” Therefore, the overall accumulated evidence does not support 
the assertion that dividend changes convey information about future earnings.  
The relation between dividend changes and the post and current financial 
performance may be more interesting and important for both the corporate finance and 
the market efficiency perspectives. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) point out that, 
according to Lintner (1956), changes in dividends depend on current and past earnings. 
Miller (1987) and Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) support the view that 
dividends are better described as lagging earnings than as leading earnings. Using a 
sample period 1947-1967, Charest (1978) finds an abnormal performance of around 4% 





. Healy and Palepus (1988) find that earnings increase both before 
and after dividends initiation. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) document the 
significant increases in earnings in the years prior to dividend increases and the 
significant decreases in earnings in the years prior to dividend decreases. In addition, 
Garrett and Priestley (2000) provide evidence that dividends convey information about 
positive changes in current permanent earnings rather than future permanent earnings as 
the information of future earnings growth is captured by the changes in lagged stock 
price. Koch and Sun (2004) provide empirical results showing that dividend increases 
are overwhelmingly preceded by earnings increases but by contrast the chance that 
dividend decreases follow earning increases is very low. 
 (2) The Relation between Market Reactions and Dividend Changes 
Early studies lend support to the signaling rationale that the information content of 
dividends is reflected in the movement of stock price, as the announcements of dividend 
increases precede significant price increases and that announcements of dividend 
decreases precede significant price decreases. For example, Pettit (1972) shows that the 
price shifts are observed prior to the announcements of dividends, which was a result of 
market imperfection regarding insiders’ action. Charest (1978) finds that the 
announcement of a dividend increase generates excess returns of about 1%. But his 
study does not necessarily suggest what the information content of dividends is, since it 
does not preclude the effect of contemporaneous earnings announcements. Aharony and 
Swary (1980) overcome this shortcoming; they find that in cases where earnings 
announcements follow dividend announcements, the average abnormal return is 0.36% 
for announcements of dividend increases and -1.13% for dividend decreases. Stock 
prices are positively related to dividend announcements after controlling for 
contemporaneous earnings announcements, indicating that dividend payment conveys 
information that is not entirely contained in published earning information. In addition, 
their study supports the efficient market hypothesis; that dividends provide information 
to stock market and affect stock price. Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) 
investigate a sample that consists of large dividend changes of more than 10% and 
provide supportive results for the dividend signaling model that the average abnormal 
return to dividend increases is 1.34% and the average abnormal market reaction to 
                                                 




dividend decreases is 3.71%. Using the Fama-French three-factor model Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) report three-year significant abnormal returns of 8.3% 
for dividend increases. They did not detect any abnormal performance for dividend-
decreasing firms.  
Not surprisingly, the post-dividend abnormal performance is even more 
pronounced for initiations and omissions. Michaely, Thaler and Womack (1995) 
reported a market-adjusted return of almost 25% in the three years after initiations and a 
negative abnormal return of 15% in the three years after omissions. Assuming that both 
dividend initiations and dividend omissions represent extreme changes in dividend 
policy, stock markets should have more dramatic responses to announcements of 
dividend initiations and dividend omissions than to announcements of dividend 
increases and dividend decreases. Asquith and Mullins (1983) argue that dividends’ 
effects should be most visible at initiation since initial dividends are more likely to be 
unexpected than normal dividend changes. If this is the case, the market reaction on 
announcement day of dividend initiation should fully reflect the effect. Their sample 
consists of firms that did not pay dividends for at least 10 years. The majority of firms 
exhibit a positive market reaction to the announcement of initial dividend. The 2-day 
excess return is +3.7% and t-statistic is 6.59. This result is comparable to the returns 
reported by other studies that focus on dividend initiations. For example, Healy and 
Palepu (1988) report two-day excess returns of 3.9 percent, and Michaely, Thaler, and 
Womack (1995) find three-day excess returns of 3.4 percent. The market apparently 
views the announcement of an initial dividend as good news regarding firms’ future 
prospects. 
Bernheim and Wantz (1995) designed a tax-based method to investigate the 
market reaction to dividend changes. The underlying logic is that during periods when 
the relative taxes on dividends are higher than taxes on capital gains, paying dividends 
is more costly and therefore there should be a larger market reaction to dividend. All 
conditions being equal, when higher taxes are associated with dividends, the signal role 
of dividends is more distinctive. Bernheim and Wantz obtained favourable results for 
the signaling hypothesis in their empirical test. Using robust nonparametric techniques, 
however, Bernhardt, Douglas, and Robertson (2005) do not support the hypothesis of 
dependence between the tax regime and the excess returns associated with a given 
change in dividend signal. The tax-based signaling models cannot explain the dividend 
policy choice of firms. Furthermore, using data from six years before and six years after 
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the Tax Reform Act of 1986, Grullon and Michaely (2002) find that the market 
responded much more positively to dividend increases when dividend taxation was 
lower (after the tax change), a finding that is inconsistent with tax-based signaling 
theories.  
The above empirical results show that the market potentially has an asymmetric 
response to dividend increases and decreases (and for initiations and omissions), which 
implies that lowering dividends carries more informational content than increasing 
dividends, perhaps because reductions are more unusual, or because reductions are of a 
greater magnitude. This argument maybe provides a sensible explanation for Lintner 
(1956); that firms prefer to maintain a relatively stable dividend level and manage to 
avoid cutting dividends. 
 
(3)The Effect of Dividend Changes on the Market’s Expectations for Future 
Earnings  
Different to previous studies that attempt to exploit price reactions to announcements of 
changes in financial policies, Ofer and Siegel (1987) develop analyst forecasts as a 
proxy for market expectations of earning. Using 781 dividend change events, they find 
that either the size of the unexpected dividend change or the change in stock price 
surrounding the announcement help reduce forecast errors for forecasts made before 
dividend announcements.  Consistent with Ofer and Siegel (1987), Denis, Denis, and 
Sarin (1994) find that the median analysts revise forecast of annual EPS following 
dividend changes. However, both these studies fail to eliminate the effect of 
unexamined interim earnings disclosures surrounding dividend announcements, which 
could interfere with the effect of dividend policy. Controlling for the information 
conveyed by current earnings, Carroll (1995) develops a method to examine the role of 
dividend changes in information signaling. The relationship between stock returns and 
earnings forecasts’ errors following dividend announcements shows that dividend 
announcements convey information to the market about earnings in the next quarter and 
the quarter one year after, but are not consistent with dividends revealing new 
information about the variance of future earnings. 
Building up a sample that consists of 429 announcements of dividend change of 
more than 10%, Lang and Litzenberger (1989) conducted an empirical test applying 
analysts’ forecast of future earnings as measurement of market reaction. They find that 
dividend changes do not affect significantly the analysts’ earnings forecasts. These 
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results are inconsistent with the predictions of the cash flow signaling hypothesis. In 
contrast, Yoon and Starks (1995) find that dividend change announcements are 
associated with revisions in analysts' forecasts of current earnings in a manner generally 
consistent with the cash flow signaling hypothesis.  
 
(4) Survey Evidence of Dividend Signaling 
In his field study, Lintner (1956) did not present survey results that showed directly that 
managers consciously use dividend policy to signal future free cash flows to outside 
investors. Almost half a century later, Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) 
documented that there is a lack of support for the notion that managers use dividends as 
a costly signal tool to convey favorable information about asset valuation to the market. 
CFOs emphasized that a comparably more advantageous signal tools than dividend 
announcements are earnings announcements and direct conveyance to other market 
participants. Therefore there appears to be a gap between the managers’ responses and 
the perception in primary dividend signaling models, although  Baker (1999) and Baker, 
Powell and Veit (2002) show that managers of NYSE and NASDAQ accept the 
conception that dividend policy influences the asset valuation and that paying dividends 
signals future earnings prospects. The results of Allen’s (1992) small-sampled survey in 
the US confirmed the dividend signaling mechanism.  
In addition to the US based surveys, there are some surveys about corporate 
executives’ attitude toward managerial signaling hypothesis in other countries. Lasfer 
(1997) inquired into the motivation for paying scrip dividends by UK companies. The 
majority of managers felt that scrip dividends signal future growth in earnings and 
dividend increases. Nevertheless, the large proportion of respondents did not agree the 
payment of scrip dividends increases the market value of firms. Dhanani (2005) 
surveyed the views of British financial managers on corporate dividend policy and 
found evidence for companies utilizing dividend changes, together with other potential 
informational tools, as a signal to convey inside information.  
2.3.3 Summary 
Lintner’s (1956) model implies that dividends act as a signal of past as well as future 
firm’s prospects. Unlike an assumption in Miller and Modigliani (1961), the real 
markets are not perfect actually. One of the examples is that the information sets of 
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various market participants are not balanced. When managers have more inside 
information about a company than outside investors, they can communicate information 
by paying dividends because only high quality firms have the ability to afford the costly 
dividends (Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985). 
In general, the extant literature has not reached a consensus on dividend 
signaling equilibrium (Allen and Michaely, 2003). First, the overall evidence does not 
provide strong support for the assertion that dividend changes convey information about 
future earnings. The absence of positive association between dividend changes and 
future changes in earnings raises serious questions about the validity of the dividend 
signaling models as this relationship is central for dividend signaling. Second, the 
studies on the market reaction to dividend announcements yield results in accordance 
with information signaling hypothesis. That is, stock prices go up (or down) after the 
increases (decreases) in dividends. Stronger price effects are associated with dividend 
initiations and omissions. Third, a great number of empirical tests document that 
analysts revise their predictions on earnings in the same direction with changes in 
dividends, with the exception of Lang and Litzenberger (1989) who find results 
consistent with the investment opportunity hypothesis. Finally, field surveys yield 
relatively mixed empirical results. Therefore, the overall empirical results on dividend 
signaling are not homogeneous.  
Furthermore, dividend signaling can be questionable for the following aspects. 
First, smaller and/or younger firms are more likely to encounter information asymmetry 
(Mougoue and Rao, 2003; Mozes and Rapaccioli, 1995). However, previous empirical 
investigations show that established firms rather than newly listed firms make the 
majority of payouts (Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Skinner, 2004, 
Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008), contradicting the prediction of 
signaling logic. Second, signaling rationale is not appropriate to explain the practices of 
dividend cut and omission. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2009) argue that it is not 
reasonable for managers to use dividend cuts to signal their negative views on future 
performance. Therefore, managerial signaling hypothesis is at best a partial 
interpretation of the corporate dividend policies.  
Nonetheless, previous studies did not negate the hypothesis that dividends carry 
inside information about corporations. Preceding literature shows the evidence that 
dividend policies merely reflect the past and current company performance before 
announcement. In addition, it is possible that the past and current company performance 
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determines the changes in dividends and will continue in the same direction for a period 
after the dividend changes. Moreover, dividend signaling can become more puzzling 
when we consider further potential informational devices. Managers to reinforce or 
undermine other communications such as earning announcements, advertising and 
direct discussion with investors can use dividend policies. For example, when 
examining the market reaction to dividend announcement, researcher must be careful to 
control the effect of earnings announcement. 
 
2.4 Residual Theory 
2.4.1 Theoretical Models 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) point out that a key implication of MM’s (1961) 
dividend irrelevance model is that firms pay out as dividends all cash flows after 
financing all profitable investments. The residual dividend strategy supports flexible 
dividend payouts. In this theory, the dividends are the remaining segment of earnings 
after corporations meet all the project capital needs. In case the future profitable projects 
have not been fully financed with internally generated fund, corporations have the 
options to lessen dividends or pay no cash dividends.  
The attractiveness of residual dividend strategy is to the great degree companies 
may avoid the compelling external financing resulting from executing invariable 
dividend policies in which a portion of cash flows have to be disgorged out regularly 
even if internal funds are not sufficient. In the pecking order theory developed by Myers 
(1984), and Myers and Majluf (1984), there is a financing hierarchy such that firms 
prefer internal finance to external finance and, within external financing, debt finance 
over equity finance, because of transaction, information and monitoring costs. In the 
process of external financing, the value of corporation can be reduced because the 
issuing new stocks will be costly. Fama and French (2002) develop formally a 
prediction that dividends are attractive to firms with profitable investments and less 
growth opportunities because of the tendency to avoid expensive external finance in the 
light of pecking order theory. Moreover, Clatworthy and Peel (2007) suggest that 
companies may be obliged to disclose ‘confidential’ information if they have to raise 
external capital.  
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An issue with respect to residual dividend theory is that it implies that dividends 
must be volatile because both earnings and the capital budgeting vary from year to year. 
This theory implies also that mature companies will pay dividends as they are likely to 
have excess cash given their low investments, and conversely, growth firms will pay 
low or no dividends, as they need to use the cash for investments. While these last two 
implications are not controversial as dividends are found to be negatively related to 
firms’ growth options (e.g., Fama and French, 2001), previous studies show that 
dividends are not volatile but they tend to increase steadily through time and they do not 
follow strictly annual changes in earnings. Under this theory, it is also difficult to 
predict dividends as both earnings and investment needs follow random walks, 
particularly for firms that are not at maturity stage. This is different from the findings of 
Lintner (1956) that firms set long-term payout ratios and pursue dividend 
smoothing. 
However, the residual theory is appealing under the agency theory framework. 
The agency costs hypothesis implies that under the residual theory, dividend payouts 
contribute to firm value, as Jensen (1986) suggests that excessive free cash flow may 
produce agency costs, which will be imposed on shareholders because managers 
possibly do not behave as the best stewards of investors. Surplus funds provide chances 
for managers to spend money without restraint and therefore destroy the assets of firm. 
Jensen’s agency theory based on free cash flow hypothesis leads to the justification that 
firms should pay out all residual cash flow to remove a major source of temptation from 
managers to overinvest and consume excessive perquisites and avoiding the consequent 
value destruction. Easterbrook (1984) suggests that frequent dividend payments force 
firms to finance externally. The investment banker or other creditors will closely look at 
the actual status of the firms when new securities are issued, acting as a monitor for 
their own interests. Paying out dividends help reduce the agent costs since the improved 
monitoring disciplines managers to operate in the way of value-maximizing. Overall, 
agency theory leads to a prediction that disgorging the free cash flow to investors as 
dividends is propitious for reducing agency costs and in turn adding value to firms.  
Moreover, the signaling hypothesis implies that, under the residual theory, a 
payment of dividends can signal a lack of investment opportunities. As results, the 
abnormal return at announcement date will be negative.  
The level of corporate managerial governance may be the other influential factor 
pertaining to residual dividend policy. One hypothesis is that firms with low shareholder 
rights and excess cash are vulnerable to overinvestment problem and will possibly have 
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lower profitability and valuations. In order to prevent poor governance structure from 
being exposed to the market, in high-investor-protection environment, managers should 
spend cash quickly on acquisitions and capital expenditures and then disgorge the 
residuals to shareholders, rather than hoard it. On the contrary, in low-investor-
protection environment, managers would deliberately remain more cash for their own 
interests (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny, 2000).  
Flexible dividends may also serve to optimize firms’ capital structure 
(Megginson, 1997). According to Smith and Warner (1979), leveraged firms are often 
constrained to conduct dividend payments due to debt covenants even in the short run. 
Bradley and Roberts (2004) report that 85 percent of the private debt issues they 
examine have dividend restriction covenant. Lenders are likely concerned with dividend 
payments as the risk they bear will increase as dividend payouts increase.  
2.4.2 Empirical Evidence 
Residual theory of dividends predicts that dividends are affected negatively by 
investment. Consistently, Alli, Khan, and Ramirez (1993) find evidence consistent with 
a negative relation between firm capital expenditures and dividends. Slater and Zwirlein 
(1996) find, within a sample consisting of S&P 400 Industrial Index firms between 
1986 and 1989, that dividend payout is negatively related with investment. However, 
Elston (1996) provides evidence that the relation between dividend and investment 
policy is relatively weak for large U.S. firms from 1975 to 1988. 
Lang and Litzenberger (1989) show that the market reacts to dividend 
declarations in the context of the firm’s investment opportunity set. They use Tobin’s Q 
ratio to measure overinvestment. The argument here is that firms with Q<1 have low 
grow opportunities, thus high agency conflicts (Jensen, 1986), while high Q are high 
growth, low agency conflicts. According to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis, 
dividend increases make overinvestment problem less serious and boost firm value 
accordingly. Therefore, Q<1 firms should have greater abnormal returns on dividend 
announcements than Q>1 firms. The empirical results provided by Lang and 
Litzenberger (1989) are consistent with the overinvestment hypothesis that dividends 
credit to controlling agency problem. During sample period of 1979-1984, the 
difference in the average daily returns at dividend announcement days between Q <1 
firms and Q>1 firms (e.g., (Q<1)-(Q>1)) is 0.8% and p-value is less than 1%. During 
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the alternative sample period of 1982-1984, the difference is 1.79% and significant.  
However, using a larger sample from 1969 to 1988, Yoon and Starks (1995) find 
no evidence that the abnormal return for low-q firms is significantly larger than that of 
high-q firms after controlling for dividend change, dividend yield, and firm size. They 
also find that the capital investments increase (decrease) for three subsequent years after 
dividends increase (decrease), inconsistent with the prediction of free cash flow 
hypothesis. Contrary to Yoon and Starks (1995), Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan 
(2002) report that capital expenditures decrease significantly in the years after large 
dividend increases from 1967 to 1993, suggesting that companies increase their 
dividends when they reach a maturity stage. Fama and French (2001, 2002) provide 
evidence that dividend payouts are more favorably linked with higher profitability and 
less investment opportunities, consistent with the predictions of pecking order theory 
and residual dividend policy. 
Survey studies (Baker and Powell, 1999; Graham and Harvey, 2001; Brav et al., 
2005; Dhanani, 2005) of dividend policy reported relatively more affirmative evidence 
than market data analysis. Most of the respondents, corporate financial managers, 
express the explicit disagreement that dividend is the residual after investment policies 
and financial policies have been made. The main responses state firms maintain a target 
dividend per share or growth rate per share and go to great length to avoid large change 
in dividend policy, especially dividend omission. Only a minority of surveyed firms 
view cash dividends as a residual after funding desired investments from earnings 
(Baker and Smith, 2006). 
2.4.3 Summary 
The residual dividend strategy suggests that the dividend payments are made from the 
equity that remains after all the project capital needs are met. The residual dividend 
strategy has the advantage of avoiding the compelling expensive external financing. 
However, under the residual dividend policy, dividends are volatile. This is different 
from the findings of Lintner (1956) that firms have target payout ratio and prefer stable 
dividend policy. Under the residual theory, a payment of dividends can manifest a lack 
of investment opportunities. As results, abnormal return for the dividend announcement 
is going to be negative. However, on the other hand, dividend payout contribute to firm 





2.5 Agency Costs  
Miller and Modigliani (1961) propose that, in frictionless environment, the choice 
between cash distribution and retention will not affect substantially the firm value, and 
only investment decisions matter. However, in the real world the conflicts of interests 
among managers, stock shareholders and debt holders may hurt the firm value. 
Dividend policy will be relevant if it affects substantially these conflicts of interest.  
Traditional residual theory of dividends suggests that dividends distributed are 
the residual funds after making investment decisions. However, residual theory and free 
cash flow theory are not identical in essence. Free cash flow theory highlights that 
distributing surplus funds will increase firm value by reducing agency costs and. In 
contrast, in light of residual theory, the dividend increases (initiations) indicate 
profitable investment projects are not sufficient and accordingly negative market 
reaction is possible. In the next section, I will discuss the impact of dividends on the 
resolution of agency problem. 
2.5.1 Manager-shareholder Conflict 
The conflicts of interest on the free cash flow may exist between managers and 
shareholders. Jensen and Meckling (1976) explicitly describe the occurring mechanisms 
of agency conflict. As agents, managers are conferred the authority of operating assets 
on behalf of principals (shareholders and/or bankers) with the commitment to maximize 
principals’ wealth. However, in reality managers are not perfect agents as sometimes, 
they are likely to allocate firm’s resources to benefit themselves rather than the 
shareholders or creditors. The manager-shareholder conflict emerges in the agency 
relationship as long as the original inside owner(s) sell off a part of stock shareholdings 
to outside shareholders. As suggested by various previous studies (e.g., Jensen and 
Meckling, 1976), the separation of ownership and control bring about the interest 
collisions. Intuitively, the costs of agency conflict can be measured by the discrepancy 
between the values of firm when the majority of ownership is in the hands of insiders or 
blockholders compared to when ownership is dispersed. In order to minimize the 
incidence of agency conflict and the subsequent loss in fortune, principals can take 
54 
 
preventative measures in pecuniary as well as non-pecuniary means. Jensen and 
Meckling (1976) argue that the activities in solving agency problem incur three kinds of 
costs: the monitoring expenditures17, the bonding expenditures18 and the residual loss19
Rozeff (1982) argues that dividends help address the agency issue of equity. If 
the earned capital does not fluctuate, the regular dividend payouts will force managers 
to raise capital by external financing. Thus, the new capital supplier and existing 
shareholders are accessible to the management genuine intentions. At same time, 
dividend payments increase the transaction cost of raising external capital. Hence, the 
dividend paying firms gain a benefit that is equal to the discrepancy between the agency 
cost borne by shareholders and the transaction cost of reissuance resulting from 
dividend distribution. An optimal dividend policy intends to maximize the sum of 
agency costs and transaction costs of raising external capital.   
. 
In line with Jensen and Meckling (1976) proposition, Easterbrook (1984) claims 
that one form of agency cost is the monitoring of managers, and the other is the risk 
aversion of managers who are inclined to bypass risky projects with higher expected 
returns because their personal wealth is usually in combination with companies’ 
performance. They will be encountering punishments like redundancy if the risks 
become out of control. While shareholders would like the managers to take risks so as 
to expand profit margin, creditors would have the opposite preference because they bear 
the large part of incremental risk but will not share the profits. Easterbrook specify why 
dividends payments help alleviate both agency costs. For the monitoring cost, 
Easterbrook proposes an argument similar to Rozeff (1982) that dividends create a 
comparable pressure on managers who are compelled to issue new securities when 
internal funds are distributed as dividends. In the process of external capital sourcing, 
investment bankers 20
                                                 
17The principal can limit divergences from his interest by establishing appropriate incentives for the agent and by incurring 
monitoring costs to limit the aberrant activities, of the agent.   
 and other relevant capital market participants (e.g. securities 
exchanges and capital suppliers) will actively monitor managers’ behavior for 
shareholders’ interests. For this reason, dividends essentially reduce indirectly the cost 
associated with monitoring. For the issue of risk aversion, Easterbrook argues that the 
firm may adjust the debt-equity ratio by issuing new equity and thus the conflicts of 
18 In addition, in some situations it will pay the manager to expend resources (bonding costs) to guarantee that he will not take 
certain actions, which would harm the principal, or to ensure that the principal will be compensated if he does take such actions.   
19 The dollar equivalent of the reduction in welfare experienced by the principal due to this divergence is also a cost of the agency 
relationship, and it is referred to as the “residual loss”. 
20 The monitoring role of investment bankers in new equity issues has been stipulated by Bhagat (1986), Smith (1986), Hansen and 
Torregrosa (1992) and Jain and Kini (1999). 
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interests between debt holders and equity holders can be controlled accordingly. For 
instance, if firms disgorge cash raised from equity issuance, then the integral risk drops 
and as a result managers are more likely to undergo risk.  
Jensen’s (1986) developed the free cash flow hypothesis that can be seen as “a 
minor variant of the agency argument” discussed in the previous section. (Frankfurter, 
Wood, 2003, P101) Under this theory, managers may find it easier to pursue their self-
goals when the firm has surplus cash after financing all projects with positive net 
present value. The possible selfish activities range from spree spending to thoughtless 
expansion (e.g. invest in negative NPV project). Dividend payments are beneficial to 
sort out the activity of adverse selection by cutting down the free cash flows that are 
available for managers. In this sense, dividend payouts act as a statutory discipline upon 
managers. Grossman and Hart (1980), Easterbrook (1984) and Stulz (1990) put similar 
arguments based on freed cash flow hypothesis forward. Free cash flow hypothesis 
contradicts MM’s irrelevancy proposition, suggesting that corporate dividend policy 
and investment policy are interacted.  
Free cash flow hypothesis implies that the cash-abundant companies without 
many growth opportunities are more likely to confront overinvestment problem. Lang 
and Litzenberger (1989) and Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) provide the 
favorable evidence that firms that increase dividend experience decreasing investment, 
consistent with free cash flow hypothesis. They find that capital expenditures 
substantially decline in the years after large dividend increases suggesting that firms 
that increase dividends reached maturity as they experience decline in investment 
opportunity. However, Howe, He and Kao (1992) provide evidence that price responses 
surrounding tender offer, share repurchase and special dividend announcements are not 
statistically different for both high-Q and low-Q firms. Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994) 
built up a large sample which includes 6777 events of large dividend change from 1962 
to 1988. When controlling for the magnitude of dividend change and dividend yield, 
Tobin’s Q has no significant effect on the abnormal returns of announcement period. In 
addition, for the firms with Tobin’s Q less than unit, capital expenditures increase after 
dividend increase but decrease after dividend decreases. Similarly Yoon and Starks 
(1995) built up a large sample consists of 4179 large dividend changes over the period 
of 1969–1988. Slightly different from Denis, Denis and Sarin (1994), Yoon and Starks 
(1995) add firm size as explanatory variable into their regression model. The results 
show that the price reactions to announcements of dividend increase are statistically 
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indifferent between firms with Q<1 and firms with Q>1. Yoon and Starks also argue 
that the investment information is not revealed at the time of dividend announcements 
as the capital expenditure changes forwards the same direction of dividend changes over 
the 3 years after dividend announcements. However, they show that low Q firms have 
higher dividend levels than high Q firms, consistent with the excess fund hypothesis.  
Lie (2000) applied cross-sectional regressions to examine the effect of the 
investment opportunities on the announcement period returns for all disbursements 
including special dividends, regular dividend increases (greater than 10%) and self-
tender offers. For self-tender offers and large special dividends, the coefficients of the 
interaction variable between cash levels and indicator of low growth opportunity are 
significantly positive. This indicates at least partial cause of cash payouts may be 
attributable to overinvestment problem. However, there is no evidence that agency costs 
of free cash flows are able to explain the fund distributions in the form of regular 
dividend increases and small special dividends. Thus, under the logic of Lang and 
Litzenberger’s (1989), free cash flow hypothesis can be at best partially approved. In 
particular, regular dividend increases and small special dividends appear to have no 
correlation with agent conflicts. Consistent with residual theory, the firms that 
announced incremental cash distribution generally have sufficient funds. One more 
contributable finding is that temporary funds support both special dividends and tender 
offers but permanent funds support regular dividend increases.  
The above empirical tests that apply Tobin’s Q as a measure of investment 
opportunities do not support Lang and Litzenberger’s (1989) conclusion. Yoon and 
Starks (1995) discuss the question as to whether Tobin’s Q is a good proxy of 
overinvestment. The choice of cut-off points of Tobin’s Q, which discriminate high-Q 
and Low-Q firms, can be subjective, but this can be alleviated by examining directly the 
changes in capital expenditures.21
2.5.2 Shareholder-creditor Conflict 
  
The management’s choice of dividend decisions will be influenced by both the 
management-shareholder conflict and the shareholder-creditor conflict. If a firm’s 
surplus fund is distributed to its shareholders in the form of dividends, then possible 
                                                 
21 This method is originally applied by Lindenberg and Ross (1981). Lang and Litzenberger define a value-maximizing firm as one 
with a one-year q greater than unity, while Lang, Stulz, and Walkling (1991) define a high-q firm as one with a three year average q 
greater than one. 
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profitable projects may be missed out and the debt providers bear the increasing 
bankrupt risk. Jensen and Meckling (1976) suggest that creditors can arrange bond 
covenants to discipline managerial behaviors that would reduce the value of bonds. For 
example, Kalay (1982b) find that firms held significantly more cash or cash equivalents 
than the minimum they are allowed to hold. A debt covenant will prefer high-level cash 
retention. Myers (1977) also argues that it is common for a bond covenant to regulate 
debt-financed dividends. These two studies refer to the concept of wealth expropriation, 
which means that dividend payment serves as a device to transfer wealth from debt 
holders to shareholders. If the presence of wealth expropriation effects, an increase in 
dividends will lead to an increase in equity prices but a decreases in bond prices. These 
predictions under the wealth expropriation hypothesis contradict the expectations under 
the dividend signaling and agency theories under which both share and bond prices will 
increase when firms announce an increase in their dividends.   
However, this wealth expropriation hypothesis is debatable considering that 
firms are not likely to weaken their prestige in return for a limited benefit acquired by 
transferring debt holders’ wealth to shareholders. In addition, previous studies argue 
that the existence of various debt covenants effectively prevents managers from issuing 
debts to finance dividends or to give up investments in positive NPV projects. Previous 
studies also provide weak evidence on the wealth expropriation hypothesis. For 
example, Handjinicolaou and Kalay (1984) find that bond prices fall after the dividend 
decrease and do not change after those dividend increases. Thus, according to prior 
analysis, this finding challenges the wealth expropriation. Allen and Michaely (2003) 
label the finding of DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990), that firms in financial distress are 
reluctant to cut dividends, as the sole favorable evidence for the wealth expropriation 
hypothesis. They argue that not cutting dividends may constitute a significant wealth 
transfer from debt holders to equity holders. However, this assertion is still questionable 
since DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) report that more than half of their firms are 
forced to cut dividend by loan covenants. Therefore, the issue is still an open question.  
2.5.3 Corporate Governance and Agency Cost 
Shareholder rights and legal environment as well as miscellaneous corporate 
governance mechanisms involving managerial and block-holder ownership, 
compensation, and board structure may influence a firm’s dividend policy either 
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externally or internally. One manifestation is that the firms with high level of free cash 
flow and lower managerial governance will have the tendency to incur overinvestment 
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976 and Richardson 2006).  
LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (2000) conducted an empirical 
cross-sectional investigation involving more than 4000 firms across 33 countries. They 
document that firms in common law countries where minority investors have higher 
production are more desirable to disgorge cash dividends, in comparison to those in 
civil law countries. An additional finding is that firms in countries with superior 
legislation protection empirically commit lower dividend payouts if they are in high 
growth rate. The combination of these findings indicates that investors take advantage 
of better law protection to force the management to return surplus funds and to isolate 
from agency problem they impose. For example, if corporate executives want to 
expropriate individual investors’ wealth and refuse to increase dividends, shareholders 
have the right to deny this decision or immediately use voting power to change the 
management. The results refute the alternative hypothesis in which the managers 
intentionally make dividend payouts in order to establish the reputation in capital 
markets, which will be beneficial for raising future capital or maintaining high stock 
prices. LLSV (2000) demonstrate, at country-level, the well-managed firms are more 
likely to pay higher dividends relative to firms whose outside investors are not protected. 
Highly efficient legal system ought to be helpful for investors to tackle the agency 
problem by forcing managers to pay dividends.  
Similarly, Mitton (2004) use a sample that consists of 365 firms from 19 
emerging markets, to examine how dividend policy links with corporate governance 
both at country-level and at firm level. The indicator for country-level protection is the 
type of legal systems. Consistent with the conclusion of LaPorta et al. (2000), the results 
of Mitton (2004) show that firms in common law countries pay high dividend. In 
addition, firms with better firm-specific corporate governance pay higher dividends. 
Eije and Megginson (2008) and Denis and Osobov (2008) provide also additional 
evidence consistent with “outcome hypothesis”. 
Gompers et al. (2003) find firms with stronger corporate governance are 
associated with a range of mature characteristics such as larger firm size, higher 
profitability and lower capital expenditures. In line with Fama and French (2001), the 
mature firms tend to pay higher dividends. Combining Gompers et al. (2003) and Fama 
and French (2001), there should be a positive relation between corporate governance 
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and level of dividend. 
Faccio, Lang, and Young (2001) explore the issue of expropriation of minority 
investors by controlling shareholders from the perspective of dividend policy, using a 
sample of 3,294 Western European firms and 2,603 Eastern Asian firms. They argue 
that miscellaneous factors may have an impact on controlling shareholders’ 
expropriation. Faccio et al (2001) use the ratio of controlling shareholder’s ownership to 
control rights (O/C) to measure the possibility of insider expropriation. The lower value 
of O/C means that the controlling shareholders have greater chance to benefit 
themselves at the expense of outside investors’ benefits. Dividends can be used to 
address this problem. If controlling shareholders are motivated by the low O/C to invest 
in suboptimal projects in order to expropriate minority shareholders’ wealth, low 
dividends are expected to be paid because more resources will be under the control of 
insiders. Their results imply that investors will require higher dividends to remove the 
resources which may be wasted only if they essentially worry about the expropriation.  
Jiraporn and Ning (2006) present results that support the “substitute 
hypothesis”,in which dividend payout serves as a substitution of shareholder rights, i.e., 
the inclination to pay higher dividends is greater when shareholder protection is weak, 
intending to build up the reputation of management. They argue that the divergence 
between their results and the finding of LaPorta et al. (2000) is due to the fact that their 
test on dividend policy is limited to solo legal system rather than multiple legal systems. 
This sample sources from Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) for 1993, 
1995, 1998, 2000, and 2002 when the data on corporate governance is available. 
Jiraporn and Ning follow Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and use “Governance 
Index (GINDEX)” as proxy of the level of shareholder protection. The higher GINDEX 
means that shareholder rights are predicted more heavily by regulation.  
Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) provide US experience that firm value is 
negatively influenced by weaker governance structures, especially when firms held high 
excess cash holdings. Weaker governance is meant to lower stockholder rights with 
which the firm may suffer agency costs largely. This finding is in line with Jensen’s 
(1986) hypothesis that managers could squander surplus funds when free cash flow is 
ample and consequently firm value is destroyed. Harford, et al. (2008) further discuss 
that in environments with good shareholder protection like the US, weakly controlled 
managers do not want to draw the attention of shareholders to their inferior governance 
due to high cash balances. The managers may also recognize that in some instances 
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others could use the large cash hoard to self-finance corporate control actions against 
them. This inference leads to a prediction of negative association between corporate 
governance and dividends. 
2.5.4 Managerial Ownership and Agency cost 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that the increasing managerial ownership contributes 
to solve the cost of “separation of ownership and control”. When managers own limited 
shareholdings and the remaining shareholders do not have sufficient voting power, 
managerial entrenchment may occur in various forms. The greater fraction of shares 
owned by management means that the non value-maximum practices are 
disadvantageous to managers. Thus, managerial ownership aligns the interest of 
managers and that of outside investors. Barclay, Smith and Watts (1995) also hold the 
viewpoint that corporate insider ownership reduces significantly the severity of 
overinvestment problems. As presented in section 2.4.1, Rozeff (1982), Eastbrook 
(1984) and Jensen (1986) suggest that corporate dividend policy plays a role in 
overcoming the agency costs of firms. The following question is how the two corporate 
governance mechanisms are related. The current theoretical models and empirical 
evidence are mixed. 
Using insider ownership as an indicator of the agency costs, Rozeff (1982) build 
up a multi-factor model in which growth rates, systematic risk level, the population of 
shareholders are jointly explanatory variables and hypothesize that dividend payout and 
managerial ownership are substitutes Under Rozeff’s framework, Chen and Steiner 
(1999) include voting rights, risk taking, and capital structure as explanatory variables. 
They find that management ownership and dividends are substitute mechanisms aimed 
at reducing agency costs. In addition, some later studies (Crutchley and Hansen, 1989; 
Agrawal and Jayaraman, 1994; Mahadwartha, 2007) suggest that dividend payout and 
managerial ownership are substitutes if the main purpose of paying dividends is to deal 
with the agency issue. These arguments suggest that managerial ownership should 
exhibit a negative relation to dividend policy because these two mechanisms are 
substitutes not complementary. Consistent with these findings, Moh’d et al. (1995) 
document that larger managerial ownership leads to lower dividend payout ratios. 
Similarly, Collins, Saxena and Wansley (1996), Dempsey and Laber (1992), Crutchley 
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and Hansen (1989), and Eckbo and Verma (1994) provide further support for Rozeff’s 
(1982) assertion.  
Nevertheless, the evidence that is not consistent the substitute assumption 
(Rozeff, 1982) can be found in other theoretical models and empirical investigations. 
Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that the external 
monitoring forces will have very low effect on insiders when managers control 
corporate stockholdings to some substantial extent  Thus, it is possible that dividend 
policy may convert to have a positive relation with managerial ownership should inside 
managers hold overwhelming stakes because in such circumstance dividends might be 
employed as a external discipline for purpose of adding firm value.Likewise, Fenn and 
Liang (2001) argue that the higher proportion of shares retained by managers will 
encourage more dividends to be distributed.  Fenn and Liang imply that managers 
would refuse high dividends which determine their control over the company when 
managerial ownership is low. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) manifest that the enhanced 
monitoring will lead to higher dividend payouts according to Jesen’s (1986) free cash 
flow hypothesis. As such, the assumption on the contrary to Rozeff (1982) is that there 
is a complementary relationship between directors’ stock ownership and dividends 
payout in respect of reducing agency costs.  
Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) propose an interesting argument that the 
relation between managerial ownership and firm performance is not linear. In other 
words, the increasing proportion of managerial shareholdings will not be bound to 
stimulate managers to maximize firm value for shareholders. They find that at medium 
levels (between 5% and 25%), insider ownership increases drive the managers’ interests 
to the opposite direction of stockholders’ interests. Following the idea of Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Schooley and Barney (1994) suggest a non-monotonic 
relationship between the dividend payout ratio and managerial ownership. Replicating 
the original Rozeff (1982) model, Casey and Dickens (2000) investigate the relationship 
between dividends and managerial ownership using a sample of US firms covering 
1982–1992. They find that insider ownership is not significant in explaining dividend 
levels. Hu and Kumar (2004) also find that managerial ownership does not have 
significant effect on dividend payout ratios once the factor of firm size is added into the 
model. Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) find that given executive directors’ personal 
wealth is associated with shareholdings, dividend payout is needed to diversify personal 
portfolio and meet individual consumption.  
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2.5.5 Institutional Shareholders Ownership and Agency Cost 
The traditional dividend models predict that large shareholders ownership has positive 
relation with corporate dividend payments. One argument is that large investors (e.g. 
pension funds) normally prefer dividend income to capital gains due to their favorable 
tax rate on dividends. That is, low-taxed or tax exempted institutional investors are 
expected to select dividend paying stocks, while high-taxed individuals will avoid them. 
Allen, Bernardo and Welch (2000) assume that firms pay dividends in order to attract 
large and well-informed investors (e.g. institutions) who are taxed at lower rate and are 
assumed to have greater ability to discipline the managerial activities. Therefore, higher 
percentage of institutional participation means better management monitoring, and 
therefore reduces agency costs and increases firm value. The other argument is that 
powerful blockholders such as insurance company may compel management to take 
progressive dividend policies aiming to improve monitoring (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; 
Zeckhauser and Pound, 1990). Dividend policy is an indirect approach of monitoring, is 
less costly, and more effective in certain environment. Moreover, for US market, the 
other plausible motivation for institutions to own shares with dividend payment is the 
“prudent man” regulations (e.g., ERISA adopted in 1974), as argued by Brav and 
Heaton (1998). 
The alternate governance mechanism is that block holders, who have strong 
voting positions or board representations, possess the advantage to monitor the 
managers’ activity compared to small shareholders. Therefore, the existence of outside 
block holders constitutes a substitute for dividends as a device to reduce the agency 
costs. Consistent with this hypothesis, Warther (1993) proposes a “sleeping dogs” 
theory in which managers set appropriate dividend level to pacify outside disperses 
investors with the aim to avoid external interference towards business operations. 
Zwiebel (1996) and Myers (2000) echo the “sleeping dogs” model. This scenario will 
disappear if shareholders are large enough to exert strong monitoring power on firms’ 
operations. Under this line of reasoning, there will be a negative relationship between 
the need to pay dividends and the proportion of outside block holders.   
Overall, the empirical evidence provided to date on the impact of large 
shareholders ownership on dividend policy is mixed. Eckbo and Verma (1994) report a 
significant positive impact of both relative ownership and voting power of institutional 
shareholders and managers on dividend policy. Moh’d et al. (1995) show that higher 
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dividend payout is linked with larger institutional ownership, in line with Shleifer and 
Vishny (1986) that dividends compensate the monitoring activities of the large 
shareholders. Dhaliwal et al. (1999), on the other hand, report that dividend initiators 
experience an average 5.7% increase in institutional share ownership, versus a 1.5% 
increase for matched firms that do not initiate dividends. Binay (2001) also reports 
dividend initiations (omissions) cause significant increase (decline) in institutional 
ownership. However, using UK based panel data consists of 211 firms through 1988 to 
1992, Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) report a significant positive relation between 
dividend policy and institutional ownership. They suggest that the preferential tax 
treatment given to institutional shareholders in the United Kingdom. Hotchkiss and 
Lawrence (2007) show that institutional investors increase the percentage of shares as 
dividend increases owing to tax clientele. In contrast, Hu and Kumar (2004) find that 
the likelihood of dividend payments and dividend yields have negative relation with the 
fraction of total shares owned by the largest outside shareholders. Goergen et al. (2005) 
find, amongst German firms, a negative relationship between the control power and the 
need of using dividend policy as monitoring measure. Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2008) analyze a large panel of U.K. firms for the 1990s and present results in line with 
Rozeff (1982) who argues that the impact of the voting power of shareholder coalitions 
on the payout ratio is consistently negative. Khan (2006) uses panel data consisting of 
330 listed UK firms over 1985-1997 to show that ownership concentration has a 
negative impact on dividends and certain institutions like insurance companies rather 
than individuals prefer dividends, suggesting that dividends can substitute for the 
monitoring of concentrated ownership  and investors who have large voting power may 
force firms to pay dividends. Jain (2007) also provides evidence that institutional 
investors have greater likelihood to own non-dividend paying stocks or low dividend 
paying stocks while non-institutional investors prefer to hold dividend-paying stocks or 
high dividend paying stocks. However, using on US data, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
show that dividend payouts are not a substitute of ownership as monitoring device, 
since there is no significant difference in dividend levels between firms with and 
without block shareholders. In addition, a number of empirical studies (Richardson et al. 
1986; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack 1995; Brav and Heaton 1998; Grinstein and 
Michaely, 2005 and Hoberg and Prabhala, 2008) offer evidence that dividend policy 
64 
 
does not have a pressing role in explaining changes in ownership22
2.5.6 Stock Options and Agency Cost 
. Brav et al. (2005) 
provide survey evidence that supports practitioners’ wisdom that individual 
stockholders prefer dividends to capital gains and, more importantly, that supports the 
view that the demands of particular clienteles do not have a major influence on 
corporate payout policies.  
Stock option plan as a performance-based incentive encourages managers to work in the 
interest of shareholders. It grants the executives a right to buy some stock shares at a 
fixed exercise/ strike price for a specified term. While the literature (Mehran, 1992; 
Carpenter and Sanders, 2002; Yermack, 1996) focuses on the bearing between stock 
options and firm value，the studies connecting executive stock options to a firm’s 
dividend policy are limited. On condition that managers are granted stock options, then 
the interests of managers and individual stockholders are bonded. As a result, agency 
costs will be minimised. In addition, in order to boost stock prices, managers will prefer 
to invest in positive NPV projects rather than pay dividends to shareholders. 
Lambert, Lanen, and Larker (1989) find that dividends decline relative to 
expected levels after the adoption of executive option plans. Similarly, studies by Hu 
and Kumar (2004) and Bhattacharyya et al. (2008) report a negative relation between 
stock options and dividend payments. Consistent with Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 
(1989), Weisbenner (2000), and Allen and Michaely (2003) argue that the growing 
popularity of executive stock options may create an incentive to pay fewer dividends in 
that executive stock options are not “dividend protected”. Instead, corporate decision 
makers tend to distribute more cash in the form of repurchases and to avoid stock 
dilution resulting from the exercise of stock options. Similar to Lambert et al. (1989), 
Fenn and Liang (2001) empirically examine this relationship by large sample covering 
1993–1997 and report a strong negative relationship between dividends and 
management stock options. Further, Fenn and Liang find a statistically significant, 
positive relationship between repurchases and management stock options. The results 
                                                 
22Richardson et al. (1986) only find minor trading volume changes after dividend initiations. Michaely et al. (1995) observe 
“relatively minor” trading volume changes following both initiations and omissions, and dividend omissions are associated with a 
small average increase (from 30.0% to 30.9%) in institutional ownership, whereas a sharp decline should have occurred if dividends 
were essential to make the stock attractive to these investors. Brav and Heaton (1998) fail to find statistically significant decline in 
quantity of institutional investors after dividend omissions. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) find that while institutions tend to avoid 
holding stock in firms that pay no dividends, firms that increase dividends do not attract greater institutional ownership. Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2008) find that institutional ownership does not significantly change after dividend increases. 
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explain why managers with substantial levels of stock options prefer to make stock 
repurchases at the expense of cash dividends. 
2.5.7 Summary 
Corporate dividends reduce agency costs due to either increasing the external 
monitoring or lessening extra cash flows available to managers that could be wasted for 
private interests (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984; Jensen, 
1986). Dividend payments force firms to raise funds externally to finance new 
investments, which in turn increase the level of external monitoring of corporate 
activities. By returning free cash flows to shareholders, dividend payments reduce the 
opportunity of managers to make sub-optimal investments.  
Agency rationale sheds light on the link between dividend policy and corporate 
governance. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Richardson (2006) argue that firms with 
high level of free cash flow and lower managerial governance will have the tendency to 
overinvest. In respect of the relation between between dividend policy and corporate 
governance, LaPorta et al. (2000) propose the “outcome model” suggesting that better 
protected investors can require corporate insiders to pay dividends in order to reduce 
agency costs. LaPorta et al. (2000) also propose the “substitute model” suggesting that 
the companies with substantial moral hazard intentionally pay dividends to investors 
who are not well protected by law in order to establish a reputation for future external 
financing.  
It is controversial in literature about whether dividends and corporate 
governance are substitutes or complements. Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend payout 
and directors’ ownership can be viewed as substitutes for mitigating agency conflicts 
and predicts that firms pay higher dividends when insiders hold a lower fraction of 
equity. This logic is similar to the “substitute model” proposed by LaPorta et al. (2000). 
Jensen’s (1986) substitution notion suggests that debt and dividends can be substitutes 
for reducing agency costs. Some recent studies (e.g. Jiraporn and Ning, 2006; Officer, 
2006) are consistent with the notion that dividend payments and corporate governance 
can be substitutes. 
In contrast, Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that owner-managers as stock investors 
will benefit from dividend disbursement which might act as a performance-enhancing 
incentive. Thus, the argument of Fenn and Liang (2001) is similar to “outcome model” 
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of LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that strong corporate governance leads to higher 
demand of dividend payouts. For the other example, Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) 
argue that institutional investors with strong voting power may oblige companies to 
increases dividends to move away free cash flow from managers. 
 
2.6 Life Cycle Hypothesis 
2.6.1 Theoretical Model 
Firms have their own life cycle. Premised on Knight (1921) and Schumpeter (1934), 
Mueller (1972) proposed a formal life cycle theory. The start-up stage can be difficult 
for a fresh firm because of the existing market threshold. The limited initial resources 
must be invested into product development, marketing and organization. After the start-
up stage, the firm will reach a high-growth stage during which it expands customers and 
exploits the market potential. Firms will eventually reach a point at which they progress 
from a high growth period to a so called ‘maturity period’. With increasing market 
competition, profitable investment opportunities become absent and the growth rate 
declines.  
These characteristics associated with a firm normally vary over its life cycle and 
dividend polices at different points in time are adjusted by managers correspondingly. 
In an early period, a newly listed firm, recently entered into the stock market has plenty 
of growth opportunities but at same time, its profitability is relatively low and volatile. 
Meanwhile, the cost of capital of young firms is relatively higher due to the severer 
information asymmetry. Thus, the best financial strategy for a newly established 
company is to retain earnings rather than to distribute them immediately. When the firm 
matures, its investment opportunity set begins to shrink due to the more competitive 
market environment. Simultaneously, the growth rate of assets slows down and the 
systematic risk set has dropped, but the earning capacity increases. As a result, the 
quantity of accumulated cash flow exceeds the capital demand. It is unsurprising that a 
firm in a mature stage has the capability to return surplus cash in the form of dividend 
payments to shareholders.  
Jensen’s (1986) agency theory of free cash flow provides a reasonable 
explanation for the dynamics suggested by the lifecycle proposition. In the early stage, 
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the agency costs are not substantial since it is assumed that managers are less likely to 
pursue their own interests at the expense of profitable investments. When the 
corporation reaches the maturity stage, the accumulated surplus capital causes an 
increase in agency costs, which can consequently reduce firm value. To mitigate the 
agency costs, mature firms reach a position to initiate or increase dividends so that stock 
price will be protected. In other words, a young firm can be more efficient in utilizing 
capital than an established firm, as the need to pay dividends is weak and vice versa. 
Previous studies relating to the life-cycle theory of dividends (Fama and French, 
2001; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006) 
suggest that corporate decision makers design dividend policy by taking into account 
the trade-off between the benefit, (e.g., reduction in agency costs of free cash flow) and 
cost of cash flow distribution (e.g., floating cost due to dividends). In addition, a firm is 
subject to different levels of capital cost at different points in its life cycle. A young 
firm has a relatively high cost of external capital for to two reasons. First, investors have 
less information about a newly listed firm, so information asymmetry tends to be 
material. Second, a young firm is in great need of cash infusion and its internal funds 
are limited. As the firm becomes more mature, the information asymmetry is less severe 
and the cost of external capital drops. These arguments suggest that a firm in its 
maturity stage faces increasing agency cost as well as lower cost of external capital, and 
therefore, paying dividends is preferential. 
The prediction of the signaling theory of dividend policy is seemingly opposite 
to that of investment opportunities and supply of cash flow. A young firm should have 
stronger motivation to address the issue of information asymmetry because of its limited 
communication with the market participants. In contrast, a mature firm should have 
already set up efficient channels to communicate with outside investors. Thus, if 
dividend payment is a tool to convey information from insiders to outside investors, 
newly listed firms have a greater need to pay dividends than mature firms do. 
The predictions of the dividend residual theory are in line with the implications 
of the lifecycle hypothesis. Both theories emphasize that rational management will meet 
the requirement of investment in the first place and only distribute the remaining cash 
after investments are undertaken. As DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) pointed out that 
satisfying the positive NPV projects is the fundamental principle of MM’s (1961) 
irrelevancy proposition. The most obvious discrepancy between the life cycle theory 
and dividend residual theory is that the former explains the time profile of dividend 
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policies by dynamic means. The residual cash flows after undertaking available 
investments vary at different time along life cycle of firms due to the time-changing 
growth opportunities. In other words, the residual theory leads to opportunities-induced 
and time-varying dividend strategy. 
2.6.2 Empirical Evidence 
The important empirical evidence presented by Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan 
(2002) suggests that the systematic risk firmly declines (increase) during the post period 
of dividend increase (decrease). This finding features an alternate discrepancy between 
mature firms and high-growth firms. The appreciation of stock prices after the dividend 
increase further indicates that the market categorizes firms that increase dividends as 
ones with relatively lower systematic risk. Besides, this study provides support to 
Lintner’s (1956) argument of dividend smoothing which suggests that firms are unlikely 
to set high target payout ratios until the earning level can persist. Fama and French 
(2001) conduct an analysis of dividend policies across all US listed firms. They suggest 
that the decrease in the proportion of dividend payers is partly the result of the 
increasing number of firms with small size, low profitability and high growth. This 
suggests that firms at their initial stage are reluctant to undertake progressive dividend 
decisions. Although they argue that the propensity to pay dividends still goes down 
even if they control for these characteristics of firms, their study provides some support 
for the life cycle hypothesis. DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006) employ a mix of 
earned/contributed capital as a logical proxy for the extent to which a firm matures, and 
provide additional evidence for the life cycle theory of dividend policy. In their test, the 
ratio of retained earnings to total equity (RE), and the ratio of retained earnings to total 
assets (TA) are measures of the maturity of firms.  
When firms are in a stage of absorbing external capital, values of RE/TE 
(RE/TA) tend to be low. When firms mature, the values of RE/TE (RE/TA) tend to be 
high, as internal cash flows are accumulated and self-financing ability is intensified. 
They find that the propensity of dividend distribution is influenced significantly by the 
ratio of internal capital to the external capital after controlling for traditional firm 
characteristics, cash flow and dividend history. More recently, Denis and Osobov (2008) 
conduct an international empirical investigation involving six economies: United States, 
United Kingdom, Japan, Canada, Germany and France. They find that the “earned 
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contributed capital mix” explains strongly the inclined propensity of paying dividends. 
Although the findings of Bulan, Subramanian, and Tanlu (2007) and Eije and 
Megginson (2008) are compatible with life cycle theory of dividends, there is no 
evidence that the mix of earned/contributed capital affects dividend decisions. 
2.6.3 Summary 
 Fama and French (2001), Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002), and DeAngelo 
and DeAngelo (2006) suggest that corporate decision makers design dividend policy by 
taking into account the trade-off between the benefit, (e.g., reduction in agency costs of 
free cash flow) and cost of cash flow distribution (e.g., floating cost due to dividends). 
In light of life cycle theory, changes in dividends reflect the variability of growth 
opportunity and free cash flows. Firms in the early stages of their life cycles prefer 
reinvest into profitable projects to distribute dividend payments. Firms are likely to pay 
dividends when they reach matures stages of life cycles in term of profitability and 
growth opportunities. Overall, the empirical evidence is consistent with the implications 
of the firm life cycle theory of dividends. 
 
2.7 Catering Hypothesis 
2.7.1 Theoretical Model 
Compared with the traditional rationality assumptions, behavioral corporate finance is 
potentially more realistic, in that it emphasizes that both investor and managerial 
behaviors are less than fully rational. In practice, corporate payout policy can be 
influenced by the irrational actions of managers and/or investors (Barberis and Thaler, 
2003 and Baker et al., 2007b).  As argued by LaPorta et al. (2000), corporate dividend 
policy may be substantially shaped by investor preferences in common law countries, in 
which legal systems provide strong investor rights.  In civil law countries, where 
investor protection is weak, managerial motivations are likely to dominate the tendency 
of paying dividends, while investor preferences at best play an ancillary role in 
corporate payout decisions. 
Shefrin and Statman (1984) originally established a behavioural dividend theory 
explaining why individual investors prefer dividend-paying stocks to non-dividend-
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paying stocks. This model assumes that three psychological considerations account for 
demands for dividends. Firstly, investors may be prone to employ regular cash dividend 
payment as a “self-control” device for their private consumption. Specifically, the 
investors follow the rule of “consume only out of dividends” so that they avoid the risk 
of excessive spending. In line with other dividend theories, such as signaling model, 
“self-control” hypothesis implies that the benefit resulting from dividends ought to be 
large enough to offset the relevant costs such as tax burdens caused by dividends. 
Secondly, adopting the rule of “consume only out of dividends” is beneficial as 
investors do not regret the decision of selling stocks in case the stock price appreciates 
later on. This sort of motivation is referred to as “regret aversion”. Thirdly, investors 
tend to discriminately value diverse sources of income due to “mental accounting”. For 
example, if an investor considers the marginal utility of a unit dividend to outweigh that 
of a unit capital gain, she/he will correspondingly give priority to the type of stocks 
which come with dividends. 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) argue that some investors’ preference to 
dividend-paying stocks may be time varying, and the potential cause can be attributed to 
institutional clientele or uninformed sentiment. In other words, investors’ demand for 
dividend-paying stocks features the nature of “fads” or “fashion”. Black and Scholes 
(1974) state that dividend clientele rise due to taxation, transaction costs, and 
regulations on institutions. As discussed above, the psychological factors such as 
“mental accounting” (Shefrin and Statman, 1984) constitute the basis of sentiment. Such 
demand for dividend payers changes over time and materially affects stock prices, 
bringing about an increase or decrease in stock price. This contradicts the assertion by 
Miller and Modigiliani (1961) that in a perfect market environment, arbitrage prevents 
investors from having a preference between capital gains and dividends. To benefit 
stock prices, corporations actively cater to the demand of investors by adjusting 
dividend policies. For example, in periods when markets put a premium on dividend 
payers, the non-dividend payers are more likely to start paying dividends. 
In contrast, conventional dividend hypotheses assume that insider executives 
tentatively apply dividend payment as a certain tool to address some difficulties the 
corporations are confronting. For example, when investors do not have enough 
information on interior cash flows or prospectuses, dividend payments show managers’ 
confidence regarding the long-term capability to raise earnings in spite of the existence 
of the relevant costs that may occur. When insiders are wondering if managers act as 
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perfect agents, dividend disbursements reduce resources, which could potentially be 
squandered. Both Shefrin and Statman (1984) and Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b) show 
that investors are perhaps motivated by irrational views to make decisions between 
dividends and capital gains. However, unlike Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b), Shefrin 
and Statman’s (1984) theory does not necessarily require that investors’ irrational 
preferences change over time.  
2.7.2 Empirical Evidence 
(1) Positive Evidence 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) report that variations of both the value weighted dividend 
premium and equally weighted dividend premium reflect the variation of the propensity 
to pay dividends. During the period from 1962 to 2000, US corporations had stronger 
incentives to pay dividends as there was a price premium credited to dividend-paying 
firms. The values of dividend premium were positive during two periods: 1962-1966 
and 1970-1977, and negative for the remaining observed years. In general, their study 
strongly supports the prediction that dividend premium can explain the corporate 
decisions of dividend initiation and omission. Baker and Wurgler (2004b) provide 
additional evidence that catering incentives have strong explanatory power for the 
propensity to pay dividends over the period between 1963 and 2000, which is described 
by Fama and French (2001).  
Li and Lie (2006) developed the catering theory by using the price premium of 
dividend payers to explain dividend increase and decrease. They found that dividend 
premium explains dividend initiations, omissions, and the magnitude of dividend 
changes. The market responds positively to changes in dividends, which are motivated 
by managerial catering. Bulan, Subramanian, Tanluet (2007) applied dividend premium 
as an explanatory factor in their dividend life cycle model. They find that the likelihood 
of paying dividends is higher if the market puts a higher price premium on firms that 
pay dividends, even after controlling for maturity characteristics such as size, growth 
rate, cash flows and capital expenditures. They find that dividend initiation signal that a 
firm becomes mature and that managers cater for the dividend demand of its investors. 
Kale, Kini and Payne (2012) examine the determinants of dividend initiations of IPOs. 
They test the major dividend theories including residual, tax, transaction costs, clientele, 
agency, signaling and catering.  Catering proxy is used as one explanatory variable in 
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the regressions exploring the determinants of dividend initiation decisions (Logistic 
regression), the level of dividends initiation (Tobit regression) and the timing of 
dividend initiation (Cox Hazard Model). All regressions show a positive relationship 
between dividend premium and the decision to initiate dividends. However, they also 
find evidence supporting the various other dividend theories. Ferris, Sen, and Yui 
(2006b) find a similar decreasing trend in UK dividend policy documented by Fama and 
French (2001), controlling for characteristics of size and profitability. They conclude 
that catering factor has a significantly positive impact on UK firms’ propensity to pay 
dividends. The tax law indicator, mirroring the tax law change of June 1997, has no 
explanatory power for dividends trends in the UK.  
Neves (2006) studied the relevancy to dividend catering theory among Eurozone 
countries. She finds that firms in Eurozone countries are concerned with market 
sentiment when they make dividend policy, and that the catering effect interacts with 
firm characteristics including liquid assets, investment opportunities and free cash flow. 
More recently, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) examine firms in 23 countries. 
They show that, consistent with the “outcome hypothesis” of LaPorta et al., (2000), 
shareholders in common law countries push managers to cater to the market sentiment 
about dividends, but firms in civil law countries are not driven by catering incentives to 
make dividend decisions. 
 
(2) Negative Evidence 
Julio and Ikenberry (2004) found that while there is an increase tendency in dividend 
premium from 2000, in line with the observed phenomenon of “reappearing dividends”, 
the variation of dividend premium for other periods does not correspond to the change 
of the propensity to pay dividends. In addition, they found that abnormal returns for 
initiation announcement periods do not change over time after 1997, when they control 
for the size and age of initiating firms. These findings suggest that it is difficult to relate 
the tendency of initiating dividends to manager’s intention of catering to investors. 
Based on firms listed on the London Stock Exchange during the 1990s, Renneboog and 
Trojanowski (2008) report a contradiction of catering hypothesis that while the average 
Tobin’s Q of non-dividend payers in the large part of sample periods is higher than that 




Hoberg and Prabhala (2005, 2006) test whether changes in the propensity to pay 
dividends is a function of growth opportunity, profitability, firm size, catering 
incentives and idiosyncratic risk. They find that the coefficients of dividend premium 
(Baker and Wurgler (2004a, b) are positive and significant without risk variable in the 
model, but become insignificant after controlling for risk; the adjust R2
Eije and Megginson (2008) examine the determinants of dividend policy among 
European Union firms by building up logistic regressions, setting the dependent 
variable as 1 if a firm pays dividends and 0 otherwise. The model includes country-
specific dummy variable equals 1 if the median market to book ratio of dividend-paying 
firms is larger than that of non-dividend-paying firms, to test if firms cater to the 
dividend demand of investors. According to the original catering model (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a), a significant positive relation should exist between catering proxy and 
the direction of dividend payout. Their results are not consistent with catering theory as 
the catering dummy had significantly negative slopes for the full period of 1991-2005 
and a sub-period of 2001-2005, and has no explanatory power for the other sub-periods. 
Denis and Osobov (2008) present two key results contradicting the prediction of the 
catering theory. First, in some countries like the UK and Japan, while the dividend 
premium changed materially the propensity of paying dividends remained stable in the 
mean time. Second, the dividend premium does not move in the direction of dividend 
shift (initiation and omission), in terms of frequency and direction. Denis and Osobov 
conclude that the catering incentive is not the first-order cause for the observed dividend 
patterns, as it does not correspond with the difference between the expected and the 
actual percent of dividend payers. Instead, the dividend patterns seem to depend on the 
relevant life cycle characteristics. In particular, the correlation between the dividend 
premium and the shift in the propensity to pay dividends can hardly be proved in the 
United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, and Japan. Chay and Suh (2008) report 
empirical results similar to Eije and Megginson (2008) as their dividend premium 
appears to have a wrong sign (negative) in regressions for explaining dividend policy. 
 for the 
regression appears to be extremely small (-0.018 for the period 1963 to 2000). Their 
results cast only some doubt on the catering hypothesis of dividend policy rather than 
robustly negate the catering incentive in making dividend decisions. Using German data, 
Savov and Weber (2006) fail to find any supporting evidence for the catering theory, 
even after controlling for the current growth rate.  
Studies based on stock price reaction to dividend initiation announcements also 
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do not support the catering theory, suggesting that the long-term stock returns will run 
into the opposite direction of dividend changes. For example, stocks of dividend paying 
firms are over-valued when investors irrationally put price premium on dividend-paying 
stocks. When the market reveals the true value for firms that change dividend policy to 
cater to investors, the overvalued stock prices fall. However, this prediction is not 
compatible with Michaely et al. (1995) who report long-run price increases during the 
post period of initiation announcements. Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) and 
Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) provide evidence that long-run price 
increases during the post period of dividend increase announcements. 
2.7.3 Summary 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a, 2004b) argue that some investors prefer dividend-paying 
stocks due to time-varying sentiment. Managers cater to such sentiment by paying 
dividends when the market put price premium on firms that pay dividends. The existing 
literature does not provide conclusive evidence for the dividend catering theory. In 
general, the catering hypothesis of dividend policy confronts several challenges. First, 
future research should discuss more about whether dividend premium is a reliable proxy 
of market sentiment. An alternative explanation of dividend premium is the difference 
in investment opportunities between dividend payers and non-payers. The likelihood of 
paying dividends should be adversely connected with investment opportunities. For the 
former payers, the rate of continuing to pay dividends will decrease with the increase in 
dividend premium since payers generally have greater investment opportunities than 
non-payers. To further explore this issue, future tests need to investigate the correlation 
between dividend premium and market-to-book ratio, as the latter is commonly known 
as investment opportunity. Second, it is difficult to assess whether managers actively 
cater to market sentiment or are compelled by extreme investor demand. Third, 
individual firm characteristics should be integrated with investors’ sentiment to explain 
dividend policy. Julio and Ikenberry (2004) document that catering holds no 
explanation after adjustment of size and age. Fourth, catering theory predicts that 
corporations tend to alter the supply of dividends in response to the time-varying 





2.8 Summary and Remarks 
The academic literature is still not clear as to whether, when, why and how companies 
pay dividends, and whether dividends create or destroy value (see below and Allen and 
Michaely, 2003; DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Skinner, 2008, for extensive reviews). In 
general, the extant literature has not reached a consensus on dividend signaling 
equilibrium (Allen and Michaely, 2003). First, the overall evidence does not provide 
strong support for the assertion that dividend changes convey information about future 
earnings. Second, the studies on the market reaction to dividend announcements yield 
results in accordance with information signaling hypothesis. Third, in most cases, 
analysts revise their predictions on earnings in the same direction with changes in 
dividends. Finally, empirical results obtained from field surveys are relatively mixed.  
Nonetheless, previous studies did not negate the hypothesis that dividends carry 
inside information about corporations. Miller (1987), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler 
(1997), Garrett and Priestley (2000), Koch and Sun (2004) show that dividend policies 
reflect the past or current company performance before dividend announcement. 
However, previous studies focus on seasoned firms and analyze the determinants of and 
the market reaction to dividend initiations (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Healy and 
Palepu, 1988; Christie, 1990). There is absent of evidence showing how pre-IPO 
financial accounting position influence the dividend policies presented in IPO 
prospectuses. 
The other interesting question may be how two signaling devices are interrelated. 
For example, Booth and Smith (1986) suggest that venture capital backing and 
underwriter reputation can serve to provide certification to firms. According to the IPO 
signaling hypothesis (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989), dividend 
payments are more likely for issue firms that are venture capital backed or sponsored by 
prestigious underwriter since “good” firms are able to afford costly dividends. However, 
it is also possible that two signal devices are substitutes. For instance, dividends might 
substitute venture capital backing as a signal. Preceding literature does not discuss this 
issue clearly. 
Agency rationale sheds light on the link between dividend policy and corporate 
governance. LaPorta et al. (2000) propose the “outcome model” suggesting that better 
protected investors can require corporate insiders to pay dividends in order to reduce 
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agency costs. LaPorta et al. (2000) also propose the “substitute model” suggesting that 
the companies with substantial moral hazard intentionally pay dividends to investors 
who are not well protected by law in order to establish a reputation for future external 
financing. However, the literature about whether dividends and corporate governance 
are substitutes or complements is controversial. Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend 
payout and directors’ ownership can be viewed as substitutes for mitigating agency 
conflicts and predicts that firms pay higher dividends when insiders hold a lower 
fraction of equity. This logic is similar to the “substitute model” proposed by LaPorta et 
al. (2000). Similarly, Jensen (1986) argues that dividends and debt are substitutes since 
both of them help reduce agency costs. More studies such as Jiraporn and Ning (2006) 
and Officer (2006) have mentioned the substitute assumption.  
In contrast, Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that owner-managers as stock investors 
will benefit from dividend disbursement which might act as a performance-enhancing 
incentive. Thus, the argument of Fenn and Liang (2001) is similar to “outcome model” 
of LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that strong corporate governance leads to higher 
demand of dividend payouts. Other studies such as Grinstein and Michaely (2005) and 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) contain the concept of complement in developing their 
arguments. A range of IPO-specific factors might have the potential to act as the proxy 
variables to test above controversial assumptions. These IPO-specific factors can 
include managerial ownership, lockup agreement, institutional ownership, venture 
capital backing, managerial stock option and long-term debt ratio. However, previous 
literature has not developed relevant hypotheses in the context of IPO.  
Although agency cost-based lifecycle theory are broadly supported by empirical 
evidence (Fama and French, 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008), 
some evidence is mixed and more possible proxy variables deserve to be tested. For 
example, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that the fraction of retained earnings to total 
equity is not a significant explanatory variable in explaining dividend policy, 
inconsistent with the findings of DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and Denis and 
Osobov (2008). Additionally, since the empirical evidence on catering theory is 










When Do IPOs Start Paying Dividends? 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Previous studies identified a number of conflicting hypotheses to explain firms’ 
dividend decisions. On the one hand, the signaling, agency costs and shareholder 
preferences suggest that companies can create value by paying dividends. On the other 
hand, the introduction of taxation implies that firms destroy value by paying dividends 
when dividends are taxed at a higher rate than capital gains (see Allen and Michaely, 
2003, for review). In this chapter, I focus on the impact of signaling and agency costs on 
firms’ dividend policy. I chose the case of Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) to test the 
various hypotheses underlying the dividend decision because such newly listed firms 
are characterized by high information asymmetries and maybe subject to high agency 
conflicts. I hand-collect a large number of IPOs specific characteristics, including 
lockup lengths, underpricing and ownership structure, which I use as proxy variables in 
my tests, and assess the likelihood that an IPO pays dividends in the first few years of 
its quotation. 
Recent empirical research has studied the dividend behavior of IPO firms. In 
these studies, a number of characteristics concerning IPO are used to explain the timing 
of dividend initiation (Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu, 2006), the choice of payout 
methods (Jain, Shekhar and Torbey, 2009) and the decision to initiate dividends (Kale, 
Kini and Payne, 2012). However, the theoretical links between IPOs and post-IPO 
dividend decisions principally remain ambiguous in the literature23
                                                 
23 For example, Kale et al. (2012) use underpricing as an explanatory variable in multivariate regressions of whether IPO decide to 
initiate dividends, but they neither present a clear line of argument nor discuss the implication of their results. 
. In addition, any 
evidence that has been offered about the effect of the IPO decision on dividend payout 
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is often contradictory. For instance, Michaely and Shaw (1994) argue that firms who 
underprice less tend to pay higher dividends, but this contradicts Allen and Faulhaber’s 
(1989) hypothesis in respect of IPO signaling and Kale et al. (2012) find that 
underpricing is not a significant factor in explaining why IPOs initiate dividends in their 
regression settings.  
Moreover, previous studies do not consider the effects of some important IPO-
specific factors, such as lock-ups 24
This investigation first seeks to develop a series of hypotheses in which IPO-
spcific fators and accouting characteristics are theoretically linked to the post-IPO 
dividend patterns, namely whether or not IPOs pay dividends and the timing of dividend 
initiation. The next task is to examine empirically these hypotheses using a large sample 
that consists of 1707 IPOs issued on the London Stock Exchange in the period between 
1990 and 2010. Following Jain et al (2009) and Kale et al. (2012), the tested sample 
includes any IPO firms that paid dividends during its public life or until the end of 2011. 
As well as the data collected from DataStream, a considerable amount of data is 
collected manually from offering prospectuses. To achieve the different research 
, insider ownership, institutional ownership, and 
managerial option plans on the dividend decision in the post-IPO period. Moreover, the 
current empirical evidence in this area has been dominated by US-based rather than 
UK-based research, but the US experience is of limited value in the UK because of the 
different regulations, competition rules and IPO protocols adopted in both countries. For 
example, while in the US lockup agreements are relatively standard and their average 
length is around 180 days (Brav and Gompers, 2003), in the UK, companies tend to 
implement more varied and flexible lockup agreements in comparison to US companies 
(Espenlaub et al. 2001), and their average length is 365 days (Hoque and Lasfer, 2009). 
In an attempt to fill the existing gaps in the literature, this paper answers the following 
fundamental questions about the dividend decisions of IPOs. Has the probability that 
IPO firms start to pay dividends been shifting over time? When do IPO firms start to 
pay dividends? What are the influential factors in the decisions of whether IPOs pay 
dividends and the timing of dividend initiation? Do these determinants have any 
theoretical implications for the relation between IPO practice and dividend policy? In 
discussions contained in this chapter, high propensity of initiating dividends has two 
meanings: the greater chance that IPOs initiate dividends and earlier dividend initiation.  
                                                 
24 A typical lockuplockup agreement provides that directors, related parties and any relevant employees undertake to give up the 
right to sell a specific percentage of their shareholdings for a specified period after they are issued. 
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objectives, various methods are employed including: univariate analysis, the cross-
sectional regression model, the cross-sectional ordinal regression model, the Cox 
Proportional Hazard (CPH) model, and the unbalanced panel regression model. I also 
estimate the linear probability model (LPM) regression using the OLS, Newey-West, 
GLS and Fama-Beth techniques in order to check the validity of results by estimating 
the unbalanced logistic panel regressions. 
The main findings generated from this study are as follows. Firstly, the results 
show that during the sample period, the percent of dividend-initiating IPOs is 46.8%, 
but IPOs issued in 2000s are generally more reluctant to initiate dividends than those 
issued in the 1990s (70.8% vs. 32.6%, respectively). These results suggest that the 
probability of paying dividends is sample period dependent and that the time effect 
should be considered in the regressions models. The results also indicate that more than 
half of dividend-paying companies start to pay dividends within the first year after their 
IPO.  
Secondly, in line with Michaely and Shaw (1994), my results show that 
underpricing is negatively associated with the probability of dividend initiation and the 
early dividend initiation. The negative effect of underpricing on dividend initiation 
cannot be explained by the IPO signaling rationale in Allen and Faulhaber’s (1989). 
This may suggest that paying no dividends or postponing the dividend payment means 
the information asymmetry is substantial, so the issuing firms would intentionally lower 
the offer price to compensate the uninformed investors, in line with the implication of 
Dividend Discount Model and Rock’s “winner’s curse” (1986).  
Thirdly, consistent with the prediction of dividend signaling theory, managerial 
ownership and underwriter reputation, two signaling proxy variables, are positively 
associated with the likelihood of initiating dividends considering. However, inconsistent 
with signaling, VC backing, the alternative signaling proxy variable, is found to be a 
factor with negative effect on the likelihood to pay dividends, indicating that IPOs 
substitute dividends as signaling device. Besides, the impact of the institutional 
ownership on the decision to initiate dividends of IPOs is not significant. 
Fourthly, consistent with the substitute assumption of agency costs which 
suggests that weak corporate governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts 
(Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta 
et al., 2000; Officer, 2006), the results show that initiation propensity is negatively 
influenced by the full lockup restriction period, VC backing and managerial stock 
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option. My test contributes to confirming the negative relation between lockup length 
and dividends (Brav and Gompers (2003). The negative relation between lockup length 
and dividends is in line with the finding of Jain et al. (2009) implies that venture 
capitalists enhance the monitoring for the backed companies (Chan, 1983; Barry et al., 
1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Bergloff, 1994; Hellmann, 2002; Lee and Wahal, 
2004; Cumming and Johan; 2008; Krishnan et al., 2011) and, as a result, the demand of 
dividends declines. The negative effect of managerial options (OPTION) is consistent 
with the findings reported by Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner 
(2000), and Fenn and Liang (2001).  
Fifthly, consistent with the complement assumption of agency costs which 
suggests that dividend payment is a complement for corporate governance (LaPorta et 
al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), managerial ownership 
and leverage are positively related to the inclination of dividend initiation. In addition, 
consistent with free cash flow hypothesis, IPOs’ preference to initiate dividends is 
adversely influenced by the growth opportunities of IPOs, technology intensity and 
issuing on AIM. 
Moreover, consistent with the suggestion of life cycle theory (Grullon et al., 
2002; DeAngelo et al., 2006), VC backing and lock-up agreement have negative effect 
on the dividend policy of IPOs. According to lifecycle theory, dividend policy is 
positively affected by the firm’s maturity stage. Venture capitalists are assumed to 
prefer early-stage companies (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 
1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2000, 2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Cumming and Johan, 
2008 and Krishnan et al., 2011). Lock-up agreements tend to be more restrictive for 
young firms (Brav and Gompers, 2000, 2003). Also, consistent with the predictions of 
lifecycle theory, IPO firms with larger size, higher profitability and lower growth 
opportunities are found to be more likely to initiate dividends and pay earlier, In line 
with previous studies (Fama and French, 2001; Bulan, et al., 2007; Denis and Osobov, 
2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009 and Kale et al., 2011). The other 
findings in support of lifecycle theory include the negative effects of technology focus 
and AIM issuance on initiation propensity. In addition, as Eije and Megginson (2008) 
argued, the positive effect of leverage is consistent with life cycle hypothesis since 
mature firms may be associated with high leverage. Finally, the tests show that the IPOs 
issued in years when markets put a price premium on dividend paying payers are more 
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likely to become dividend payers and tend to initiate dividends earlier, consistent with 
the implication of catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). 
Overall, my results suggest that the dividend behaviours of IPOs are influenced 
by miscellaneous theoretical mechanisms. The most homogeneous results are associated 
with the life cycle theory and catering theories. There are also some empirical results in 
support of signaling and agency theory. These results contribute to the existing literature 
as they show that IPO factors affect significantly the aftermarket dividend decisions. 
The rest of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 draws on previous 
literature to develop seventeen hypotheses to be tested. Section 3.3 outlines the sample 
selection and data description. Section 3.4 details the methodology that has been used to 
test these hypotheses as well as empirical results. Section 3.5 presents robust tests and 
the final section discusses the findings and conclusions of the testing.  
 
3.2 Literature Background and Hypotheses 
In this section, I contrast the various theories of dividends and IPOs to set up my 
hypotheses relating to the main dividend theories: signaling, agency conflicts, life cycle 
and catering. In developing these testable hypotheses, I attempt to clarify the theoretical 
links between IPOs’ propensity to initiate dividends and a range of IPO-related factors.  
3.2.1 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
Lintner (1956) model suggests that managers tend to set a long-term target payout ratio 
and that dividends are sticky, tied to long-term sustainable earnings, and smoothed from 
year to year. Lintner’s description of dividend policy actually implies dividend changes 
contain the information of earnings. Miller and Modigliani (1961) also suggest that 
dividends convey information on future cash flows in an incomplete market where 
information asymmetry exists. Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and Rock (1985), and John 
and Williams (1985) forward formally signaling theory, which suggests that firms 
intentionally pay dividends to signal the intrinsic value of firms at the expense of 
issuing new shares (Bhattacharya, 1979), letting slip positive NPV project (Miller and 
Rock, 1985) or higher taxes on dividends relative to capital gains (John and Williams, 
1985). Dividend payout has the potential to be a signal since low quality firms are 
unable to afford the costs attached with dividends. In the context of signaling, the links 
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between dividend activities of IPOs and a series of proxy variables, such as 
underpricing, directors’ stock ownership, lockup agreements, institutional ownership, 
and venture capital participation and underwriter reputation, are discussed in the 
following section.  
 
(1) Underpricing 
The first day trading price of IPOs is usually higher than the offer price specified in the 
offering prospectus.25
We may assume that the issue of uncertainty is more serious for those 
companies that do not pay dividends or that postpone the dividend payment because 
investors are unable to obtain information from dividends paid. As such, it is predicted 
that the reluctance to pay dividends will occur concurrently with underpricing for IPOs 
 This difference known in the literature as underpricing or first 
day return is considered in previous literature to signal the quality of the IPO. It is 
possible for share under-pricing to be linked to dividend policy by looking at the 
Dividend Discount Model that suggests that the market share price is the present value 
of the expected future dividend streams. This implies that market share price reflects the 
information given to investors on the first trading day. On the other hand, the offer price 
can partly reflect information given to corporate insiders. Hence, underpricing increases 
with the degree of information asymmetry between outside investors and insiders. This 
inference coincides with Rock’s theory (1986) about the ‘winner’s curse’ which 
explains how an expected initial return needs to positive in order to retain the 
participation of uninformed investors who are more likely to receive unattractive 
offerings, and earn lower initial returns in comparison to informed investors. Ritter 
(1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) all consistently 
suggest that there is an underlying positive relationship between underpricing and ex 
ante uncertainty about the value of the IPO firm. Moreover, Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
argue that underpricing should become less common as more information is distributed 
homogeneously across investor groups and that uncertainty about an IPO firm decrease 
when dividends are eventually distributed. Overall, the degree of underpricing discloses 
the intensity of information asymmetry. 
                                                 
25 Ibbotson, Jody, and Ritter (1988) found that under-pricing averaged at 21% when they sampled 2259 US companies from 1980 to 
1984. In a subsequent investigation, Ritter (1998) expanded the sample period from 1960 to 1996 to find that average under-pricing 
is 15%. In the UK, Levis (1993) reported that 721 IPOs issued on the London Stock Exchange between 1980 and 1988 had been 
underpriced by 14.3% on average, and that, thereafter, underperformance in stock price lasted for up to 36 months. However, in “hot 
issue markets” IPO under-pricing can attain a higher level. For example, according to Ljungqvist (2007) IPOs are under-priced on 
average by 71% and 57% in 1999 and 2000, respectively. 
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that confront asymmetric information. In the view of information delivery, dividends 
and discounted initial returns can be substitutes. Besides, a number of firms do not pay 
dividends at the stage of IPO and therefore the stock price of the first trading day cannot 
in practice be directly deducted from DDM. In such a case, the investment banks and/or 
issuing firms would intentionally lower the offer price to compensate the uninformed 
investors. This is also the concept of Rock’s (1986) ‘winner’s curse’ assumption. 
Therefore, the implication of Rock’s theory (1986) and the signaling role of dividends 
suggest that IPOs consider underpricing as a substitute for dividends to mitigate the 
asymmetric information.  
By contrast to Rock’s (1986) ‘winner’s curse’ idea, the principles of signaling 
rationale as discussed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) and 
Welch (1989) suggest that underpricing can function as an indicator of the intrinsic 
value of a company, because managers possess more information about prospect than 
investors do. The underlying implication is that well placed issuing firms try to ‘leave a 
good taste’ in order to woo investors and to seek future issues at more advantageous 
prices. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) hypothesise that 
high-quality IPO firms arrange low offer prices so that they are able to interpret future 
high dividends more favorably. However, low-quality firms are less likely to pay high 
future dividends because they are less likely to have sustainable future cash flows, and 
thus less likely to discount offer prices. This line of reasoning is similar to the 
assumption of a two-dimensional signal that is described by Hughes (1986). However, 
Michaely and Shaw (1994) find that firms who underpriced less, tended to pay higher 
dividends, inconsistent with the prediction of IPO signaling. Therefore, Allen and 
Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) imply that dividends and 
underpricing are complementary. These controversial arguments led me to test whether 
dividends and underpricing are substitutes or complementary. Therefore, I set up the 
following testable hypothesis: 
H1: The propensity to pay dividends is negatively related to the level of 
underpricing. 
 
 (2) Managerial Ownership 
Leland and Pyle (1977) and Ross (1977) argue that the fraction of equity retained by 
insiders signals a firm’s quality. When insiders are optimistic about the prospects of 
company, they always wish to hold more shares after the IPO. Signaling interpretations, 
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such as those proposed by Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), 
hypothesize that well-informed IPO issuers convey information about a firm’s value by 
retaining shares and through low offer prices. Dividend signaling principle 
(Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and Rock, 1985; John and Williams, 1985) suggests that 
only high quality firms are able to afford the costly dividends. Moreover, disgorging 
dividends in post-IPO stage is optimal if managers contemplate that high directors’ 
ownership is not sufficient for signaling firm value. By using univariate method, Kale et 
al. (2012) find that dividend-initiating firms have higher insider ownership than non-
dividend-initiating firms, but the relevant evidence in their regression analysis is mixed. 
The results reported by Eckbo and Verma (1994) and Lasfer (1996)26
H2: The propensity of dividend payment is positively related to the directors’ 
stock ownership. 
 are not in line 
with the positive relation between managerial ownership and dividend policy suggested 
by signaling rationale. This leads to the following testable hypothesis:   
 
(3) Lockup Agreement 
A typical lockup agreement provides that directors, related parties and any relevant 
employees undertake to give up the right to sell a specific percentage of their 
shareholdings for a specified period after they are issued. The retention of managerial 
shares is not an adequate protection mechanism against selling (Gale and Stiglitz, 
1989)27, while lock-ups may provide enhanced information communication for outside 
investors. Brav and Gompers (2000) and Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) 
elaborate the role of lock-up agreements28
                                                 
26 Using a sample consisting of 308 firms listed in Toronto Stock Exchange over 1976-1988, Eckbo and Verma (1994) report a 
significant negative impact of the relative voting power of owner-managers on dividend policy. When Lasfer (1996) analyzes a 
sample of 108 UK companies to explore the effect of taxation on dividend policy from 1973 to 1983, he concludes that there is a 
negative relationship between directors’ shareholdings and dividend distribution. 
in information equilibrium. Courteau (1995) 
and Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005) argues that firms which are thought of as 
‘high-quality’ often accept the severe lock-up agreements to signal inside information to 
new investors. Thus, firms that accept severer lock-up restriction have greater chance to 
pay dividends, in the spirit of the signal hypothesis in which only ‘high-quality’ firms 
favor dividends. Nevertheless, one may also argue that in case no or low dividends are 
27 Gale and Stiglitz (1989) argue that insiders can sell their retained shares on the secondary market as soon as they are able to do so. 
28 Brav and Gompers (2000) suggest that lockup agreements may prevent insiders from exploiting private benefit by using their 
superior information since lockup agreements give time for outsiders to absorb the private information of existing shareholders. 
Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) argue that issuing firms with information asymmetry will involve lockup agreements. 
Their argument is based on two findings: (1) High-tech firms that have greater information asymmetry are more likely to choose 
absolute expiry dates than other firms. According to their idea, absolute expiry dates mean less uncertainty and more transparency 
than flexible expiry dates. (2) Sponsor reputation can be a signaling substitute to lockup agreements. 
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paid out, the information asymmetry would become more serious and thus the more 
restrictive lockup provisions will be required.  
Prior studies do not provide direct empirical evidence relating dividend policy to 
the lock-up covenant, with the exception of Brav and Gompers (2003) who find that the 
IPOs with longer than median lock-up length have lower frequency of dividend 
initiations than counterparts but the associated significance in their test is smaller than 
standard29
H3: A more restrictive lockup agreement will lead to a higher propensity to pay 
dividends. 
. Brav and Gompers (2003) conclude that the empirical result is inconsistent 
with the implication of signaling mechanism. The testable hypotheses below can be 
suggested:  
 
(4) Institutional Ownership 
The information advantage of institutional investors may contribute to explaining the 
dividend activities of IPOs 30 . Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) contend that 
institutional investors have greater ability to certify the true quality of firms relative to 
individual investors. In consequence, high quality firms would like bear the tax cost of 
dividends to attract informed institutional investors who are inclined to dividend-paying 
firms. Allen et al. (2000) assume that institutions prefer dividends due to prudent-man 
rule31 and the institutions' relative tax advantage. Based on Allen et al. (2000), Kale et 
al. (2012) hypothesize that firms will have stronger motivation to initiate dividends 
when the current level of institutional ownership is lower than what it should be. In their 
regression analysis, Kale et al. (2012) find a significant and positive relation between 
the IPOs’ propensity to initiate dividends and institutional ownership deficit 32
H4: Institutional ownership at IPO stage correlates negatively to future 
dividends propensity. 
.This 
leads to the testable hypothesis:  
 
(5) Venture Capital Backing 
                                                 
29 p-value of difference in means=0.74. 
30  Some US-based studies focus on discussing tax-induced dividend distribution when discussing the effect of institutional 
ownership on dividend policy. However, the tax disadvantage of dividends is not universal in non-US environment. For instance, 
UK firms pay Advanced Corporation Tax on behalf of their shareholders but deducted it from their corporation tax liability (Lasfer, 
1996) until the tax credit is abolished in 1999. In his research, Lasfer (1996) finds no evidence to support the widespread practice of 
tax-induced clientele in the UK.  
31 Allen et al. (2000) assume that institutions prefer dividends due to prudent-man rule and the institutions' relative tax advantage.  
32 It is the difference between the predicted and actual level of institutional ownership. The predicted level of institutional ownership 
is obtained by estimating OLS regressions with indicator variables which are suggested by literature. 
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The role of venture capital investors in shaping the dividend behavior of IPOs can be 
investigated in the context of certification hypothesis. Venture capitalists are active 
investors who have an important influence on corporate decision-making processes33 
because they  usually possess the expertise in the area they focus  and tend to play the 
active role in supporting firms such as external financing and IPO decisions34 . Booth 
and Smith (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) explicitly theorise that venture 
capitalists have the potential to certify the quality of IPOs. A large number of empirical 
investigations have documented the positive influence of venture capital backing on the 
long-term IPO performance35. However, the evidence of the impact of venture capital 
investor on short-run performance appears to be controversial36
Given the certification role of venture capitalists, the incidence of dividend 
initiation should increase with the involvement of venture capital investors, all else 
constant, in light of the dividend signaling principle. Nevertheless, if it is other potential 
factors, such as underwriter reputation, virtually facilitate to certify, the expected 
relation may not be supported. Jain et al. (2009) find that VC backing is a significantly 
negative factor influencing the IPOs’ decision to initiate dividends. Therefore, the 
testable hypothesis is: 
.  
H5: The participation of venture capitalists has a positive association with 
dividend policy. 
 
(6) Underwriter Reputation 
A prestigious underwriter can serve as a certification of IPO quality (Booth and Smith, 
1986; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Carter and Manaster, 
1990; Holland and Horton, 1993), suggesting that better firms are more likely to 
collaborate with a highly trusted financial sponsor. Many empirical investigations find 
                                                 
33 See Warne (1988), Gladstone (1989), Sahlman (1990), Barry, Muscarella, Peavy and Vetsuypen (1990), Megginson and Weiss 
(1991), Hellman and Puri (2002) 
34 See Fenn, Liang, and Prowse (1995), Gorman and Sahlman (1989), Lerner (1994), Gompers (1995) 
35 Using US IPO sample, Gompers and Lerner (1997) find that the venture capitalist reputation as well as the underwriter reputation 
have positive influence on the long-term IPO performance. Similarly, using UK IPO sample, Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999) 
find that the long-run (1-36 months) aftermarket performance of venture capital-backed IPOs is better than that of counterpart IPOs. 
Li and Masulis (2008) find that IPOs backed by venture capital investment and are associated with stronger long-term aftermarket 
performance. Krishnan et al., (2011) find that IPOs with backing of more reputable VCs in their portfolio firms are associated with 
superior long-run performance. They also find that VCs that are more reputable hold shares of their portfolio companies at higher 
level. 
36 Barry et al. (1990) observe that IPO underpricing decreases when the extent to which venture capitalists involve into the IPO 
firms that they invested in increases. Megginson and Weiss (1991) find that venture capital-backed IPOs are less likely to be 
underpriced than non-venture capital-backed IPOs. However, Gompers and Lerner (1997) show that the significant short-term IPO 
returns have negative association with the reputation of underwriter solely. Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999) also find that short-
run (6 days) post-IPO returns appear to be affected by the reputation of the sponsor rather than the venture capitalists. Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) question the certification hypothesis by arguing that venture-backed IPOs are able to reduce underpricing by 
means of the choosing underwriters or exchanges. 
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that underwriter reputation can essentially influence the short-term or long-term IPO 
performance 37 . Allen and Faulhaber (1989) suggest that IPOs with prestigious 
underwriters tend to initiate dividends since ‘good firms’ have ability and demand to 
undertake high dividend payments.  However, Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) 
only find mixed evidence38
H6: IPOs with prestigious underwriters have a greater propensity to pay 
dividends. 
 in support of the positive effect of underwriter prestige on 
the probability of dividend initiation. As such, the following hypothesis can be put 
forward: 
3.2.2 Agency Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explicate that the separation of ownership and control 
causes the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, which will in turn 
lead to the increase in agency costs and the loss of firm value. Agency-costs based 
dividend theories articulate that dividends expose the companies to external 
monitoring39
Agency rationale sheds light on the link between dividend policy and corporate 
governance. LaPorta et al. (2000) contribute an insight into explaining how corporate 
governance affects dividend actions. They propose two basic models. “Outcome model” 
suggests that minority investors who are better protected by law have enough right to 
 (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984) and reduce free cash flows under the 
control of managers (Jensen, 1986). As LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 
(2000) argued, the critical idea of the agency theories is that disgorging earnings to 
shareholders in form of dividends reduces the chance that managers pursue personal use. 
On the other hand, corporate governance also affects the agency costs and firm value 
essentially. Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Richardson (2006) suggest that low quality 
of managerial governance will cause overinvestment and damage investor wealth, 
especially when a great amount of free cash flow appears. Consistent with this argument, 
Gompers et al. (2003), Harford, Mansi, and Maxwell (2008), Masulis, Wang, and Xie 
(2009) demonstrate that strong governance structures enhance firm value by remedying 
the agency conflicts between insiders and outsiders. 
                                                 
37 See Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Maksimovic and Unal (1993), Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, 
Dark and Singh (1998), Gompers and Lerner (1998a), Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001)  
38 In their univariate analysis, it is found that the underwriters of dividend-initiating IPOs are usually more prestigious. However, the 
results from multivariate analysis are not consistent.  
39 Dividend payments compel companies to raise external capital from public market in the future. 
88 
 
require corporate insiders to pay dividends in order to reduce cash flows under 
managers’ control. “Substitute model” suggests that the companies with substantial 
moral hazard intentionally pay dividends to investors who are not well protected by law 
because they need to establish a reputation for future external financing. “Outcome 
model” predicts that superior investor protection will result in higher dividend payouts, 
while “substitute model” leads to an opposite prediction. Basing on large sample cross 
countries40
It is worthy of noting that firms differ in corporate governance not only at 
country level
, LaPorta et al. (2000) support the “outcome model” of agency theory.  
41 but also at firm-level 42(Gompers et al., 2003; Mitton, 2004). Thus, it is 
of interest to study the effect of the internal corporate governance structure on IPOs’ 
dividend choice. Consistent with LaPorta et al. (2000), recent studies 43
 
support that 
strong corporate governance (investor protection) leads to high dividend payouts. 
However, Jensen’s (1986) substitute notion suggests that debt and dividends can be 
substitutes for reducing agency costs. Similarly, Officer (2006) documents that dividend 
payments and corporate governance can be substitutes. The following part of this study 
will test whether dividends and corporate governance are substitutes or complementary 
in the context of agency theory by employing various proxy variables such as 
managerial ownership, lockup agreement, institutional ownership, venture capital 
backing, managerial stock option and leverage. 
(1) Managerial Ownership 
Rozeff (1982) argues that dividend payout and directors’ ownership can be viewed as 
substitutes for mitigating agency conflicts and predicts that firms pay higher dividends 
when insiders hold a lower fraction of equity. This logic is similar to the “substitute 
model” given by LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that weak corporate governance 
leads to higher demand of dividend payouts. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and 
Gaver (1993) propose similar arguments. In the following context of this paper, such 
assumption will be referred as “substitute assumption”. However, the relevant evidence 
is controversial. In addition, the results in support of the substitution-monitoring effect 
have been provided by Dempsey and Laber (1992), Eckbo and Verma (1994), Moh’d et 
                                                 
40 4000 companies from 21 civil law countries and 12 common law countries. 
41 The difference in corporate governance at country level is due to the different law systems across countries as suggested by 
LaPorta et al. (2000). 
42 Gompers et al. (2003) use the Governance Index as proxy of the level of corporate governance. Mitton (2004) use corporate 
governance ratings provided by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (2001) to measure the level of corporate governance. 
43 Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003), Dittmar, Mahrt-Smith, and Servaes (2003), Mitton, 2004; Harford et al. (2008) 
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al. (1995), Crutchley and Hansen (1989)44, Collins, Saxena, and Wansley (1996), Chen 
and Steiner (1999) and Faccio et al. (2001). On the contrary, some empirical 
investigations, including Casey and Dickens (2000), Hu and Kumar (2004)45
By contrast, Rozeff (1982), Fenn and Liang (2001) suggest a complementary 
assumption in which the higher proportion of shares retained by managers will 
encourage more dividends to be distributed. Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that owner-
managers as stock investors will benefit from dividend disbursement which might act as 
a performance-enhancing incentive. Thus, the argument of Fenn and Liang (2001) is 
similar to “outcome model” of LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that strong corporate 
governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts. Fenn and Liang (2001) claim 
that their logic is considerably similar to that of Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997)
, Morck, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (1988), Schooley and Barney (1994), do not support this substitute 
assumption.  
46
In addition, Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) argue that dividend payout is 
needed to diversify personal portfolio and meet individual consumption on condition 
that executive directors’ personal wealth is being tied with shareholders’ interests. In 
earlier literature, Demsetz and Lehn (1985), and Fama and Jensen (1983) point out that 
the external monitoring forces will not have important effect on insiders when managers 
control the substantial shares of corporate stocks.  In such circumstance, managers may 
actively employ dividend policy as an external monitoring in order to increase firm 
value, leading to a positive relation between dividend policy and managerial ownership 
. In 
the following context of this paper, such assumption will be referred as “complement 
assumption”. However, Fenn and Liang (2001) find that total corporate payouts are 
positively associated with management’s stock ownership only when corporations 
experienced severe agency problems, e.g. low management stock ownership, low 
growth opportunities, or high free cash flow. The univariate analysis undertaken by 
Kale et al. (2012) reveals that dividend-initiating firms appear to have greater fraction of 
shares retained by the original owner at IPO comparing with non-dividend-initiating 
firms. However, this finding is not evident in regression analysis. Jain et al. (2009) 
conduct the same analysis but do not find significant relevant evidence.  
                                                 
44  Analyzing a US-based sample covering 1977-1985, Crutchley and Hansen (1989) document a substitute relation between 
dividends and insider holdings in the context of reducing agency costs and point out that the trading off of benefit-cost determines 
the two corporate policies. 
45 For example, Hu and Kumar (2004) also find that managerial ownership does not have significant effect on dividend payout ratios 
once the factor of firm size is added into the model.  
46 Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) hypothesize that the inadequate corporate governance or serious managerial entrenchment will 
lead to less leverage because, in this occasion, managers have the nature to avoid firm risk and secure their personal wealth.  
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as well. Furthermore, the entrenchment hypothesis proposed by Farinha (2003) is 
distinguishable from other comparable hypotheses and predicts a U-shaped relation47
H7: Dividend payment is positively correlated with managerial ownership. 
 
between insider ownership and dividend policies, suggesting that when insider 
ownership is higher than a critical entrenchment level, the relationship between 
dividend policies and insider ownership can be complementary. Similar to Renneboog 
and Trojanowski (2011), Farinha (2003) also conjecture that managers tend to use 
dividends to meet the need of liquidity and diversify their personal wealth if their 
shareholdings are high. Therefore, to test these controversial arguments, I set up the 
following testable hypothesis. 
 
(2) Lockup agreement 
Lockup agreement possesses the potential to address agency problem. Brav and 
Gompers (2003) suggest that lockup agreements can align the interests of managers and 
investors for overcoming the moral hazard. The information asymmetry can be assumed 
more likely in the period following IPO. Over the lockup period, stock prices will 
gradually communicate private information to insiders if the market is efficient, as Ofek 
and Richardson (2000) argued. Moreover, as the result, agency costs are curbed to a 
certain extent until the expiry of lock-ups. Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) 
also suggest that lockup agreement can serve as corporate governance device. However, 
Brav and Gompers’s (2003) commitment hypothesis is questioned by Brau, Lambson 
and Mcqueen (2005) who argue that lockup contracts impose only short-term 
restrictions on managers, whilst the monitoring ought to be an ongoing long-term 
process.  
Prior research does not directly discuss how dividend policy and lockups are 
related. I conjecture that the more restrictive the lockup provisions (longer lock-up 
period or higher proportion of locked shares) result in the less demand of paying 
dividends. This logic is actually similar to the substitute assumption (Rozeff, 1982; 
Jensen, 1986; LaPorta et al., 2000). The testable hypothesis is as follows. 
H8: Lockup agreement has a negative effect on the willingness of dividend 
initiation. 
 
                                                 
47 It is assumed that there exists a critical entrenchment level. When insider ownership is lower than this entrenchment level, 
dividend policies and insider ownership can be considered as substitutes. 
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(3) Institutional Ownership 
Institutional investors are believed to have the advantage of monitoring capability over 
individual investors by preceding literature (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986; Zeckhauser and 
Pound, 1990; Gillan and Starks, 2000)48. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) point out that 
the enhanced monitoring will lead to higher dividend payouts. Without sufficient 
monitoring, managers might tilt toward diverting internal surplus funds to chase 
personal interest. With monitoring being intensified, managers might find it become less 
likely for them to use free cash flow freely, thereby leading to more dividend payouts. 
Hence, larger institutional holdings will accompany higher payouts. In addition, 
Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argue that institutional investors with strong voting 
power may oblige companies to increases dividends, so as to move away free cash flow 
from managers. Eckbo and Verma (1994) and Farinha (2003) also suggest the similar 
arguments. However, Grinstein and Michaely (2005)49 and Short, Zhang, and Keasey 
(2002)50
H9: Institutional ownership has a positive relation with the incidence of 
dividend initiation. 
 document a substitute relation between institutional ownership and dividend 
payout ratio. Thus, the testable hypothesis is as the following. 
 
 (4) Venture Capitalists Backing 
Previous studies have discussed the monitoring mechanism of venture capitalists 
involvement51
                                                 
48 Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) argue that institutions are able to provide external monitoring 
because of their influential voting rights and that institutional investors monitor the price of shares more carefully than individual 
investors do. Similarly, Gillan and Starks (2000) suggest that institutional investors have greater opportunity and ability to monitor a 
firm’s performance. 
. For example, in a recent study, Krishnan et al. (2011) suggest that the 
monitoring offered by venture capitalists at IPO, along with VC’s expertise in certain 
industry and advisory service, is one of reasons why the venture capitalists has the 
potential to certify the firms being backed by them. A gap in preceding literature is that 
dividend policy has not been directly related the participation of venture capitalists 
within the context of agency conflicts. Following the discussion in previous section, 
there may be two predictions. I conjecture that venture capital investors are associated 
with a reduction in the likelihood to pay dividends for IPO firms following a line of 
49 The results provided by Grinstein and Michaely (2005) notably contain two levels. First, there is clear evidence that institutional 
investors prefer dividend-paying firms to non-dividend paying firms. Second, higher institutional ownership does not stimulate 
firms to increase the magnitude of corporate dividend payouts. 
50 Within framework of Linter (1956) model, Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002) investigate a sample that consists of 211 UK firms 
from 1988 to 1992 and demonstrate a positive relation between institutional ownership and dividend payout ratio. 
51 Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Chan (1983), Bergloff (1994), Hellmann (2002), Lee and Wahal (2004), 
Cumming and Johan (2008), Krishnan et al. (2011) 
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argument, which is similar to substitute assumption (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; 
LaPorta et al., 2000). I set up the following hypothesis. 
H10: Venture capital backing has a negative effect on the willingness of 
dividend initiation. 
 
(5) Managerial Stock Options 
Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that stock option plan can be a component of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Stock option plan may facilitate the alignment of interests of 
managers and investors and reduce the agency costs. Then, again, substitute assumption 
predicts that the use of stock option substitute for dividend payout to address agency 
problem.   
Moreover, stock option plan may prompt managers to choose repurchases 
instead of dividends when paying out residual funds for two reasons. Firstly, Lambert, 
Lanen and Larcker (1989) assert that managers who have been granted stock options 
will have an incentive to reduce dividend payments because executive stock options are 
not “dividend protected” which means that dividends can negatively affect stock price 
given that other conditions are constant. Secondly, Bagwell and Shoven (1988), Smith 
and Watts (1992), Dittmar (1997), and Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that when a 
company faces a growth in opportunity it tends to pay payout in form of stock 
repurchasing rather than dividend payment, partially due to repurchases taking the 
advantage of the extra flexibility. The generated results are in accordance with the 
notion that managers tend to substitute repurchases for dividends in the presence of 
stock options52
H11: Stock option plans prevent IPOs from initiating dividends. 
. Given above discussion, I conjecture the following hypothesis: 
 
(6) Leverage 
Jensen (1986) argues that debt and dividend payment can be effective substitutes for 
reducing the agency costs of free cash flow because, relative to dividend payment, debt 
is a stronger commitment taken by entrepreneurs to pay out future cash flows since 
firms must face lawsuit in case of the default of interest and principal payment. This 
                                                 
52  Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner (2000), and Fenn and Liang (2001) find that there is a negative 
relationship between executive stock options and dividend payouts. Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001), Aboody and Kasznik 
(2001) and Liljeblom and Pasternack (2002) document a positive relationship between repurchases and management stock options. 
Moreover, Weisbenner, (2000) shows that repurchases will not adversely affect the exercise price of stock options. 
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substitution notion is supported by some subsequent studies53. However, contrary to the 
hypothesized substitution relation, Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) observe that 
debt ratio54
 H12: Leverage level of firms at IPO stage is positively associated with the 
probability of dividend initiation. 
 of dividend initiating firms is on average significantly higher than that of 
non-dividend-initiating firms. A possible explanation is that, as Eije and Megginson 
(2008) argued, if high debt level is merely a characteristic for mature firms, then a 
positive relation between debt ratio and the dividend propensity is expected according 
to life cycle hypothesis. The substitution-monitoring effect between debt ratio and 
dividend payout may be evident for established firms rather than the newly listed firms 
at time of IPO. The above discussion leads to the following hypothesis. 
 
(7) Free Cash Flow and Growth opportunities 
The free cash flow issue is closely linked with the growth opportunities of entrepreneurs. 
According to free cash flow hypothesis, dividend distribution is more important for 
firms with low growth prospect or high cash flows. Hence, the propensity of paying 
dividends is anticipated to be negatively associated with research and development 
expenditure (R&D)55, capital expenditures56 and the proxy of growth opportunities57. 
By contrast, the bearing between dividend behavior and firm size is not strong from the 
perspective of agency theory (Smith and Watts, 1992). Because of this uncertainty, 
Farinha (2003) does not give an expected sign for firm size, which is used as an 
indicator factor 58
In addition, firms that belong to high technology sectors are in need of capital 
 when estimating OLS regressions with dividend payout ratio as 
dependent variables. Likewise, the prediction regarding the effect of profitability on 
dividend policy can uncertain under agency explanation. Farinha (2003) also infers that 
the relation between profitability on dividend policy is not definite; signaling suggests a 
positive relation while agency theory suggests a negative relation. Hence, I do not use 
firm size and profitability as proxy variables of agency theory. 
                                                 
53 See Crutchley and Hansen (1989),  Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992), Chen and Steiner (1999),  Eije and Megginson (2008), 
Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011)  
54 Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) use the ratio of long term debt to total assets as the proxy of debt ratio and the relevant 
data are obtained in the year of IPO for the sample firms. 
55 See Fama and French (2001) and Kale et al. (2012) for review. 
56 See Kale et al. (2012) for review. 
57 See Fama and French (2001), Denis and Osobov (2008), Eije and Megginson (2008), Bulan et al. (2007) and Kale et al. (2012) for 
review. 
58 As same as Allen and Michaely (1995) and Keim (1985), Farinha (2003) observe a negative relationship between dividend payout 




infusion (see Wu, Erkoc and Karabuk, 2005, for review) and thus undergo less agency 
costs of free cash flow than firms in conventional sectors undergo undergo. Therefore, 
the propensity of paying dividends for high-technology firms is expected to be 
relatively low. Besides, AIM (the alternative investment market), launched in June of 
1995, is an international market accommodating the growth and small firms. IPOs on 
AIM, in comparison to the main market, should display a greater reluctance to initiate 
dividends because of high growth. To sum up, above discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H13: Likelihood to initiate dividends negatively associates with R&D 
expenditure, capital expenditures, growth opportunities, high technology focus and AIM. 
3.2.3 Life-cycle 
To explain changes in dividend policy, Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002)59
 
 
explicitly propose a maturity hypothesis in which the preference in dividend policy 
shifts with the changes in growth opportunities, capital expenditures, profitability and 
free cash flows at different stages of corporation development. Specifically, young start-
ups are not in a position to disgorge earnings to shareholders because they need to inject 
capital to meet the need of abundant growth opportunities. In contrast, mature matures 
have higher profitability and shrinking investment opportunity, thereby overinvestment 
is material (Jensen, 1986). DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) and DeAngelo, DeAngelo 
and Stulz (2006) advance a more comprehensive explanation for the dynamic process of 
corporate dividend decisions by elaborating that there is a trade-off, which shifts along a 
life cycle of enterprise, between the advantage (e.g., agency cost savings) and 
disadvantage (e.g., cost of external financing) of distributing dividends. Consistent with 
the life cycle explanation of dividend policy, Fama and French (2001) find that 
dividends tend to paid by large firms with high profitability and less growth 
opportunities. In the context of life cycle, dividend activities of IPOs are related to a 
series of proxy variables including venture capital backing, lockup agreement and other 
financial variables. 
(1) Venture Capital Backing 
Looking at life cycle theory may locate a link between the venture capital involvement 
                                                 




and the dividend pattern of IPOs. A large body of literature suggests that venture 
capitalists prefer to invest into early-stage companies that are small, young and 
technology-focused (see Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; 
Lee and Wahal, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011). According to life cycle hypothesis, there is 
a negative correlation between venture capitalist participation and the likelihood of 
dividend payouts. In line with above argument, Jain et al. (2009) find that venture 
capitalist backed IPO firms prefer to delay dividend initiation. 
In addition, cumming and Johan (2008) suggest that venture capital institutions 
tend to select early stage high technology firms as investment targets since they aim at 
achieving investment returns from capital gains60
H14: There is a negative relation between venture capital participation and the 
propensity of dividend payments. 
. Lerner (1994) argues that previous 
empirical studies show that venture capitalists prefer short-term investment 
opportunities, and they are sensitive to lockup agreements. When Field and Hanka 
(2001) examine US lockup agreements, they find that venture capitalists often sell more 
aggressively than other shareholders do when lockup agreements finally expire, and 
three-day abnormal return volumes are much bigger if firms are financed by venture 
capitalists. In addition, Bradley and Roberts (2004) have similar findings. Thus, the 
following testable hypothesis is: 
 
(2) Lockup Agreement 
Previous studies produce some indirect signs linking lockup agreement with the 
dividend pattern of IPOs through lifecycle hypothesis. First of all, Brav and Gompers 
(2000, 2003) report results suggesting that young firms with a low ratio of book to 
market, a low cash flow margin, and low-quality underwriters usually adopt longer 
lockup periods. Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) test a hypothesis of whether 
the IPOs underwritten by prestigious underwriters have less need for lock-up 
agreements, but no significant evidence is produced. Chambers and Dimson (2009) find 
that the reputation of underwriter and the age of IPO are positively correlated. 
Assuming the arguments of Espenlaub et al. (2001), and Chambers and Dimson (2009) 
are consistent, it should follow that a firm’s maturity has a negative relation the severity 
of lockup agreements. Therefore, this leads to the following hypothesis. 
                                                 
60 Cumming and MacIntosh (2003), McKaskill, Weaver, and Dickson (2004) and Parhankangas, Landstrom, and Smith (2005) 
express the similar viewpoint. 
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H15: The severity of lockup agreements is negatively related to the propensity to 
initiate dividends. 
 
(3) Free Cash Flow and Growth opportunities  
Life cycle theory suggests that the extent to which a firm matures has a positive effect 
on the likelihood to pay dividends. Relative to young firms, mature firms are commonly 
characterized by large firm size, low growth and high profitability but shrinking R&D 
expenditure and capital expenditures. Of these variables, firm size, growth rate and 
profitability have been widely considered as life cycle factors in empirical studies, such 
as Fama and French (2001), Ferris et al. (2009) and Jain et al. (2009). A number of 
empirical studies document that dividend policy is associated with large firm size, lack 
of growth opportunities and high profitability (see Fama and French, 2001; Denis and 
Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Bulan et al., 2007; Kale et al., 2011 for 
review). Kale et al. (2012) find a significant and negative relation between the 
propensity to pay dividends and R&D expenditures. Nevertheless, the findings about 
capital expenditures are controversial in relevant studies 61
High technology firms need to retain residual capital to support R&D and 
marketing strategy since they face increasingly competitive environment, continuous 
technology transition and innovation create uncertainty (Wu, Erkoc and Karabuk, 2005). 
Consequently high-technology firms are often not in a position to pay dividends. The 
findings provided by DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004) and Jain et al (2009) are 
in line with this prediction. Likewise, firms issued on AIM are likely to be youger and 
to have high growth opportunities; therefore they are more likely to decline or postpone 
initiating dividends relative to those on the main market. Previous studies do not 
provide empirical results using AIM as an explanatory variable. As such, the testable 
hypothesis is as the following. 
. Moreover, Eije and 
Megginson (2008) conjecture that leverage can be positively associated with the degree 
of maturity, and if so, debt and dividends are complements. However, their tests do not 
support this argument. On the contrary, the results from univariate comparison of Jain et 
al (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) illustrate that dividend-paying IPOs have higher debt 
level than non-dividend-paying ones, consistent with the prediction of lifecycle 
hypothesis. However, this finding is not evident in the multivariate analysis. 
                                                 
61 Jain et al. (2009) do not find a significant effect of capital expenditures. Kale et al (2011) find a significantly negative effect in 
probit panel regressions but the counterpart finding in univariate analysis is opposite. 
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H16: The propensity of paying dividends is expected to be negatively associated 
with R&D expenditure, capital expenditures, the proxy of growth opportunities, high 
technology focus and AIM, and positively associated with firm size, profitability and 
leverage.  
3.2.4 Catering 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) argue that firms tend to initiate dividends when the market 
looks favorably on firms that pay dividends. Indeed, it could be argued that investors 
place a measure of sentiment on receiving dividend premiums62
H17: IPOs are associated with greater chance of initiating dividends when 
dividend premium is high, and smaller chance of initiating dividend when dividend 
premium is low. 
, and this is the main 
reason, apart from making profits, why they prefer dividend-paying stocks to non-
paying stocks. However, empirical evidence about what is known as ‘catering theory’ 
has produced controversial results. Baker and Wurgler, (2004a, 2004b), Li and Lie 
(2006), Ferris, Sen, and Yui (2006b), Neves (2006), Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal 
(2009), Jain, et al. (2009) and Kale, et al. (2012) provide the supportive evidence of 
dividend catering theory. On the contrary, the results presented by Julio and Ikenberry 
(2004), Hsieh and Wang (2006), Bulan, et al. (2007), Chay and Suh (2008), Hoberg and 
Prabhala (2008), Eije and Megginson (2008) and Denis and Osobov (2008) cast doubt 
on catering theory. In spirit of catering theory of dividends, I have the following 
hypothesis. 
 
To develop the testable hypotheses relating to the main dividend policies, the 
discussion so far focuses on the impact of each individual main IPO characteristics on 
the propensity to pay dividends. The full list of hypotheses together with supplementing 
references and predicted signs is in Table 3-1. 
 
                                                 
62 The measure of investor sentiment is dividend premium, which is measured as the difference between the logs of the average 
market-to-book ratios of payers and non-payers. 
98 
 
Table 3-1 Expected Signs of Explanatory Factors 
Main Hypotheses Indicator Factors Main Relevant Literature Exp Signa Obs Signb Empirical Evidencec d 
Signaling / 
Certification 
Underpricing Rock (1986), Ritter (1984), Beatty and Ritter (1986), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Michaely and Shaw (1994) - 
- Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
Mixed Kale et al. (2012) 
Underpricing Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) + , Welch (1989) 
- Michaely and Shaw (1994) 
Mixed Kale et al. (2012) 
Managerial Ownership Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989) + 
-  Eckbo and Verma (1994), Lasfer (1996) 
Mixed Kale et al. (2012) 
Lock-ups Brav and Gompers (2003) + , Espenlaub et al. (2001), Courteau (1995), Brau et al. (2005) No Brav and Gompers (2003) 
Institutional Ownership Allen et al. (2000), - Kale et al. (2012) - Kale et al. (2012) 
VC Backing Booth and Smith (1986), Megginson and Weiss (1991) + - Jain et al (2009) 





Managerial Ownership Rozeff (1982), Smith and Watts (1992), Gaver and Gaver (1993)  - 
- 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Dempsey and Laber (1992), 
Eckbo and Verma (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995), Collins, Saxena, 
and Wansley (1996), Chen and Steiner (1999), Faccio et al. 
(2001) 
No Casey and Dickens (2000), Hu and Kumar (2004), Morck et al. (1988), Schooley and Barney (1994) 
Lock-ups Brav and Gompers (2003), Espenlaub et al. (2001) - No Brav and Gompers (2003) 
Institutional Ownership Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Gillan and Starks (2000) - + Short et al(2002),Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
VC Backing 
Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lee and Wahal 
(2004), Krishnan et al. (2011), Chan (1983), Bergloff (1994), Hellmann 
(2002), Cumming and Johan (2008) 
- - Jain et al. (2009) 
Managerial Stock 
Option 
Fenn and Liang (2001), DeAngelo et al. (2004), - Denis and Osobov (2008) - 
Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner (2000), 
Fenn and Liang (2001) 
Leverage Jensen (1986), - Eije and Megginson (2008) - 
Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Jensen et al.(1992), Chen and 
Steiner (1999) 
+ Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) 
 
 Managerial Ownership 
Fama and Jensen (1983), Demsetz and Lehn (1985), Fenn and Liang 
(2001), Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011), + Farinha (2003) 
Mixed Fenn and Liang (2001), Kale et al. (2012) 









Brav and Gompers (2003), Espenlaub et al. (2001)  + No Brav and Gompers (2003) 
Institutional Ownership 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Zeckhauser and Pound (1990), Eckbo 
and Verma (1994), Farinha (2003) + , Shleifer and Vishny (1986), Gillan 
and Starks (2000),  
+ Short et al. (2002),Grinstein and Michaely (2005) 
VC Backing 
Barry et al. (1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Lee and Wahal 
(2004), Krishnan et al. (2011), Chan (1983), Bergloff (1994), Hellmann 
(2002) ,Cumming and Johan (2008) 
+ - Jain et al (2009) 
Managerial Stock 
Option Fenn and Liang (2001) + - 
Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner (2000), 
Fenn and Liang (2001) 
Leverage Jensen (1986), Eije and Megginson (2008) + 
- Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Jensen et al. (1992), Chen and Steiner (1999) 
Mixed Jain et al. (2009), Kale et al. (2012) 
Agency costs of free 
cash flow 
 
R&D Expenditure Fama and French (2001) - , Kale et al. (2012) 
Mixed Jain et al. (2009) 
- Kale et al. (2012) 
Capital Expenditures Kale et al. (2012) - 
No Jain et al. (2009) 
Mixed Kale et al. (2012) 
Growth Opportunity - Fama and French (2001) - 
Fama and French (2001), Denis and Osobov (2008),  
Eije and Megginson (2008), Bulan et al. (2007), Kale et al. 
(2012) 
Technology Intensity Liu (2000), Wu et al. (2005), - DeAngelo et al. (2004) Mixed Jain et al. (2009) 
AIM  -   
Life Cycle 
VC Backing 
Lerner (1994), Gompers (1995), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Gompers 
and Lerner (2000, 2003), Lee and Wahal (2004), Cumming and Johan 
(2008) and Krishnan (2011) 
- - Jain et al. (2009) 
Lock-ups Brav and Gompers (2003), Espenlaub et al. (2001) - 
No Brav and Gompers (2003) 
Firm Size + 
Fama and French (2001) 
+ Fama and French (2001), 
Bulan et al. (2007), 
Denis and Osobov (2008),  
Eije and Megginson (2008), 
Kale et al. (2012) 
Growth Opportunity - - 
Profitability + + 
R&D Fama and French (2001), - Jain et al. (2009) 
Mixed Jain et al. (2009) 




Capital Expenditures Jain et al. (2009) - 
No Jain et al. (2009) 
Mixed Kale et al. (2012) 
Leverage + Eije and Megginson (2008) 
- Eije and Megginson (2008) Crutchley and Hansen (1989) 
Mixed Jain et al (2009), Kale et al. (2012) 
Technology Intensity DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), Denis and Osobov (2008), - Jain et al. (2009) - DeAngelo et al. (2004), Jain et al. (2009) 
AIM  -   
Catering Catering + Baker and Wurgler’s (2004a)  
+ 
Baker and Wurgler’s (2004b) , 
Li and Lie (2006), 
Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) 
No Hoberg and Prabhala (2008), Denis and Osobov (2009), Hsieh and Wang (2006), Bulan et al. (2006) 
 
Table 3-1 summarizes the testable hypotheses discussed in section 3.2 and reports the expected signs suggested by literature as well as the observed signs in pervious empirical studies. These theoretical 
hypotheses cover the involved variables used in Chapter 3 and Chapter 4.  
a “Main related literature” sets out the primary theoretical studies that provide the theoretical background from which the hypotheses are drawn. These studies are underlined if they directly predict the 
direction of the relation between dividend policy and studied variable.   
b “Exp Sign” denotes the expected sign indicating the impact of indicator factors on the willingness of initiating dividends. The sign of “+” indicates a positive relation and “-” indicates a negative 
relation.   
c “Obs Sign” denotes the observed sign in empirical studies indicating the impact of indicator factors on the willingness of initiating dividends. In addition to the signs of “+” and “-”, “No” indicates that 
the observed sign in relevant studies is not statistically significant, and “Mixed” is marked when the result of multivariate regression model is not in line with that of univariate analysis. For example, 
Kale et al. (2012) find that the average underpricing for dividend-initiating companies is significantly lower than that for non-dividend-initiating companies in unvariate analysis, but this relation is not 
significant in multivariate analysis. 
d “Empirical Evidence” displays the evidence obtained from the empirical analysis that studies the relation between dividend policy and indicator factors. 
e “Bonding/Monitoring & Substitute” means that the relevant inferences are on basis of the combination of bonding/monitoring mechanism and substitute assumption. Rozeff (1982) originally 
hypothesize a substitute relation between insider stock ownership and dividend policy in sense of reducing agency costs. As stated by Fenn and Liang (2001), “Rozeff (1982) argues that insider stock 
ownership provides direct incentive alignment between managers and shareholders, while dividends serve as a bonding mechanism to reduce management's scope for making unprofitable investment out 
of internal funds. Thus, insider stock ownership and dividend policy are viewed as substitute means of addressing potential agency problems.” Jensen (1986) explicitly suggests debt substitutes for 
dividends as a promise to return excess funds. The spirit of substitute assumption is also similar to that of “substitute model” by LaPorta et al. (2000) in which, in countries where the investor protection 
is low, managers pay dividends in order to establish reputation for future external financing. 
f “Bonding/Monitoring & Complement” means that the relevant inferences are on basis of the combination of bonding/monitoring mechanism and complement assumption.  In light of “outcome model” 
by LaPorta et al. (2000), minority investors in countries with high investor protection may force insiders to payout cash flows, implying a complementary relation between strong corporate governance 
and high dividend payment. Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that high managerial ownership intensifies corporate governance and motivates managers to disgorge more cash flows. Grinstein and Michaely 
(2005) argue that institutional investors act as better monitors, so managers tend to increase dividends according to Jesen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. 
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3.3 Sample and Data  
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample comprises IPO firms listed on London Stock Exchange with an official 
admission date of between January 1st, 1990 and December 31, 2010. Information about 
the list of IPOs issued from June 27, 1995 to December 31, 2010 is obtained from The 
New Admissions Summary 63, which is publicly accessible from the London Stock 
Exchange official website. Information about the list of IPOs issued from January 1st
To guarantee that the data collected is valid for empirical analysis several 
exclusions are undertaken in the process of preparing the sample. Following criteria 
used in previous studies (e.g. Fama and French, 2001 and Denis and Osobov, 2008), 
IPO firms that belong to the industries of finance, investment and the utilities are 
excluded. Secondly, IPO firms are excluded if offering prospectuses are not available, 
or where offering prospectuses included incomplete information. Thirdly, IPO firms 
that presented erroneous information are excluded from the study. Consequently, the 
final sample comprised 1707 IPO firms. Table 3-2 shows the distribution of IPOs 
during 1990-2010, which is comparable to the studies of Chambers and Dimson (2009), 
and Hoque and Lasfer (2009). To observe whether the IPO firms started to pay 
dividends, I track the sample IPOs until they are delisted or the end of 2011, whichever 
is the earliest.  
, 
1990 to June 26, 1995 is from DataStream and checked against the offering 
prospectuses supplied by Perfect Filings.  
3.3.2 Data Description 
The variables employed in this paper are categorised into two types as IPO-related 
factors and basic financial accounting variables. IPO-related factors include: 
underpricing (i.e. first-day return), managerial stock ownership, length of lockups, 
percentage of locked-up shares, managerial stock option, institutional ownership, 
venture capital stakes, underwriter reputation, catering proxy (dividend premium), high 
technology dummy, and AIM dummy. The values of the IPO-related factors are fixed as 
                                                 
63 New Admissions Summary contains data regarding new issues from June 27, 1995. 
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at the time of IPO, and remained constant across the entire sample period. The raw data 
regarding IPO-related variables is hand-collected primarily from the offering 
prospectuses supplied by Perfect Filings. 
The basic financial accounting variables include firm size, profitability, growth 
opportunity, leverage, sales, research and development (R&D), capital expenditure, and 
working capital. The values of the financial variables are set as time-variant across the 
years included in the sample time period. The data on basic financial accounting 
variables and stock price is collected from DataStream. The London Stock Exchange 
statistics database is used to supplement the data relating to stock prices.  
The variables used in my empirical investigation are defined as follows: 
1. UNDERPRICING refers to under-pricing or initial return, which is the percentage 
difference between the offer price and the closing price on the first day of trading. All 
offer prices are sourced from prospectuses and checked against New Admissions 
Summary provided by London Stock Exchange. Closing prices for the first day of 
trading are sourced from DataStream and Bloomberg. 
2. DIRECTOR is the percentage of directors’ ordinary shares, immediately following 
admission.  
3. VC STAKE is the aggregate percentage of venture capital-backed stakes, 
comprising more than 3% of enlarged ordinary share capital, immediately following 
admission. In the prospectus information, under the section Directors’ and Other 
Interests, only non-director’s stakes of more than 3% of enlarged ordinary share capital 
are considered. In addition, following the model of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), 
venture capital-backed shares included venture capital or private equity funds. 
4. VC-BACKED is a dummy variable, which equals the value of 1 if the listing firm 
is VC-backed, and the value of 0 if otherwise. 
5. INSTITUTION is the aggregate percentage of institutional stakes which are more 
than 3% of enlarged ordinary share capital immediately following admission (See 
Hoque and Lasfer, 2009).  
6. OPTION is the percentage of executive stock options - measured as the number of 
shares of granted stock options divided by the enlarged ordinary shares after admission. 
7. There are four variables in relation to lockup agreements:  
• INSIDER LOCKUP and AGGREGATE LOCKUP refer to the locked-up director 
stakes and the aggregate locked-up stakes respectively. It is notable that insider 
shareholdings and the number of lockup directors’ shares are actually different items 
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since not all insider stock shares are subject to lockup agreements. Both Field and 
Hanka (2001) and Espenlaub et al. (2001) mention that the percentages of locked-up 
insider stock shares can be different in various lockup agreements. Moreover, lock-up 
agreement is a kind of mandatory discipline required by underwriters and must be 
accepted by issuing firms while managers are relatively free to decide how many they 
would like to retain previous shares. Therefore, insider stock ownership and locked-up 
director stakes may play as different roles in interacting with the decision to initiate 
dividends.  
Besides, the lockup period for firms on London Stock Exchange is usually 
subject to two stages; shares specified as being subject to lockup are not allowed to be 
disposed during the first stage, and can only be sold with the consent of the underwriters 
during the second stage.  
• LOCKUP DAYS refers to the log of the number of days for the first stage, and 
LOCKUP CONSENT refers to the log of the number of days for full lockup period 
including the first and the second stage.   
8. REPUTATION is a measurement of underwriter reputation, and is computed as 
the relative market share of the investment bank as underwritten at IPO issue 
(Megginson and Weiss, 1991) (See Appendix 3-1 for details). 
9. AIM is a dummy variable, which equals a value of 1 if a firm is listed on the 
Alternative Investment Market, and a value of 0 if otherwise. 
10. HITECH is a dummy variable, which equals a value of 1 if the firm is a high 
technology firm, and 0 if otherwise. Researchers and organizations often give diverse 
definitions of what they class as a high technology firm.  However, following Espenlaub 
et al. (2001), the definition used for this analysis classes high technology firms as those 
firms operating in sectors belonging to the TechMARK segment of the London Stock 
Exchange, such as Aerospace & Defence, Automobiles & Parts, Chemicals, Electronic 
& Electronic Equipment, Fixed Line Telecommunication, Health Care Equipment & 
Service, Mobile Telecommunications, Pharmaceuticals & Biotechnology, Software & 
Computer Service and Technology Hardware & Equipment.  
11. DP refers to Dividend Premium, which is a catering proxy calculated as the 
difference between the logs of the market to book values of dividend payers and non-
dividend payers (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). Please see variable (19) for details about 
the approach taken in respect of calculating market to book ratio. 
In addition, I use the following control variables (in case a variable is collected 
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from DataStream, the corresponding DataStream Code will be shown in the following 
brackets): 
• BUBBLE is defined as the ‘internet bubble’ period between 1999-2000 according to 
the theories of Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Levis (2008). 
• DUMMY2000S is a dummy variable, which is equal to 1 if IPOs are issued after 
December 31, 2000, but equal to 0 if otherwise. 
• LNGP is a proxy for firm size, defined as log (IPO proceeds). IPO proceeds is 
calculated as the gross amounts raised at IPO in millions of pounds, and identified 
by the issuing firm in its offering prospectus. 
• LNASST is a proxy for firm size, defined as log (Total Assets [07230]). 
• PROFIT is a proxy for profitability ratio, defined as (net income [07250] + interest 
expense if available [01075] + deferred taxes if available [03263]) / book value of 
total assets [07230] (See Fama and French, 2001 and Denis and Osobove, 2008). 
• MTBV (Market to Book Ratio) is a proxy for growth opportunities, measused (Total 
Assets [07230] – Common Shareholders’ Equity [03501] + Market Capitalisation 
[08001] / Total Assets [07230]). 
• LEVERAGE is a proxy for debt ratio, measused as Long-term debt [03251] / Total 
assets [07230]. 
• WCAP is a proxy for working capital, measused as Working capital [03151] / Total 
assets [07230]. 
• R&D is a proxy for Research & Development (R&D), measused as (R&D) [01201] / 
Total Assets [07230]. 
• CAPEXP is a proxy for capital expenditure, measured as Capital Expenditure per 
Share [05505] × Number of Shares [05326]/ Total Assets [07230]. 
 
Table 3-2 shows the propensity of firms to pay dividends out of 1707 UK IPOs 
issued during the period 1990–2010. Also, as illustrated by Fig 3-1, IPO firms that 
issued in the 2000s have lower probability to initiate dividends compared to in the 
1990s. It can be seen that a dramatic shift in proportion of dividend-initiating IPOs 
occurring between 1999 and 2000. Prior to 1999, the number of dividend initiating IPOs 
is greater than that of non-dividend initiating IPOs. However, after 2000 fewer IPOs 
chose to initiate dividends. For example, it is shown that 62% of IPOs that issued in 
2004 did not pay dividends until the end of 2010. These findings are consistent with the 
research of Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris, Sen and Unlu (2009) who argue that 
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an increase in non-paying newly listed firms account for a declining trend in divided 
payments.  
Over the entire sample period most dividend initiators started paying dividends 
in the first year after IPO. As reported in Table 3-2, over the full sample period, 524 of 
799 (65.58%) dividend-initiating IPO firms initiated dividends in the first post-IPO 
years. Only 18.15% of dividend-initiating IPO firms started dividend payments in the 
second year, and this proportion is much lower in the following years. McCaffrey and 
Hamill (2000) document similar findings, noting that 90% of 270 UK firms initiated 
dividends within the first year of going public for the period from 1982 to 1991. 
Comparable studies show that US firms have a smaller probability to initiate dividends 
in the first year after IPO in comparison with UK firms. Kale et al. (2012) find that 30.7% 
of dividend paying firms start paying dividends in the first post-IPO year using a sample 
of 6588 firms listed on the U.S. markets from 1979 to 2005. Also, in a sample of 445 
US firms, Jain et al. (2009) found that 49% of dividend firms initiated dividends within 
one year of going public from 1990 to 2000. 
The statistics show that UK IPOs postponed dividend initiation during the period 
of time associated with the ‘internet bubble’ in 1999 and 2000 (Jungqvist and Wilhelm, 
2003). Fig 3-2 shows that from 1990 to 2010, the average length of time between IPO 
issue and dividend initiation is between 200-600 days, with the exception of a surge in 
the internet bubble period. The results show that the percentages of dividend-initiating 
IPOs that initiate dividends within one post-year are 32%, 22%, 44%, 40% and 47% for 
the years 1999, 2000, 2001, 2002 and 2003, respectively, which are much lower than 











Table 3-2 Yearly Distribution of Dividend Initiations 
The table reports the evolution of firms that initiated dividends over post-IPO period. Column “Year” displays the 
IPO years during which IPO firms are issued. Column “IPO” displays the total numbers of IPOs. Column “Non-
payers” displays the number of non dividend-initiating IPOs. Column “Payers” displays the number of dividend-
initiating IPOs. Column “One” displays the number of dividend-initiating IPOs that start paying dividends within one 
calendar year (365 days) after IPO. Similarly, the following columns displays the numbers of IPOs that start paying 
dividends within two years (730 days), three years (1095 days), four years (1460 days) and more than four years after 
IPO, respectively. Parentheses in columns “Non-Payer” and “Payer” present the percentages of non-payers and 
payers respectively. Parentheses in following columns present the percentages of dividend-initiating IPOs that initiate 
dividends at different times. 
                                                                                                              
Year IPO Non-Payer Payer 
IPOs that initiated dividends at different post-IPO years 
One Two Three Four After Four 
1990 9 2 (22%) 7 (77%) 6 (85%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 1 (14%) 
1991 8 0 (0%) 8 (100%) 8 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
1992 21 4 (19%) 17 (80%) 17 (100%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 
1993 52 9 (17%) 43 (82%) 36 (83%) 3 (6%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) 4 (9%) 
1994 104 15 (14%) 89 (85%) 71 (79%) 13 (14%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 3 (3%) 
1995 78 26 (33%) 52 (66%) 40 (76%) 6 (11%) 2 (3%) 1 (1%) 3 (5%) 
1996 136 48 (35%) 88 (64%) 73 (82%) 9 (10%) 2 (2%) 0 (0%) 4 (4%) 
1997 98 29 (29%) 69 (70%) 53 (76%) 11 (15%) 1 (1%) 1 (1%) 3 (4%) 
1998 66 21 (31%) 45 (68%) 30 (66%) 11 (24%) 2 (4%) 0 (0%) 2 (4%) 
1999 62 31 (50%) 31 (50%) 10 (32%) 7 (22%) 0 (0%) 1 (3%) 13 (41%) 
2000 190 136 (71%) 54 (28%) 12 (22%) 6 (11%) 6 (11%) 2 (3%) 28 (51%) 
2001 81 52 (64%) 29 (35%) 13 (44%) 5 (17%) 3 (10%) 2 (6%) 6 (20%) 
2002 56 31 (55%) 25 (44%) 10 (40%) 9 (36%) 3 (12%) 2 (8%) 1 (4%) 
2003 54 37 (68%) 17 (31%) 8 (47%) 6 (35%) 2 (11%) 0 (0%) 1 (5%) 
2004 178 111 (62%) 67 (37%) 41 (61%) 15 (22%) 7 (10%) 2 (2%) 2 (2%) 
2005 212 149 (70%) 63 (29%) 35 (55%) 16 (25%) 1 (1%) 5 (7%) 6 (9%) 
2006 166 111 (66%) 55 (33%) 31 (56%) 19 (34%) 2 (3%) 2 (3%) 1 (1%) 
2007 84 57 (67%) 27 (32%) 19 (70%) 8 (29%) 0 (0%) 0 (0%) N/A 
2008 12 8 (66%) 4 (33%) 3 (75%) 0 (0%) 1 (25%) N/A N/A 
2009 3 2 (66%) 1 (33%) 1 (100%) 0 (0%) N/A N/A N/A 
2010 37 29 (78%) 8 (21%) 7 (87%) N/A N/A N/A N/A 



















3.4 Empirical Results 
3.4.1 Univariate Analysis 
Table 3-3-A presents the results of the univariate analysis in respect of the comparison 
between IPOs that initiate dividends and IPOs that do not initiate dividends. For each 
control group, the means, medians and standard deviations of indicator variables are 
figured out. T-statistics detailing the differences in mean values between control groups 









                                                                                                                     (3-1) 
In equation (3-1), 𝑀1and 𝑀2 are mean values of the indicator variables, 𝜎12 and 𝜎22 are 
the variances of the indicator variables, and 𝑁1  and 𝑁2  refer to the number of 
observations for control IPO groups.  
First, some results are consistent with the preceding US-based research. In 
accordance with Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012), dividend-initiating IPOs 
exhibit  lower underpricing (UNDERPRICING), are of a larger size (LNGP and 
LNASST), have higher profitability (PROFIT) and higher leverage (LEVERAGE), more 
reputable underwriters (REPUTATION), lower growth opportunities (MTBV) and lower 
R&D expenditure (R&D), comparing with non-initiating IPOs. Consistent with the 
results of Jain et al. (2009), IPOs that initiate dividends are associated with lower 
venture capital stakes (VC STAKE) and less likely to be high-technology companies 
(HITECH). Further, consistent with the results of Kale et al. (2012) IPOs that initiate 
dividends have higher directors’ stakes (DIRECTOR). However, there is no significant 
difference in institutional ownership (INSTITUTION) and capital expenditures 
(CAPEXP) between control groups. 
In addition, some new variables have not been examined in recent studies. The 
results provide a hint that the inclination to initiate dividends is adversely influenced by 
the severity of lockup agreement in terms of the proportion of locked-up shares and the 
length of lockup period. Specifically, in comparison to IPOs that did not initiate 
dividends, dividend-initiating IPOs are attached with lower aggregate locked-up shares 
(AGGREGATE LOCKUP) and shorter lockup periods (LOCKUP CONSENT). But the 
control groups are not found to differ significantly in locked-up director stakes 
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(INSIDER LOCKUP) and the first stage of the lockup period (LOCKUP DAYS).  
Moreover, the other significant relations indicated in the univariate analysis are 
as follows. Firms with a higher percentage of managerial stock options (OPTION) have 
a lower likelihood to initiate dividends. AIM IPOs (AIM) have a greater reluctance to 
make dividend payouts in comparison with main market IPOs. The level of working 
capital (WCAP) of dividend-initiating firms is lower than that of non dividend-initiating 
firms. 
Table 3-3-B presents the results regarding the comparisons between IPOs that 
initiate dividends at different times post IPO. “Within 1 Year” group includes IPOs that 
initiated dividends within the first post-IPO year. Accordingly, “Between 2 and 4 years” 
group includes IPOs that initiated dividends between 2 and 4 post-IPO years, and “After 
4 years” group includes IPOs that initiated dividends after 4 Post-IPO years.  
The comparison between “Within 1 Year” group and the “Between 2 and 4 years” 
group reveals that the earlier dividend initiations are negatively related with  
underpricing (UNDERPRICING), stock option (OPTION), working capital (WCAP), 
and the lockup period (LOCKUP CONSENT), and positively related with AIM, 
dividend premium (DP), firm size (LNGP, LNASST), and profitability (PROFIT).  
I also conduct the comparison between “Within 1 Year” and “After 4 years”. The 
results show that in addition to the relations revealed in the comparison between 
“Within 1 Year” group and the “Between 2 and 4 years” group, the earlier dividend 
initiations are also associated with lower proportion of aggregate locked-up shares 
(AGGREGATE LOCKUP), lower growth (MTBV), higher debt ratio (LEVERAGE) and 
technology focus (HITECH). The results in Table 3-3-A and Table 3-3-B jointly show 
that in many cases the characteristics associating with a greater (lower) likelihood to 
pay dividends will drive (impede) IPOs to start paying dividends earlier. 
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Table 3-3-A Means and Medians of Characteristics of Initiating and Non-Initiating IPOs 
Table 3-3-A compares the key variables between the group of Initiating IPOs and that of Non-Initiating IPOs. “Full Sample” represents all IPO firms in the sample. “Initiating IPO” comprises IPOs that 
initiated dividends from admission date to December 31, 2011 or delisted date, whichever is earlier. “Non-Initiating IPO” comprises IPOs that do not initiated dividends from admission date to 
December 31, 2011 or delisted date, whichever is earlier. Table 3-3-B compares the key variables among three groups: “Within 1 year”, “Between 2 and 4 years”, and “After 4 years”. “Within 1 Year” 
comprises IPOs that initiate dividends within the first post-IPO year. “Between 2 and 4 years” comprises IPOs that initiate dividends between two and four post-IPO years. “After 4 years” comprises 
IPOs that initiate dividends after four Post-IPO years. The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.*denotes the significance of differences between control groups at 10%, ** at 5% and *** 
at 1%, respectively.   
 
Variable 
Full Sample Initiating IPO (1) Non-Initiating IPO (2) T-stat of 
difference 
(1) (2) 
Obs Mean S.D. Median Obs Mean S.D. Median Obs Mean S.D. Median 
UNDERPRICING 1696 0.154 0.367 0.071 799 0.120 0.231 0.071 897 0.184 0.453 0.083 -3.711*** 
DIRECTOR 1707 0.302 0.242 0.263 799 0.312 0.252 0.263 908 0.292 0.233 0.248 1.707* 
VC STAKE 1707 0.126 0.183 0.000 799 0.105 0.171 0.000 908 0.144 0.191 0.056 -4.468*** 
INSTITUTION 1707 0.159 0.128 0.000 799 0.155 0.145 0.000 908 0.165 0.111 0.000 -1.583 
OPTION 1707 0.002 0.016 0.000 799 0.001 0.003 0.000 908 0.003 0.021 0.000 -3.993*** 
INSIDER LOCKUP 1538 0.266 0.239 0.197 799 0.261 0.248 0.197 908 0.270 0.230 0.229 -0.771 
AGGREGATE LOCKUP 1538 0.415 0.283 0.376 799 0.378 0.284 0.376 908 0.448 0.277 0.468 -5.102*** 
LOCKUP DAYS 1538 5.968 0.329 5.886 684 5.977 0.368 5.886 854 5.961 0.293 5.886 0.954 
LOCKUP CONSENT 1538 6.278 0.438 6.388 684 6.225 0.441 6.264 854 6.320 0.432 6.579 -4.212*** 
REPUTATION 1707 0.010 0.016 0.006 799 0.012 0.019 0.006 908 0.008 0.013 0.003 4.686*** 
AIM 1494 0.756 0.429 1.000 620 0.595 0.491 1.000 874 0.871 0.336 1 -12.105*** 
HITECH 1707 0.358 0.480 0.000 799 0.289 0.454 0.000 908 0.419 0.494 0 -5.642*** 
DP 1707 -0.368 0.125 -0.345 799 -0.34 0.138 -0.345 908 -0.393 0.107 -0.433 8.704*** 
LNGP 1707 0.423 0.682 0.569 799 0.613 0.659 0.569 908 0.256 0.659 0.240 11.181*** 
LNASST 1666 1.076 0.808 1.359 791 1.397 0.729 1.359 875 0.785 0.765 0.789 16.737*** 
MTBV 1664 3.377 3.144 2.209 791 2.934 2.456 2.209 873 3.778 3.613 2.689 -5.621*** 
PROFIT 1664 -0.100 0.339 0.066 791 0.063 0.181 0.066 873 -0.248 0.379 -0.133 21.635*** 
LEVERAGE 1664 0.076 0.134 0.016 791 0.102 0.146 0.016 873 0.053 0.117 0.000 7.619*** 
WCAP 1664 0.200 0.342 0.046 791 0.110 0.267 0.046 873 0.281 0.380 0.224 -10.714*** 
R&D 1664 0.004 0.551 0.000 791 -0.022 0.793 0.000 873 0.027 0.088 0.000 -1.710* 
CAPEXP 1664 0.051 0.071 0.029 791 0.053 0.066 0.029 873 0.049 0.076 0.015 1.250 
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Table 3-3-B Means and Medians of Characteristics of Dividend-Initiating IPOs at Different Times 
Variable 
Within 1 year (3) Between 2 and 4 years (4) T-stat of 
difference 
(3) (4) 
After 4 years (5) T-stat of 
difference 
(3) (5) 
Obs Mean S.D. Median Obs Mean S.D. Median Obs Mean S.D. Median 
UNDERPRICING 523 0.095 0.127 0.070 198 0.154 0.317 0.078 -2.527** 78 0.208 0.414 0.072 -2.387** 
DIRECTOR 523 0.295 0.244 0.242 198 0.326 0.259 0.293 -1.440 78 0.394 0.271 0.349 -3.034*** 
VC STAKE 523 0.100 0.166 0.000 198 0.115 0.183 0.000 -1.024 78 0.115 0.173 0.000 -0.714 
INSTITUTION 523 0.152 0.121 0.000 198 0.165 0.148 0.000 -1.120 78 0.147 0.118 0.000 0.355 
OPTION 523 0.000 0.001 0.000 198 0.001 0.006 0.000 -2.291** 78 0.001 0.005 0.000 -1.804* 
INSIDER LOCKUP 449 0.246 0.238 0.183 198 0.263 0.254 0.203 -0.805 78 0.356 0.281 0.320 -3.304*** 
AGGREGATE LOCKUP 449 0.368 0.277 0.367 198 0.377 0.299 0.360 -0.341 78 0.449 0.287 0.515 -2.331** 
LOCKUP DAYS 449 5.987 0.379 5.886 163 5.950 0.322 5.886 1.179 72 5.980 0.397 5.886 0.146 
LOCKUP CONSENT 449 6.196 0.453 6.176 163 6.293 0.405 6.479 -2.546** 72 6.254 0.429 6.292 -1.061 
REPUTATION 523 0.012 0.019 0.006 198 0.012 0.019 0.005 -0.032 78 0.014 0.022 0.004 -0.740 
AIM 372 0.492 0.501 0.000 179 0.765 0.425 1.000 -6.666*** 69 0.710 0.457 1.000 -3.587*** 
HITECH 523 0.266 0.442 0.000 198 0.263 0.441 0.000 0.085 78 0.513 0.503 1.000 -4.107*** 
DP 523 -0.320 0.143 -0.345 198 -0.368 0.110 -0.398 4.846*** 78 -0.407 0.132 -0.433 5.392*** 
LNGP 523 0.711 0.628 0.663 198 0.415 0.657 0.320 5.473*** 78 0.455 0.729 0.417 2.951*** 
LNASST 516 1.523 0.674 1.433 198 1.245 0.748 1.194 4.555*** 77 0.949 0.785 0.882 6.083*** 
MTBV 516 2.795 2.109 2.215 198 2.801 2.405 2.041 -0.034 77 4.208 3.966 2.759 -3.063*** 
PROFIT 516 0.094 0.107 0.077 198 0.048 0.204 0.055 3.022*** 77 -0.113 0.340 -0.028 5.326*** 
LEVERAGE 516 0.107 0.149 0.021 198 0.101 0.145 0.016 0.541 77 0.075 0.130 0.002 2.009** 
WCAP 516 0.082 0.231 0.041 198 0.135 0.285 0.066 -2.365*** 77 0.237 0.382 0.079 -3.489*** 
R&D 516 0.005 0.041 0.000 198 0.005 0.028 0.000 0.031 77 -0.270 2.541 0.000 0.951 









Table 3-4 Correlations between Key Variables 
The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2. 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) 
(1) UNDERPRING 1           
(2) DIRECTOR 0.0537 1          
(3) VC 0.0061 -0.2884 1         
(4) INSTITUTION -0.0450 -0.1534 -0.0803 1        
(5) OPTION 0.0157 -0.0383 -0.0097 -0.0190 1       
(6) INSIDER LOCKUP 0.0567 0.9452 -0.2765 -0.1432 -0.0343 1      
(7) AGGREGATE LOCKUP 0.0375 0.5030 -0.0500 -0.0413 -0.0382 0.5711 1     
(8) LOCKUP DAYS -0.012 0.052 -0.067 -0.013 -0.019 0.049 0.041 1    
(9) LOCKUP CONSENT 0.0122 0.0497 -0.0062 -0.0322 0.0265 0.0528 0.0719 0.5379 1   
(10) REPUTATION -0.0438 -0.1427 0.0341 0.0063 -0.0177 -0.1411 -0.0974 -0.1761 -0.2444 1  
(11) AIM 0.0623 0.1323 -0.0584 -0.0272 0.0603 0.1251 0.1401 0.0489 0.1634 -0.3901 1 
(12) HITECH 0.0525 -0.0019 0.0818 -0.0409 -0.0435 0.0054 0.0721 0.0041 -0.0017 0.0263 -0.0777 
(13) DP -0.0849 -0.0462 0.0555 0.0288 0.0274 -0.0315 -0.0346 0.0116 0.1311 0.0091 -0.0345 
(14) LNGP -0.1979 -0.1416 0.0519 0.0293 -0.1828 -0.1242 -0.0569 -0.0771 -0.1434 0.4891 -0.5482 
(15) LNASST -0.1037 -0.2158 0.1085 0.0123 -0.1195 -0.2188 -0.1956 -0.0936 -0.1120 0.4123 -0.4727 
(16) MTBV 0.0842 0.1523 -0.0583 0.0434 -0.0138 0.1628 0.1623 0.0141 0.0061 -0.0380 -0.0102 
(17) PROFIT -0.0100 0.0583 -0.0475 -0.0418 -0.0499 0.0433 -0.0423 0.0293 -0.0111 0.1165 -0.1852 
(18) LEVERAGE -0.0478 -0.0449 -0.0335 0.0008 -0.0296 -0.0475 -0.0943 -0.0146 -0.0655 0.1206 -0.1546 
(19) WCAP 0.0386 -0.0666 0.0488 0.0026 0.0281 -0.0587 0.0391 -0.0201 -0.0260 0.0001 0.0990 
(20) STAT -0.0880 0.2051 -0.1311 -0.0941 -0.0549 0.1973 0.0854 0.0807 0.0154 0.0215 -0.1998 
(21) R&D -0.0876 -0.0668 0.0334 0.0086 0.0009 -0.0689 -0.0301 0.0002 -0.0357 0.0096 -0.0151 
(22) CAPEXP -0.0790 0.0546 -0.0335 -0.0407 0.0088 0.0624 -0.0203 -0.0070 -0.0461 0.0462 -0.0848 
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Table 3-4-Continue Correlation Matrixes 
Variable (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22) 
(12) HITECH 1           
(13) DP -0.1164 1          
(14) LNGP 0.0655 0.0663 1         
(15) LNASST -0.1215 0.1331 0.6979 1        
(16) MTBV 0.2179 -0.069 0.0174 -0.2787 1       
(17) PROFIT -0.1314 0.0727 0.2028 0.4847 -0.2381 1      
(18) LEVERAGE -0.0990 0.0491 0.1207 0.2536 -0.0764 0.0810 1     
(19) WCAP 0.1680 -0.0541 0.0063 -0.0384 0.0391 -0.0317 -0.3106 1    
(20) STAT 0.0156 0.0234 0.1083 0.0529 0.0614 0.2963 0.1004 -0.3054 1   
(21) R&D 0.0584 0.0285 0.0083 0.0506 -0.0523 0.0463 0.0097 -0.0327 0.0187 1  








3.4.2 Multivariate Binary Logistic Regression Model  
In order to investigate the factors influencing the decision to initiate dividends, a 
multivariate logistic model equation is formulated.  
𝑙𝑜𝑔 �
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 1|𝑋𝑖)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖 = 0|𝑋𝑖)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                     (3 − 2) 
In this test, one observation corresponds to one firm that issued initial public 
offerings in the period from Jan 1st 1990 to Dec 31st 2010. The dependant variable takes 
on the value of 1 if a firm initiated dividend within three years post-IPO, and the value 
of 0 otherwise. Dividend initiation is defined as an event of a publicly trading firm 
made its first cash dividend payment during the post-IPO period. I apply this dependant 
variable mainly due to the following considerations. First, as Table 3-2 shown, 89% of 
dividend initiations in the sample occurred within three years after IPO (65% in the 1st 
year, 18% in the 2nd
In equation (3-2), Xi  represents the vector of control variables that defined in 
section3.3.2, and ‘i’ indicates the number of control variables in each model. The values 
of the explanatory variables are measured in the fiscal year of IPO, and, thus, this cross-
sectional logistic test does not capture the effect of time-varying factors. For instance, 
the values of profitability (PROFIT) should change over the post-IPO time in fact, but a 
cross-sectional logistic model only captures the predictive effect of firms’ profitability 
as recorded at time of IPO.  
 year, and 4% in the third year), thus whether or not a firm made the 
first dividend payment in three post-IPO years can reflect basically its inclination of 
paying dividends. Second, whilst there are 3 observations in 2009 and 37 observations 
in 2010 for which we can not observe whether they initiated in three post-IPO years, 
this will not affect significantly the robustness of the data since these observations only 
account for 2.34% of the sample population (1707). I also conduct two robust tests to 
check if my results are sensitive to the sample specification and the selection of 
dependant variable.  
Model verification is necessary for multivariate regression models in order to 
assure the robustness of estimation. Incorporating highly interrelated predictor variables 
that carry overlapping information can lead to the biased estimation of parameters64
                                                 
64 Kale et al. (2012) include more than twenty variables in one regression, thus the potential risk of multi-collinearity increases. 
. In 
this study, a set of measures are taken to reduce the risk of multicollinearity. First, 
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highly correlated variables such as LOCKUP DAYS and LOCKUP CONSENT that act 
as a proxy of the length of lockup, are not used in one regression specification at same 
time. Second, if the parameter estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of another control 
variable, the variable vector is adjusted in order to boost the adequacy of the model. 
Finally, the variable vector is verified by referring to the results obtained from the 
univariate analysis. If there is significant difference in results, the variable vector is 
adjusted as well. By taking these measures, eight model specifications are constructed. 
Models (1)-(4) control for the IPO-specific factors only and Models (5)-(6) control for 
both IPO-specific variables and financial accounting variables. 
Table 3-5 indicates some significant interrelationships that are consistent with 
the results obtained in univariate comparisons (Table 3-3-A, B). The estimated 
coefficients of managerial ownership (DIRECTOR), underwriter reputation 
(REPUTATION), catering proxy (DP), firm size (LNGP and LNASST), and profitability 
(PROFIT) are positive and significant in all models that include these relevant variables. 
Consistent with the signaling-based hypotheses, the higher director ownership 
(DIRECTOR) and the higher underwriter reputation (REPUTATION) provide the 
certification to high quality firms who have stronger motivation and necessity to pay 
dividends as signaling. The results on LNGP, LNASST and PROFIT support the 
lifecycle hypothesis as mature firms are characterized as large size and high profitability 
(e.g. Fama and French, 2001). The coefficients of LEVERAGE are significantly 
positive in all revolved models expect in Model (6) the coefficient is not significant (p-
value=0.128). Lifecycle hypothesis also provide a plausible explanation for the result on 
LEVERAGE as it is possible that at the IPO stage the established firms tend to have high 
debt ratio and more likely to pay dividends (Eije and Megginson, 2008).  
In contrast, the estimated coefficients of venture capital backing (VC-BACKED), 
venture capital-backed stakes (VC STAKE), managerial stock option (OPTION), AIM 
dummy (AIM), high-technology dummy (HITECH), dotcom bubble dummy (BUBBLE), 
2000s dummy (DUMMY2000S), market-to-book ratio (MTBV), R&D and working 
capital (WCAP) are all significantly negative in all models that include these relevant 
variables. These results can be related to free cash flow hypothesis and lifecycle 
hypothesis. For instance, IPOs issued on AIM, defined as a growth market, have 
relatively lower probability to initiate dividends since the cashflows generated need to 
be used to support investment opportunities. Similarly, previous studies suggest that 
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young and high growth firms are likely to be VC-backed65, committed to lockup shares 
for a longer period66 and from the technology-focused industries67
However, the results show that the coefficients of underpricing 
(UNDERPRICING) are negative in all model specifications but not significant in 
Models (3), (5), (6) and (7) which include firm size related control factors such as AIM, 
LNGP and LNASST. This suggests that the effect of underpricing on dividend decision 
is sensitive to the inclusion of the firm size. Similarly, the coefficients of the full lock-
up period (LOCKUP CONSENT) and the aggregate locked-up shares (AGGREGATE 
LOCKUP) are significant and negative in Model (2) and (8) respectively, consistent 
with the suggestions of substitution assumption of agency theory and lifecycle theory. 
But the coefficients of LOCKUP CONSENT and AGGREGATE LOCKUP are not 
significant in Model (6) and (4). The coefficient of capital expenditure (CAPEXP) is 
only significantly negative in Model (7). Besides, I find on significant coefficients for 
INSIDER LOCKUP length of first lock-up period (LOCKUP DAYS), and institutional 
ownership (INSTITUTION).  
. . It is not surprising 
that IPOs issued during internet bubble period are less likely to pay dividends since they 
are normally more technology-focused. The finding on DUMMY2000S may suggest a 
tendency that the newly listes firms are becoming more reluctant to pay dividends (e.g. 
Fama and French, 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008). The findings on VC-BACKED,VC 
STAKE and OPTION are in line with the substitute assumption of agency costs which 
suggests that dividends and other instruments of addressing agency conflicts adversely 
related. 
      
                                                 
65 See Lerner (1994), Gompers (1995), Bergemann and Hege (1998), Lee and Wahal (2004), and Krishnan et al.(2011) 
66 See Brav and Gompers (2000, 2003) 
67 See DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (2004), Denis and Osobov (2008), and Jain et al. (2009) 
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Table 3-5 Logistic Regressions on Whether Firms Initiate Dividends within Three Years Post-IPO 
The table reports the results from estimating logistic regressions on a sample of IPOs during the period 1990-2010. The dependent variable equals to one if an IPO firm initiated dividend during the three 
post-IPO years, whichever is the earliest, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.The t-statistics of the differences between control groups are presented as well. *, 
**, and ***denote significance at 10%, at 5% and at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNDERPRICING -0.462** -0.444** -0.167 -0.604** -0.593 -0.771 -0.292 -1.214*** 
 (0.015) (0.021) (0.329) (0.010) (0.254) (0.259) (0.264) (0.061) 
OPTION -1.10*** -1.088*** -0.754*** -0.853*** -0.77** -0.723** -1.42** -0.987** 
 (0.008) (0.01) (0.009) (0.006) (0.033) (0.041) (0.015) (0.015) 
INSTITUTION -0.302 -0.48766     -0.500 -0.593     
 (0.488) (0.26)     (0.370) (0.316)     
DIRECTOR     0.985***       0.785***   
     (0.000)       (0.010)   
VC STAKE   -1.17647***   -0.831**   -1.030***   -0.556 
   (0.000)   (0.011)   (0.009)   (0.128) 
VC-BACKED -0.508***   -0.560***   -0.478***   -0.544***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.001)   (0.000)   
INSIDER LOCKUP 0.194       -0.369       
 (0.426)       (0.271)       
AGGREGATE LOCKUP       -0.174       -0.465* 
       (0.430)       (0.090) 
LOCKUP DAYS     0.257       0.258   
     (0.185)       (0.211)   
LOCKUP CONSENT   -0.496***       -0.214     
   (0.000)       (0.178)     
REPUTATION       22.719***       10.010** 
       (0.000)       (0.023) 
AIM     -1.883***       -1.894***   
     (0.000)       (0.000)   
HITECH     -0.614*** -0.632***     -0.608*** -0.461*** 
     (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.002) 
DP 3.309*** 3.195***     2.517*** 1.968***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000)     
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BUBBLE     -0.603***       -1.530***   
     (0.001)       (0.000)   
DUMMY2000S       -1.674***       -1.350*** 
       (0.000)       (0.000) 
LNGP         0.567***       
         (0.000)       
LNASST           0.815***     
           (0.000)     
MTBV         -0.132***     -0.102** 
         (0.001)     (0.013) 
PROFIT         9.205*** 8.496***   8.828*** 
         (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
LEVERAGE         2.692*** 0.850 1.651*** 3.006*** 
         (0.000) (0.128) (0.001) (0.000) 
WCAP           -1.626*** -0.887***   
           (0.000) (0.000)   
R&D         -0.431***     -0.377*** 
         (0.000)     (0.003) 
CAPEXP         -1.293   -1.725* -1.641 
         (0.200)   (0.070) (0.119) 
Constant 1.422*** 4.441*** -0.129 1.268*** 1.090*** 1.299 -0.038 1.245*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.912) (0.000) (0.000) (0.223) (0.976) (0.000) 
N 1527 1527 1354 1527 1496 1495 1326 1496 










3.4.3 Cox Proportional Hazard Model  
In addition to examining the decision to initiate dividends, this chapter investigates the 
decision-making on the timing of dividend initiation. To fulfill this objective, I employ 
Cox Proportional Hazard model (Cox model) which is extensively applied in survival 
analysis because of its nature to estimate factors that influence the timing of events on 
censored observations (Shumway, 2001; Bulan et al., 2007; Jain et al. 2009; Kale et al. 
2011). The fundamental formulation of Cox model is: 
ℎ(𝑡) = ℎ0(𝑡)𝑒(𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+⋯+𝑏𝑘𝑥𝑘)                                                                                     (3 − 3) 
In Equation (3-3), ℎ(𝑡) represents the hazard function, which can be estimated 
as the proportion of individuals who experience the event of interest in a certain time 
interval (Allison, 1995 and LeClere, 2000). The equation h0(t) represents the baseline 
hazard or the hazard for an individual when all the covariates are equal to 0. The hazard 
function or the log of the hazard function is a function of the control variable (𝑥1, 𝑥2,⋯𝑥𝑘) and the parameters of the covariates (𝑏1, 𝑏2,⋯𝑏𝑘). Coefficients of the 
proportional hazards model are estimated by maximizing the partial likelihood 68
In this test using Cox model, the event of interest is the incidence of dividend 
initiation, and IPO firms that did not initiate dividends are censored until they started to 
pay dividends or were delisted. Time to event is measured as the number of days from 
the IPO date to the date when firms left the sample because of dividend initiation, 
delisting or takeover or to December 31, 2011.The model specifications are as same as 
the logistic models in Table 3-5. A positive (negative) coefficient indicates that there is 
a positive relation between the control variables and the incidence of event. According 
to Allison (1995), a hazard ratio represents the percentage change of the hazard caused 
by a unit increase in the covariate when controlling for other covariates.  Relative 
Hazard Ratio can be formulated as: 
, 
suggesting that the baseline hazard function h0(t) did not have to be specified. In other 
words, h0(t) is an unknown parameter in the process of estimation, thus Cox model can 
be described as a kind of semi-parametric model.  
ℎ(𝑡)
ℎ0(𝑡) = 𝑒(𝑏1𝑥1+𝑏2𝑥2+⋯+𝑏𝑘𝑥𝑘)                                                                                                      (3-4) 
When controlling for other covariates, the hazard ratio of a certain control 
                                                 
68 Efron (1977) suggests that partial likelihood estimation is efficient, especially when applied to the analysis of a large sample.   
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variable is equal to 1 when the corresponding parameter is valuated as 0 (i.e. 𝑒0=1). 
This means that the associated covariate does not have any effect on the timing of 
dividend initiation. A hazard ratio which exceeds1 represents that the associated 
covariate causes an earlier dividend initiation. In contrast, a hazard ratio of less than 1 
indicates that the associated covariate brings about delayed dividend initiation. 
Table 3-6 details the results from estimating the multivariate Cox model. 
Overall, the variables with a positive (negative) effect on the decision to distribute 
dividends will trigger a shorter (longer) duration between IPO and the first dividend 
payment. The results show that the time to dividend initiation generally shortens as the 
increase in the values of directors’ ownership (DIRECTOR), underwriter reputation 
(REPUTATION), catering proxy (DP), firm size (LNGP and LNASST), profitability 
(PROFIT) and long-term debt ratio (LEVERAGE). Accordingly, all these control 
variables have hazard ratios that are greater than 1, suggesting that these factors 
stimulate IPOs to speed up dividend initiation. For instance, as reported in Model (4), 
underwriter reputation (REPUTATION) is shown to be a highly efficient interpreter for 
the timing of dividend initiation as its hazard ratio of 120.24. 
In line with the results from the logistic models (Table 3-5), the estimated 
coefficients of venture capital involvement (VC-BACKED), venture capital stakes (VC 
STAKE), full lockup period (LOCKUP CONSENT), AIM dummy (AIM), high-
technology dummy (HITECH), dotcom bubble dummy (BUBBLE), DUMMY2000S and 
working capital (WCAP) are significantly negative. Besides, Managerial stock option 
(OPTION) has significant and negative parameters in the majority of the interrelated 
models except for Model (6) (p-value=0.175). In addition, the corresponding relative 
hazard ratios for these variables are less than one. These results suggest that these 
factors interrelate with the delay of dividend initiation.  
Some control variables are not significant in all affiliated models. For example, 
the coefficients of underpricing (UNDERPRICING) are negative and significant in 
Models (1), (2), (4), (6) and (8) but insignificant in Models (3), (5), and (7) when size 
factors (AIM, LNGP and LNASST) are controlled. This suggests that underpricing has a 
general adverse influence on the time to dividend initiation, but this influence is 
sensitive to firm size. Similarly, the coefficient of locked-up managerial shares 
(INSIDER LOCKUP) is significant at 10% level in Model (1) but insignificant in Model 
(5) and (8). Market-to-book ratio (MTBV) is negative and significant at 1% and 10% in 
Model (5) and Model (8) respectively. Moreover, institutional ownership 
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Table 3-6 Cox Proportional Hazard Models on The Timing of Dividend Initiation 
The table presents the results from estimating Cox Proportional Hazard Models for IPOs during the period 1990-2010. The dependent variable is the hazard function (see Allison, 2000). HR is the 
hazard ratio as defined in Equation (3 - 4).The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.The p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. *denotes significance 
at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
UNDERPRICING -0.415*** 0.661 -0.449*** 0.638 -0.148 0.862 -0.476*** 0.621 
 (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.302)  (0.002)  OPTION -0.872** 0.000 -1.077*** 0.000 -0.783** 0.000 -0.723** 0.000 
 (0.037)  (0.008)  (0.022)  (0.026)  INSTITUTION -0.343 0.710 -0.239 0.787         
 (0.177)  (0.469)        DIRECTOR         0.498*** 1.646     
       (0.007)     VC STAKE     -0.818*** 0.441     -0.516** 0.597 
    (0.000)     (0.018)  VC-BACKED -0.402*** 0.669     -0.365*** 0.694     
 (0.000)     (0.001)     INSIDER LOCKUP -0.267* 0.766             
 (0.050)           AGGREGATE LOCKUP             -0.168 0.846 
          (0.165)  LOCKUP DAYS         0.078 1.081     
       (0.565)     LOCKUP CONSENT     -0.361*** 0.697         
    (0.000)        REPUTATION             9.395*** 120.243 
          (0.000)  AIM         -1.430*** 0.239     
       (0.000)     HITECH         -0.547*** 0.578 -0.517*** 0.596 
       (0.000)  (0.000)  DP 2.567*** 13.024 2.514*** 12.356         
 (0.000)  (0.000)        BUBBLE         -0.728*** 0.483     
       (0.000)     DUMMY2000S       -1.057*** 0.348        (0.000)  
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N 1696  1527  1354  1696  
χ 166.17 2  125.69  235.16  267.37  
Variable (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio Coefficient Hazard Ratio 
UNDERPR -0.198 0.820 -0.322* 0.725 -0.154 0.857 -0.509*** 0.095 
 (0.136)  (0.065)  (0.332)  (0.001)  OPTION -0.355* 0.00 -0.463 0.00 -0.769*** 0.00 -0.679*** 0.000 
 (0.064)  (0.175)  (0.009)  (0.001)  INSTITUTION -0.266 0.767 -0.109 0.897         
 (0.383)  (0.762)        DIRECTOR         0.429** 1.535     
       (0.048)     VC STAKE     -0.669*** 0.512     -0.311 0.166 
    (0.002)     (0.171)  VC-BACKED -0.302*** 0.740     -0.331*** 0.718     
 (0.000)     (0.000)     INSIDER LOCKUP -0.174 0.840             
 (0.349)           AGGREGATE LOCKUP             -0.216 0.117 
          (0.137)  LOCKUP DAYS         0.072 1.074     
       (0.606)     LOCKUP CONSENT     -0.227*** 0.797         
    (0.011)        REPUTATION             6.177*** 880.723 
          (0.001)  AIM         -1.357*** 0.257     
       (0.000)     HITECH         -0.458*** 0.632 -0.150* 0.078 
       (0.000)  (0.098)  DP 1.728*** 5.631 1.569*** 4.800         
 (0.000)  (0.000)        BUBBLE         -0.632*** 0.531     
       (0.000)     DUMMY2000S             -0.806*** 0.036 
          (0.000)  LNGP 0.395*** 1.485             
 (0.000)           LNASST     0.479*** 1.615         
    (0.000)        
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MTBV -0.057*** 0.945         -0.036** 0.015 
 (0.001)        (0.023)  PROFIT 2.999 20.072 2.845*** 17.197     2.643*** 2.164 
 (0.000)   (0.000)     (0.000)  LEVERAGE 1.676*** 5.344 0.816** 2.261 1.279*** 3.594 1.785*** 1.598 
 (0.000)  (0.012)  (0.000)  (0.000)  WCAP     -0.830*** 0.436 -0.550*** 0.577     
    (0.000)  (0.000)     R&D -0.209 0.811         -0.206*** 0.037 
 (0.823)        (0.000)  CAPEXP -0.296 0.744     -0.797 0.451 -0.095 0.507 
 (0.640)     (0.163)  (0.864)  N 1663  1495  1326  1496  




(INSTITUTION), aggregate locked-up shares (AGGREGATE LOCKUP), length of first 
lock-up stage (LOCKUP DAYS), R&D ratio and capital expenditure ratio (CAPEXP) 
demonstrate no constant significant relationship to initiation timing.  
3.4.4 Multivariate Logistic Panel Regression Model 
In order to analyse the impact of time series financial accounting variables on the 
decision of paying dividends, I use panel data methodology which has the advantage 
over cross-sectional data in capturing the dynamics of variables and provides more 
efficient econometric estimates by increasing the number of data points (Hsiao, 
Mountain and Ho-Hillman, 1995). In this section, time-series proxy variables include 
size (LNASST), growth opportunities (MTBV), profitability (PROFIT), long-term debt 
ratio (LEVERAGE), capital expenditures (CAPEXP) ， R&D and working capital 
(WCAP). In addition, the IPO-related variables used in the previous tests are still 
controlled.  
The panel sample is constructed following a procedure developed by Kale et al. 
(2012). Dividend initiation is defined as an event of a publicly trading firm made its 
first cash dividend payment during the post-IPO period. If a firm initiated dividends 
from its IPO date to December 31, 2011, it is defined as a dividend-paying firm at the 
year of dividend initiation, and as a non-dividend paying firm for all the preceding years. 
Firms are taken out of the sample once they started paying dividends. However, if a firm 
did not initiate dividends until December 31, 2011, or its delisted date, it is defined as a 
non-dividend paying firm. Therefore, the tested sample is subject to an unbalanced pool 
data (Wooldridge, 2002).  
The formulation of the multivariate logistic panel regression is as follows:  𝑙𝑜𝑔 �𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 1|𝑋𝑖𝑡)
𝑃(𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 0|𝑋𝑖𝑡)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡                                                                                (3 − 4) 
In equation (3-4), the firm-year dependent variable is a dichotomous variable, which 
assumes the value of 1 if a firm initiated dividends and 0 otherwise. Xit represents the 
vector of control variables as defined in section 3.3.2 for each sample year. For each 
individual ‘i’ in the population, there a binary response 𝑦𝑖𝑡 applies for each sample year. 




It is crucial that the time-series correlated standard errors for the logistic panel 
model should be validated (Wooldridge, 2002). Petersen (2009) points out that clustered 
standard errors are likely for panel regressions and that the bootstrap method69
Table 3-7 shows the results from estimating the unbalanced panel logistic model. 
The coefficients of lifecycle variables including LNASST, MTBV and PROFIT are 
highly significant and have the same signs as suggested by previous studies such as 
Fama and French (2001) who argue that large firms with low growth opportunities and 
high profitability tend to pay dividends. However, contrary to the prediction of free cash 
flow hypothesis, the results show that dividend-initiating firms have a higher level of 
capital expenditures (CAPEXP). Recent relevant papers (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije 
and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009; Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012) do not control for 
capital expenditures in their regressions on dividend policy. Fama and French (2001) 
(P.16) state that ‘some readers express a preference for capital expenditures (roughly the 
change in long-term assets), rather than the change in total assets, to measure 
investment. Our view is that short-term assets are investments.’ A possible signaling-
based explanation is that high capital expenditures signal firms’ capability to sustain 
future dividend payments.  
 is a 
solution for addressing correlated standard errors (e.g. Efron and Tibshirani, 1986; 
Horowitz, 2001; Kayhan and Titman, 2007). Testes conducted by Cheng, Nagar, Rajan 
(2005), Petersen (2009), and Greene (2010) show that the bootstrapping procedure is 
efficient in detecting and correcting the clustered standard errors. Also, Bulan et al. 
(2007) and Kale et al. (2012) apply the method of bootstrapping to estimated standard 
errors in probit or logit panel regression models. Therefore, I use the bootstrapping 
method with 200 iterrations to deal with the time-series clustering in this section.  
The results also show that LEVERAGE is positive and significant in Model (7) 
and (8). However, when I control for firm size using LNASST in Model (5) and (6), the 
coefficient of LEVERAGE is not significant. Working capital (WCAP) is significantly 
negative in Model (6), but this factor becomes insignificant in Model (7). However, 
R&D is not significant in all models (Model (5) and (8)). Moreover, the remaining 
results in respect of IPO-related elements are qualitatively in line with the results 
obtained from cross-sectional logistic analysis and Cox models. One exception is that  
                                                 
69 Bootstrapping is a popular re-sampling method and Monte Carlo simulation. It can be used as an alternative to using asymptotic 
approximations for detecting standard errors, confidence intervals, and p-values for test statistics. Computer simulations can be used 
to estimate complicated non-linear models when traditional optimization methods are not effective (Wooldridge 2000). The equation 
for Bootstrap Estimation of Standard Error is:  𝑠𝑒�𝐵�𝜃� ∗� = � 1
𝐵−1
∑ (𝜃�(𝑏) − 𝜃� ∗����)2𝐵𝑏=1 , where 𝜃� ∗����= 1𝐵 ∑ 𝜃�(𝑏)𝐵𝑏=1  
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Table 3-7 Logistic Regression on Decision to Initiate Dividends basing on Unbalanced Panel Data 
The table presents the results from estimating logistic panel regressions on the sample of all the firms that conducted 
IPOs during the period 1990-2010. A firm is defined as a dividend initiator in the year of dividend initiation and as a 
non-dividend initiator for all preceding years. If a firm starts paying dividend then it will be excluded from the 
sample. If a firm does not initiate dividends until the end of 2010 or delist date, it is classified as non-dividend 
initiator for all years. One observation refers to one firm in one observed year. The dependent variable is a 
dichotomous variable that equals to one if one observation initiates dividend and zero otherwise. The explanatory 
variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. 
*denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNDERPRICING -0.359* -0.477** -0.582** -0.299 
 (0.077) (0.044) (0.044) (0.123) 
OPTION -57.642* -82.695** -114.678** -68.772** 
 (0.077) (0.024)* (0.020)* (0.032) 
INSTITUTION -0.347 -0.105     
 (0.376) (-0.826)     
DIRECTOR     0.816**   
     (0.012)   
VC STAKE   -1.036***   -0.389* 
   (0.001)   (0.099) 
VC-BACKED -0.436***   -0.509***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   
INSIDER LOCKUP -0.301       
 (0.156)       
AGGREGATE LOCKUP       -0.148 
       (0.354) 
LOCKUP DAYS     0.211   
     (0.263)   
LOCKUP CONSENT   0.037     
   (0.771)     
REPUTATION       7.145** 
       (0.020) 
AIM     -1.959***   
     (0.000)   
HITECH     -1.006*** -0.299*** 
     (0.000) (0.007) 
DP -0.108 0.002     
 (0.792) (0.995)     
BUBBLE     -0.328*   
     (-0.074)   
DUMMY2000S    -1.314*** 
    (0.000) 
LNASST 0.806*** 0.870***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     
MTBV -0.095***     -0.155*** 
 (0.001)     (0.000) 
PROFIT 7.106 6.579   6.212*** 
 (0.000)** (0.000)**   (0.000) 
LEVERAGE -0.046 0.169 0.857** 0.865*** 
 (0.905) (0.690) (0.038) (0.010) 
WCAP   -0.497** -0.142   
   (0.012) (0.426)   
R&D -0.482     -0.386 
 (0.827)     (0.746) 
CAPEXP 3.025***   2.612*** 2.041*** 
 (0.000)   (0.001) (0.001) 
Constant -2.626*** -3.109*** -1.900 -0.598*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.094) (0.000) 
Obs 6303 5735 5532 6303 
χ 335.8 2 304.61 256.27 511.29 
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the full length of lock-up period (LOCKUP CONSENT) does not have explanatory 
power in Model (6). 
 
3.5 Robustness Tests 
In this section, I test for robustness of my results from estimating cross-sectional 
logistic regressions, Cox proportional hazard model regressions and logistic panel 
regressions. 
3.5.1 Robustness Test for Cross-sectional Logistic Regression Model 
Firstly, I carry out two logistic regression models to check the results reported in Table 
3-5. In the first checking logistic regression model, the dependant variable is set as one 
if a firm initiated dividends within one post-IPO year and zero otherwise. Comparing 
with the original logistic model for which the dependant variable has a value of one if 
dividend initiation happened within three post-IPO year, the checking logistic regression 
allows the IPOs in 2009 and 2010 to be estimate as equally as the earlier IPOs in other 
years. However, it undermines the sample representativeness as it treats the 2nd
In the second checking regression model, the dependent variable equals to one if an IPO 
firm initiated dividend from admission date to December 31, 2010 or delisted date, 
whichever is the earliest, and zero otherwise. It boosts the sample representativeness by 
distinguishing all the dividend initiating firms form non-initiating firms. However, it 
does not estimate equally the IPOs issued in different years.  
-year 
payers who account for 18% of dividend initiating IPO firms as non-payers. 
Table 3-8 and Table 3-9 report the results from estimating the two logistic 
regression models. In general, these estimates are qualitatively similar to the results 
reported in Table 3-5. All coefficient signs are unchanged except for the coefficient of 
R&D in Table 3-8, Model (8). There are some changes in the significance of the 
estimated coefficients. For instance, different from the results in original model, the 
coefficients of managerial ownership are not significant using the first checking 
regression (Table 3-8). However, the estimated coefficients of managerial ownership 
using the second checking regression (Table 3-9) are positive and significant, consistent 
with Table 3-5. Therefore, the empirical results are not different significantly. 
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Table 3-8 Logistic Regressions on Whether Firms Initiate Dividends within One Post-IPO Year 
The table presents the results from estimating logistic regressions on a sample of IPOs during the period 1990-2010. The dependent variable equals to one if an IPO firm initiated dividend during the one 
post-IPO year, whichever is the earliest, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.The t-statistics of the differences between control groups are presented as well. *, 
**, and ***denote significance at 10%, at 5% and at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNDERPRICING -1.079*** -1.112*** -0.427 -1.468*** -0.863** -1.226*** -0.469 -1.759*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.140) (0.000) (0.025) (0.005) (0.133) (0.000) 
OPTION -4.346** -4.14** -2.785 -3.361* -1.764 -1.712 -2.623 -2.456* 
 (0.031) (0.030) (0.142) (0.055) (0.139) (0.114) (0.128) (0.099) 
INSTITUTION -0.615 -0.668     -0.894 -1.069*     
 (0.180) (0.154)     (0.120) (0.071)     
DIRECTOR     0.477       0.491   
     (0.122)       (0.119)   
VC STAKE   -1.161***   -0.737*   -1.298***   -0.709* 
   (0.001)   (0.056)   (0.003)   (0.085) 
VC-BACKED -0.526***   -0.641***   -0.554***   -0.643***   
 (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   (0.000)   
INSIDER LOCKUP -0.415       -0.389       
 (0.123)       (0.239)       
AGGREGATE LOCKUP       -0.350       -0.535* 
       (0.165)       (0.066) 
LOCKUP DAYS     0.291       0.278   
     (0.196)       (0.227)   
LOCKUP CONSENT   -0.587***       -0.408**     
   (0.000)       (0.012)     
REPUTATION       14.867***       6.870 
       (0.001)       (0.144) 
AIM     -2.141***       -2.048***   
     (0.000)       (0.000)   
HITECH     -0.645*** -0.756***     -0.533*** -0.365** 
     (0.000) (0.000)     (0.001) (0.026) 
DP 4.216*** 4.131***     3.060*** 2.546***     
 (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.000)     
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BUBBLE     -1.897***       -1.744***   
     (0.000)       (0.000)   
DUMMY2000S       -1.891***       -1.681*** 
       (0.000)       (0.000) 
LNGP         0.728***       
         (0.000)       
LNASST           0.836***     
           (0.000)     
MTBV         -0.118***     -0.092** 
         (0.005)     (0.022) 
PROFIT         7.505*** 7.065***   7.212*** 
         (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) 
LEVERAGE         2.379*** 0.669 1.344*** 3.011*** 
         (0.000) (0.227) (0.008) (0.000) 
WCAP           -1.695*** -0.912***   
           (0.000) (0.000)   
R&D         -0.369***     0.154 
         (0.000)     (0.918) 
CAPEXP         -1.225   -1.709 -1.577 
         (0.234)   (0.103) (0.135) 
Constant 1.415*** 4.814*** -0.590 0.953*** 0.675** 2.191** -0.478 0.895*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.663) (0.000) (0.015) (0.042) (0.733) (0.000) 
N 1527 1527 1354 1527 1496 1495 1326  











Table 3-9 Logistic Regressions on Whether Firms Initiate Dividends post IPO 
The table presents the results from estimating logistic regressions on the sample of IPOs during the period 1990-2010. The dependent variable equals to one if an IPO firm initiated dividend from 
admission date to December 31, 2011 or delisted date, whichever is the earliest, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.The t-statistics of the differences between 
control groups are presented as well. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNDERPRICING -0.428*** -0.444** -0.167 -0.574*** -0.277 -0.332 -0.186 -0.709* 
 (0.010) (0.021) (0.330) (0.006) (0.233) (0.250) (0.308) (0.090) OPTION -0.888** -1.09*** -0.754*** -0.697** -0.293* -0.437* -0.761** -0.529** 
 (0.018) (0.010) (0.009) (0.018) (0.061) (0.070) (0.011) (0.037) INSTITUTION -0.569 -0.487   -0.498 -0.448    
 (0.138) (0.261)   (0.267) (0.388)    DIRECTOR   0.985***    1.023***   
   (0.000)    (0.000)   VC STAKE  -1.177***  -0.883***  -1.154***  -0.678** 
  (0.000)  (0.005)  (0.001)  (0.044) VC-BACKED -0.639***  -0.560***  -0.585***  -0.529***   
 (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)   INSIDER LOCKUP -0.266    -0.145     
 (0.234)    (0.597)     AGGREGATE LOCKUP    -0.277    -0.222 
    (0.155)    (0.378) LOCKUP DAYS   0.240    0.215   
   (0.217)    (0.281)   LOCKUP CONSENT  -0.490***    -0.294  
**   
  (0.000)    (0.039)    REPUTATION    21.129***    13.872*** 
    (0.000)    (0.004) AIM   -1.882***    -1.774***   
   (0.000)    (0.000)   HITECH   -0.614*** -0.652***   -0.519*** -0.285** 
   (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.050) DP 3.382*** 3.189***   2.125*** 1.521***    
 (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000) (0.002)    BUBBLE   -0.605***    -0.452**   
   (0.001)    (0.014)   DUMMY2000S    -1.646***    -1.358*** 
    (0.000)    (0.000) 
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LNGP     0.577***     
     (0.000)     LNASST      0.616***    
      (0.000)    MTBV     -0.056*   -0.023 
     (0.084)   (0.501) PROFIT     6.125*** 5.351***  5.852*** 
     (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) LEVERAGE     2.444*** 1.088** 1.936*** 2.836*** 
     (0.000) (0.043) (0.000) (0.000) WCAP      -1.281*** -0.771***   
      (0.000) (0.000)   R&D     -2.285*   -0.805 
     (0.081)   (0.516) CAPEXP     -0.318  -1.017 -0.428 
     (0.728)  (0.266) (0.665) Constant 1.719*** 4.401*** -0.025 1.329*** 1.126*** 2.196** 0.060 1.142*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.983) (0.000) (0.000) (0.020) (0.960) (0.000) 
N 1696 1527 1354 1696 1663 1495 1326 1496 
Pseudo R 0.072 2 0.071 0.145 0.157 0.309 0.318 0.171 0.333 
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3.5.2 Robustness Test for Cox Proportional Hazard Model 
I run the ordered logistic regressions to check the robustness of the results regarding the 
timing of initiating dividends (Table 3-6). When an event of interest has more than two 
categories, and when the values of each category have a meaningful sequential order, 
the ordinal model is an appropriate method of estimation. In this research, the ‘ordered 
response’ can be the timing of dividend initiation. In line with the classification used in 
the univariate analysis (section 3.4.1), IPO companies are categorised into three groups: 
the “Within 1 year” group, the “Between 2 and 4 years” group, and the “After 4 years” 
group. These dependent variables are given the value of 1, 2 and 3 for companies in 
three ordered groups respectively, and this enabled all observations in this sample to be 
ordered according to the timing of dividend initiation. The formula used is as follows: log�𝑃𝑗� = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                                             (3 − 5)  Xi corresponds is the vector of control variables as defined in section 3.3.2, and ‘i’ is the 
number of control variables in each model. Notably, equation (3-5) regresses 𝑃𝑗  (𝑗 = 1, 2)  on the predictor variables, and the number of odds is the number of 
categories minus one. 
𝑃1 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 1 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑃𝑂)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 1𝑠𝑡 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑃𝑂)                                                             (3 − 6) 
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑛 4 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟𝑠 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑃𝑂)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝐼𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑚 𝑡ℎ𝑒 5𝑡ℎ 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑒𝑟 𝐼𝑃𝑂)                                                      (3 − 7)  
The terms (βj)  are designed to play a similar role as the intercept term in binary logistic 
model. However, the coefficients βi   are the same for all odds. It’s notable that the signs 
of estimated coefficients are expected to be opposite to the corresponding ones of 
logistic models, since a greater dependent variable represents a longer waiting period 
and a lower propensity to initiate. For example, profitable firms are more likely to 
initiate dividends, thus, the coefficient of profitability is positive in logistic models. By 
comparison, should profitable firms are more likely to initiate earlier, the coefficient of 
profitability tend to be negative in ordered regression models since the dependant 
variables are rated as a low number (1 versus 2 and 3, and 1 and 2 versus 3 for example).  
Table 3-10 reports the results from estimating the ordered logistic regressions 
and shows that firm size (LNGP and LNASST), profitability (PROFIT) and catering 
proxy (DP) have significant and positive coefficients. Consistently, these variables 
show a negative relationship with the decision to initiate dividends in logistic analysis. 
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By comparison, venture capital involvement (VC-BACKED), AIM dummy (AIM), and 
dotcom bubble (BUBBLE), and 2000s dummy (DUMMY2000S) which are negatively 
related the decision to initiate dividends, affect positively the IPO firms decision to 
postpone dividend initiations. In addition, whereas insider lockup (INSIDER LOCKUP) 
does not show any predictive power in the logistic regressions, its coefficient is 
significantly positive in ordered regressions. 
More predictor variables do not display a constant statistical significance in the 
regressions. For example, underpricing (UNDERPR) is significant at 10% level in 
models (1), (2), (4), (5) and (8), but insignificant in the remaining models. Similar 
results are observed for venture capital stake (VC), institutional ownership 
(INSTITUTION), managerial stock options (OPTION), aggregate lockup period 
(LOCKUP CONSENT), high-technology dummy (HITECH), long-term debt ratio 
(LEVERAGE), and ratio of working capital to total assets (WCAP). These results 
indicate that the explanatory power of these factors is sensitive to the inclusion of other 
control variables.  
Furthermore, directors’ ownership (DIRECTOR), aggregate locked-up shares 
(AGGREGATE LOCKUP), underwriter reputation (REPUTATION), market to book 
ratio (MTBV), R&D investment (R&D), and capital expenditure (CAPEXP) are not 










Table 3-10 Ordered Logistic Regressions on the Timing of Dividend Initiation 
The table presents the results from estimating ordered logistic regressions on the sample of IPOs during the period 1990-2010. The dependent variable equals to 1 if the dividends are initiated within 1 
year. The dependent variable equals to 2 if the dividends are initiated during 2- 4 years after IPO. The dependent variable equals to 3 if the dividends are initiated after 4 years of IPO. The explanatory 
variables are as defined in Section 3.3.2.The t-statistics of the differences between control groups are presented as well. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
UNDERPRICING 1.116 1.231*** 0.326 ** 1.410 0.630*** 0.693 * 0.310 1.143 
 (0.004) (0.022) (0.533) (0.002) (0.060) (0.176) (0.565) (0.045) 
DIRECTOR     0.018       -0.060   
     (0.964)       (0.893)   
VC STAKE   0.585   0.315   0.832   * 0.557 
   (0.172)   (0.452)   (0.075)   (0.232) 
VC-BACKED 0.359   ** 0.404   ** 0.414   ** 0.419   ** 
 (0.017)   (0.042)   (0.013)   (0.034)   
INSTITUTION 1.110 0.657 **     1.171 1.030 *     
 (0.042) (0.253)     (0.065) (0.130)     
OPTION 0.56 0.977* 0.939*** 0.619 ** 0.428 0.787 0.965** 110.451 ** 
 (0.081) (0.009) (0.019) (0.111) (0.173) (0.027) (0.021) (0.023) 
INSIDER LOCKUP 0.758   ***     0.671   **     
 (0.009)       (0.048)       
AGGREGATE LOCKUP       0.066       0.390 
       (0.785)       (0.239) 
LOCKUP DAYS     -0.300       -0.324   
     (0.311)       (0.349)   
LOCKUP CONSENT   0.363   **     0.267     
   (0.046)       (0.186)     
REPUTATION       -1.211       -0.189 
       (0.775)       (0.968) 
AIM     1.370   ***     1.342   *** 
     (0.000)       (0.000)   
HITECH     0.336 0.416*   **   0.279 0.430 
     (0.065) (0.023)     (0.219) (0.016) 
DP -3.483 -3.637***   ***   -2.802 -2.649***   ***   
 (0.000) (0.000)     (0.000) (0.001)     
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BUBBLE     2.585   ***     2.515   *** 
     (0.000)       (0.000)   
DUMMY2000S       1.122   ***     1.149 
       (0.000)       (0.000) 
LNGP         -0.534   ***     
         (0.002)       LNASST           -0.665   ***   
           (0.000)     MTBV         0.073     0.077 
         (0.110)     (0.079) PROFIT         -3.283 -3.739***   *** -3.648 
         (0.000) (0.000)   (0.000 LEVERAGE         -0.569 -0.120 -0.366 -1.802 
         (0.303) (0.873) (0.626) (0.006) WCAP           1.206 0.504 ***   
           (0.000) (0.225)   R&D         -0.048     -1.605 
         (0.977)     (0.480) CAPEXP         1.280   1.574 1.496 
         (0.322)   (0.281) (0.256) CUT1 2.457 4.509 0.171 1.566 1.854 2.520 0.076 1.702 
CUT2 4.163 6.128 2.236 3.304 3.748 4.427 2.159 3.566 
N 799 684 540 799 791 677 537 678 
χ 61.070 2 47.190 73.780 55.350 109.100 102.050 130.860 66.160 
Pseudo R
 




3.5.3 Robustness Test for Logistic Panel Regression Model 
Petersen (2009) notes that clustering in estimating panel regression models can result in 
biased standard errors. To examine the robustness of the estimates from logistic panel 
regression, I use the Linear Probability Models (LPM) with Newey-West, Generalized 
Least-Squares (GLS) and Fama-MacBeth 70
In Equation (3-8), 𝐲𝒊𝒕 takes on a value of 1 if a firm-year observation paid 
dividends and 0 otherwise. 𝐗𝒊𝒕  represents the vector control variables as defined in 
section 3.3.2 for each sample year.  𝛆𝒊𝒕 is the error term. 
 procedures. The formulation is as the 
following: 
𝒚𝒊𝒕 = 𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝒊𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝜺𝒊𝒕                                                                                                        (𝟑
− 𝟖) 
Table 3-11 presents the results from estimating Model (5)-(8)71. In general, the 
results from LPM using different methods to correct t-statistics are consistent with the 
results from logistic panel regressions. In particular, the coefficients of LNASST, MTBV, 
PROFIT and CAPEXP are virtually the same under different methods, indicating the 
effects of these variables are robust. In addition, the estimation using GLS generates the 
most similar results as those resulted from unbalanced panel logistic models. However, 
there is some evidence that the OLS and the Newey-West methods appear to understate 
the standard errors72
 
 in line with Petersen (2009). For example, Table 3-9-A shows that 
the coefficient of R&D is significant in Newey-West regression but not significant at 








                                                 
70  According to Fama-MacBeth method (See Fama and MacBeth, 1973; Fama and French, 2001), the slope coefficients are 
estimated by averaging the coefficients from the annual models over the sample period. 
71 The estimates of dividend premium are not valid when using Fama-MacBeth because all firms have the same values of DP in a 
sample year.   





Table 3-11 Linear Probability Model basing on Unbalanced Panel Data 
This table reports the results from estimating Linear Probability Model regressions (Equation (3-8)). Dependent 
variable takes on a value of 1 if a firm-year observation paid dividends and 0 otherwise.  Explanatory variables are 
defined in section 3.3.2 for each sample year.   
 
Variable Newey-West GLS Fama-Macbeth 
Model (5) 
 
UNDERPRICING -0.018*** -0.043** -0.464 
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.340) VC-BACKED -0.038*** -0.067*** -0.019 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.541) INSTITUTION -0.022 -0.071 -0.385 
 (0.483) (0.180) (0.172) OPTION -0.476*** -0.899** -5.689 
 (0.000) (0.021) (0.258) INSIDER LOCKUP -0.026 -0.042 -0.004 
 (0.164) (0.163) (0.959) DP 0.051 0.037 (omitted) 
 (0.145) (0.288)  LNASST 0.057*** 0.099*** 0.060** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.017) MTBV 0.005*** 0.001 -0.081 
 (0.000) (0.579) (0.197) ROA 0.214*** 0.110*** 0.639** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.044) LEVERAGE 0.045 -0.036 -0.173 
 (0.189) (0.342) (0.533) R&D -0.020* -0.009 8.468 
 (0.086) (0.451) (0.330) CAPEXP 0.333*** 0.394*** 0.231 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.155) Constant 0.109*** 0.158*** 0.293** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.060) N 6303 6303 6303 
R
 
2  0.089 0.216 F 70.730 452.330 1.960 
 *** *** * Model (6) 
 
UNDERPRICING -0.021*** -0.047 0.238 
 (0.001) (0.011) (0.351) VC STAKE -0.072*** -0.146*** -0.204 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.229) INSTITUTION 0.013 -0.042 -0.145 
 (0.689) (0.475) (0.267) OPTION -0.378*** -0.766* -9.847 
 (0.000) (0.057) (0.191) LOCKUP CONSENT -0.001 -0.025 0.024 
 (0.898) (0.124) (0.480) DP 0.011 0.027 (omitted) 
 (0.754) (0.445)  LNASST 0.057*** 0.100*** 0.089** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.027) ROA 0.194*** 0.094*** 0.275*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.003) LEVERAGE 0.060 -0.015 -0.060 
 (0.102) (0.701) (0.587) WCAP -0.047*** -0.022 0.084 
 (0.000) (0.128) (0.360) Constant 0.112 0.292*** -0.042 
 (0.068) (0.005) (0.868) N 5735 5735 5735 
R
 
2  0.082 0.210 F 71.450 365.360 2.740 
 *** *** ** Model (7) 
 UNDERPRING -0.023*** -0.046** -0.026 
 (0.001) (0.023) (0.384) 
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DIRECTOR 0.050*** 0.048 0.070** 
 (0.007) (0.166) (0.040) VC-BACKED -0.031*** -0.060*** -0.023** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.035) OPTION -0.423*** -0.900** -5.502* 
 (0.000) (0.043) (0.090) LOCKUP DAYS 0.020 0.031 -0.025 
 (0.160) (0.198) (0.160) AIM -0.155*** -0.264*** -0.127*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) HITECH -0.075*** -0.097*** -0.090*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.005) BUBBLE -0.033** -0.020 (omitted) 
 (0.023) (0.134)  LEVERAGE 0.129*** 0.014 0.108** 
 (0.000) (0.725) (0.040) WCAP -0.012 -0.002 -0.011 
 (0.211) (0.902) (0.468) CAPEXP 0.229*** 0.238*** 0.144* 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.074) Constant 0.125 0.252 0.378** 
 (0.136) (0.089) (0.020) N 5532 5532 5532 
R
 
2  0.065 0.085 F 26.350 302.500 5.820 





UNDERPRICING -0.016** -0.041** -1.078 
 (0.017) (0.015) (0.294) VC STAKE -0.034 -0.086** 0.660 
 (0.103) (0.013) (0.303) OPTION -0.528*** -1.127*** -9.385 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.140) AGGREGATE LOCKUP -0.002 -0.057 -0.057 
 (0.901) (0.013) (0.415) REPUTATION 0.938*** 1.323*** 2.875 
 (0.009) (0.001) (0.310) HITECH -0.038*** -0.052*** -0.131 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.460) DUMMY2000S -0.192*** -0.135*** (omitted) 
 (0.000) (0.000)  MTBV -0.002* -0.007*** 0.418 
 (0.059) (0.000) (0.360) PROFIT 0.201*** 0.151*** -0.175 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.744) LEVERAGE 0.089*** 0.036 -1.438 
 (0.010) (0.329) (0.359) R&D -0.006 -0.001 -3.643 
 (0.024) (0.920) (0.331) CAPEXP 0.229*** 0.353*** 1.149 
 (0.001) (0.000) (0.373) Constant 0.312*** 0.370*** -0.221 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.667) N 6303 6303 6303 
R
 
2 0.147 0.133 0.218 
F 81.550 507.180 0.970 











3.6 Findings and Conclusions 
In this chapter, I use various methodologies to assess the impact of IPO characteristics 
on the decision to initiate dividends in the post-IPO period. I develop various 
hypotheses by combining the various determinants of dividends with the IPO theories. 
In identifying the theoretical links and interpreting the observed empirical results, I 
focus on the signaling, agency costs, life cycle and catering theories of dividends. I 
hand-collect all the data from prospectuses, including offer price to calculate 
underpricing, lockups, institutional ownership, management holdings, venture 
capitalists and managerial stock option. In addition, I use IPOs fundamental variables 
such as firm size, leverage, growth opportunities, R&D expenditure, capital 
expenditures and working capital.  
I use univariate analysis, cross-sectional logit, and unbalanced logistic panel 
regressions to examine the indicator factors that distinguish IPOs with dividend 
initiation from those without dividend initiation. Importantly, measures are taken to deal 
with the time series correlation for panel data analysis. In addition, by using Cox 
Proportional Hazard (CPH) models, I investigate the timing of dividend initiations. To 
test for the robustness of my results, I use cross-sectional ordinal logit models and linear 
probability models (LPM). The overall results (as summarized in Table 3-12) illustrate 
that those indicator factors causing greater (smaller) incidence to initiate dividends will 
be associated with shorter (longer) time intervals between IPO and dividend initiation. 
The main findings can be generalized as following: 
3.6.1 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
My results show that underpricing (UNDERPRICING) is negatively associated with the 
probability of dividend initiation and the early dividend initiation. This finding 
coincides with Michaely and Shaw (1994) who find underpriced IPOs tend to pay low 
dividends. The negative effect of underpricing on dividend initiation cannot be 
explained by Allen and Faulhaber’s (1989) IPO signaling high-quality IPO firms 
arrange low offer prices so that they are able to interpret future high dividends more 
favorably. Instead, this result is in line with the implication of Dividend Discount Model 
and Rock’s “winner’s curse” (1986). Specifically, paying no dividends or postponing 
the dividend payment means the information asymmetry is substantial, so the issuing 
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firms would intentionally lower the offer price to compensate the uninformed investors. 
The alternative argument can be that underpriced IPO firms usually confront ex ante 
uncertainty which impede the dividend payments. 
Both managerial ownership (DIRECTOR) and underwriter reputation 
(REPUTATION) are positively associated with IPOs’ propensity to pay dividends, in 
support of dividend signaling theory. Informed managers of high-quality IPOs tend to 
retain a large fraction of shares (Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977) and wish signal information by 
distributing dividends. Similarly, prestigious underwriters provide certification for 
“good” firms (Booth and Smith, 1986) who have strong motivation and capability to 
initiate dividends.  
By contrast, VC backing (VC STAKE, VC-BACKED) and the length of full lock-
up restriction period (LOCKUP CONSENT) are found to be the factors with negative 
effect on the inclination to pay dividends. The alternative variables proxy for lock-ups 
such as INSIDER LOCKUP, AGGREGATE LOCKUP and LOCKUP DAYS also show 
negative effect on the initiation propensity, but these results are not statistically solid. In 
information equilibrium, these results suggest that IPOs substitute their dividends for 
these factors as signaling device since these factors are shown in previous studies to 
mitigate the level of information asymmetries (Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Brav and Gompers, 2003; Espenlaub et al., 2001; Courteau, 1995; Brau et 
al., 2005). For example, we may argue that the information asymmetry would become 
more serious if no dividends are paid out and in such case the more restrictive lockup 
provisions will be required. Moreover, I find no evidence the institutional ownership 
has significant influence on the decision to initiate dividends of IPOs.  
3.6.2 Agency Costs 
The findings that the propensity of paying dividends is negatively influenced by the full 
lockup restriction period (LOCKUP CONSENT), VC backing (VC STAKE; VC-
BACKED) and managerial stock option (OPTION) provide support for the substitute 
assumption of agency costs which suggests that weak corporate governance leads to 
higher demand of dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; 
Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 2000; Officer, 2006). For example, IPOs who 
define longer lockup restriction periods (LOCKUP CONSENT) find it less necessary to 
reduce agency costs by paying dividends, because the lockup agreements bond the 
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interests of directors and investors (Brav and Gompers, 2003). These results are in 
accordance with results from some previous studies. Jain et al. (2009) find that VC 
backing (VC STAKE; VC-BACKED) negatively affects the likelihood to initiate 
dividends. The documented negative effect of managerial options (OPTION) is 
consistent with findings reported by Smith and Watts (1992), Yermack (1995), 
Weisbenner (2000), and Fenn and Liang (2001). And, the finding in respect of 
managerial options is consistent with the argument of Lambert, Lanen and Larcker 
(1989) who suggest that executive stock options motivate managers to reduce dividends 
because they are not “dividend protected. 
By contrast, the results regarding managerial ownership (DIRECTOR) and 
leverage (LEVERAGE) lend support for the complement assumption of agency costs 
which suggests that strong corporate governance accompanies higher dividend payment 
(LaPorta et al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). Both proxy 
variables are positively associated with the inclination of IPOs.  
My results also show the strong evidence that IPOs’ preference to initiate 
dividends is adversely influenced by the growth opportunities (MTBV) and technology 
intensity (HITECH). And companies issued on AIM which is defined as a high growth 
market are more reluctant to initiate dividends relative to those issued on main market. 
These results are consistent with free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986). 
3.6.3 Life-Cycle 
The findings that VC backing and lockup agreement have negative effect on the 
dividend policy of IPOs are consistent with the suggestion of life cycle theory in which 
mature firms instead of young firms are in a better position to pay dividends. Previous 
literature (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and 
Lerner, 2000, 2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Cumming and Johan, 2008 and Krishnan et 
al., 2011) suggests that venture capitalists prefer to invest into early-stage companies 
that are small, young and technology-focused. Likewise, Brav and Gompers (2000, 
2003) find that young firms are associated with longer lockup periods. The other 
explanation for the negative effect of VC backing can be that venture capitalists prefer 
short-term capital gains to long-term future dividends stream (Lerner, 1994 and Field 
and Hanka, 2001). 
IPO firms with larger size (SIZE), higher profitability (ROA) and lower growth 
142 
 
opportunities (MTBV) are found to be more likely to initiate dividends and pay earlier, 
in line with previous studies (Fama and French, 2001; Bulan, et al., 2007; Denis and 
Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009 and Kale et al., 2011).  In 
addition, the findings that IPOs from high technological industry and AIM are reluctant 
to initiate dividend coincide with life cycle hypothesis since these firms are commonly 
considered as young and high growth. In addition, the positive signs of leverage 
(LEVERAGE) shown in results are consistent with life cycle hypothesis because high 
leverage may simply indicate that firms are in mature stage (Eije and Megginson, 
2008).However, the negative signs, which are expected under lifecycle hypothesis, for  
R&D Expenditure (R&D) and Capital Expenditures (CAPEXP) can only be found in 
univariate analysis. 
3.6.4 Catering 
Finally, the tests show that the IPOs issued in the years when markets put a price 
premium on dividend paying payers (DP) are more likely to become dividend payers 
and tend to initiate dividends earlier, consistent with the implication of catering theory 
(Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 
To sum up, common firm characteristics and IPO-related factors can affect 
dividend decisions of IPOs through miscellaneous mechanisms of dividends. The most 
homogeneous results are associated with the life cycle theory and catering theories. 
There are also some empirical results in support of signaling and agency theory. The 
empirical tests do not negate any of the major dividend theories. For example, the 
results about underpricing, institutional ownership or lock-ups contradict the predictions 
of signaling theory. But the signs of the alternative proxy variables, such as directors’ 
ownership and underwriter reputation, are in the direction as predicted by signaling 
theory.  
An issue worthy of discussion is that, in some cases, different theories do lead to 
the same predictions for some proxy variables. For example, both signaling theory and 
the complement assumption of agency costs predict a positive relation between 
managerial ownership and the likelihood of paying dividends.  For such case, finding 
support for particular theories can be difficult. This may suggests that, in some cases, 




Table 3-12 Summaries of Results 
Main Hypotheses Indicator Factors Proxy Variables Exp Sign Univariate Logit CPH Panel Logit Ordinal Logit LPM+GLS  
Signaling / Certification 
Underpricing UNDERPRICING + - - - - No -  
Managerial Ownership DIRECTOR + + + + + No No √ 
Lock-ups 
INSIDER LOCKUP + No No No No - -  
AGGREGATE LOCKUP + - No No No No   
LOCKUP DAYS + No No No No No No  
LOCKUP CONSENT + - - - No No No  
Institutional Ownership INSTITUTION + No No No No No No  
VC Backing 
VC STAKE + - - - - No -  
VC-BACKED +  - - - - -  
Underwriter Reputation REPUTATION + + + +  No  √ 
  Bonding/Monitoring & 
Substitute  
Managerial Ownership  DIRECTOR - + + + + No No  
Lock-ups 
INSIDER LOCKUP - No No No No - -  
AGGREGATE LOCKUP - - No No  No   
LOCKUP DAYS - No No No No No No  
LOCKUP CONSENT - - - - No No No √ 
Institutional Ownership  INSTITUTION - No No No No No No  
VC Backing 
VC STAKE - - - - - No - √ 
VC-BACKED -  - - - - - √ 
Managerial Stock Option  OPTION - - - - - - - √ 
Leverage  LEVERAGE - + + + No No No  
   
Managerial Ownership  DIRECTOR + + + + + No No √ 
Lock-ups 
INSIDER LOCKUP + No No No No - -  
AGGREGATE LOCKUP + - No No  No   
LOCKUP DAYS + No No No No No No  
LOCKUP CONSENT + - - - No No No  
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VC + - - - - No -  
VC-BACKED +  - - - - -  
Managerial Stock Option  OPTION + - - - - - -  
Leverage  LEVERAGE + + + + No No No √ 
Agency costs of free cash flow 
R&D Expenditure  R&D - - No No No No No  
Capital Expenditures  CAPEXP - - No No - No -  
Growth Opportunity  MTBV - - No - - No - √ 
Technology Intensity  HITECH - - - - - No - √ 
AIM  AIM - - - - - - - √ 
  Life cycle 
VC Backing 
VC - - - - - n - √ 
VC-BACKED -  - - - - - √ 
Lock-ups 
INSIDER LOCKUP - No No No No - -  
AGGREGATE LOCKUP - - No No  No   
LOCKUP DAYS - No No No No No No  
LOCKUP CONSENT - - - - No No No √ 
Firm Size  LNGP,LNASST + + + + + + + √ 
Growth Opportunity  MTBV - - No - - No - √ 
Profitability  PROFIT + + + + + + + √ 
R&D Expenditure  R&D - - No No No No No  
Capital Expenditures  CAPEXP - - No No - No -  
Leverage  LEVERAGE + + + + No No No √ 
Technology Intensity  HITECH - - - - - No - √ 
AIM  AIM - - - - - - - √ 
 Catering Dividend Premium  DP + + + + No + No √ 
 
* For definitions of proxy variables please refer to Section 3.3.2 
* No denotes that there is no robust evidence found in tests 
* √ denotes that the observed sign is generally in accordance with the excepted sign. 
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Appendix 3-1 Definition of Underwriter Reputation 
There are two widely used measures of underwriter reputation in the empirical IPO 
literature. Previous studies also introduced other measures of underwriter reputation, 
such as the dummy variable of the global underwriters in Derrien and Kecskes (2007), 
and the dummy variable of Accepting Houses Committee (AHC) in Chambers and 
Dimson (2009). Carter and Manaster (1990) measure reputation using underwriters’ 
relative positions in the ‘tombstone’ advertisements in the financial press that follow the 
completion of an IPO. Megginson and Weiss (1991) use the relative market share of the 
underwriter, which is comparably simple, as it requires less effort to construct, and it is 
practical and its effectiveness has been confirmed. Carter, Dark, and Singh (1998) point 
out that the proxy used in their tests is correlated with Carter and Manaster (1990) and 
Megginson and Weiss (1991). In practice, the choice of measure results has not 
substantial impact on the results. In this paper, the market share of each underwriter is 
measured as the IPO proceeds of each underwriter generated from 1990 to 2010 divided 
by the total amount of IPO proceeds of all sample firms during the same period. When 

































































When a firm wishes to trade on the London Stock Exchange, it is required by law to 
outline its proposed dividend policy in a publically available IPO prospectus. However, 
firms are free to define the terms and conditions under which they plan to execute 
dividend policy, and these terms and conditions often vary from one firm to another. 
For example, some firms provide guarantees of post-IPO dividend payments73, whilst 
others do not 74
Previous studies focus more on seasoned firms and analyze the determinants of 
and the market reaction to dividend initiations (Asquith and Mullins, 1983; Healy and 
Palepu, 1988; Christie, 1990). In this chapter, I contribute to the literature by assessing 
the determinants of dividend policy as stated in the IPO prospectuses. At the stage of 
preparing for IPO, such initial dividend policies are likely to be influenced by its pre-
IPO financial status. Therefore, I analyze the pre-IPO accounting information disclosed 
in the prospectuses, profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash 
flow for three consecutive pre-IPO years to assess whether dividend policy of IPOs is 
related to profitability, cash inflow from operating activities, capital expenditures, 
. The next question must be why do firms adopt specific dividend 
policies at the time of IPO? 
                                                 
73 For example, Dawnay Day Carpathian plc, which is a firm listed on AIM on 26 July 2005, includes the following statements in its 
prospectus: ‘it is the directors’ intention that the company will operate a regular distribution policy subsequent to Admission, with 
an initial dividend yield intended to be 3 per cent, and expected to be paid to shareholders by 31 December 2005.’ 
74 For example, Inditherm plc, which is a firm listed on AIM on 14 December 2001, includes the following statements in its 
prospectus, ‘The Board anticipates that, following the Placing, cash resources will be retained for the development of the Group’s 
business and will not be distributed for the foreseeable future.’ 
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turnover ratio and debt ratio in the context of signaling, agency costs, and lifecycle 
theories. In addition, IPO prospectuses provide a considerable amount of information 
about IPO-related factors such as: corporate stock option schemes, investment bank 
sponsorship, lock-up agreements, stock ownership structure, high technological 
intensity and AIM dummy75
I collect data manually from the IPO prospectuses. My sample includes 932 IPO 
firms listed on the London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2010, classified into four sub-
groups according to their attitude toward dividend payments, or their willingness to pay 
dividends at the time of IPO. The issuing firms that declared their clear intention
. These variables have the potential to relate to dividend 
behaviors of IPOs in the context of the important dividend theories encompassing 
signaling, agency costs, life cycle and catering. Theoretical testable hypotheses for most 
of these variables in relation to dividends have been developed in Chapter 3 of this 
thesis. While Chapter 3 focuses on the aftermarket dividend behavior of IPOs, this 
chapter  investigates how the  financial position of a firm during a three-year period pre-
IPO and a variety of IPO-related factors affect the dividend decisions made by firms at 
the time of the IPO. Thus, this chapter will allow me to address further gaps in the 
literature. Moreover, using event study methodology this study examines the abnormal 
returns to dividend initiations in order to understand the information content of various 
dividend policies declared in IPO prospectuses. This study further contributes to 
literature by investigating the role that IPOs’ dividend policies play in long-run 
aftermarket performance. 
76 to 
pay dividend in offering prospectuses are grouped into Type1, whilst those that had no 
intention of paying dividends and/or that did not release effective information about 
their dividend policy are grouped into Type4, with Type2 and Type3 firms falling in 
between. Type2 firms pursue an active or progressive77
                                                 
75  The Alternative Investment Market (AIM) is a market for small and young IPOs, which do not necessarily satisfy the 
requirements imposed on IPOs listed on the Main market, such as a minimum of three-year trading statements.  
 dividend policy, but relative to 
Type1 firms, they are relatively more likely to default dividend payments if their 
financial status cannot reach the expected standard. Type3 firms state that they will not 
declare a dividend in short or medium term, but usually they state that they will 
continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy. One may argue that Type3 
firms resemble Type4 firms in terms of their style of dividend policy. Therefore, I track 
76 Type1 firms inform the investors of the dividend level and/or the timing of the dividend payment. 
77 In IPO prospectuses, firms frequently use the phrase, ‘progressive dividend policy’ to indicate they that have positive and active 
attitude toward paying dividends. In this study, Type1 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type2, Type3 and Type4 
IPOs. Accordingly, Type1 and Type2 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type3 and Type4 IPOs. 
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the post-IPO dividend patterns of IPOs in the sample and find that, in medium term (2-
5years), Type3 IPOs have higher incidence of initiating dividends than Type4 IPOs. 
Further, to mitigate the potential issue of classification, I conduct robustness tests using 
a different setting of dependent variables. This classification enables us to analyze the 
key firm characteristics by using univariate comparisons, cross-sectional logistic 
regression models, and cross-sectional ordinal logistic regression models.  
The main findings of this study are as follows. I find that the pre-IPO financial 
position of a firm appears to exert substantial influence on IPO dividend policy. IPOs 
with superior pre-IPO performance in profitability and cash inflow from operating 
activities tend to adopt active dividend policies such as Type1 or Type2. More 
specifically, IPOs that declare the detailed dividend level and/or the timing of the 
dividend payment (Type1) commonly exhibited higher profitability and continuous 
growth in earnings, and maintained positive level of earnings. This is consistent with 
Miller (1987), Healy and Palepus (1988), Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and 
Koch and Sun (2004) who document that there is a strong link between a firm’s past 
earnings and changes in dividend policies. These findings are also consistent with the 
implication of Lintner (1956) model which suggests that dividend policy follows shifts 
in long-run, sustainable levels of earnings and managers are prudent to draw the very 
initial dividend policies so as to prevent from reversing dividend changes in the future. 
In this sense, the dividend policies presented in IPO prospectuses signals the past 
financial performance of firms. 
Similar to the finding of Jain, Shekhar, and Torbey (2009), IPOs collaborating 
with prestigious underwriters are more inclined to adopt active dividend policies. In 
light of the IPO signaling explanation (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989), this result suggests 
that prestigious underwriters provide certification for high quality IPOs (Booth and 
Smith, 1986; Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989; Carter and 
Manaster, 1990; Holland and Horton, 1993) who have the ability and demand to 
undertake high dividend payments. More importantly, I find that lower institutional 
ownership causes IPOs to choose relatively active dividend strategies when going 
public, consistent with Kale, Kini and Payne (2012) who suggest that IPOs are more 
likely to initiate dividends when the current level of institutional ownership is lower 
than what it should be so that they can attract the dividend-seeking institutional 
investors firms.  
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The results also show that the active dividend policies in offering prospectuses 
are negatively related to the length of full lockup restriction period and venture capital 
participation. Since these factors are shown in previous studies to mitigate the level of 
information asymmetries (e.g., Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed, 2001; Brav and 
Gompers, 2003; Booth and Smith, 1986; Megginson and Weiss, 1991), these results 
imply that IPOs substitute dividends for these factors as signaling devices. However, 
contrary to the predictions of IPO signaling theory (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989; 
Grinblatt and Hwang, 1989), the effect of managerial ownership on IPOs’ dividend 
policy is not significant. The results overall suggest that dividends serve as a role in 
information equilibrium at IPO stage. 
Consistent with the substitute assumption of agency costs which suggests that 
enhanced corporate governance leads to lower demand of dividend payouts (Rozeff, 
1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 
2000; Officer, 2006), the decision of choosing active dividend policy is negatively 
influenced by the length of full lockup restriction period since Brav and Gompers (2003) 
argue that lockup agreements can align the interests of managers and investors. 
Similarly, consistent with the substitute assumption of agency costs, IPOs with VC 
backing, high institutional ownership or high level of managerial stock options tend to 
be relatively conservative in stating dividend policy in prospectuses. Previous literature 
suggests that these factors can bind the interests of insiders and outsiders (e.g. Fenn and 
Liang, 2001) or enhance the monitoring (e.g. Megginson and Weiss, 1991). On the 
other hand, these revealed relations challenge the complement assumption of agency 
costs which suggests that dividend payment is a complement for corporate governance 
(LaPorta et al., 2000; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
In addition, consistent with the predictions of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 
1986) and residual rationale (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 
2006), IPOs with higher cash flows and lower capital expenditures tend to be active in 
making dividend policies when going public. On the contrary, IPOs in high 
technological sectors or IPOs issued on AIM are relatively conservative for their 
dividend policies since they are normally growing rapidly and need capital injection. 
Higher asset turnover ratios lead firms to choose more active initial dividend policies 
when they go public, consistent with the residual theory of dividends. 
My results are primarily consistent with the predictions of the lifecycle theory. 
Previous studies suggest that venture capitalists prefer to invest into early-stage 
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companies that are small, young and technology-focused (see Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 
1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011). 
Therefore, the finding that the venture-capital backed IPOs tend to declare relatively 
conservative dividend policies in prospectuses is in line with the prediction of lifecycle 
theory. Moreover, this finding is in line with the argument that venture capitalists tend 
to pursue capital gains from short-term investments rather than long-term dividend 
streams (Lerner, 1994; Field and Hanka, 2001). In addition, Brav and Gompers (2003) 
and Espenlaub et al. (2001) suggest that the degree of a firm’s maturity has a negative 
relation with the severity of lock-up agreements. Thus, the finding that firms with 
longer full lockup period are reluctant to be active in dividend decision making is in line 
with the life cycle theory as well. Moreover, the other consistent evidence for lifecycle 
theory is that larger IPOs are more progressive in choosing dividend policies at the time 
of IPO since larger firms are considered to be more mature (Fama and French, 2001, 
Deshmukh, 2003). 
Also, the tests show that the evidence on catering theory is mixed as the 
coefficients of dividend premium are insignificant in binary logistic regressions, but 
significant in some of ordinal logistic regressions. Dividend policies at IPO stage are 
sensitive to the periods of time. IPOs issued in the ‘internet bubble’ period opt for 
relatively conservative dividend strategies. IPOs issued in 2000s are less likely to adopt 
active dividend policies than those issued in the 1990s. 
Furhtermore, I find that Type1 IPOs have lower cumulative abnormal returns 
(CARs) to dividend initiation announcements compared with non-Type1 counterparts, 
supporting the conjecture that Type1 IPOs release sufficient information through 
dividend policies declared in offering prospectuses and therefore their formal dividend 
initiations fail to shock the market. While TYPE2 has the significant CARs over the 
major event windows, neither TYPE3 nor TYPE4 has the statistically significant CARs. 
A possible explanation is that investors only regard the dividend disbursement made by 
low technology-focused companies (Type1 and Type2) 78
                                                 
78 The statistics in the following cotext shows that Type3 and Type4 companies are more likely to belong to high technology 
industries relative to Type1 and Type2 counterparts. 
 as good news. I find that 
dividend-paying companies outperform non-dividend paying counterparts during three 
post-IPO years, indicating that non-dividend initiating IPOs rather than dividend-
initiating ones account for the decline in long-run underperformance. The additional 
remarkable finding is that Type1 IPOs do not exhibit declining long-run performance. 
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The cumulative average market-adjusted returns for Type1 IPOs remain positive during 
the 36 holding months after IPO. Long-run performance descends orderly from Type1 to 
Type4 in the most of observed post-IPO months. This finding supports the argument 
that the dividend policies stated in prospectuses communicate the information, and thus 
reduce the possibilities that outside investors are overoptimistic over the prospect of the 
invested companies and that managers overstate the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. 
The empirical tests overall support lifecycle theory, substitution assumption of 
agency theory, free cash flow hypothesis, while the evidence on signaling and catering 
theory is relatively mixed. The information content of dividend policies released at the 
time of IPO has materially effects on the abnormal returns to dividend initiation 
announcements and the long-run aftermarket excess returns. The rest of this paper is 
organized as follows. Section 4.2 reviews the literature and formulates a series of 
testable hypotheses to be used as a framework for conducting an empirical analysis. 
Section 4.3 details the sample and the variables used. Section 4.4 presents the empirical 
results. The discussion and conclusions are presented in Section 4.5. 
 
4.2 Literature Background and Hypotheses 
In this section, to investigate why firms adopt certain dividend policies at IPO stage, I 
develop the testable hypotheses by focusing the main dividend theories: signaling, 
agency conflicts, life cycle and catering. Previous chapter of this thesis outlines a series 
of hypotheses linking key IPO characteristics and IPO-related factors to dividend 
behaviors, namely the decision to initiate dividends and the timing of dividend initiation. 
This chapter retains some fundamental variables discussed in the previous chapter (see 
Table 3-1), but I focus more on the financial characteristics of the sample firms before 
their IPO. For example, in line with the arguments developed in the previous chapter, I 
expect high technological firms to state relatively conservative dividend policies in 
offering prospectuses at the time of their IPO. I, therefore, set out the testable 
hypotheses as follows. 
4.2.1 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
Lintner’s (1956) field investigation stressed that companies that pay dividends set their 
long-term target payout ratios, and they are reluctant to make any changes in dividends 
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that they cannot maintain in the future. This suggests that firms initiate dividends only 
when the management believes that long-term sustainable earnings are available and 
that dividends carry information content actually. Relaxing a condition of the complete 
market described by Miller and Modigliani’s (1961), Bhattacharya (1979), Miller and 
Rock (1985), and John and Williams (1985) establish the signaling theory suggesting 
that dividends signal the intrinsic value of dividends when information asymmetry 
exists. However, the evidence relating to whether dividends convey information on the 
future earnings is mixed79
 
. In this section, in the context of asymmetric information and 
signaling theory, dividend behavior of IPOs is linked to a series of IPO-related proxy 
variables including underpricing, directors’ stock ownership, lock-up agreements, 
institutional ownership, and venture capital participation and underwriter reputation. 
 (1) Pre-IPO Profitability 
Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997) point out that, according to Lintner (1956), 
changes in dividends depend on current and past earnings. Miller (1987) proposes that 
dividends proxy for ‘lagging’ earnings rather than ‘leading’ earnings. Healy and 
Palepus (1988) find that earnings increase both before and after dividends initiation. 
Garrett and Priestley (2000) develop a model and provide evidence to show that 
dividends convey information about positive changes in current permanent earnings 
rather than in future permanent earnings as the information of future earnings growth is 
captured by the changes in lagged stock price. Koch and Sun (2004) provide empirical 
results showing that dividend increases are overwhelmingly preceded by earnings 
increases, but, by contrast, the chance that dividend decreases follow earning increases 
is very low. Therefore, I conjecture that IPO firms with a better pre-IPO financial 
position in earnings tend to state relatively active 80 dividend policies in their IPO 
prospectuses. On the contrary, less profitable firms are more likely to declare 
conservative81
H1: Higher profitability level prior to IPO is positively associated with more 
active dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
 dividend policies.  
 
                                                 
79 The evidence supporting the positive relation between changes in dividends and future earnings can be found in Brickley (1983), 
Healy and Palepu (1988), and Aharony and Dotan (1994), Guay and Harford (2000), Jagannathan et al. (2000), Nissim and Ziv 
(2001). On the contrary, Watts (1973), DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Skinner (1996), Benartzi, Michaely, and Thaler (1997), Garrett 
and Priestley (2000), Grullon, Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) and Grullon, Michaely, Thaler, and Benartzi (2005) do not find 
evidence to support that dividends signal future earnings. 
80 Active (progressive, advance) dividend policy will be defined and interpreted in detail in section 4.3.1. 
81 Conservative dividend policy is a contrast term to active dividend policy. 
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(2) Managerial Ownership 
Leland and Pyle (1977), Ross (1977), Allen and Faulhaber (1989) and Grinblatt and 
Hwang (1989) suggest that high quality IPO firms convey inside information by 
retaining greater fraction of shares. Therefore, according to dividend signaling principle, 
IPO firms with higher insider ownership are more likely to pay costly dividends. This 
leads to the following testable hypothesis:   
H2: Higher managerial ownership is associated with more active dividend 
policies specified in prospectuses. 
 
(3) Lockup Agreement 
A typical lock-up agreement provides that directors, related parties and any relevant 
employees undertake to give up the right to sell a specific percentage of their 
shareholdings for a specified period after they are issued. Brav and Gompers (2000) and 
Espenlaub et al. (2001) elaborate the role of lock-up agreements 82
H3: IPOs with severer lockup agreement are associated with more active 
dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
in information 
equilibrium, and Courteau (1995) and Brau, Lambson and McQueen (2005) argue that 
high quality firms tend to accept severe lock-up agreements to communicate 
information to new investors. In the spirit of the signal hypothesis, firms that accept 
severer lock-up restriction will be attached with greater chance to pay dividends. But 
there exists a possibility that lock-up agreements are negatively related the propensity of 
dividend initiation since one may argue that the information asymmetry would become 
more serious if no dividends are paid out and thus the more restrictive lock-up 
provisions will be required. Prior studies do not provide direct empirical evidence 
relating dividend policy to the lock-up covenant except Brav and Gompers (2003) who 
provide the empirical result, which is inconsistent with the signaling explanation. The 
testable hypotheses below can be suggested:  
 
(4) Institutional Ownership 
Allen, Bernardo, and Welch (2000) suggest that high quality firms are willing to attract 
                                                 
82 Brav and Gompers (2000) suggest that lock-up agreements may prevent insiders from exploiting private benefit by using their 
superior information since lock-up agreements give time for outsiders to absorb the private information of existing shareholders. 
Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed (2001) argue that issuing firms with information asymmetry will involve lock-up agreements. 
Their argument is based on two findings: (1) High-tech firms that have greater information asymmetry are more likely to choose 
absolute expiry dates than other firms. According to their idea, absolute expiry dates mean less uncertainty and more transparency 
than flexible expiry dates. (2) Sponsor reputation can be a signaling substitute to lock-up agreements. 
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informed institutional investors who can provide certification of firm quality at expense 
of tax cost of dividends for purpose of signaling firm value. Based on Allen et al. (2000), 
Kale et al. (2012) hypothesize that firms are more likely to initiate dividends when the 
current level of institutional ownership is lower than what it should be. Correspondingly, 
if the current level of institutional ownership is high enough to demonstrate the 
contemporary intrinsic value, the incidence of dividend initiation should be lower and 
the initiation of dividends should be delayed. This leads to the testable hypothesis:  
H4: Lower Institutional ownership is associated with more active dividend 
policies specified in prospectuses. 
 
(5) Venture Capital Backing 
Booth and Smith (1986) and Megginson and Weiss (1991) explicitly theorise that 
venture capitalists have the potential to certify the quality of IPOs because of their 
superior knowledge on the firms that they back. A positive relation between the long-
term post-IPO performance and the venture capital involvement are supported by 
literature83. However, the evidence of the impact of venture capital investor on short-run 
performance appears to be controversial 84
H5: The participation of venture capitalists is positively associated with more 
active dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
. If the reputation of venture capitalists 
provides certification for IPOs, then the incidence of dividend initiation by IPOs is 
expected to increase with the involvement of venture capital investors according to the 
dividend signaling principle. Therefore, the testable hypothesis is: 
 
(6) Underwriter Reputation 
Booth and Smith (1986), Allen and Faulhaber (1989), Grinblatt and Hwang (1989), 
Carter and Manaster (1990) and Holland and Horton (1993) argue that a prestigious 
underwriter can serve as a certification of IPO quality, suggesting that better firms are 
more likely to collaborate with highly trusted financial sponsors. Many empirical 
investigations find that underwriter reputation can essentially influence the short-term 
and long-term IPO performance85
                                                 
83 Gompers and Lerner (1997), Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999), Li and Masulis (2008) and Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis and Singh 
(2011) 
. Allen and Faulhaber (1989) suggest that prestigious 
84 (Barry et al.(1990), Megginson and Weiss (1991), Gompers and Lerner (1997), Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999) and Habib and 
Ljungqvist (2001) 
85 Beatty and Ritter (1986), Titman and Trueman (1986), Maksimovic and Unal (1993), Carter and Manaster (1990), Carter, Dark 
and Singh, (1998), Gompers and Lerner (1998a), Espenlaub, Garrett and Mun (1999), Habib and Ljungqvist (2001) and Chambers 
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underwriters may prompt firms to initiate dividends since ‘good firms’ have ability and 
demand to undertake high dividend payments. As such, the following hypothesis can be 
put forward: 
H6: IPOs with prestigious underwriters have a greater propensity to specify 
more active dividend policies in prospectuses. 
4.2.2 Agency Costs 
Jensen and Meckling (1976) explicate that the separation of ownership and control 
causes the conflicts of interest between managers and shareholders, which will in turn 
lead to the increase in agency costs and the loss of firm value. Agency-costs based 
dividend theories articulate that dividends expose the companies to external 
monitoring86
The link between dividend policy and corporate governance taken by 
entrepreneurial companies can be explained by the agency rationale. However, prior 
theoretical models are intricate and relevant empirical evidence is mixed. LaPorta et al. 
(2000) propose two basic models of agency costs. “Outcome model” suggests that the 
minority investors who are better protected by law have the preference and the 
sufficient power to require corporate insiders to pay dividends in order to reduce cash 
flow under managers’ control. “Substitute model” suggests that the companies with 
substantial moral hazard intentionally substitute dividends for the right of outside 
investors because they need to establish a reputation for future external financing. 
“Outcome model” predicts that superior investor protection will result in higher 
dividend payouts, while “substitute model” leads to an opposite prediction. The 
following part of this study will discuss whether dividends and corporate governance 
are substitutes or complementary in the context of agency theory by employing various 
proxy variables including managerial ownership, lock-up agreement, institutional 
 (Rozeff, 1982; Easterbrook, 1984) and cut off the managers-controlled 
free cash flow which causes overinvestment (Jensen,1986). The corporate governance 
can essentially affect firm value in respect of agency conflicts. Jensen and Meckling 
(1976) and Richardson (2006) suggest that low quality of managerial governance will 
damage investor wealth due to overinvestment, especially when a great amount of free 
cash flow appears, and such argument is supported by Gompers et al. (2003), Harford, 
Mansi, and Maxwell (2008) and Masulis, Wang, and Xie (2009).  
                                                                                                                                               
and Dimson (2009) 
86 Dividend payments compel companies to raise external capital from public market in the future. 
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ownership, venture capitalists backing, managerial stock options and financial 
accounting variables about free cash flow and growth opportunities. 
 (1) Pre-IPO Cash Flows and Capital Expenditures  
Free cash flow hypothesis implies that agency problems are more likely for the firms 
with high cash inflows from and low capital expenditures. Lang and Litzenberger (1989) 
and Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan (2002) find that companies with abundant free 
cash flows need to distribute dividends in order to solve overinvestment problems.  
Therefore, the following hypothesis is: 
H7: According to agency theory, declaring relatively active dividend policies in 
IPO prospectuses is more likely for IPOs with higher cash flows and lower capital 
expenditures. 
 
(2) Pre-IPO leverage 
Jensen (1986) argues that debt and dividend payment can be effective substitutes for 
reducing the agency costs of free cash flow because, relative to dividend payment, debt 
is a stronger commitment taken by entrepreneurs to pay out future cash flows since 
firms must face lawsuit in case of the default of interest and principal payment. Eije and 
Megginson (2008) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) also forward the same 
argument. Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Jensen, Solberg and Zorn (1992) and Chen and 
Steiner (1999) find support for the substitution-monitoring effect between debt ratio and 
dividend payout.  
H8: According to agency theory, higher leverage level of firms in prior to IPO is 
positively associated with more active dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
 
(3) Managerial Ownership 
 
Rozeff (1982) argues that insider stock ownership aligns the interests of managers and 
shareholders; thereby the owner-managers are prompted to work for the maximisation 
of investors’ wealth. His model assumes that dividend payout and directors’ ownership 
can be viewed as substitutes in terms of mitigating agency conflicts and predicts that 
firms pay higher dividends when insiders hold a lower fraction of equity because 
dividend payments are helpful in reducing agency costs of monitoring/bonding. Hence, 
the implication of Rozeff (1982) is similar to that of “substitute model” given by 
LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that weak corporate governance leads to higher 
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demand of dividend payouts. Smith and Watts (1992) and Gaver and Gaver (1993) 
propose similar arguments. In the following context of this paper, such assumption is 
referred as “substitute assumption”. Empirical results in support of “substitute 
assumption” encompass Crutchley and Hansen (1989), Dempsey and Laber (1992), 
Eckbo and Verma (1994), Moh’d et al. (1995), Collins, Saxena, and Wansley (1996), 
Chen and Steiner (1999), Faccio, Lang and Young (2001). 
Contrary to Rozeff (1982), Fenn and Liang (2001) suggest a complementary 
assumption in which the higher proportion of shares retained by managers will 
encourage more dividends to be distributed. Fenn and Liang (2001) claim that their 
logic is considerably similar to that of Berger, Ofek and Yermack (1997) who 
hypothesize that the inadequate corporate governance or serious managerial 
entrenchment will lead to less leverage because, in this occasion, managers have the 
nature to avoid firm risk and secure their personal wealth. Fenn and Liang (2001) also 
argue that owner-managers as stock investors will benefit from dividend disbursement 
which might act as a performance-enhancing incentive. Thus, the argument of Fenn and 
Liang (2001) is similar to “outcome model” of LaPorta et al. (2000) which implies that 
strong corporate governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts. In the 
following context of this paper, such assumption is referred as “complement 
assumption”. However, Fenn and Liang (2001) and Kale et al. (2012) only provide 
mixed evidence to “complement assumption”. 
H9: According to complement assumption of agency costs, IPOs with higher 
managerial ownership have a greater propensity to specify more active dividend 
policies in prospectuses. 
 
(4) Lockup Agreement 
Previous studies suggest that lock-up agreements possess the potential to deal with 
agency problem of corporations. Brav and Gompers (2003) argue that lock-up 
agreements are usually motivated by a commitment to align/bond the interests of 
managers and investors for overcoming the moral hazard problem. Moreover, as a result, 
agency costs are limited until the expiry of lock-ups. Espenlaub, Goergen and Khurshed 
(2001) assume that the presence of information asymmetry is more serious for firms 
from high-technology industry where investors undergo higher risk of being exploited 
and lock-up agreement can serve as corporate governance device. However, Brau, 
Lambson and Mcqueen (2005) argue that lock-up contracts only impose short-term 
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restrictions on managers, whilst the monitoring ought to be an ongoing long-term 
process.  
Prior research does not directly discuss the connection between dividend policy 
and lock-ups with respect of agency conflicts and relevant evidence is absent. Assuming 
lock-up agreement plays a role as a commitment to reduce the agency cost, there will be 
two possible predictions. First, the more restrictive the lock-up provisions87
H10: According to substitution assumption of agency costs, IPOs with less 
restrictive Lock-up agreement tend to specify more active dividend policies in 
prospectuses. 
 result in the 
less demand of paying dividends. This logic is actually similar to the substitute 
assumption (Rozeff, 1982; LaPorta et al., 2000). Second, restrictive lock-up provisions 
indicate that the firms suffer serious agency costs, so it is necessary to pay dividends as 
a complement measure to mitigate the conflicts of interest. This logic is actually similar 
to the complement assumption (LaPorta et al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grinstein 
and Michaely, 2005). To investigate the controversial arguments, I set up the following 
hypothesis. 
 
(5) Institutional ownership 
Shleifer and Vishny (1986) and Zeckhauser and Pound (1990) and Gillan and Starks 
(2000) suggest that institutions help strengthen monitoring toward the firms that they 
invest. Grinstein and Michaely (2005) argue that larger institutional holdings will 
accompany higher payouts since the enhanced monitoring will lead to higher dividend 
payouts according to Jensen’s (1986) free cash flow hypothesis. In addition, Zeckhauser 
and Pound (1990), Eckbo and Verma (1994), and Farinha (2003) suggest that 
institutional investors with strong voting power may oblige companies to increases 
dividends in order to move away free cash flow from managers. Thus, the argument of 
Grinstein and Michaely (2005) reflects the essence of “complement assumption” which 
implies that strong corporate governance leads to higher demand of dividend payouts 
and is supported by the results provided by Grinstein and Michaely (2005), Short, 
Zhang, and Keasey (2002) and Eckbo and Verma (1994). Thus, the testable hypothesis 
is as the following. 
H11: IPOs with higher Institutional ownership tend to specify more active 
                                                 
87 This means longer lock-up period or higher proportion of locked shares. 
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dividend policies in prospectuses. 
 
(6) Venture Capital Backing 
Previous studies have discussed the monitoring mechanism of venture capitalists 
involvement (Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Lee and Wahal, 2004; 
Chan, 1983; Bergloff, 1994; Hellmann and Puri, 2002 and Cumming and Johan, 2008). 
In a recent study, Krishnan et al. (2011) suggest that the monitoring offered by venture 
capitalists at IPO, along with VC’s expertise in certain industry and advisory service, is 
one of reasons why the venture capitalists has the potential to certify the firms being 
backed by them. A gap in preceding literature is that dividend policy has not been 
directly related the participation of venture capitalists within the context of agency 
conflicts. Following the discussion in previous section, there may be two predictions. 
First, according to a line of argument that is similar to substitute assumption (Rozeff, 
1982; LaPorta et al., 2000), venture capital investors are associated with smaller 
likelihood to pay dividends for IPO firms. Second, according to a line of argument 
which is similar to complement assumption (LaPorta et al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; 
Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), the prediction is contrary. To investigate the 
controversial arguments, I set up the following hypothesis. 
H12: According to substitution assumption of agency costs, IPOs with higher 
venture capital backing tend to specify more active dividend policies in prospectuses. 
 
(7) Stock Option 
Fenn and Liang (2001) argue that stock option plan can be a component of corporate 
governance mechanisms. Stock option plan may facilitate the alignment of interests of 
managers and investors and reduce the agency costs. Then, again, there are two 
predictions on the relationship between stock options and dividends. Substitute 
assumption predicts that the use of stock option substitute for dividend payout to 
address agency problem. In contrast, complement assumption predicts that stock option 
plan and dividend payment are complements.  
In addition, there is an indirect way to interpret the relationship between stock 
options and dividends in the context of agency theory. Stock option plan may be a 
motivation for managers to choose repurchases instead of dividends when paying out 
residual funds (Lambert, Lanen and Larcker, 1989; Bagwell and Shoven, 1988; Smith 
and Watts, 1992; Dittmar, 1997; Fenn and Liang, 2001). The results in previous studies 
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support the notion that managers tend to substitute repurchases for dividends in the 
presence of stock options. Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner 
(2000), and Fenn and Liang (2001) find that there is a negative relationship between 
executive stock options and dividend payouts. Jolls (1998), Fenn and Liang (2001), 
Aboody and Kasznik (2001) and Liljeblom and Pasternack (2002) document a positive 
relationship between repurchases and management stock options. In addition, 
Weisbenner, (2000) shows that repurchases will not adversely affect the exercise price 
of stock options. Given above discussion, I conjecture the following hypothesis. 
H13: According to substitution assumption of agency costs, IPOs with higher 
stock options tend to specify more active dividend policies in prospectuses. 
 
 (8) Technology Focus and Choice of Exchange 
In addition, firms that belong to high technology sectors are rapidly growing and in 
need of capital infusion (see Wu, Erkoc and Karabuk, 2005, for review) and thus 
undergo less agency costs of free cash flow when comparing with firms in conventional 
sectors. The propensity of paying dividends for high-technology firms is expected to be 
relatively low. Besides, AIM (the alternative investment market), launched in June of 
1995, is an international market accommodating the growth and small firms. IPOs on 
AIM, in comparison to the main market, should display a greater reluctance to initiate 
dividends because of high growth. To sum up, above discussion leads to the following 
hypothesis. 
H14: IPOs in high technological sectors or IPOs issued on AIM do not tend to 
specify more active dividend policies in prospectuses. 
4.2.3 Life-cycle 
Lifecycle theory (Fama and French, 2001; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002; 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006) suggests that young firms are not in a position to pay 
dividends because their limited initial resources must be reinvested into product 
development, marketing and organization. In contrast, mature firms that are more 
profitable and confront shrinking investment opportunities have stronger need to payout 
cash flows in the form of dividends. 
 
(1) Pre-IPO Leverage 
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As Eije and Megginson (2008) argue that if high debt level is merely a characteristic for 
mature firms, then life cycle hypothesis suggests a positive relation between leverage 
and the dividend propensity. Jain et al. (2009) and Kale et al. (2012) observe that debt 
ratio of dividend initiating firms is on average significantly higher than that of non-
dividend-initiating firms. It is possible that the substitution-monitoring effect between 
debt ratio and dividend payout will only be evident for established firms rather than the 
newly listed firms at time of IPO. Given above discussion, I conjecture the following 
hypothesis: 
H15: According to lifecycle theory, higher leverage level of firms in prior to 
IPO is positively associated with more active dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
  
(2) Venture Capital Backing 
A large body of the literature suggests that venture capitalists prefer to invest into early-
stage companies that are small, young and technology-focused88. In addition, Lerner 
(1994) and Cumming and Johan (2008) suggest that venture capitalists prefer short-term 
investment opportunities and aim at achieving investment returns from capital gains89
H16: Venture capital participation is negatively associated with the possibility 
that IPOs specify active dividend policies in their prospectuses. 
. 
Field and Hanka (2001) and Bradley and Roberts (2004) examine US lock-up 
agreements and find that venture capitalists often sell more aggressively than other 
shareholders do when lock-up agreements finally expire. According to life cycle 
hypothesis, these entrepreneurial companies backed by venture capitalists are less likely 
to return earnings to investors in form of cash dividend payouts since they are in dearth 
of funds to support their rapid expansion and. Thus, I construct the following testable 
hypothesis: 
 
(3) Lock-up Agreement 
Brav and Gompers (2000, 2003) present evidence to support that young firms with a 
low ratio of book to market, a low cash flow margin, and low-quality underwriters 
usually adopt longer lock-up periods. So, this leads to the following hypothesis. 
H17: The severity of lock-up agreements is negatively related to the active 
                                                 
88 Lerner (1994), Gompers(1995),Bergemann and Hege (1998), Gompers and Lerner (2000, 2003), Lee and Wahal (2004) and 
Krishnan (2011) 
89 Cumming and MacIntosh (2003), McKaskill, Weaver, and Dickson (2004) and Parhankangas, Landstrom, and Smith (2005) 
express the similar viewpoint. 
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dividend policies specified in prospectuses. 
 
(4) High technology intensity and AIM issuance 
High technology firms need to retain residual capital to support R&D and marketing 
strategy, so they are often not in a position to pay dividends. Likewise, firms issued on 
AIM feature high growth rate and young age and thus they are more reluctant to pay 
dividends. In short, the testable hypothesis is as the following. 
H18: IPOs in high technological sectors or IPOs issued on AIM are less likely to 
specify active dividend policies in prospectuses. 
4.2.4 Catering 
(1) Dividend Premium 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a) argue that firms tend to initiate dividends when the market 
looks favorably on firms that pay dividends. Indeed, it could be argued that investors 
place a measure of sentiment on receiving dividend premiums90
H19: IPOs are associated with larger (smaller) chance to specify an active 
dividend policy in prospectuses when dividend premium is high (low). 
, and this is the main 
reason, apart from making profits, why they prefer dividend-paying stocks to non-
paying stocks. In spirit of catering theory of dividends, I have the following hypothesis. 
 
4.3 Sample and Data 
4.3.1 Sample Selection 
The sample used in this study consists of IPOs listed on the main market and on the 
Alternative Investment Market (AIM) of the London Stock Exchange during 15 years 
period spanning from 1996 through to 2010. As same as in the previous chapter, I 
extracted information about the list of IPOs from the New Admissions Summary91
                                                 
90 The measure of investor sentiment is dividend premium, which is measured as the difference between the logs of the average 
market-to-book ratios of payers and non-payers. 
 of 
London Stock Exchange statistics. There are several exclusions taken in the process of 
sample selection. The sample excludes IPO firms that belong to the industries of finance, 
investment and the utilities. The sample excludes IPO firms without offering 
91 New Admissions Summary contains data from June 27, 1995. 
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prospectuses available or without complete information required by the tests. It is 
necessary for all sample IPOs provide prospectuses containing complete historical 
accounting reports, including profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and statement 
of cash flow, for three consecutive fiscal years pre-IPO. These criteria lead to the final 
sample of 932 IPOs. In spite of the exclusion of a number of AIM IPOs without three 
years trading statements, the sample does not tilt only to firms listed on the main market. 
Table 4-1 presents the annual distribution of my sample IPOs segmented into Main 
market and AIM.  
 
Table 4-1 Statistics of Sample  
IPO Year All Main Market AIM 
1996 108 57 51 
1997 84 45 39 
1998 59 36 23 
1999 40 18 22 
2000 107 51 56 
2001 49 11 38 
2002 40 9 31 
2003 37 7 30 
2004 114 16 98 
2005 116 16 101 
2006 92 10 82 
2007 55 12 42 
2008 3 2 1 
2009 2 0 2 
2010 26 8 18 
Total 932 298 634 
 
In prospectuses, the issuing firms do not use a standard format to state their post-
IPO dividend policies. Thus, dividend policies stated in the prospectuses differed from 
firm to firm. For example, some IPOs present the clear time schedule of distributing 
dividends. In contrast, some IPOs state that they would not be paying dividends in the 
immediate future, or even provide limited information on dividend policies. In the 
following analysis, all sample IPOs are categorized into four types according to the 
propensity of firms to pay dividends as expressed in the offering prospectuses: 
 
Type1: Firms have a definite intention to pay regular dividends after admission, and 
they inform the investors of the rough timing of the dividend payment and/or dividend 
levels. In some cases, they declare the exact dividend payout ratio, dividend yield or 
dividend coverage.  
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Example 1 ‘The Directors do not intend to pay an interim dividend in respect of the half 
year ending 30 September 2004, but anticipate that a final dividend in respect of the 
financial year ending 31 March 2005 will be recommended representing two-thirds of a 
full year’s dividend and which will be payable in July 2005. Thereafter, the Directors 
intend that interim and final dividends in respect of each financial year ending 31 
March will be paid in November and July respectively in the approximate proportions 
of one-third and two-thirds of the total annual dividend.’ (Pay-point PLC, issued on 
main market of London Stock Exchange in 2004) 
 
Type2: Firms express the intention to adopt a progressive dividend policy92
 
 depending 
on future operating performance and financial conditions, but the detailed dividend 
plans such as time schedule and dividend level are not displayed. 
Example 2 ‘The Directors intend to pursue a progressive dividend policy subject to the 
need to retain earnings for future investment and the availability of adequate 
distributable reserves.’ (Tellings Golden Miller, issued on AIM of London Stock 
Exchange in 2003) 
 
Type3: Firms anticipate that profits and operating cash flows will be retained to support 
business growth in the short or medium term rather than be paid out as dividends.  
 
Example 3 ‘For the foreseeable future, most of the cash resources generated by the 
Group’s operations will be devoted to funding its expansion. Accordingly the Directors 
do not expect that RTS Networks will declare a dividend in the early years of its 
development. The Board will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend 
policy.’ (RTS Networks Group PLC, issued on AIM of London Stock Exchange in 1999) 
 
Type4: Firms do not have an intention to pay dividends and fail to anticipate the future 
dividend strategy. 
 
Example 4 ‘…It is inappropriate at the date of this document to give an indication of 
the likely amount of future dividends or when they may start to be paid...’ (Airtech PLC, 
issued on AIM of London Stock Exchange in 1996) 
                                                 
92 In IPO prospectuses, firms frequently use the phrase, ‘progressive dividend policy’ to indicate they that have positive and active 
attitude toward paying dividends. In this study, Type1 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type2, Type3 and Type4 
IPOs. Accordingly, Type1 and Type2 IPOs have more progressive dividend policies than Type3 and Type4 IPOs. 
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From above examples, I can see that Type1 firms have the most active attitude 
to paying dividends, stating that they are going to start dividend payments after 
admission definitely. However, such declarations on dividend policy are in actual 
different from formal dividend announcements because they do not contain the accurate 
expressions on dividend level, ex-dividend date, record date and payment date. Type2 
firms express that they pursue progressive dividend policies rhetorically, but the 
progress arrangement and sketchy level remain unveiled. They warn that they might 
miss out dividend payments due to uncertain prospects. Type3 firms express explicitly 
that they just have no intention to pay dividends in the near future, and Type4 firms are 
more conservative than other firms in paying dividends, as they provide no effective 
information about future dividend policy.  
Table 4-2 shows data segmented for the five sub-periods 1996-2010, 1996-2009, 
1996-2008, 1996-2007, and 1996-2006. I trace the date of dividend payment for each 
sampled firm from IPO to the end of 2011. For the sub-period 1996-2010, I can observe 
whether IPOs belonging to different types paid in 1st
As expected, the greatest incidence of initiating dividends is found to be 
associated with Type1 IPOs. The likelihood to initiate dividends for Type2 IPOs is 
lower than that for Type1 IPOs but apparently higher than that for Type3 and Type4 
counterparts. Accordingly, Type3 IPOs have slightly higher likelihood to initiate 
dividends than Type4 counterparts except for the sub-period 1996-2010. For example, 
for the sub-period 1996-2008, 97.89%
 year after IPO. For the sub-period 
1996-2009, the observable period extends to the first two successive post-IPO years. 
Similarly, the observable years are three, four and five for sub-periods 1996-2008, 
1996-2007, and 1996-2006 respectively. This method allows us to compare the 
incidences of paying dividend for different IPO groups in a relatively reasonable way.  
93
 
 firms in Type1 actually paid out dividends in 5 
years after IPO, but the percents of initiating dividends are only 39.84%, 9.59% and 
5.26% for Type2, 3, and 4 firms, respectively, over the same observation window. The 
tiny discrepancy between Type3 and Type4 in respect of the style of dividend policy 
might foretell that the characteristics of the two groups of IPOs do not differ 
substantially, and this assumption is taken in to account in the following tests. 
 
                                                 




Table 4-2 Descriptive Statistics 
All sample firms are classified into four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at the time of IPO. IPOs 
in the sample are grouped into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at the time of 
IPO. Type1: The firms declare in their offering prospectuses that they determine to pay regular dividends after IPO 
and usually specify the details such as the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: The firms 
state that they have intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy depending on future operating 
performance, but they do not specify the details such as dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment.  Type3: 
The firms anticipate that they will not distribute dividends in the short or medium term, but usually they state that 
they will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy. Type4: The firms do not have intention to pay 
dividends and do not provide any effective information about dividend policy. There are totally five sub-periods, 
1996-2010, 1996-2009, 1996-2008, 1996-2007, and 1996-2006. I trace the date of dividend payment for each 
sampled firm from IPO to the end of 2011. For each sub-period, the column “IPO” shows the numbers of IPO 
observations sorted by dividend policy types. “Payer” shows the percentages of different type IPOs that paid 
dividends within different observed periods. For example, the observed period is the 1st post-IPO year for sub-period 
1996-2010, and the two post-IPO years for sub-period 1996-2009. The columns “One”, “Two”, “Three”, “Four” and 
“Five” show the numbers of IPOs that paid dividends in 1st , 2nd, 3rd, 4th, and 5th
 
 year after IPO, respectively.  
Panel A. Dividend Payments One Year Post-IPO – Sample Period 1996-2010 
TYPE IPO Payer One Two Three Four Five 
1 357 71.99  257     
2 153 19.61  30     
3 320 0.94  3     
4 102 1.96  2     
Total 932 31.33  292     
Panel B. Dividend Payments Two Years Post-IPO – Sample Period 1996-2009 
1 352 94.89  252 82    
2 143 36.36  28 24    
3 310 3.87  3 9    
4 101 2.97  2 1    
Total 906 44.26  285 116    
Panel C. Dividend Payments Three Years Post-IPO – Sample Period 1996-2008 
1 351 97.15  251 82 8   
2 143 38.46  28 24 3   
3 309 5.83  3 9 6   
4 101 4.95  2 1 2   
Total 904 46.35  284 116 19   
Panel D. Dividend Payments Four Years Post-IPO – Sample Period 1996-2007 
1 349 97.71  249 82 8 2  
2 143 39.86  28 24 3 2  
3 308 8.12  3 9 6 7  
4 101 4.95  2 1 2 0  
Total 901 47.50  282 116 19 11  
Panel E. Dividend Payments Five Years Post-IPO – Sample Period 1996-2006 
1 332 97.89  237 77 8 2 1 
2 128 39.84  25 21 3 2 0 
3 292 9.59  3 9 6 7 3 
4 95 5.26  2 1 2 0 0 
Total 847 48.29  267 108 19 11 4 
 
4.3.2 Data Description 
Two categories of variables are employed in this part of study: measures of pre-IPO 
financial performance and a fraction of IPO-related factors that are used in Chapter 3. 
Three pre-IPO historical financial records are manually collected from profit and loss 
statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash flow provided by the offering 
prospectuses. For each of year prior to IPO, the following raw data are collected: total 
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assets, earnings, net cash inflow from operating activities, increase in cash, total 
turnover, long-term debts, and net cash outflow from capital expenditure. To test the 
above hypotheses, I develop a set of financial ratios and growth variables (summarized 
in Table 4.3). 
 
Table 4-3 Definitions of Variables 
The table provides the list of variables and their definitions. In Panel D, the subscript n is equal to 1 if the increase if 
from t-1 to t, and 2 if the increase is during two consecutive periods from t-2 to t-1 and from t-1 to t.  
 
Variable Definitions 
Panel A. Accounting 3-year Averages 
ROA  The average ratio of  EBIT to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
CF/TA  The average ratio of Cash Inflow from operating activities to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
CF Change/TA The average ratio of change in Cash between the penultimate and the last financial period to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
TURNOVER RATIO The average ratio of  Turnover to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
LEVERAGE  The average ratio of  Long-term debt to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
CAPEX/TA The average ratio of Capital Expenditure to total assets for the previous three fiscal years before IPO 
Panel B. Accounting Last Fiscal Year Ratios 
ROA (-1Y) The ratio of  EBIT to total assets for the last fiscal year prior to IPO  
CF/TA (-1Y) The ratio of Cash Inflow from operating activities to total assets for the last 
fiscal year prior to IPO  
CF Change/TA (-1Y) The ratio of change in Cash between the penultimate and the last financial 
period to total assets for the last fiscal year prior to IPO  
TURNOVER RATIO (-1Y) The ratio of  Turnover to total assets for the last fiscal year prior to IPO  
LEVERAGE (-1Y) The ratio of Long-term debt to total assets for the last fiscal year prior to 
IPO  
CAPEX/TA (-1Y) The ratio of Capital Expenditure to total assets for the last fiscal year prior 
to IPO  
Panel C. IPO Characteristics 
DIRECTOR Directors' Ownership, the percentage of enlarged ordinary shares held by directors after admission 
VC STAKE 
VC is the aggregate percentage of venture capital-backed stakes that are 
more than 3% of enlarged ordinary share capital immediately following 
admission. Following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), venture capital-
backed shares include venture capital or private equity funds 
VC-BACKED A dummy variable equals to 1 if the IPO firm is VC-backed, 0 otherwise 
INSTITUTION The aggregate percentage of institutional stakes which are more than 3% of enlarged ordinary share capital immediately following admission 
OPTION The percentage of executive stock options, measured as the number of shares granted as stock options over the enlarged ordinary shares after admission 
INSIDER LOCKUP Locked-up directors’ shares 
AGGREGATE LOCKUP Aggregate locked-up shares 
LOCKUP DAYS The nature logarithm of days for lockup period during which locked-up shares are not allowed to be disposed  
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LOCKUP CONSENT The nature logarithm of days for the full restriction period during which locked-up shares can only be sold with the consent of underwriters 
REPUTATION Underwriter reputation, computed as the relative market share of the investment bank underwriting the IPO (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) 
AIM A dummy variable equals to 1 if the IPO is listed on the Alternative Investment Market and 0 otherwise 
HITECH A dummy variable equals to 1 if the IPO is from the high technology industry and 0 otherwise 
DP 
Dividend premium, calculated as the logarithm of the difference between the 
market to book value of dividend payers and non-payers (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a) 
BUBBLE Defined as the period 1999-2000 following Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003) and Levis (2008) 
DUMMY2000S A dummy variable which equals 1 if IPO issues after the date of December 31, 2000, and 0 otherwise 
LNGP The nature logarithm of IPO proceeds as stated in the prospectus 
UNDERPRICING94 The initial return calculated as the percentage difference between the offer price and the closing price of the first trading day  
Panel D. Changes in Pre-IPO Financial Ratios 
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the ratio of EBIT to total assets increased 
during years n, and 0 otherwise  ROA  
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the ratio of cash inflow from operating 
activities to total assets increased during years n, and 0 otherwise  CF/TA  
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the Change in cash flow increased during 
years n, and 0 otherwise  CFCHANGE/TA 
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the TURNOVER RATIO increased during 
years n, and 0 otherwise  TURNOVER 
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the long-term debt increased during years 
n, and 0 otherwise  LEVERAGE 
Gn
A dummy variable equals to 1 if the ratio of capital expenditure to total 
assets increased during years n, and 0 otherwise  CAPEX/TA  
POSITIVE ROA A dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if a IPO firm maintained positive profit during the financial period from t-2 to t, and 0 otherwise 
POSITIVE CF 
A dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if a IPO firm maintained positive 
Cash Inflow from operating activities during the financial period from t-2 to 
t, and 0 otherwise 
POSITIVE CFCHANGE/TA 
A dummy variable takes on the value of 1 if a IPO firm maintained positive 
Change in cash flow during the financial period from t-2 to t, and 0 
otherwise 
 
4.4 Empirical Results 
4.4.1 Univariate Analysis  
 (1)  Accounting 3-year Averages and Last Fiscal Year Ratios 
As explained in the previous section, the entire sample used in this study is divided into 
four company types (Types 1, 2, 3 and 4) based on a firm’s intention to pay dividends 
                                                 
94 Although underpricing is not available when issuing firms release their offering prospectuses, I simply control this variable to 
examine the interrelationship between underpricing and the dividend policy in prospectus. 
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after floatation. For each company type, the mean, lower quartile, median and upper 
quartiles of indicator variables and t-statistics of difference in means between any two 
types of firms being calculated are reported.  
The results of the categorical analysis on 3-year-average key financial ratios are 
presented in Table 4-4, Panel A. Type1 firms outperform significantly other firms in 
profitability (ROA) and cash flows (CF/TA) from operating activity with associated t-
statistics of differences in means between Type1 and the other firms at 1% level. While 
type2 firms exhibit average cash flow from operations slightly higher than 0, their 
profitability is observed to be negative over pre-IPO stage. In comparison with Type1 
and Type2, Type3 and Type4 are associated with lower and negative profitability and 
cash flows. Moreover, Type3 performs poorer ROA than Type4 and Type3 does not 
significantly differ from Type4 in CF/TA (t-statistics = -0.84).  
In general, these findings are consistent with Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler 
(1997) who state that firms tend to pay dividends when earnings/profit increased. IPOs 
with active attitude towards dividend policy exhibited better financial performance 
during the previous three fiscal years, in terms of profitability and cash flow from their 
operating activities. It is somewhat surprising that pre-IPO profitability for Type2 is on 
average negative. Unlike Type1 firms, Type2 firms do not determine to pay dividends 
immediately after finishing IPO because they do not reach sustainable profitability. But 
on the other side, Type2 is virtually more profitable than Type3 and Type4.  
Table 4-4, Panel A. also shows that Type1 and Type2 have higher TURNOVER 
RATIOs than Type3 and Type4, indicating that firms with the most active initial 
dividend policy are more efficient in utilising assets to raise revenue. There is no 
distinct difference in asset TURNOVER RATIO between Type1 and Type2 firms as the 
t-statistic of difference is 1.43 (> p-value 10%). Further, Type1 and Type2 are of lower 
capital expenditures ratios relative to Type3 and Type4, consistent with the predictions 
of residual, free cash flow and lifecycle hypotheses. It is possible that Type1 and Type2 
are more mature and thereby spent less on capital expenditures, and as a result, they 
tend to implement a more active dividend policy. It is also notable that Type1 and 
Type2 firms are not statistically different in terms of capital expenditure ratios. In 
addition, different types do not significantly differ in long-term debt ratios or changes to 
cash flow. Table 4-4, Panel B. compares key financial ratios for the last fiscal years 
prior to IPO across different types. Overall, the results are consistent with the findings 
in Table 4-4, Panel A. 
171 
 
 (2) IPO Characteristics  
Table 4-4, Panel C. indicates that Type1 is distinct from other types in the following 
characteristics by using univariate method. Type1 firms are evidently larger (LNGP) 
and more likely to be underwritten by prestigious investment banks (REPUTATION) 
than non-Type1 firms with the associated t-statistics are all greater than 2.0. Type1 has 
lower venture capital backed stakes (VC STAKE) and institutional ownership 
(INSTITUTION) than Type3 and Type4, and shorter consent period of lock-up than 
Type2. In addition, although Type1 firms are of lower level of managerial options 
(OPTION) and aggregate locked-up shares (AGGREGATE LOCKUP) than non-Type1 
firms, the associated t-statistics are only significant when comparing with Type3.  
Type2 is significantly associated with higher managerial ownership 
(DIRECTOR), longer lockup period (LOCKUP CONSENT) and lower initial return 
(UNDERPRICING) in comparison with Type3 and Type4. In addition, Type2 features 
lower OPTION, REPUTATION and LNGP, and higher locked-up directors’ shares 
(INSIDER LOCKUP) relative to Type3. Moreover, Type3 does not significantly 
distinguish from Type4 in firm characteristics, except that Type3 has higher OPTION 
than Type4. 
I note, however, that the ownership of institutional investors reported in Table 4-
4 is relatively low (mean value is 9.75% for Type1, 12.05% for Type2, 14.78% for 
Type3, and 16.11% for Type4). In particular, the corresponding median values for Type3 
and Type4 are zeros. This is because many companies (471) have reported zero 
ownership in IPO prospectuses. If I exclude the firms that reported zero ownership, the 
mean and median are 23.67% and 17.38% for the whole sample. Hoque and Lasfer 
(2009) who use prospectuses to collect information on intuitional ownership as well 
report that 327 of 831IPOs95
Table 4-4, Panel D shows that Type1 and Type2 firms are less likely to be 
backed by venture capitalists comparing with Type3 and Type4 firms. The percentages 
of VC backed firms are 42.58%, 50.98%, 58.44% and 57.84% for Type1, Type2, Type3 
and Type4, respectively. Type1 and Type2 firms are also less likely to be from the high 
technology sectors. The percentages of high technology firms for Type1 and Type2 
firms are 26.33% and 33.33%, economically lower than 52.81% and 59.8% for Type3  
 showed zero ownership of institutions in prospectuses over 
1999-2006. 
                                                 
95 As described in Section 4.3.1, my sample excluded the IPOs that did not include profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and a 
statement of cash flow for three pre-IPO fiscal years in prospectuses. Thus, my sample is smaller than Hoque and Lasfer (2009) over 
the sample period. 
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Table 4-4 Comparison of Pre-IPO Financial Ratios between Different Types 
The sample includes 932 IPOs issued on London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2010. IPOs in the sample are grouped 
into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at the time of IPO. Type1: The firms 
declare in their offering prospectuses that they determine to pay regular dividends after IPO and usually specify the 
details such as the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: The firms state that they have 
intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy depending on future operating performance, but they do not 
specify the details such as dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type3: The firms anticipate that 
they will not distribute dividends in the short or medium term, but usually they state that they will continue to review 
the appropriateness of its dividend policy. Type4: The firms do not have intention to pay dividends and do not 
provide any effective information about dividend policy. The definations of remaining variables are presented in 
Table 4-3. The last three columns present the t-statistics of the differences in means between different type firms. *, 
**, *** denotes significance at 10%, 5% and 1%, respectively.   
 
Type N Mean Q1 Median Q3 t-stat of difference between means Type1 Type2 Type3 
Panel A. Average 3-year Pre-IPO Financial Ratios (%) 
ROA 
Type1 357 9.74  3.76  7.50  13.69     Type2 154 -8.21  -10.12  2.84  10.49  4.77***   
Type3 320 -53.37  -98.09  -23.24  0.51  14.42*** 8.01***  
Type4 101 -35.81  -56.73  -20.75  1.56  7.22*** 3.81*** -2.32** 
CF/TA  
Type1 357 17.58  8.27  15.28  23.74     Type2 154 0.93  -6.50  7.79  19.16  4.99***   
Type3 320 -33.91  -73.98  -8.98  9.25  14.15*** 7.33***  
Type4 101 -28.48  -46.16  -9.90  4.72  8.4*** 4.68*** -0.84  
CF Change/TA 
Type1 357 2.04  -1.23  1.05  4.61     Type2 154 3.14  -1.62  1.28  7.17  -0.99    
Type3 320 1.68  -3.92  0.77  8.58  0.32  1.00   
Type4 101 1.58  -3.90  0.17  8.32  0.30  0.87  0.06  
TURNOVER RATIO 
Type1 357 184.24  93.21  165.75  247.83     Type2 154 168.21  80.24  144.22  233.40  1.43    
Type3 320 109.30  8.12  79.09  173.54  8.73*** 5.26***  
Type4 101 115.62  30.96  97.57  171.78  5.64*** 3.72*** -0.52  
LEVERAGE 
Type1 357 23.96  2.41  11.40  33.19     Type2 154 22.57  0.52  8.65  28.74  0.43    
Type3 320 29.02  0.00  7.27  38.33  -1.62  -1.72*  
Type4 101 28.20  0.78  10.87  33.01  -0.88  -1.07  0.16  
CAPEX/TA 
Type1 357 8.25  2.04  4.92  12.09     Type2 154 9.15  1.56  5.78  13.37  -0.83    
Type3 320 13.90  2.74  9.94  21.88  -6*** -3.82***  
Type4 101 12.00  2.40  7.75  19.27  -2.6*** -1.72* 1.21  
Panel B. Last Financial Year Ratios (%) 
Type N Mean Q1 Median Q3 t-stat of difference between means Type1 Type2 Type3 
ROA (-1Y) 
Type1 357 12.09  3.95  9.10  15.38     Type2 154 -3.23  -9.31  4.21  13.11  4.05***   
Type3 320 -52.37  -74.58  -19.73  3.09  13.22*** 8.22***  
Type4 101 -41.78  -63.44  -10.60  2.81  6.75*** 4.43*** -1.15  
CF/TA (-1Y) 
Type1 357 19.03  7.96  16.59  26.99     Type2 154 6.18  -3.97  7.00  23.77  3.86***   
Type3 320 -28.77  -57.08  -10.22  8.99  12.94*** 7.39***  
Type4 101 -24.07  -44.22  -3.79  10.60  7.16*** 4.52*** -0.68  
CF Change/TA (-1Y) 
Type1 357 1.72  -2.90  0.55  5.50     Type2 154 4.19  -4.09  1.05  13.08  -1.39    
Type3 320 -0.02  -9.41  0.00  11.89  0.91  1.71*  
Type4 101 1.12  -5.82  1.00  10.31  0.23  0.99  -0.36  
TURNOVER RATIO (-1Y) 
Type1 357 182.11  93.85  163.27  250.76     Type2 154 157.97  70.62  134.70  234.68  2.15**   
Type3 320 104.23  4.85  69.29  170.97  8.98*** 4.77***  




Type1 357 23.25  0.75  0.75  250.76     Type2 154 19.70  0.00  0.00  234.68  1.10    
Type3 320 28.02  0.00  0.00  170.97  -1.48  -2.17**  
Type4 101 26.62  0.00  0.00  165.02  -0.67  -1.28  0.26  
CAPEX/TA (-1Y) 
Type1 357 7.77  1.38  4.90  10.28     
Type2 154 9.41  1.20  3.79  10.97  -1.08    
Type3 320 13.14  1.61  6.42  20.22  -4.29*** -2.15**  
Type4 101 12.85  2.24  6.86  19.04  -2.82*** -1.59  0.15  
Panel C. IPO Characteristics 
Type N Mean Q1 Median Q3 t-stat of difference between means Type1 Type2 Type3 
DIRECTOR (%) 
Type1 357  31.67  7.35  28.22  50.60     Type2 154  38.11  14.40  34.93  61.30  -2.55**   
Type3 320  30.55  8.48  28.93  45.54  0.59  2.99***  
Type4 101  30.36  12.16  27.05  49.00  0.52  2.56** 0.08  
VC STAKE (%) 
Type1 357  9.97  0.00  0.00  15.40     Type2 154  12.05  0.00  3.30  18.50  -1.24    
Type3 320  14.78  0.00  6.32  24.34  -3.45*** -1.51   
Type4 101  16.11  0.00  7.63  26.70  -2.74*** -1.61  -0.57  
INSTITUITION (%) 
Type1 357  9.75  0.00  0.00  13.50     Type2 154  11.10  0.00  0.00  14.22  -0.76    
Type3 320  13.45  0.00  4.78  20.64  -2.66*** -1.28   
Type4 101  14.00  0.00  4.05  22.12  -1.85* -1.12  -0.24  
OPTION (%) 
Type1 357  0.06  0.00  0.00  0.02     
Type2 154  0.08  0.00  0.00  0.05  -0.88    
Type3 320  0.24  0.00  0.02  0.11  -3.12*** -2.59***  
Type4 101  0.10  0.00  0.01  0.08  -1.46  -0.52  2.32** 
INSIDER LOCKUP (%) 
Type1 313  30.94  7.35  7.35  0.02     Type2 144  34.06  10.02  10.02  0.05  -1.21    
Type3 307  29.84  7.75  7.75  0.11  0.57  1.65*  
Type4 97  29.33  11.18  11.18  0.08  0.63  1.55  0.20  
AGGEGATE LOCKUP (%) 
Type1 313  45.31  24.70  48.95  66.08     Type2 144  46.87  25.68  50.30  69.42  -0.59    
Type3 307  49.25  31.23  51.68  70.80  -1.89* -0.89   
Type4 97  49.01  24.78  49.75  74.03  -1.20  -0.61  0.08  
LOCKUP DAYS 
Type1 313  418.59  360  360 467     Type2 144  418.94  360  360  360  -0.02    
Type3 307  396.41  360 360  360  1.84* 1.40   
Type4 97  416.03  360 360  360  0.14  0.13  -1.07  
LOCKUP CONSENT 
Type1 313  549.20  360 509  720     Type2 144  666.42  360 720  720  -3.65***   
Type3 307  581.71  360 602 720  -1.61  2.61***  
Type4 97  583.40  360  720  720  -1.17  2.14** -0.06  
REPUTATION (%) 
Type1 357  1.41  0.18  0.59  1.79     
Type2 154  0.74  0.14  0.33  0.78  4.53***   
Type3 320  1.09  0.18  0.37  1.62  2.14** -2.67***  
Type4 101  0.92  0.12  0.26  0.80  2.55** -1.00  0.94  
LNGP 
Type1 357  0.70  0.22  0.22  0.02     
Type2 154  0.34  -0.08  -0.08  0.01  6.06***   
Type3 320  0.47  0.02  0.02  0.02  4.59*** -2.11**  
Type4 101  0.37  -0.10  -0.10  0.01  4.54*** -0.44  1.26  
UNDERPRICING (%) 
Type1 357  11.54  2.50  7.81  16.67     Type2 152  8.62  2.44  7.02  14.00  2.34**   
Type3 318  14.81  1.79  7.50  15.83  -1.66* -2.98***  
Type4 101  12.96  1.65  7.72  17.61  -0.57  -1.68* 0.62  
         
         
174 
 
Panel D. IPO Characteristics 
 VC-backed Non VC-backed VC-backed Percent (%) 
Type1 152 205 42.58 
Type2 78 75 50.98 
Type3 187 133 58.44 
Type4 59 43 57.84 
 Hitech Non Hitech Hitech Percent (%) 
Type1 94 263 26.33 
Type2 51 102 33.33 
Type3 169 151 52.81 
Type4 61 41 59.80 
 AIM Main Market AIM Percent (%) 
Type1 172 185 48.18 
Type2 130 23 84.97 
Type3 253 67 79.06 
Type4 79 23 77.45 
 
and Type4 firms. Finally, Type1 firms are more likely to be issued on the main market 
rather than AIM. Only 48.18% of Type1 firms are based on AIM, compared to 84.97%, 
79.06% and 77.45% for Type2, Type3 and Type4 firms, respectively.  
 
(3) Changes in Pre-IPO Financial Ratios  
In order to investigate the effects of changes in pre-IPO financial position on dividend 
policies as stated in IPO prospectuses, several growth variables are developed to 
measure the changes in financial performance before IPO.  
Figure 4-1, Panel A. illustrates that firms that experienced increase in earnings 
or maintained positive earnings are more likely to undertake active dividend policy 
when going public. The first bar diagram (1) indicates that the proportion of IPO firms 
that experienced the increase in ROA from t-1 to t descends from Type1 to Type4 
orderly and monotonically. The proportions are 59.66% and 50.65% for Type1 and 
Type2 firms versus 48.44% and 40.59% for Type3 and Type4. Such relation is also 
applicable to the second diagram (2), indicating that the proportion of firms that 
experienced a continuous increase in ROA from t-2 to t-1 and from t-1 to t decreases 
from Type1 to Type4 in order. The third diagram (3) indicates that the proportion of 
IPO firms that maintained positive earnings during pre-IPO period (from t-2 to t) 
decreases from Type1 to Type4 in order.  
Figure 4-1, Panel B. illustrates that firms that are capable of maintaining 
positive cash inflows from operating activities prior to IPO are more likely to undertake 
active dividend policy (Type1 and Type2) during the process of IPO. The proportions 
for Type1, Type2, Type3 and Type4 firms are 78.43%, 39.86%, 20.63% and 19.8%, 
respectively. However, different types of IPOs do not differ significantly in the  
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Figure 4-1 Pre-IPO Changes in Financial Ratios 
The figure illustrates the percentage of IPOs that experienced three occasions, where t refers to the IPO year. (1) IPOs 
experienced increase in financial ratios from t-1 to t; (2) IPOs experienced continuously increase in financial ratios 
from t-2 to t-1 and from t-1 to t; (3) IPOs maintained positive earnings or cash inflow from operating activities during 
the financial period from t-2 to t. The sample includes 932 IPO firms listed in London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 
2010. IPOs in the sample are grouped into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at 
the time of IPO. Type1: The firms declare in their offering prospectuses that they determine to pay regular dividends 
after IPO and usually specify the details such as the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: 
The firms state that they have intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy depending on future operating 
performance, but they do not specify the details such as dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment.  Type3: 
The firms anticipate that they will not distribute dividends in the short or medium term, but usually they state that 
they will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy. Type4: The firms do not have intention to pay 
dividends and do not provide any effective information about dividend policy. Appendix 4-1 details the results. 
 
A. Pre-IPO Profitability 
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probability of exhibiting increases in cash flow from operation over pre-IPO phase. The 
monotonic relationship revealed above is not evident for the other financial ratios as the 
residual figures (Panel C.D.E.F.) shown.  
4.4.2 Logistic Regression Analyses 
(1) Cross-Sectional Binary Logistic Regressions 
This section uses cross-sectional binary logistic regression model to investigate the 
determinants of dividend policy at the time of IPO. Table 4-2 reports that 97.15% of 
measure Type1 firms honoured their promises to start paying dividends in the three 
post-IPO years, therefore Type1 IPOs make the definite decisions to initiate dividends. 
It is expected that Type1 firms differ significantly from other firms in the key 
characteristics that influence the dividend decisions. In the following multivariate 
logistic test, the dependent variable is equal to 1 if an IPO firm is categorized into Type1 
and 0 otherwise. The predictor factors used include accounting 3-year averages, 
accounting last fiscal year ratios, IPO characteristics, changes in pre-IPO financial ratios 
(See Table 4-3 for variable definitions). Eight logistic regression specifications are built 
up, following a procedure of model verification. The formula used in multivariate 
logistic regressions is:  log �P(𝑦𝑖=1|𝑋𝑖)
P(𝑦𝑖=0|𝑋𝑖)� = 𝛽0 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                                     (4-3) 
where 𝑋𝑖  represents the vector of control variables, and i is the number of control 
variables in each regression.  
Table 4-5, Panel A shows the results from estimating logistic regressions with 
accounting 3-year averages and accounting last fiscal year ratios as explanatory 
variables. The results indicate that Type1 firms have on average higher profitability, 
cash flow from operation and of high turnover ratio over pre-IPO stage than other firms, 
as the estimated coefficients of ROA, CF/TA and TURNOVER RATIO are positive and 
significant at a 1% level. These results are consistent with the findings obtained in the 
categorical analyses (Table 4-4). In addition, both the coefficients of ROA (-1Y) and 
CF/TA (-1Y) are positive and significant, suggesting that dividend policies are 
significantly influenced by IPOs’ profitability and cash flow in the last fiscal year prior 
to IPO. As shown in Model (5), the significant and negative coefficient of CAPEX/TA 
suggests that firms are likely to follow the residual theory when they set up their 




nor CF Change/TA (Model (6)) have significant effect on IPOs’ dividend policies. 
A number of factors that tend to drive IPOs to reject Type1 dividend policy 
encompass VC backing (VC-BACKED), managerial option (OPTION and IFOPTION), 
institutional holding (IFINST), lockup period (LOCKUP CONSENT), the quoted junior 
stock market (AIM), Technology intensity (HITECH), bubble period (BUBBLE) and 
quotation during the post-2000 period (DUMMY2000S). On the contrary, the 
coefficients of LNGP (gross proceeds) and REPUTATION (the choice of reputable 
underwriter) are significantly positive, indicating that large firms collaborating with 
reputable underwriters tend to declare active dividend policy when going public.  
In contrast, the t-values of venture capitalist backing (VC), Locked-up directors’ 
shares (INSIDER LOCKUP), and aggregate locked up shares (AGGREGATE LOCKUP) 
are sensitive to inclusion of other control variables. For instance, when controlling for 
REPUTATION in Model (4), p-value of VC is 0.11, which is lower than the standard of 
significance. The estimated coefficients of VC are significantly negative in Model (6) 
and (7). Moreover, none of the coefficients on the length of lockup (LOCKUP DAYS), 
director ownership (DIRECTOR) and the dividend premium (DP) is statistically 
significant in the relevant regression models. 
Table 4-5, Panel B shows the results from estimating logistic regressions with 
growth variables to capture the effects of dynamic changes in financial ratios on 
dividend policy at IPO stage. The coefficients of growth in earnings (G1 ROA, G2 ROA) 
and maintain positive earnings (POSITIVE ROA) are positive and significant at 1% 
level, suggesting that IPOs undertaking Type1 dividend policy experienced the changes 
in earnings in positive direction. Similarly, the estimated coefficients on POSITIVE CF 
(firms maintain positive cash flow from operation prior to IPO) and POSITIVE 
CFCHANGE/TA (firms maintain positive change in cash flow prior to IPO) is positive 
and significant. On the contrary, the estimated coefficients on growth in cash flow (G1 
CF/TA, G2 CF/TA) and growth in change in cash flow (G1 CFCHANGE/TA) are not 
statistically significant. The remaining results are qualitatively similar to the results 
raised in Table 4-5, Panel A, with three the flowing exceptions: the coefficients of 
INSTITUITION and VC stake are significantly negative in all regression models; the 
coefficients of AGGREGATE LOCKUP are not significant in any regressions; the 




Table 4-5 Logistic Regressions on the Willingness of paying Dividends at IPO stage  
This sample includes 932 IPO firms listed in London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2010. The IPO prospectuses contain a section stating the proposed dividend policy. IPOs in the sample are grouped 
into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at the time of IPO. Type1: The firms declare in their offering prospectuses that they determine to pay regular dividends after 
IPO and usually specify the details such as the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: The firms state that they have intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy 
depending on future operating performance, but they do not specify the details such as dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment.  Type3: The firms anticipate that they will not distribute 
dividends in the short or medium term, but usually they state that they will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy. Type4: The firms do not have intention to pay dividends and do 
not provide any effective information about dividend policy. The dependent variable equals to one if an observed IPO belongs to Type1, and zero otherwise. The explanatory variables are as defined in 
Table 4-3. p-values are reported in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Panel A. With Accounting Variables as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ROA 3.52***        
 (0.00)        CF/TA  3.69***       
  (0.00)       LEVERAGE   -0.22       
   (0.27)      TURNOVER    0.44***     
    (0.00)     CAPEX/TA     -3.37***    
     (0.00)    CF CHANGE/TA      -0.02    
      (0.97)   ROA(-1Y)       3.04***  
       (0.00)  CF/TA(-1Y)        2.49*** 
        (0.00) AIM -1.16***    -1.91***    
 (0.00)    (0.00)    HITECH  -0.65***    -0.91***  -0.78*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   0.88***    0.97***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    21.41***    13.38** 
    (0.00)    (0.01) INSTITUTION -0.68       -1.09*  
 (0.2)      (0.05)  IFINST  -0.34**      -0.5*** 
  (0.04)      (0.00) DIRECTOR   -0.14   0.36     




VC STAKE    -0.75   -1.04** -0.89*  
    (0.11)  (0.02) (0.09)  VC-BACKED   -0.55***  -0.7***   -0.35** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.04) OPTION    -166.27** -138.79**   -188.61** 
    (0.01) (0.03)   (0.01) IFOPTION   -0.56***   -0.4** -0.44**  
   (0.00)   (0.01) (0.02)  INSIDER LOCKUP -0.65*     -0.38   -0.84** 
 (0.09)     (0.23)  (0.02) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  -0.88**   -0.14   -0.71**  
  (0.01)   (0.71)  (0.04)  LOCKUP DAYS   0.32     -0.21   
   (0.14)    (0.43)  LOCKUP CONSENT    -0.33*    -0.5** 
    (0.08)    (0.01) DUMMY2000S -1.24***   -1.58***   -1.78***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   0.57    0.14  0.17  -0.89  
   (0.48)   (0.86) (0.86) (0.35) Constant 1.46*** 0.20  -2.04  1.86  1.61*** 0.33  2.26  3.18** 
 (0.00) (0.31) (0.14) (0.12) (0.00) (0.35) (0.18) (0.02) χ 332.95  2 243.96  80.30  202.95  203.65  56.96  335.26  246.98  
Pseudo R
 
2 0.30  0.22  0.07  0.18  0.18  0.05  0.30  0.22  
Panel B. With Changes in Accounting Variables as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
G1 ROA 0.67***        
 (0.00)        G2 ROA  0.59***       
  (0.00)       POSITIVE ROA   2.23***      
   (0.00)      G1 CF/TA    0.18      
    (0.25)     G2 CF/TA     -0.11     
     (0.56)    POSITIVE CF/TA      2.24***   
      (0.00)   G1 CFCHANGE/TA       0.04   
       (0.81)  POSITIVE CFCHANGE/TA        0.46** 
        (0.02) AIM -1.33***    -1.86***    




HITECH  -0.94***    -0.71***  -0.98*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   0.77***    1.02***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    20.18***    15.47*** 
    (0.00)    (0.00) INSTITUTION -1.25**      -1.77***  
 (0.01)      (0.00)  IFINST  -0.55***      -0.62*** 
  (0.00)      (0.00) DIRECTOR   -0.78**  0.37     
   (0.03)  (0.35)    VC STAKE    -1.13**  -1.05** -1.59***  
    (0.01)  (0.04) (0.00)  VC-BACKED   -0.44**  -0.71***   -0.39** 
   (0.01)  (0.00)   (0.01) OPTION    -172.36** -137.61**   -231.52*** 
    (0.01) (0.03)   (0.00) IFOPTION   -0.44**   -0.35* -0.61***  
   (0.01)   (0.05) (0.00)  INSIDER LOCKUP 0.02      -0.8**  -0.40  
 (0.96)     (0.03)  (0.24) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  -0.47    -0.20   -0.30   
  (0.11)   (0.58)  (0.35)  LOCKUP DAYS   -0.03     -0.24   
   (0.91)    (0.33)  LOCKUP CONSENT    -0.19     -0.58*** 
    (0.31)    (0.00) DUMMY2000S -1.32***   -1.68***   -1.83***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   -0.66    -0.09  0.80  -0.75  
   (0.47)   (0.92) (0.36) (0.4) Constant 0.97*** 0.20  -1.40  1.68  1.31*** -0.88** 2.71* 3.8*** 
 (0.00) (0.28) (0.36) (0.15) (0.00) (0.03) (0.08) (0.00) χ 191.52  2 81.42  264.99  164.93  181.62  255.81  207.21  140.68  
Pseudo R
 







(2) Cross-Sectional Ordinal Logistic Regressions 
In this section, cross-sectional ordinal logistic regressions are used to examine the 
determinants of the dividend policies at IPO stage. Ordinal logistic regression model has 
the advantage over binary logistic regression model in investigating events that have 
more than two outcomes. The equation is written as:  
𝑙𝑜𝑔�𝑃𝑗� = 𝛽𝑗 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖                                                                                                           (4 − 4)  
where Xi  indicates a vector of control variables and ‘i’ is the number of control 
variables. The term, 𝛽𝑗, function as the interceptor in a linear regression. However, the 
coefficients 𝛽𝑖   remain the same for all odds. The number of odds is the number of 
categories minus one. Therefore, given there are three orders, 𝑃𝑗  , 𝑗 = 1, 2  are the 
following: 
𝑃1 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2/𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3)                                                                                            (4 − 5)  
𝑃2 = 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒1/𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒2)𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 (𝑇𝑦𝑝𝑒3)                                                                                            (4 − 6)  
I first arrange three orders in the test with dependent variable equaling 1, 2 and 3, 
corresponding to dividend policies of Type1, Type2 and the rest (Type3 and Typee4). 
Setting jointly Type3 and Type4 as one order is due to that Type3 firms resemble Type4 
firms in terms of their style of dividend policy and firm characteristics. By doing so, 
IPO firms declaring active dividend policies, such as Type1 and Type2, are taking 
smaller values in regressions. As a result, if a control variable is associated with more 
active dividend policy its coefficient is expected to be negative. In ordinal logistic 
analysis, the explanatory variables are those variables used in the binary logistic 
regression analysis (Table 4-5, Panel A and Table 4-5, Panel B). 
Table 4-6 shows the results from running ordinal logistic regressions with three 
orders. The overall estimates are qualitatively consistent with the results generated from 
binary logistic analysis. For example, the estimated coefficients of ROA, CF/TA, 
TURNOVER, ROA(-1Y) and CF/TA(-1Y) (Panel A.) and G1 ROA, G2 ROA, POSITIVE 
ROA and POSITIVE CF (Panel B) are negative and statistically significant, indicating 
that these factors have a positive correlation with active dividend policies declared in 
IPO prospectuses. On the contrary, capital expenditure has a negative influence on the 
possibility that IPOs decide to undertake active dividend policies since the coefficient of 
CAPEX/TA in Model (5) of Panel A is positive and significant. In addition, coefficient 




It is noticeable the results on AGGREGATE LOCKUP, LOCKUP CONSENT 
and DP are distinguishable from those generated from binary logistic regressions while 
the results on the rest of proxy variables remain constant qualitatively. The coefficients 
of AGGREGATE LOCKUP are significantly positive in Model (2), (5), (7), indicating a 
monotonously negative relation between the willingness of executing active dividend 
policies and the percent of aggregate locked-up shares. The coefficients of LOCKUP 
CONSENT are insignificant in all regression models except Model (8) in Table 4-6, 
Panel B. Consistent with the expectation suggested by catering theory, the proxy 
variable of dividend catering (DP) has positive and significant coefficients in Model 3 
of Panel A and Model (3) and Model (7) of Panel B. 
In order to check if results are sensitive to different classifications concerning 
IPOs, I implement a robust test in which the responsive variables are 1, 2, 3 and 4 for 
Type1, Type2, Type3 and Type4 respectively. Table 4-7 shows that the overall results 
remained unchanged qualitatively compared with the results in Table 4-6, with the 
exception that the coefficients of LOCKUP CONSENT are insignificant in all regression 






Table 4-6 Ordinal Logistic Regressions on the Willingness of Paying Dividends at IPO stage (1) 
This sample includes 932 IPO firms listed in London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2010. The IPO prospectuses contain a section stating the proposed dividend policy. IPOs in the sample are grouped 
into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends at the time of IPO. Type1: The firms declare in their offering prospectuses that they determine to pay regular dividends after 
IPO and usually specify the details such as the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: The firms state that they have intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy 
depending on future operating performance, but they do not specify the details such as dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment.  Type3: The firms anticipate that they will not distribute 
dividends in the short or medium term, but usually they state that they will continue to review the appropriateness of its dividend policy. Type4: The firms do not have intention to pay dividends and do 
not provide any effective information about dividend policy. The dependant variables for Type1, Type2 IPOs are 1, 2 respectively. The dependant variables for Type3 and Type4 IPOs are 3. The 
explanatory variables are as defined in Table 4-3. p-values are reported in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Panel A. With Accounting Ratios as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ROA -2.35***        
 (0.00)        CF/TA  -2.77***       
  (0.00)       LEVERAGE   0.24       
   (0.16)      TURNOVER    -0.47***     
    (0.00)     CAPEX/TA     3.21***    
     (0.00)    CFCHANGE/TA      -0.20    
      (0.68)   ROA(-1Y)       -2.18***  
       (0.00)  CF/TA(-1Y)        -2.29*** 
        (0.00) AIM 0.88***    1.64***    
 (0.00)    (0.00)    HITECH  0.64***    0.94***  0.77*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   -0.71***    -0.64***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    -16.46***    -9.35** 
    (0.00)    (0.03) INSTITUTION 0.65       0.84*  
 (0.13)      (0.06)  IFINST  0.35**      0.4** 
  (0.02)      (0.01) DIRECTOR   -0.11   -0.88**    




VC STAKE    0.59   0.96** 0.76*  
    (0.13)  (0.01) (0.07)  VC-BACKED   0.49***  0.63***   0.35** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.02) OPTION    147.22*** 119.95**   152.69*** 
    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.00) IFOPTION   0.65***   0.52*** 0.58***  
   (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)  INSIDER LOCKUP 0.47      0.25   0.75** 
 (0.14)     (0.38)  (0.02) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  0.87***   0.61*  0.83***  
  (0.00)   (0.05)  (0.00)  LOCKUP DAYS   -0.36*    0.04   
   (0.08)    (0.87)  LOCKUP CONSENT    0.12     0.21  
    (0.47)    (0.23) DUMMY2000S 1.01***   1.32***   1.42***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   -1.35*   -0.78  -1.01  0.15  
   (0.06)   (0.27) (0.2) (0.86) /cut1 1.15  0.31  -1.86  0.37  1.44  0.60  1.72  1.58  
/cut2 2.09  1.21  -1.12  1.21  2.29  1.34  2.68  2.50  
χ 328.75  2 290.57  84.86  204.17  216.69  82.84  349.25  301.63  
Pseudo R
 
2 0.19  0.17  0.05  0.12  0.12  0.05  0.20  0.17  
Panel B. With Changes in Accounting Ratios as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
G1 ROA -0.55***        
 (0.00)        G2 ROA  -0.52***       
  (0.00)       POSITIVE ROA   -2.1***      
   (0.00)      G1 CF/TA    -0.18      
    (0.2)     G2 CF/TA     0.10     
     (0.55)    POSITIVE CF/TA      -2.05***   
      (0.00)   G2 TURNOVER       0.29*  
       (0.09)  G1 LEVERAGE        -0.02  
        (0.9) AIM 1.07***    1.6***    




HITECH  0.97***    0.7***  0.98*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   -0.57***    -0.74***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    -15.03***    -12.9*** 
    (0.00)    (0.00) INSTITUTION 1.08**      1.5***  
 (0.01)      (0.00)  IFINST  0.54***      0.53*** 
  (0.00)      (0.00) DIRECTOR   0.28   -0.88**    
   (0.37)  (0.01)    VC STAKE    1.01**  0.88** 1.34***  
    (0.01)  (0.04) (0.00)  VC-BACKED   0.39**  0.63***   0.4*** 
   (0.01)  (0.00)   (0.00) OPTION    146.23*** 115.49**   175.94*** 
    (0.00) (0.01)   (0.00) IFOPTION   0.58***   0.56*** 0.71***  
   (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)  INSIDER LOCKUP -0.18      0.58*  0.23  
 (0.55)     (0.06)  (0.44) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  0.51*   0.66**  0.57**  
  (0.05)   (0.04)  (0.04)  LOCKUP DAYS   -0.07     0.10   
   (0.74)    (0.64)  LOCKUP CONSENT    -0.04     0.32* 
    (0.82)    (0.05) DUMMY2000S 1.12***   1.44***   1.55***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   -0.49    -0.97  -1.63** -0.16  
   (0.52)   (0.21) (0.03) (0.84) /cut1 0.72  0.25  -1.47  0.19  1.15  -0.29  2.47  2.51  
/cut2 1.53  1.01  -0.53  0.98  1.97  0.63  3.30  3.30  
χ 163.08  2 104.60  290.82  145.81  187.85  287.24  195.47  152.05  
Pseudo R
 









Table 4-7 Ordinal Logistic Regressions on the Willingness of Paying Dividends at IPO stage (2) 
This sample includes 932 IPO firms listed in London Stock Exchange from 1996 to 2010. The IPO prospectuses contain a section stating the proposed dividend policy. IPOs in the sample are grouped 
into the following four types according to their willingness to pay dividends. Type1: The firms announce that they determine to pay regular dividends after IPO and usually specify the dividend level 
and/or the timing of dividend payment. Type2: The firms state that they have intention to carry out active/progressive dividend policy depending on future operating performance, but they do not specify 
the dividend level and/or the timing of dividend payment.  Type3: The firms anticipate that they will not pay out dividends in the short or medium term. Type4: The firms currently do not have intention 
to pay dividends and provide limited information about dividend policy. The dependant variables for Type1, Type2, Type3, and Type4 firms are 1, 2, 3 and 4 respectively. The explanatory variables are 
as defined in Table 4-3. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Panel A. With Accounting Ratios and as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
ROA -1.04***        
 (0.00)        CF/TA  -1.41***       
  (0.00)       LEVERAGE   0.20       
   (0.2)      TURNOVER    -0.42***     
    (0.00)     CAPEX/TA     2.33***    
     (0.00)    CFCHANGE/TA      -0.12    
      (0.78)   ROA(-1Y)       -0.86***  
       (0.00)  CF/TA(-1Y)        -1.29*** 
        (0.00) AIM 0.83***    1.53***    
 (0.00)    (0.00)    HITECH  0.69***    0.92***  0.74*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   -0.66***    -0.59***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    -15.75***    -10.34** 
    (0.00)    (0.01) INSTITUTION 0.60       0.85**  
 (0.11)      (0.02)  IFINST  0.32**      0.38** 
  (0.01)      (0.01) DIRECTOR   -0.12   -0.74**    
   (0.67)  (0.02)    VC STAKE    0.51   0.83** 0.77**  




VC-BACKED   0.44***  0.57***   0.31** 
   (0.00)  (0.00)   (0.02) OPTION    21.98** 19.38**   26.99*** 
    (0.02) (0.03)   (0.00) IFOPTION   0.55***   0.43*** 0.45***  
   (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)  INSIDER LOCKUP 0.23      0.22   0.54* 
 (0.42)     (0.42)  (0.06) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  0.6**   0.5*  0.46*  
  (0.02)   (0.08)  (0.07)  LOCKUP DAYS   -0.28     0.07   
   (0.16)    (0.75)  LOCKUP CONSENT    0.10     0.16  
    (0.5)    (0.29) DUMMY2000S 0.86***   1.21***   1.21***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   -1.54**   -0.91  -1.26* -0.20  
   (0.02)   (0.18) (0.07) (0.8) /cut1 0.62  0.21  -0.73  0.00  1.00  -0.28  2.02  2.06  
/cut2 1.43  0.96  0.20  0.78  1.80  0.64  2.84  2.83  
/cut3 3.50  3.05  2.47  2.81  3.92  2.95  4.98  4.94  
χ 148.29  2 99.70  277.30  109.41  155.32  275.88  169.21  121.95  
Pseudo R
 
2 0.07  0.05  0.13  0.05  0.07  0.13  0.08  0.06  
Panel B. With Changes in Accounting Ratios as Explanatory Variables 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
G1 ROA -0.54***        
 (0.00)        G2 ROA  -0.48***       
  (0.00)       POSITIVE ROA   -2.03***      
   (0.00)      G1 CF/TA    -0.08      
    (0.55)     G2 CF/TA     0.15     
     (0.33)    POSITIVE CF/TA      -1.95***   
      (0.00)   G2 LEVERAGE       0.15   
       (0.49)  G1 CAPEX/TA        0.04  
        (0.74) AIM 1.03***    1.53***    




HITECH  0.97***    0.67***  0.95*** 
  (0.00)    (0.00)  (0.00) LNGP   -0.51***    -0.67***  
   (0.00)    (0.00)  REPUTATION    -15.11***    -13.51*** 
    (0.00)    (0.00) INSTITUTION 0.9**      1.24***  
 (0.02)      (0.00)  IFINST  0.49***      0.5*** 
  (0.00)      (0.00) DIRECTOR   0.24   -0.77**    
   (0.41)  (0.01)    VC STAKE    0.88**  0.67* 1.1***  
    (0.01)  (0.07) (0.00)  VC-BACKED   0.32**  0.56***   0.36** 
   (0.02)  (0.00)   (0.01) OPTION    17.55* 18.02**   26.48*** 
    (0.05) (0.04)   (0.00) IFOPTION   0.43***   0.43*** 0.56***  
   (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00)  INSIDER LOCKUP -0.16      0.48*  0.18  
 (0.57)     (0.09)  (0.52) AGGREGATE LOCKUP  0.49*   0.55*  0.45*  
  (0.05)   (0.06)  (0.07)  LOCKUP DAYS   0.03     0.07   
   (0.87)    (0.75)  LOCKUP CONSENT    -0.05     0.25  
    (0.73)    (0.11) DUMMY2000S 1.01***   1.35***   1.38***  
 (0.00)   (0.00)   (0.00)  DP   -0.84    -1.19* -1.76** -0.59  
   (0.24)   (0.09) (0.01) (0.44) /cut1 0.62  0.21  -0.73  0.00  1.00  -0.28  2.02  2.06  
/cut2 1.43  0.96  0.20  0.78  1.80  0.64  2.84  2.83  
/cut3 3.50  3.05  2.47  2.81  3.92  2.95  4.98  4.94  
χ 148.29  2 99.70  277.30  109.41  155.32  275.88  169.21  121.95  
Pseudo R
 






4.4.3 Abnormal Returns on Dividend Initiations and Long-Run Aftermarket 
Performance  
(1) Event Study 
To understand the connotation of various dividend policies declared in IPO prospectuses 
in the context of information mechanism, the abnormal returns of dividend initiations 
are examined using event study methodology. Previous theoretical literature suggests 
that dividends contain inner information of corporations (Lintner, 1956) and serve to 
balance the information between informed and uninformed participants under imperfect 
market circumstances (Miller and Modigliani, 1961; Bhattacharya, 1979; Miller and 
Rock, 1985, and John and Williams, 1985). If stock investors consider increase 
(decrease) in dividends as good news (bad news) for companies they invest, stock 
appreciation (depreciation)96 will occur subsequently. Asquith and Mullins (1983) argue 
that dividends’ effects should be most visible at initiation since the very first cash 
payout represents the abrupt transition of dividend strategy, and they report that the 2-
day excess return on dividend initiation is +3.7% with t-statistic of 6.59. Similarly, Healy 
and Palepu (1988), Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995), and Lipson, Maquieira and 
Megginson (1998) find evidence regarding positive abnormal returns on dividend initiation 
announcements97
As introduced above, dividend policies written in IPO prospectuses create a 
certain informational imbalance. Type1 firms release the most detailed aftermarket 
dividend plans. Type2 firms state that they will pursue a progressive dividend policy. 
By contrast, Type3 and Type4 firms release limited information on dividend policy. 
Hence, I may expect that the dividend initiation announcements tend to trigger greater 
informational surprise if IPOs release more ambiguous dividend policies at the time of 
IPO.  
. 
H20: The abnormal returns of dividend initiation announcements correlate 
negatively with the transparency of dividend policies stated at IPO stage. 
 
A standard event study methodology (Brown and Warner, 1985; Mackinlay, 
                                                 
96 Charest (1978) finds that the announcements of dividend increase generate positive excess returns. Aharony and Swary (1980) 
find that the qualitatively similar result after controlling the effect of contemporaneous earning announcements. 
97 Healy and Palepu (1988) report statistically significant two-day excess returns of +3.9%; Michaely, Thaler, and Womack (1995) 
report statistically significant three-day excess returns of +3.4%; Lipson, Maquieira and Megginson (1998) report statistically 





where 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡, 𝑅𝑖𝑡 and 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 represent abnormal return, actual return and expected return. 
Follow previous dividend studies
 is used to measure the market reaction to dividend initiation announcements. 
The abnormal return for firm i and a single observed day t in the event window t is 
computed as:  
𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝑅𝑖𝑡 − 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡                                                                                                                (4 − 7) 
99
𝑅𝑖𝑇 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑇 + 𝜀𝑖𝑇                                                                                                      (4 − 8)  
, expected return (𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 ) is estimated by market 
model in which the market portfolio selected is FTSE All-Share Index. 
where 𝑅𝑖𝑇 and 𝑅𝑚𝑇 stand for the returns of individual stocks and of market portfolio 
over the estimation window respectively. 𝜀𝑖𝑇 is the zero mean disturbance term. 𝛼𝑖 and 
𝛽𝑖 are then used to calculate 𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 with using the actual market return 𝑅𝑚𝑡 over the event 
window. 
𝐸𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 + 𝛽𝑖𝑅𝑚𝑡                                                                                                             (4 − 9)  
The average daily abnormal return at the event date t is the mean across the 
observations: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡����� = 𝑁−1 ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑖𝑡𝑁𝑖=1                                                                                                        (4 − 10)  
The cumulative abnormal returns over the event window (t1, t2) can be calculated as: 
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡�����𝑡2𝑡=𝑡1                                                                                                        (4 − 11)  
The t-value of CARs (Rubac, 1982; Bonnier and Bruner, 1989; Mackinlay and Hamill, 
1997) is:  
𝑡�𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2� = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡1,𝑡2
�(𝑡2−𝑡1+1)𝑣𝑎𝑟𝑡1,𝑡2(𝐴𝑅𝑡�����)+2(𝑡2−𝑡1)𝑐𝑜𝑣𝑡1,𝑡2(𝐴𝑅𝑡�����,𝐴𝑅𝑡−1���������)                                (4 − 12)  
Table 4-8 reports the abnormal returns to dividend initiation announcement for 
several event windows encompassing (-1,1), (-3,3), (-3,-1), (-1,0), 0, (0,1) and (1,3) 
trading days where day 0 refers to the date of dividend initiation announcement. Short 
event windows are selected for the purpose of keeping away from the contamination of 
other influential information releases such as announcements of earnings and M&A. In 
this section, the market models are estimated using the 60-days estimation window (-
90,-30) trading days relative to the dividend initiation announcement day. During the 
process there are totally 404 announcements as event observations. Since taking longer 
estimation windows tends to downsize the numbers of usable observations, I further use 
a shorter 30-days estimation window (-60,-30) which leads to 457 observations to check 
                                                 
98 Ball and Brown (1968) and Fama et al. (1969) developed earlier seminal method of event study. 




the sensitivity of the results. In estimation, seven subgroups (All, Type1, Type2, Type3, 
Type4, Type2&3&4 and Type3&4) are set up. 
The following findings can be drawn from the results. First, in line with prior 
studies, the significant positive cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to dividend 
initiation announcements are observed for the full sample as shown in “ALL” column. 
With the exception of event window (1, 3), the excess returns are positive with p-values 
smaller than 5% for all event windows. For example, the CAR for event window (-3, 3) 
is 0.0229 and significant at 1% level. Second, in line with above hypothesis (H20), 
CARs of Type1 IPOs are lower than those of non-Type1 counterparts (Type2, 
Type2&3&4 and Type3&4) and full sample (ALL) for the two primary event windows 
(-1,1) and (-3,3). Such relation holds basically between Type1 and Type2 for event 
windows (-1, 0), 0, (0, 1). For example, the excess returns of TYPE1 and TYPE2 are 
0.0114 and 0.0281 for event window (-1, 0) respectively. Third, however, contrary to 
what we expected, TYPE2 has the greatest and significant CARs over the major event 
windows. In contrast, neither TYPE3 nor TYPE4 has the statistically significant CARs. 
This finding might suggest that the investors only regard the dividend initiations of non-
technological companies as good news. As revealed in Table 4-4, the proportion of 
TYPE2 IPOs belonging to high technology industries is distinctively low relative to 
TYPE3 or TYPE4 counterparts. Fourth, only TYPE1 has the significant CAR over the 
event window (-3,-1), indicating that TYPE1 companies are materially affected by the 
possible information leakage before dividend initiation announcements. When I use 30-
days estimation window (-60,-30) in estimating market model, the results (Appendix 4-
1) are qualitatively similar. 
 
(2) Long-Run Aftermarket Performance of IPOs 
The evidence that IPOs exhibit long-run underperformance in aftermarket has been 
broadly documented by prior studies (Aggarwal and Rivoli, 1990; Ritter, 1991; Levis, 
1993; Espenlaub, Gregory, and Tonks, 2000; Carter, Dark and Singh, 1998). For 
example, Levis (1993) find the accumulative average adjusted returns (excluding initial 
returns) for 712 IPOs issued on LSE over 1980-1988 is -22.96% in a 3-years period. 
Prior studies provide several potential explanations for the anomaly of IPO’s long-run 
aftermarket performance directly and indirectly. Ritter (1991) mainly suggest that 
investors tend to overvalue young growth companies, and that firms time new issues 




Table 4-8 Abnormal Returns on Dividend Initiation Announcement of IPOs in 1996-2010 
Excess returns are calculated using market model with 60-days estimation window (-90,-30) relative to dividend 
initiation announcement date and with FTSE All-Share Index as benchmark market portfolio. “All” represents the full 
sample of IPOs that initiated dividends and have complete data on stock returns and market returns; the definitions of 
“TYPE1”, “TYPE2”, “TYPE3” and “TYPE4” are incorporated in Section 4.3.1; TYPE2&3&4 represents the 
combination of TYPE2, TYPE3 and TYPE4 IPOs; TYPE3&4 represents the combination of TYPE3 and TYPE4 
IPOs. For each even window and each subgroup, abnormal returns is presented in the upper row and p-value is 
presented in parentheses in the lower row. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively. 
 
Event Window All TYPE1 TYPE2 TYPE3 TYPE4 TYPE2&3&4 TYPE3&4 
(-1,1) 0.0159*** 0.0108  0.0363*** 0.0138  0.0535  0.0287*** 0.0192* 
 (0.003) (0.119) (0.00) (0.145) (0.268) (0.00) (0.059) 
(-3,3) 0.0229*** 0.017** 0.0456*** 0.0202  0.0758  0.0377*** 0.0278* 
 (0.001) (0.048) (0.00) (0.214) (0.141) (0.00) (0.073) 
(-3,-1) 0.0065** 0.0072** 0.0042  0.0056  0.0017  0.0046  0.0050  
 (0.019) (0.039) (0.423) (0.475) (0.838) (0.272) (0.457) 
(-1,0) 0.0145*** 0.0114** 0.0281*** 0.0088  0.0557  0.0224*** 0.0152  
 (0.001) (0.034) (0.001) (0.251) (0.321) (0.00) (0.117) 
0 0.0118*** 0.0079  0.0294*** 0.0051  0.0549  0.0217*** 0.0119  
 (0.003) (0.114) (0.00) (0.502) (0.323) (0.00) (0.216) 
(0,1) 0.0132*** 0.0073  0.0376*** 0.0101  0.0528  0.028*** 0.0160  
 (0.009) (0.26) (0.00) (0.329) (0.27) (0.00) (0.14) 
(1,3) 0.0046  0.0018  0.012* 0.0095  0.0192  0.0115* 0.0108  
 (0.197) (0.674) (0.073) (0.45) (0.533) (0.067) (0.346) 
N 404 289 64 44 7 115 51 
 
of IPOs declines significantly in the aftermarket and they propose three potential 
explanations: the agency costs increase after IPO; issuers overstate pre-IPO 
performance; firms seek to issue when they experience unsustainable operating 
performance. Both Ritter (1991) and Jain and Kini (1994) suggest that market reaction 
or operating performance in the aftermarket can be attributable to information 
asymmetry and agency problem. 
However, prior studies do not take account of the role that IPOs’ dividend 
policies play in long-run aftermarket performance. In this section I attempt to test two 
hypotheses. Type1 IPOs are expected to outperform other IPOs during the long-run 
aftermarket period because their specific dividend policies released enhance the 
informational transparency and thus reduce the possibilities that outside investors are 
overoptimistic over the prospect of the invested companies and that managers overstate 
the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. The finding of Carter et al. (1998) may provide 
an indirect insight into this issue. They find that more reputable underwriters are 
associated with lower underperformance over 3-year post-IPO holding period. Given 
information on dividends is similar to underwriter reputation in term of limiting 
information asymmetry and agency conflicts, my above hypothesis persists.  




counterparts. Similarly, Type3 firms underperform Type2 counterparts but outperform 
Type4 counterparts.  
 
Apart from Type1 firms, IPO firms need to make ongoing decisions on whether 
they start paying dividends from some time point at the post-IPO stage. As expressed in 
offering prospectuses, issuing firms tend to commence dividend payments only when 
the operating performance and financial status reach certain aims. The market 
informational efficiency enables investors to acknowledge the improvement of firms 
that initiate dividends and leads to stock price appreciations subsequently.  
H22: Dividend initiating IPOs tend to outperform non-dividend initiating 
counterparts for the groups of Type2, Type3 and Type4100
 
. 
In this section I first calculate the average market-adjusted return for each event 
month and the cumulative average benchmark-adjusted aftermarket performance using 
the methodology101
𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 =  𝑟𝑖𝑡 − 𝑟𝑚𝑡                                                                                                                  (4 − 13)  
 proposed by Ritter (1991). Follow Ritter (1991) and Levis (1993), 
both estimated measures exclude the initial returns. The benchmark market portfolio 
used in the process is FTSE All-Share Index. According to Ritter (1991), each sampled 
event month comprises 21 successive trading days. The market-adjusted return for stock 
i in event month t is defined as:  
where 𝑟𝑖𝑡 and 𝑟𝑚𝑡 represent the actual return for stock i in event month t and the market 
return in event month t respectively. The average benchmark-adjusted return for each 
event month t is computed as: 
𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 1𝑛 ∑ 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖=1                                                                                                               (4 − 14)  
and the t-statistic for 𝐴𝑅𝑡 is computed as: 
𝑡-𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝐴𝑅𝑡×�𝑛𝑡𝜎𝑡                                                                                                                 (4 − 15) 
Where 𝑛𝑡  and 𝜎𝑡  represent the number of firms trading in event month t and the 
standard deviation of 𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑡 respectively. The cumulative average market-adjusted return 
for the event window between the first month and the event month is defined as:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = ∑ 𝐴𝑅𝑡𝑡𝑡=1                                                                                                              (4 − 16)  
and the t-value for 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 is computed as: 
                                                 
100 According our categorical standard, Type1 IPOs are all dividend payers. Thus, Type1 IPOs are absent from the contrastive 
analysis in this section. 




𝑡 − 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 = 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑇×�𝑛𝑡�𝑡×𝑣𝑎𝑟+2×(𝑡−1)×𝑐𝑜𝑣                                                                                     (4 − 17)  
where t is the event month, var is the average cross-sectional variance over 36 months, 
and cov is the first-order autocovariance of the 𝐴𝑅𝑡 series. 
Table 4-9 reports the average monthly market-adjusted returns 𝐴𝑅𝑡  and 
cumulative average market-adjusted returns 𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 excluding the initial returns for IPOs 
in 1996-2010 for the 36 aftermarket months. Of 36 monthly adjusted returns, 30 are 
negative with 16 event months having t-statistics lower than -1.65 (significance level of 
0.1). Except for the first four event months the cumulative average adjusted-returns is 
uniformly negative for each event month and declines to -28.34% by the end of 36 
holding months, and the associated t-statistics hold at less than -2.56 from the ninth 
month to the thirty-sixth month. Consistent with the results reported by Ritter (1991) 
and Levis (1993), the decline in long-run aftermarket performance of IPOs is significant 
economically and statistically.  
To test the first hypothesis (H21) in this section, the full sample is broken down 
into 6 comparable groups for which the long-run excess returns are examined. The 
results are reported in Table 4-10. First, the most pronounced result is that the 
cumulative average market-adjusted returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 ) for Type1 IPOs remain positive 
during the 36 holding months after IPO, with t-statistics for the first eleven event 
months are greater than 1.65. There are only 5 of 36 average market-adjusted returns 
(ARs) having t-statistics greater than 1.65 or less than -1.65. This result at least 
indicates that Type1 IPOs do not exhibit declining long-run performance. Second, CARs 
for the non-Type1 groups (Type2, Type3, Type4, Type2&Type3&Type4 and 
Type3&Type4) are significantly negative after the first several post-IPO months, similar 
to the result for the full sample. Third, consistent with H21, long-run performance 
descends orderly from Type1 to Type4 in the most of observed post-IPO months, as 
indicated by Figure 4-2. The only exception is that Type4 has higher CARs than Type2 
and Type3 after the twenty-seventh event month. Figure 4-2 also illustrates that the 
gaps in long-run performance between any two of non-Type1 groups are not 
substantially major.  
To test the second hypothesis in this section (H22), I compare paying IPOs with 
non-paying counterparts for Type2, Type3 and Type4 respectively. The results are 
reported in Table 4-11. As same as the full sample, non-dividend initiating groups have 




Table 4-9 Long-Run Abnormal Returns on Full Sample IPOs in 1996-2000 Excluding Initial 
Returns  
This table presents the equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-adjusted returns (%) and cumulative returns 
(%) excluding the initial returns for the full sample for the 36 months after going public. Full sample mean the 
aggregate of Type1, Type2, Type3 and Type4 IPOs for which the definitions are set out in section 4.3.1. Obs is the 
number of observations. ARt is the equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-adjusted return for each event 
month t. CARt is the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return at the event month t. t-ARt is the t-statistic for ARt. and t-CARt is the t-statistic for CARt. The t-values with absolute value of greater than 1.65 (significance level of 10%) are 
highlighted by using bold and italic numbers. 
 
Full Sample 
Month Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 
1 932 0.86 1.60 0.86 1.37 
2 932 -0.08 -0.16 0.79 0.88 
3 932 -0.27 -0.53 0.52 0.48 
4 932 -0.31 -0.59 0.21 0.17 
5 932 -0.87 -1.81 -0.66 -0.47 
6 931 -1.11 -1.93 -1.78 -1.15 
7 930 -0.43 -0.76 -2.20 -1.32 
8 930 -0.38 -0.73 -2.59 -1.45 
9 930 -2.31 -4.34 -4.90 -2.59 
10 930 -1.08 -2.09 -5.98 -2.99 
11 929 -2.21 -4.27 -8.19 -3.91 
12 927 -2.34 -4.48 -10.53 -4.80 
13 927 -3.00 -5.65 -13.53 -5.93 
14 925 -1.02 -1.84 -14.55 -6.14 
15 922 -1.61 -3.01 -16.16 -6.58 
16 921 -1.28 -2.42 -17.44 -6.87 
17 920 -1.32 -2.17 -18.76 -7.17 
18 915 -1.68 -2.93 -20.45 -7.57 
19 914 -0.77 -1.32 -21.22 -7.64 
20 909 -1.81 -3.05 -23.03 -8.06 
21 895 -1.08 -1.69 -24.11 -8.17 
22 888 -0.74 -1.18 -24.85 -8.20 
23 877 -1.30 -2.15 -26.14 -8.38 
24 873 -2.20 -3.79 -28.34 -8.88 
25 862 -1.16 -1.64 -29.50 -9.00 
26 854 1.16 0.87 -28.34 -8.44 
27 847 -0.39 -0.46 -28.74 -8.36 
28 842 -0.59 -0.88 -29.33 -8.35 
29 837 -0.91 -1.36 -30.23 -8.43 
30 824 -0.56 -0.79 -30.80 -8.38 
31 821 -0.29 -0.38 -31.09 -8.31 
32 815 0.50 0.59 -30.59 -8.02 
33 811 0.11 0.15 -30.48 -7.85 
34 802 1.56 1.97 -28.93 -7.30 
35 797 -0.21 -0.30 -29.13 -7.22 
36 788 0.89 1.17 -28.24 -6.86 
 
initiating groups in Type2, Type3 and Type4 at the end of 36 months are -62.95%, -
67.39% and -34.34% respectively with the most of CARs having statistics of lower than 
-1.65. In contrast, CARs for dividend paying groups remain at higher levels during 3 
post-IPO years as illustrated by Figure 4-3. CARs for dividend-initiating groups in 
Type2, Type3 and Type4 at the end of 36 months are -14.67%, -0.22% and 12.43% 
respectively. However, the most of associated t-statistics for dividend-initiating groups 
are higher than -1.65. The overall results drawn from this test indicate that non-dividend 
initiating firms rather than dividend-initiating ones account for the decline in long-run 
underperformance, in line with the second hypothesis in this section (H22). However, 
these results do not provide direct evidence in support of signaling hypotheses because 




Table 4-10 Long-Run Abnormal Returns on IPOs in Contrastive Groups of IPOs in 1996-2000, Excluding Initial Returns  
This table presents the equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-adjusted returns (%) and cumulative returns (%) excluding the initial returns for various contrastive groups for the 36 
months after going public. The definitions of Type1, Type2, Type3 and Type4 IPOs are set out in section 4.3.1. “Type2&Type3&Type4” is a combined group, which consists of Type2, Type3 
and Type4. Similarly, “Type3&Type4” is a combined group, which consists of Type3 and Type4. Obs is the number of observations. ARt is the equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-
adjusted return for each event month t. CARt is the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return at the event month t. t-ARt is the t-statistic for ARt. and t-CARt is the t-statistic for CARt. t-values with 
absolute value of greater than 1.65 (significance level of 10%) are highlighted by using bold and italic numbers. 
 
Month Type1 Type2 Type3 Type4 Type2&Type3&Type4 Type3&Type4 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 
1 357 2.27 3.81 2.27 2.78 153 1.04 0.73 1.04 0.76 320 -1.19 -1.21 -1.19 -1.00 102 2.11 0.89 2.11 0.82 575 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 422 -0.39 -0.42 -0.39 -0.36 
2 357 1.24 2.32 3.52 3.04 153 0.52 0.56 1.56 0.81 320 -1.60 -1.51 -2.80 -1.65 102 -0.81 -0.54 1.30 0.36 575 -0.90 -1.29 -0.91 -0.72 422 -1.41 -1.60 -1.81 -1.16 
3 357 0.77 1.27 4.29 3.03 153 -1.05 -0.98 0.52 0.22 320 -0.33 -0.31 -3.13 -1.51 102 -2.50 -1.47 -1.20 -0.27 575 -0.91 -1.25 -1.82 -1.18 422 -0.86 -0.94 -2.66 -1.39 
4 357 -0.07 -0.11 4.22 2.58 153 -1.66 -1.69 -1.15 -0.42 320 0.19 0.16 -2.94 -1.23 102 -0.71 -0.35 -1.92 -0.37 575 -0.47 -0.60 -2.28 -1.29 422 -0.03 -0.03 -2.69 -1.22 
5 357 0.16 0.24 4.39 2.40 153 -1.07 -1.06 -2.21 -0.73 320 -0.25 -0.26 -3.19 -1.19 102 -6.19 -4.33 -8.11 -1.40 575 -1.52 -2.34 -3.80 -1.92 422 -1.68 -2.08 -4.38 -1.77 
6 357 -0.23 -0.40 4.15 2.07 153 -1.55 -1.44 -3.77 -1.13 319 -1.30 -0.94 -4.49 -1.53 102 -2.94 -2.07 -11.04 -1.75 574 -1.66 -1.92 -5.46 -2.51 421 -1.70 -1.53 -6.07 -2.25 
7 356 0.48 0.63 4.63 2.14 153 -2.27 -2.48 -6.04 -1.67 319 -1.09 -0.94 -5.58 -1.76 102 1.26 0.65 -9.79 -1.43 574 -0.99 -1.28 -6.45 -2.74 421 -0.52 -0.52 -6.60 -2.26 
8 356 0.69 0.96 5.32 2.30 153 0.72 0.57 -5.32 -1.38 319 -0.90 -0.86 -6.48 -1.91 102 -4.15 -2.70 -13.94 -1.91 574 -1.05 -1.43 -7.50 -2.98 421 -1.69 -1.92 -8.28 -2.65 
9 356 -0.97 -1.25 4.35 1.77 153 -2.76 -2.28 -8.08 -1.97 319 -2.93 -2.88 -9.41 -2.61 102 -4.40 -2.64 -18.34 -2.37 574 -3.15 -4.41 -10.64 -3.99 421 -3.29 -3.78 -11.57 -3.49 
10 356 0.64 0.91 4.99 1.93 153 -2.66 -1.83 -10.74 -2.49 319 -2.08 -2.18 -11.49 -3.03 102 -1.59 -1.04 -19.93 -2.44 574 -2.14 -3.03 -12.79 -4.55 421 -1.96 -2.42 -13.53 -3.87 
11 356 -0.38 -0.53 4.61 1.70 153 -2.94 -2.48 -13.68 -3.02 318 -3.20 -3.14 -14.69 -3.68 102 -4.43 -2.69 -24.36 -2.85 573 -3.35 -4.72 -16.14 -5.47 420 -3.50 -4.03 -17.03 -4.64 
12 355 -0.89 -1.48 3.72 1.31 152 -0.67 -0.52 -14.35 -3.02 318 -4.70 -4.64 -19.39 -4.65 102 -2.45 -1.20 -26.81 -3.00 572 -3.23 -4.27 -19.37 -6.28 420 -4.16 -4.55 -21.19 -5.53 
13 355 -0.27 -0.41 3.45 1.17 152 -0.91 -0.63 -15.26 -3.09 318 -5.84 -5.79 -25.23 -5.82 102 -6.81 -3.80 -33.63 -3.61 572 -4.70 -6.24 -24.07 -7.50 420 -6.07 -6.92 -27.26 -6.84 
14 353 -1.00 -1.44 2.45 0.79 152 -1.30 -1.20 -16.56 -3.23 318 -1.77 -1.56 -27.00 -6.00 102 1.65 0.80 -31.97 -3.31 572 -1.03 -1.31 -25.10 -7.54 420 -0.94 -0.94 -28.20 -6.82 
15 353 0.53 0.74 2.98 0.93 152 -2.26 -1.69 -18.82 -3.55 316 -3.20 -3.09 -30.20 -6.46 101 -3.11 -1.87 -35.08 -3.49 569 -2.93 -3.98 -28.04 -8.11 417 -3.18 -3.61 -31.38 -7.30 
16 352 -0.14 -0.20 2.83 0.86 152 -2.50 -2.00 -21.33 -3.89 316 -2.24 -2.19 -32.44 -6.72 101 -0.42 -0.24 -35.50 -3.42 569 -1.99 -2.72 -30.03 -8.41 417 -1.80 -2.03 -33.18 -7.47 
17 352 -0.34 -0.39 2.49 0.73 152 -3.00 -2.74 -24.33 -4.31 316 -1.92 -1.58 -34.36 -6.91 100 -0.30 -0.15 -35.80 -3.33 568 -1.92 -2.35 -31.95 -8.68 416 -1.53 -1.47 -34.71 -7.58 
18 351 -0.71 -0.98 1.79 0.51 151 -0.42 -0.30 -24.75 -4.24 313 -3.24 -2.78 -37.60 -7.31 100 -2.16 -1.14 -37.95 -3.43 564 -2.29 -2.81 -34.24 -9.01 413 -2.98 -3.00 -37.69 -7.97 
19 350 0.64 0.87 2.43 0.68 151 -4.61 -4.24 -29.35 -4.90 313 -0.31 -0.23 -37.91 -7.17 100 -1.41 -0.96 -39.37 -3.46 564 -1.66 -1.99 -35.90 -9.19 413 -0.58 -0.54 -38.26 -7.87 
20 349 -1.63 -2.10 0.80 0.22 149 -0.53 -0.40 -29.88 -4.83 313 -2.40 -1.95 -40.31 -7.43 98 -2.48 -1.44 -41.85 -3.55 560 -1.92 -2.31 -37.82 -9.40 411 -2.42 -2.37 -40.68 -8.14 
21 343 0.37 0.45 1.17 0.31 148 -2.64 -2.14 -32.52 -5.11 307 -1.80 -1.29 -42.11 -7.51 97 -1.55 -0.86 -43.40 -3.58 552 -1.98 -2.20 -39.80 -9.59 404 -1.74 -1.52 -42.42 -8.21 
22 342 0.03 0.05 1.20 0.31 146 -1.33 -0.93 -33.86 -5.16 303 -0.83 -0.63 -42.94 -7.43 97 -2.28 -1.04 -45.69 -3.68 546 -1.22 -1.34 -41.02 -9.60 400 -1.18 -1.04 -43.60 -8.20 
23 340 0.43 0.45 1.64 0.41 143 -2.24 -1.96 -36.09 -5.33 299 -2.18 -1.95 -45.12 -7.58 95 -3.29 -1.67 -48.98 -3.82 537 -2.39 -3.09 -43.41 -9.86 394 -2.45 -2.52 -46.05 -8.41 
24 338 -0.59 -0.75 1.05 0.25 143 -1.53 -1.09 -37.63 -5.44 299 -3.87 -3.37 -48.99 -8.06 93 -3.70 -2.15 -52.67 -3.98 535 -3.22 -4.02 -46.63 -10.34 392 -3.83 -3.97 -49.88 -8.90 
25 333 -0.04 -0.04 1.01 0.24 141 -1.77 -1.40 -39.40 -5.54 295 -1.90 -1.35 -50.89 -8.15 93 -1.91 -0.81 -54.58 -4.04 529 -1.87 -1.97 -48.50 -10.48 388 -1.90 -1.58 -51.79 -9.00 
26 332 -0.50 -0.63 0.50 0.12 139 0.12 0.07 -39.28 -5.38 292 -0.18 -0.10 -51.08 -7.98 91 13.13 1.26 -41.45 -2.98 522 2.22 1.04 -46.28 -9.74 383 2.98 1.05 -48.81 -8.27 
27 332 0.74 0.43 1.24 0.28 138 -1.28 -1.18 -40.56 -5.43 287 -1.40 -1.06 -52.48 -7.98 90 0.02 0.01 -41.44 -2.90 515 -1.12 -1.27 -47.40 -9.73 377 -1.06 -0.93 -49.87 -8.22 
28 331 -0.37 -0.43 0.88 0.19 137 -0.19 -0.12 -40.76 -5.34 284 -0.34 -0.24 -52.82 -7.84 90 -2.79 -1.51 -44.23 -3.04 511 -0.73 -0.77 -48.13 -9.66 374 -0.93 -0.80 -50.80 -8.19 
29 328 -1.61 -1.86 -0.74 -0.16 137 -2.56 -1.93 -43.32 -5.57 282 -0.98 -0.79 -53.80 -7.82 90 4.40 1.46 -39.83 -2.69 509 -0.46 -0.48 -48.59 -9.57 372 0.32 0.27 -50.48 -7.98 
30 322 -0.02 -0.01 -0.75 -0.16 134 -1.07 -0.73 -44.39 -5.55 278 0.22 0.16 -53.58 -7.60 90 -4.19 -1.74 -44.02 -2.92 502 -0.91 -0.95 -49.50 -9.52 368 -0.86 -0.71 -51.34 -7.93 
31 320 0.83 0.75 0.08 0.02 134 -0.30 -0.20 -44.69 -5.50 278 -2.81 -2.45 -56.39 -7.87 89 3.55 0.91 -40.47 -2.63 501 -1.01 -0.98 -50.51 -9.54 367 -1.26 -0.98 -52.60 -7.99 
32 318 1.27 1.36 1.35 0.28 134 2.83 0.95 -41.85 -5.07 275 -0.92 -0.59 -57.31 -7.83 88 -1.46 -0.65 -41.92 -2.67 497 0.00 0.00 -50.51 -9.35 363 -1.05 -0.81 -53.65 -7.97 
33 316 -0.67 -0.77 0.68 0.14 134 -0.44 -0.24 -42.29 -5.05 273 -0.91 -0.71 -58.22 -7.81 88 6.90 2.06 -35.02 -2.19 495 0.61 0.58 -49.91 -9.08 361 0.99 0.78 -52.66 -7.68 
34 311 1.83 1.67 2.51 0.49 134 -0.06 -0.04 -42.35 -4.98 270 1.96 1.15 -56.25 -7.39 87 1.80 0.92 -33.23 -2.04 491 1.38 1.27 -48.52 -8.66 357 1.92 1.40 -50.74 -7.25 
35 311 1.21 1.34 3.73 0.72 134 0.32 0.19 -42.04 -4.87 267 -2.36 -1.74 -58.61 -7.55 85 0.53 0.21 -32.70 -1.95 486 -1.11 -1.14 -49.64 -8.69 352 -1.66 -1.39 -52.40 -7.33 




Figure 4-2 Cumulative Average Adjusted Returns (%) on IPOs in Contrastive Groups of IPOs in 
1996-2010, Excluding Initial Returns 
The figures are based on the results reported in Table 4-9 and Table 4-10. Full sample mean the aggregate of Type1, 
Type2, Type3 and Type4 IPOs for which the definitions are set out in section 4.3.1. “Type2&Type3&Type4” is a 
combined group, which consists of Type2, Type3 and Type4. Similarly, “Type3&Type4” is a combined group, which 
consists of Type3 and Type4. 
 








I then calculate the wealth relatives (WR) as the alternative performance 
measure using the original method of Ritter (1991). This measure compares the wealth 
of sample IPOs relative to that of benchmark market by following a buy and hold 
strategy. In analysis, IPOs that were not held for 36 months are dropped. 3-year holding 
period returns for firm i (𝑅𝑖) is computed as: 
𝑅𝑖 = ∏ 𝑟𝑖𝑡36𝑡=1 − 1                                                                                                               (4 − 18)  
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Table 4-11 Long-Run Abnormal Returns on IPOs in Dividend-Paying and Non-Dividend Paying Groups of IPOs in 1996-2010, Excluding Initial Returns  
This table presents the equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-adjusted returns (%) and cumulative returns (%), excluding the initial returns, for dividend-paying and Non-dividend 
paying IPOs belonging to Type2, Type3 and Type4 respectively. The definitions of Type2, Type3 and Type4 IPOs are set out in section 4.3.1. Obs is the number of observations. ARt is the 
equally weighted arithmetic average benchmark-adjusted return for each event month t. CARt is the cumulative benchmark-adjusted return at the event month t. t-ARt is the t-statistic for ARt. 
and t-CARt is the t-statistic for CARt. t-values with absolute value of greater than 1.65 (significance level of 10%) are highlighted by using bold and italic numbers. 
 
Month Type2-Pay Type2-Nonpay Type3-Pay Type3-Nonpay Type4-Pay Type4-Nonpay Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 Obs 𝐴𝑅𝑡 t-𝐴𝑅𝑡 CARt t-𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡 
1 66 2.74 1.77 2.74 1.64 87 -0.25 -0.11 -0.25 -0.12 44 -0.89 -0.46 -0.89 -0.30 276 -1.24 -1.13 -1.24 -0.95 7 6.95 1.02 6.95 1.42 95 1.76 0.70 1.76 0.64 
2 66 2.15 1.51 4.89 2.07 87 -0.71 -0.57 -0.96 -0.33 44 4.25 2.05 3.35 0.80 276 -2.54 -2.16 -3.78 -2.04 7 4.95 1.03 11.89 1.74 95 -1.24 -0.79 0.52 0.13 
3 66 -0.09 -0.08 4.79 1.66 87 -1.77 -1.07 -2.73 -0.76 44 3.80 1.04 7.15 1.39 276 -0.99 -0.91 -4.77 -2.11 7 10.41 2.12 22.31 2.68 95 -3.46 -1.97 -2.94 -0.62 
4 66 -1.28 -0.94 3.51 1.05 87 -1.96 -1.40 -4.69 -1.13 44 0.57 0.33 7.73 1.30 276 0.12 0.10 -4.64 -1.78 7 -3.46 -1.11 18.85 1.97 95 -0.51 -0.24 -3.45 -0.63 
5 66 0.10 0.08 3.62 0.97 87 -1.95 -1.38 -6.64 -1.44 44 3.36 1.54 11.09 1.66 276 -0.82 -0.79 -5.46 -1.87 7 -1.16 -0.24 17.70 1.66 95 -6.56 -4.40 -10.01 -1.62 
6 66 -1.18 -0.97 2.44 0.60 87 -1.84 -1.11 -8.48 -1.68 44 3.28 0.95 14.37 1.97 275 -2.04 -1.34 -7.50 -2.34 7 -1.74 -1.10 15.95 1.36 95 -3.03 -1.99 -13.03 -1.93 
7 66 -1.30 -0.98 1.14 0.26 87 -3.01 -2.39 -11.49 -2.10 44 -1.96 -0.84 12.40 1.57 275 -0.95 -0.74 -8.45 -2.44 7 -4.01 -1.68 11.94 0.95 95 1.65 0.80 -11.39 -1.56 
8 66 0.95 0.67 2.09 0.44 87 0.55 0.28 -10.94 -1.87 44 -0.98 -0.42 11.42 1.35 275 -0.89 -0.76 -9.34 -2.52 7 -9.30 -2.18 2.64 0.20 95 -3.77 -2.33 -15.16 -1.94 
9 66 0.32 0.21 2.41 0.48 87 -5.09 -2.88 -16.04 -2.59 44 1.51 0.53 12.93 1.44 275 -3.64 -3.36 -12.98 -3.30 7 -4.22 -0.34 -1.58 -0.11 95 -4.41 -2.82 -19.57 -2.37 
10 66 -1.41 -0.96 1.00 0.19 87 -3.61 -1.56 -19.65 -3.01 44 1.69 0.68 14.62 1.55 275 -2.68 -2.61 -15.66 -3.78 7 9.26 3.51 7.69 0.51 95 -2.39 -1.50 -21.96 -2.52 
11 66 0.96 0.55 1.97 0.36 87 -5.90 -3.80 -25.55 -3.73 44 -0.08 -0.03 14.54 1.47 274 -3.70 -3.32 -19.36 -4.45 7 -3.33 -0.82 4.35 0.28 95 -4.52 -2.59 -26.48 -2.90 
12 66 0.49 0.29 2.46 0.43 86 -1.57 -0.83 -27.11 -3.77 44 -8.74 -2.99 5.80 0.56 274 -4.06 -3.77 -23.42 -5.15 7 10.69 0.91 15.04 0.91 95 -3.42 -1.71 -29.90 -3.13 
13 66 1.84 1.05 4.30 0.71 86 -3.01 -1.43 -30.13 -4.02 44 -6.50 -2.43 -0.70 -0.06 274 -5.73 -5.25 -29.15 -6.16 7 -7.47 -2.21 7.57 0.44 95 -6.76 -3.54 -36.66 -3.69 
14 66 -0.58 -0.43 3.72 0.60 86 -1.86 -1.14 -31.99 -4.11 44 2.87 0.60 2.17 0.19 274 -2.51 -2.34 -31.66 -6.45 7 -2.55 -1.69 5.02 0.28 95 1.96 0.89 -34.70 -3.36 
15 66 -2.20 -1.24 1.52 0.24 86 -2.31 -1.19 -34.30 -4.26 44 -1.98 -0.86 0.19 0.02 272 -3.39 -2.97 -35.06 -6.87 7 -3.93 -0.67 1.09 0.06 94 -3.05 -1.75 -37.75 -3.52 
16 66 -1.54 -0.94 -0.01 0.00 86 -3.25 -1.78 -37.55 -4.52 44 -2.83 -1.09 -2.64 -0.22 272 -2.15 -1.92 -37.20 -7.06 7 6.59 0.92 7.68 0.40 94 -0.94 -0.52 -38.69 -3.49 
17 66 -2.35 -1.58 -2.37 -0.34 86 -3.50 -2.23 -41.05 -4.79 44 -6.54 -2.59 -9.18 -0.75 272 -1.17 -0.87 -38.38 -7.07 7 0.33 0.08 8.00 0.41 93 -0.34 -0.16 -39.03 -3.40 
18 66 1.39 0.85 -0.98 -0.14 85 -1.82 -0.88 -42.86 -4.83 44 0.14 0.05 -9.04 -0.71 269 -3.80 -2.98 -42.17 -7.51 7 3.48 0.42 11.49 0.57 93 -2.58 -1.33 -41.61 -3.52 
19 66 -3.86 -2.80 -4.84 -0.66 85 -5.19 -3.22 -48.06 -5.28 44 2.70 0.79 -6.34 -0.49 269 -0.80 -0.56 -42.97 -7.44 7 -0.31 -0.11 11.18 0.54 93 -1.50 -0.95 -43.11 -3.55 
20 65 -0.42 -0.21 -5.25 -0.70 84 -0.62 -0.34 -48.68 -5.18 44 -0.63 -0.18 -6.97 -0.52 269 -2.69 -2.05 -45.66 -7.71 7 0.83 0.23 12.01 0.56 91 -2.74 -1.49 -45.85 -3.64 
21 65 -2.19 -1.38 -7.44 -0.97 83 -2.99 -1.63 -51.67 -5.33 44 -2.32 -0.89 -9.29 -0.68 263 -1.71 -1.09 -47.37 -7.72 7 7.88 1.53 19.89 0.91 90 -2.29 -1.21 -48.13 -3.71 
22 65 3.54 1.52 -3.90 -0.49 81 -5.24 -3.12 -56.91 -5.67 43 -3.44 -1.20 -12.73 -0.90 260 -0.39 -0.27 -47.77 -7.56 7 -1.39 -0.70 18.50 0.83 90 -2.35 -0.99 -50.49 -3.80 
23 65 -1.86 -1.40 -5.77 -0.72 78 -2.55 -1.43 -59.46 -5.68 43 -4.45 -1.39 -17.18 -1.19 256 -1.80 -1.51 -49.57 -7.61 7 -2.85 -0.79 15.66 0.69 88 -3.32 -1.57 -53.81 -3.92 
24 65 -1.66 -0.83 -7.43 -0.90 78 -1.43 -0.72 -60.89 -5.70 43 1.45 0.40 -15.73 -1.06 256 -4.77 -4.01 -54.34 -8.17 7 -0.39 -0.18 15.27 0.66 86 -3.97 -2.15 -57.78 -4.07 
25 65 -0.41 -0.26 -7.84 -0.93 76 -2.94 -1.52 -63.82 -5.78 43 -0.54 -0.10 -16.26 -1.08 252 -2.13 -1.57 -56.47 -8.25 7 -2.42 -1.49 12.86 0.54 86 -1.87 -0.73 -59.65 -4.12 
26 65 -0.08 -0.04 -7.92 -0.92 74 0.30 0.10 -63.52 -5.56 43 -3.53 -1.72 -19.79 -1.28 249 0.39 0.19 -56.08 -7.99 7 11.11 2.08 23.97 0.99 84 13.30 1.18 -46.35 -3.10 
27 65 -1.04 -0.73 -8.97 -1.03 73 -1.50 -0.93 -65.02 -5.55 43 1.61 0.44 -18.18 -1.16 244 -1.93 -1.36 -58.01 -8.03 7 -5.01 -2.36 18.96 0.77 83 0.44 0.18 -45.91 -3.00 
28 65 -1.25 -0.97 -10.21 -1.15 72 0.76 0.27 -64.26 -5.35 43 7.26 2.45 -10.93 -0.68 241 -1.70 -1.07 -59.70 -8.06 7 0.20 0.10 19.15 0.76 83 -3.04 -1.53 -48.95 -3.14 
29 65 0.78 0.48 -9.44 -1.04 72 -5.58 -2.77 -69.84 -5.71 43 0.39 0.16 -10.54 -0.65 239 -1.23 -0.88 -60.94 -8.05 7 -2.13 -0.49 17.02 0.66 83 4.96 1.53 -44.00 -2.77 
30 63 -0.53 -0.26 -9.97 -1.07 71 -1.54 -0.74 -71.38 -5.70 43 7.02 1.81 -3.52 -0.21 235 -1.02 -0.70 -61.96 -7.98 7 -2.46 -1.35 14.56 0.56 83 -4.34 -1.66 -48.34 -2.99 
31 63 -0.99 -0.47 -10.95 -1.15 71 0.31 0.15 -71.07 -5.58 43 1.11 0.42 -2.41 -0.14 235 -3.52 -2.79 -65.48 -8.30 7 0.11 0.02 14.67 0.55 82 3.85 0.91 -44.49 -2.69 
32 63 -1.06 -0.56 -12.01 -1.24 71 6.29 1.18 -64.78 -5.01 43 1.90 0.75 -0.50 -0.03 232 -1.44 -0.80 -66.92 -8.30 7 2.94 0.79 17.61 0.65 81 -1.84 -0.76 -46.33 -2.74 
33 63 -1.62 -1.13 -13.63 -1.39 71 0.61 0.19 -64.18 -4.89 43 -2.14 -1.08 -2.64 -0.15 230 -0.68 -0.46 -67.60 -8.22 7 -3.53 -1.14 14.08 0.52 81 7.80 2.16 -38.53 -2.25 
34 63 -1.02 -0.41 -14.65 -1.47 71 0.80 0.40 -63.38 -4.75 43 4.25 1.40 1.61 0.09 227 1.53 0.79 -66.08 -7.86 7 7.18 1.63 21.26 0.77 80 1.32 0.64 -37.20 -2.12 
35 63 -0.82 -0.39 -15.47 -1.53 71 1.32 0.51 -62.06 -4.59 43 0.07 0.02 1.69 0.09 224 -2.82 -1.88 -68.90 -8.02 7 -3.23 -1.57 18.03 0.64 78 0.87 0.31 -36.33 -2.02 




Figure 4-3 Long-Run Abnormal Returns on IPOs in Dividend-Initiating and Non-Dividend 
Initiating Groups of IPOs in 1996-2000, Excluding Initial Returns 
The figures illustrate the CARs for dividend initiating and non-dividend initiating groups over 36 post-IPO months 










The wealth relative on the sample IPOs is computed as:  




                                                                                                                (4 − 19)  
Where 𝑟𝑚𝑡 represents the benchmark market return in event month t. A wealth relative 
of less than 1.00 indicates that the sampled IPOs underperformed the FTSE All-Share 
Index during 36 months in aftermarket. Accordingly, a wealth relative of greater than 
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Table 4-12, Panel A. shows that the wealth relative (WR) of Type1 IPOs is 1.19, 
indicating that Type1 IPOs have higher three-year holding period returns (TYHR) 
relative to the market. The WR of 0.96 of “Full Sample” means that the performance of 
all IPOs is close to that of the benchmark market when using TYHR as a measure. By 
contrast the values of TYHR for the remaining subgroups concentrate in the range of 
0.75-0.81. In general Type1 IPOs outperform the market, in line with the results using 
CAR as measure of long-run performance. 
Table 4-12, Panel B. shows that WRs of dividend initiating groups are 
universally greater than those of non-dividend initiating counterparts, also consistent 
with the results using CAR to measure long-run performance. Therefore, the overall 
results support the two hypotheses (H21 and H22) in this section. 
 
Table 4-12 Three-Year Holding Period Returns for Contrastive Groups 





𝑖=1 ) is the average 3-year holding return for each IPO group. FTSE is the 3-year holding return for 
FTSE-All Share index over the same period. WR is the wealth relative, which is based on equation (4-20). 
 
Panel A. 
Type Obs Raw Return FTSE WR 
Type1 309 0.40 0.17 1.19 
Type2 131 -0.18 0.04 0.79 
Type3 264 -0.16 0.03 0.81 
Type4 84 -0.16 0.12 0.75 
Type2&Type3&Type4 479 -0.17 0.05 0.79 
Type3&Type4 348 -0.16 0.05 0.80 
Full Sample 788 0.05 0.10 0.96 
Panel B. 
Type2pay 63 0.19 0.08 1.10 
Type2nonpay 68 -0.53 0.00 0.47 
Type3pay 42 -0.11 0.01 0.89 
Type3nonpay 222 -0.17 0.03 0.80 
Type4pay 7 0.28 0.28 1.00 












4.5 Findings and Conclusions  
In this chapter, I investigate the determinants of dividend decisions at stage of IPO 
basing on 932 UK IPO prospectus statements published between 1996 and 2010. In 
particular, I emphasize on examining the influence of the pre-IPO financial status on the 
dividend policies as stated in prospectuses. I develop the theoretically based testable 
hypotheses in the context of the main dividend theories including signaling, agency 
costs, life cycle and catering. All the sample firms are classified into four control groups 
according to the decision makers’ attitudes toward dividend payment. Specifically, in 
offering prospectuses, Type1 firms state that they will definitely pay dividends after 
admission. Type2 firms state that they have intention to carry out active dividend policy 
depending on future operating performance. Type3 firms anticipate that they will not 
pay out dividends in the short or medium term. Type4 firms state that they have no 
intention to pay. The results show that the proportions of firms that paid dividends 
within 5-year post-IPO are 97.89%, 39.84%, 9.59% and 5.26% for Type1, Type2, 
Type3 and Type4 firms respectively. Key firm characteristics are compared between the 
different groups using unique categorical analyses, cross-sectional binary logistic 
regression and ordinal logistic regression analyses. In addition, I examine the abnormal 
returns on dividend initiations and long-run aftermarket performance for different types 
of IPOs. The main findings are as follows. 
4.5.1 Asymmetric Information and Signaling 
The most significant finding is that pre-IPO profitability has significant influence on 
IPOs’ initial dividend policies as presented in prospectuses. Specifically, IPOs with 
active dividend policies are more profitable in terms of accounting 3-year averages 
(ROA) and accounting last fiscal year ratio (ROA (-1Y)), more likely to experience 
growth in earnings (Gn ROA) and to maintain positive earnings (Positive ROA) during 
pre-IPO period. All these results are strongly robust using various test methods. This 
finding is particularly consistent with Lintner (1956) model in which dividend policy 
follows the shifts in long-run sustainable earnings and managers are highly prudent to 
initiate dividends in order to prevent from reversing dividend changes in future. These 
findings are also consistent with Miller (1987), Healy and Palepus (1988) and Benartzi, 
Michaely and Thaler (1997) who document that there is a strong link between changes 
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in dividend policies and past earnings. In this sense, the dividend policy presented in 
IPO prospectuses signal the past financial performance of firms. 
The results show that lower institutional ownership (INSTITUTION) is 
associated with stronger propensity to choose relatively active dividend strategies for 
IPOs. According to Kale et al. (2012), IPOs tend to express an intensive willingness of 
paying aftermarket dividends to attract informed institutional investors who favor 
dividends when the current level of institutional ownership is lower than what it should 
be. The results also show that IPOs associated with prestigious underwriters 
(REPUTATION) are more inclined to specify active dividend policies. According to 
signaling explanation, prestigious underwriters provide certification for high quality 
IPOs who have the ability and demand to undertake high dividend payments (Allen and 
Faulhaber, 1989).  
In contrast, the tests show that VC backing (VC STAKE; VC-BACKED) has 
negative associations with the incidence that IPOs determine active dividend policies. 
This result violates the signaling hypothesis that VC backed high quality IPOs are more 
likely to pay dividends. Using binary logistic regression models, I find the strong 
evidence that IPOs undertaking Type1 dividend policy tend to be associated with shorter 
lock-up restriction period (LOCKUP CONSENT). Using ordinal logistic regression 
models, I find that the possibility that IPOs undertaking active dividend policies is 
negatively with the aggregate locked-up shares. These results do not support the 
hypothesis that high quality firms tend to accept severe lock-up agreements to 
communicate information to new investors 
Using event study I find that the cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) to 
dividend initiation announcements are significantly positive, in line with prior studies. I 
also find that CARs of Type1 IPOs are lower than those of non-Type1 counterparts. A 
possible explanation is that Type1 IPOs release sufficient information through dividend 
policies declared in offering prospectuses and therefore their formal dividend initiations 
fail to shock the market. Moreover, TYPE2 has the significant CARs over the major 
event windows. In contrast, neither TYPE3 nor TYPE4 has the statistically significant 
CARs. Since TYPE3 are TYPE4 firms are more likely to belong to high technology 
industries according to the statistics, this result might suggest that investors do not 
regard the dividend disbursement made by technology focused companies as good news. 
Furthermore, I find that dividend-paying companies outperform non-dividend 
paying counterparts during 3 post-IPO years, indicating that non-dividend initiating 
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IPOs rather than dividend-initiating ones account for the decline in long-run 
underperformance. This finding is consistent with the notion that market informational 
efficiency enables investors to acknowledge the improvement of firms that initiate 
dividends and leads to stock price appreciations subsequently. However, this finding 
does not provide direct evidence in support of signaling hypotheses because it is not 
clear if dividend initiations precede the stock price appreciations. 
4.5.2 Agency Costs 
The results show that IPOs with higher cash flows (CF/TA; CF/TA (-1Y)), higher 
turnover ratio (TURNOVER), and lower capital expenditures (CAPEX/TA) tend to 
choose more active dividend policies when going public, consistent with the predictions 
of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Lang and Litzenberger, 1989; Grullon, 
Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002) and residual hypothesis. Furthermore, IPOs with 
active dividend policies are more likely to experience growth in cash inflows (Gn 
CF/TA) and to maintain positive earnings (Positive CF) during pre-IPO period, 
intensifying above finding. But there is no evidence that leverage (LEVERAGE) has 
significantly influence on dividend decisions of issuing firms at IPO stage.  
The observed negative impact of full length of lockup period (LOCKUP 
CONSENT) on the decision of choosing active dividend policy (Type1) is consistent 
with the substitute assumption of agency costs which suggests that lockup agreements 
bond the interests of managers and outside investors (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith 
and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 2000; Officer, 2006). Similarly, 
the substitute assumption of agency costs is compatible with the findings that IPOs with 
VC backing (VC STAKE; VC-BACKED), high institutional ownership (INSTITUTION) 
or high level of managerial stock options (OPTION) tend to be conservative in stating 
dividend policy in prospectuses. Additionally, in line with free cash flow hypothesis and 
residual hypothesis, IPOs in high technological sectors (HITECH) or IPOs issued on 
AIM are less likely to specify active dividend policies in prospectuses. On the contrary, 
my results do not support for the complement assumption of agency costs which 
suggests that strong corporate governance accompanies higher dividend payment 
(LaPorta et al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005). 
I examine the long-run excess returns of IPOs. Unlike other IPO firms, Type1 
IPOs do not exhibit declining long-run performance. The cumulative average market-
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adjusted returns (𝐶𝐴𝑅𝑡) for Type1 IPOs remain positive during the 36 holding months 
after IPO, with t-statistics for the first eleven event months are greater than 1.65. Long-
run performance descends orderly from Type1 to Type4 in the most of observed post-
IPO months. These findings lend support to the hypothesis that detailed dividend 
policies released in prospectuses enhance the informational transparency and thus 
reduce the possibilities that outside investors are overoptimistic over the prospect of the 
invested companies and that managers overstate the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. 
4.5.3 Life-Cycle 
The finding that venture-capital backed (VC STAKE; VC-BACKED) IPOs tend to 
declare relatively conservative dividend policies in prospectuses is consistent with the 
predictions of the lifecycle theory which predicts that venture capitalists prefer to invest 
in high growth firms (Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Lee 
and Wahal, 2004; Krishnan et al., 2011). The alternative explanation can be that venture 
capitalists tend to pursue capital gains from short-term investments rather than long-
term dividend streams (Lerner, 1994 and Field and Hanka, 2001). Moreover, the 
observed negative impact of full length of lockup period (LOCKUP CONSENT) on the 
decision of choosing active dividend policy is consistent with the implications of 
lifecycle theory, assuming the degree of a firm’s maturity has a negative relation with 
the severity of lock-up agreements (Brav and Gompers, 2003). Further, in accordance 
with Fama and French (2001) and Deshmukh (2003), larger (LNGP) IPOs are more 
progressive in choosing dividend policies at the time of IPO. Lifecycle logic provide 
The finding that firms operating in high technological sectors (HITECH) are less likely 
to make active dividend policies are in line with explanation because these firms are of 
young and high growth. 
4.5.4 Catering 
The empirical tests show that the evidence in the context of catering hypothesis is 
mixed. The coefficients of dividend premium (DP) in ordered logistic regressions are 
mostly negative and significant, consistent with the prediction of dividend catering 
theory. However, in binary logistic regressions, the coefficients of dividend premium 
are not significant, inconsistent with the prediction of dividend catering theory. In 
addition, the results show that IPOs issued in the ‘internet bubble’ period opt for 
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relatively conservative dividend strategies, and IPOs issued in 2000s are less likely to 
adopt active dividend policies than those issued in the 1990s. 
Overall, the pre-IPO financial positions appear to have important influence on 
IPO’ initial dividend policies prior to admission. IPOs tilt toward active dividend 
policies when the levels of profitability and cash flows are high, increase from year to 
year or maintain positive in the three years prior to IPO. The empirical tests in general 
support lifecycle theory. There are also some evidence lending support for the signaling 
theory and substitution assumption of agency costs. However, the evidence on catering 




























Appendix 4-1 Abnormal Returns around Dividend Initiation Announcement 
Excess returns are calculated using market model with 30-days estimation window (-60,-30) relative to dividend 
initiation announcement date and with FTSE All-Share Index as benchmark market portfolio. “All” represents the full 
sample of IPOs that initiated dividends and have complete data on stock returns and market returns; the definitions of 
“TYPE1”, “TYPE2”, “TYPE3” and “TYPE4” are incorporated in Section 4.3.1; TYPE2&3&4 represents the 
combination of TYPE2, TYPE3 and TYPE4 IPOs; TYPE3&4 represents the combination of TYPE3 and TYPE4 
IPOs. For each even window and each subgroup, abnormal returns is presented in the upper row and p-value is 
presented in parentheses in the lower row. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Event Window All TYPE1 TYPE2 TYPE3 TYPE4 TYPE2&3&4 TYPE3&4 
(-1,1) 0.0138*** 0.0069  0.0328*** 0.0137  0.0467  0.0264*** 0.0182* 
 (0.004) (0.301) (0.00) (0.133) (0.348) (0.00) (0.07) 
(-3,3) 0.0203*** 0.0132* 0.0385*** 0.0213  0.0572  0.0331*** 0.0262* 
 (0.001) (0.098) (0.001) (0.172) (0.301) (0.00) (0.083) 
(-3,-1) 0.0059** 0.0069** 0.0010  0.0072  -0.0074  0.0028  0.0052  
 (0.019) (0.026) (0.839) (0.346) (0.299) (0.485) (0.435) 
(-1,0) 0.013*** 0.0077  0.0252*** 0.0091  0.0526  0.0208*** 0.0151  
 (0.001) (0.159) (0.002) (0.216) (0.356) (0.001) (0.117) 
0 0.0008  -0.3566  0.028*** 0.0048  0.0542  0.0208*** 0.0116  
 (0.647) (0.535) (0.00) (0.524) (0.333) (0.001) (0.23) 
(0,1) 0.0111** 0.0031  0.0355*** 0.0094  0.0483  0.0265*** 0.0148  
 (0.016) (0.618) (0.00) (0.364) (0.321) (0.00) (0.174) 
(1,3) 0.0042  0.0023  0.0094  0.0093  0.0104  0.0095  0.0095  
 (0.204) (0.549) (0.147) (0.453) (0.745) (0.124) (0.407) 





























Fama and French (2001) report that the incidence of dividend payers among US firms 
fell from 66.5% in 1978 to 20.8% in 1999. Subsequently, a number of empirical studies 
concur with this finding, suggesting that the declining proportion of listed companies 
that pay dividends prevails among the international capital markets. Ferris, Sen and Yui 
(2006) observe that the percentage of the UK dividend-paying firms decreased 
significantly between 1988 and 2002. Denis and Osobov (2008) find that six developed 
countries experienced the declining percentage of dividend-paying firms between 1989 
and 2002. Similarly, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that the percentage dividend-
paying firms across fifteen European countries decreased between 1989 and 2005. Most 
recently, in their investigation basing on firms in nine common law countries, and in 
sixteen civil law countries, Ferris, Sen and Unlu (2009) find that there is a global 
decrease tendency in the percentage of dividend-paying firms between 1994 and 
2007102
Fama and French (2001) argue that the declining percentage of dividend payers 
is due, in part, to the changes in the characteristics of the US exchange-listed firms. 
However, when they control for the typical characteristics associated with non-
dividend-paying firms, the actual number of dividend payers is still less than expected. 
The declining propensity of paying dividends is also confirmed by Eije and Megginson 
. 
                                                 
102 Ferris et al. (2009) show that companies based in common law countries exhibit the declining tendency in dividend payment to 
greater extent than the counterparts based in civil law countries. 
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(2008) who use data that base on fifteen European countries. Ferris et al. (2009) report 
that the proportion of dividend-paying firms decreased in most developed countries and 
developing countries.103 Denis and Osobov (2008) show that the lower propensity of 
paying dividends among six developed countries is merely small in scale when 
controlling for the determinants identified by Fama and French (2001) as well as earned 
equity104
However, Julio and Ikenberry (2004) put forward “reappearing dividends” 
statement which is grounded on the finding that the percentage of dividend-paying firms 
in the US increased slightly after hitting a low of 15% in 2001, as by the first half of 
2004, more than 20% of US firms are again regularly paying dividends. Eije and 
Megginson (2008) note that in all European countries, except for in the UK, the 
percentage of dividend-payers increased in 2004 and in 2005. However, Ferris et al. 
(2009) show that the phenomenon of the recovery in the frequency of dividend payers is 
not evident internationally
, and they do not rule out the possibility that such trend is limited to newly 
listed firms. 
105
DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Skinner (2004) argue that, rather than decreasing, the 
aggregate dividends paid out by US industrial companies in the last two decades have 
been increasing. They argue that dividend payouts are not “disappearing”, instead 
concentrated in firms with high earnings. Denis and Osobov (2008), Eije and 
Megginson (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009) also find that the aggregate dividends paid 
have increased substantially over time. Denis and Osobov (2008) suggest that the 
growing aggregate cash dividends are paid by a small number of large and profitable 
firms. A wide range of empirical investigations
.  
106
                                                 
103 Ferris et al. (2009) find that companies in civil law countries are more inclined to pay dividends and less likely to occur 
percentage reduction than those in common law countries.  
 (Fama and French, 2001; Benito and 
Young, 2001; Ferris et al., 2006; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris, Jayaraman and 
Sabherwal, 2009; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2011) suggest that large firms with high 
profitability and low growth opportunities have generally greater chance to pay 
dividends. Fama and French (2001) attribute partly the greater reluctance to pay 
dividends in the US to the surge of new listings that are becoming smaller, less 
profitable and confronting greater growth opportunities. Agency costs of free cash flow 
hypothesis (Jensen, 1986) and life cycle explanation (Grullon, Michaely, and 
104 Earned equity refers to the ratio of retained earnings to total book equity. 
105 For example, as shown in Ferris et al. (2009), the percentage of dividend-paying firms in the US increased slightly from 18% in 
2001to 22% in 2004.  For the UK, the percentage of dividend payers even dropped from 55% to 45% over the same period. 
106 Ferris et al (2009) also employ these factors in measuring the propensity of dividend behavior, but they do not report the 
coefficients of these variables are significant in their tests. 
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Swaminathan, 2002 and DeAngelo and DeAngelo, 2006) shed light on these observed 
relations107
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) observe a significant and positive 
relationship between the decision to pay dividends and earned/contributed capital mix 
which is assumed as a proxy of firm maturity. Denis and Osobov (2008) firmly confirm 
that the change in the propensity to pay dividends can be explained by the 
earned/contributed capital mix. In contrast, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that the 
effect of the ratio of retained earnings to total equity on dividend policy is not 
significant
. However, relative to firm size and profitability, growth opportunity seems 
to be a more debatable factor in explaining dividend patterns. Denis and Osobov (2008) 
find that the effect of growth opportunity proxy on the decision of whether firms pay 
dividends is significantly negative in the US, Canada and the UK, but mixed in 
Germany, France and Japan. Additionally, by testing a sample consisting of emerging 
capital markets, Aivazian and Booth (2003) find that the impact of market to book ratio 
on the scale of dividend payments is positive, inconsistent with the expected relation. 
108. Eije and Megginson (2008) conjecture that leverage and cash dividend 
payouts might be substitutes in controlling agency costs, and Eije and Megginson (2008) 
and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) offer evidence suggesting that the propensity to 
pay dividends is negatively influenced by leverage109
LaPorta et al. (2000) suggest that international dividend policies differ under 
different legislative regimes: common law and civil law
. 
110. Eije and Megginson (2008) 
show that common law jurisdiction and smaller cash holdings cause companies to pay 
out dividends rather than to repurchase shares. Ferris et al. (2009) concentrate on the 
comparison between common law and civil law jurisdictions and find that civil law 
firms generally execute more generous dividend policies than common law firms111
                                                 
107 Higgins (1981) argues that higher (lower) growth and/or lower (higher) profitability cause the poor (rich) availability of cash. 
Jensen (1986) suggests that dividends will help reduce the agency costs when substantial free cash flow is accumulated. Grullon, 
Michaely, and Swaminathan (2002) and DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) suggest that the interest tradeoff between the costs of 
paying dividends and the savings of agency costs tends to vary at different phases of a corporation’s life cycle. 
, 
consistent with the implication of “substitute model” of dividend policy proposed by 
LaPorta et al. (2000). Moreover, the dividend decisions have been related to catering 
108 Instead, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that firm age, an alternative proxy of corporate lifecycle, is a determining factor of the 
likelihood to pay dividends.  
109 The other multi-national evidence is provided by Aivazian and Booth (2003) who find a negative relation between debt ratios and 
dividend payments. 
110 LaPorta et al. (2000) hypothesized two models of agency costs. “Outcome model” predicts that companies in common law 
countries where investor protection is strong are more likely to pay high dividends because minority investors have enough right to 
force managers to pay so as to reduce agency costs. “Substitute model” predicts that companies in civil law countries where investor 
protection is relatively weak tend to pay high dividends because managers want to build up reputation for future external financing 
by distributing cash flows. The empirical results in LaPorta et al. (2000) support “outcome model”. 
111 Specifically, Ferris et al. (2000) find that civil law firms tend to have higher fraction of dividend payers, dividend continuation 
rate, increase percentage of aggregate dividends and payout ratios. 
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consideration (Baker and Wurgler, 2004; Li and Lie, 2006; Ferris, Jayaraman and 
Sabherwal, 2009), risk of enterprises (Hoberg and Prabhala, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 
2008; Ferris at el., 2009), earning report frequency and privatized company dummy112
Another trend considered by previous research is the substitutability between 
cash dividends and share repurchases. Grullon and Michaely (2002) study a sample 
covering the period 1972 to 2000 and argue that US listed firms gradually substituted 
repurchases for dividends to return earnings to shareholders. Skinner (2008) suggests a 
similar trend and contends that dividends are becoming extinct among US companies. 
Skinner’s findings are in line with the survey conducted by Brav, Graham, Harvey, and 
Michaely (2005). However, other recent non-US based studies (Ferris et al., 2006; Eije 
and Megginson, 2008; Renneboog and Trojanowski, 2011) do not provide direct 
evidence to support that dividends are being substituted by share repurchases as a way 
of distributing the free cash flow
 
(Eije and Megginson, 2008).  
113
These conflicting results imply that the disappearing dividend phenomenon is 
still controversial and that there is still a need to assess the various factors that may 
contribute to the trend in dividend payment. This empirical chapter contributes to 
existing research in the following ways:  
.  
1. It examines global trends in dividend policy across seven developed economies 
between 1989 and 2010, and it looks at the extent to which repurchases play a 
role in dividend policy as well. Stock repurchase policy across the main stock 
markets is not a focus in recent studies relating to corporate payouts (Denis and 
Osobov, 2008, Ferris et al., 2009). Although Eije and Megginson (2008) 
investigate share repurchases, their study is on a continental-wide basis, treating 
fifteen European countries as one entity. In contrast, my research is a country-
specific analysis. The patterns of stock repurchases among the main capital 
markets are depicted and the determinants of repurchase decisions are 
investigated. 
2. In contrast to existing evidence, this study investigates more dividend behaviors, 
including dividend increases, decreases, unchanged, initiations, omissions, and 
dividend continuation. A variety of company characteristics are compared 
between control groups. Examining various dividend behaviors helps expand the 
                                                 
112 Both the average reporting frequency and private companies have positive association with the amounts of payouts. 
113 Eije and Megginson (2008) find that the proportion of European firms repurchasing shares has been increasing while the 
propensity of paying dividends declined. 
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understanding towards the complete picture of dividend policies in the main 
stock markets.  
3. A long sample period has been chosen, so that those potential problems caused 
by a shorter sample period are avoided. For example, Denis and Osobov (2008) 
argue that the observed trends in dividend payment might simply result from the 
relatively short forecast period applied in their study. As Denis and Osobov 
(2008) and Partington (2009) point out, there is a possibility that Worldscope 
database initially might cover the larger and more mature firms and then add 
smaller and less mature firms for years that are more recent. If so, the decline in 
the propensity of paying dividends may be overstated because the established 
firms are better candidates to pay dividends (Fama and French, 2001). The 
sample period chosen in this study covers twenty two years from 1989 to 2010, 
including the periods used by Denis and Osobov (2008) (1989-2002), Eije and 
Megginson (2008) (1989-2005) and Ferris et al. (2009) (1994-2007). By 
extending the sample period, the issue of biased data coverage can be 
mitigated114
4. Petersen (2009) notes that in panel data based regression analysis, the 
appearance of clustered residuals across firms, or across time, is very likely, and 
that this leads to biased standard errors. Most existing studies
. Julio and Ikenberry (2004) observe an increase in the percentage of 
dividend-payers in the US market from 2001 to 2004, but it is not certain that 
this is a long-term tendency. To assess the consistency of “reappearing 
dividends”, the relevant tests need to cover longer observation periods.  
115
5. In addition to the variables already used in preceding studies, more variables that 
are comprehensive are included to examine the drivers of dividends and share 
repurchases policies, such as high technology dummy, ratio of R&D to total 
assets, M&A related factors, and delisting activity. To my knowledge, the 
impact of M&A and delisting have not been directly used to explain the 
incidence of corporate payouts and relevant theoretical hypotheses are absent in 
 do not address 
this issue properly, or do not specify a solution to this problem (Ferris et al., 
2009).  Therefore, I follow Petersen (2009) and correct the clustered standard 
errors across firms and across years in its estimation of logistic panel regressions.   
                                                 
114 Specifically, the test undertakes longer benchmark period to overcome the potential effect of noisy time. 
115 Fama and French (2001), DeAngelo et al. (2006), and Denis and Osobov (2008) follow a Fama-Macbeth procedure which is 
proven inappropriate with the presence of a firm effect as suggested by Petersen (2009). Alternatively, Eije and Megginson (2008) 
apply a bootstrapping method. The tests conducted by Cheng, Nagar, Rajan (2005) and Petersen (2009) show that bootstrapped 




This empirical analysis reveals a series of interesting trends in dividend payment. 
The overall fraction of dividend payers fell significantly from 1989 through to the early 
2000s for companies in all sample countries. This observation basing on the extended 
sample period is in general consistent with the findings reported in Denis and Osobov 
(2008) and Ferris et al. (2009). From the beginning of 2000s on, the percentage of 
payers reverts slightly upwards in the US, Canada, Japan and Hong Kong, in line with 
Julio and Ikenberry’s (2004) “reappearing dividends” assertion. Nevertheless, in the 
three European countries, UK, Germany and France, the concept of “reappearing 
dividends” is not evident. The aggregate real dividends paid have continuously 
increased over the full sample period, especially since the beginning of 21st century. 
Firms that disgorge cash flows in all sample countries retained stable dividend payout 
ratios and total payout ratios during the sample period, in line with Eije and Megginson 
(2008) who sampled European countries. Consistent with the arguments of Fama and 
French (2001) and Denis and Osobov (2008), significant decline in the proportion of 
newly listed firms that paid dividends is observed in the US, Canada, UK, Germany and 
France. By contrast, the proportion of of newly listed firms in Japan and Hong Kong 
that intend to pay dividends remains relatively stable.  
This study contributes to the literature by observing the patterns of stock 
repurchases at firm level for individual countries. US firms distinguish visibly from 
firms in other countries in the substitutability between cash dividends and share 
repurchases. In the US, share repurchases took over from dividends as the dominant 
payout form in terms of absolute amounts, and the numbers of dividend paying firms 
and stock repurchasing firms are not far apart. The increasing importance and 
prevalence of share repurchases are found in Canada and the UK. It is observed that UK 
companies experienced a pronounced surge in the amounts of repurchases from 1989 to 
2008, but the number of repurchasing firms is actually far less than those of dividend 
paying firms. The population of Canada firms that repurchased stocks fluctuates at high 
level but the amount of repurchases is relatively unimportant. For the remaining 
countries, dividend payment is still an overwhelming method of paying out earnings. 
I investigate the determinants of corporate payout decisions and my primary 
results can be summarized as follows. In general, both the decisions of paying dividends 
and repurchasing stocks are influenced by size, profitability, the fraction of retained 
earnings and leverage and the corresponding signs of coefficients coincide with those 
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suggested by literature in relation to dividend policy. These results are basically 
consistent with the implication of maturity hypothesis. That is, more mature firms are 
more likely to pay dividends and to repurchase dividends. My results contribute to 
resolving a controversy between Denis and Osobove (2008), and Eije and Megginson 
(2008) by showing that earned/contributed capital mix is a strong determinant with 
positive effect on the decision to pay dividends. My results contribute to confirming the 
strong negative relation between corporate payouts and leverage level existing in each 
observed stock market, which is consistent with Jensen (1986) implying dividends and 
debt are substitutes in reducing agency costs. However, in line with Denis and Osobove 
(2008), the results about the effect growth opportunity are mixed. The coefficient of 
market to book ratio is negative but not significant for Germany. The coefficients of 
total assets growth are of the “wrong” sign or insignificant for some countries such as 
Germany and Japan. Controlling for these characteristics discussed in this section, I 
document a declining propensity to pay dividends, namely, the gap between expected 
and actual percent of dividend payers, in all sample countries, apart from Japan, for 
1989-2010. For the communal forecast period 1996-2002, the observed propensity to 
pay dividends in my tests is qualitatively similar with the corresponding finding in 
Denis and Osobove (2008)116
Some new explanatory variables that have not been examined in competing 
studies display different impacts on the decisions of dividends and repurchases, but their 
effect is not uniform across the countries. There is some evidence to suggest that cash 
holdings are negatively related the decision to pay dividends, but positively related the 
decision to buy back shares. This result is partly consistent with Lee and Suh (2011) 
who contend a positive relation between cash holdings and repurchases. It might be 
explained that firms with high liquidity tend to pay in form of repurchases to keep 
flexible cash flows. There is some evidence that technology intensity and R&D 
expenditure are negatively related the likelihood to pay dividends but their effects on 
the likelihood to repurchase shares are more mixed. High technology and large R&D 
expenditure can be assumed to represent the rich growth opportunities, which cause low 
dividends.  
.  
The results show that the effect of M&A on the incidence of payouts is highly 
heterogeneous in different countries. For example, the US dividend paying firms have 
                                                 
116 It is relatively reasonable to compare the relevant results in Denis and Osobove (2008) with my results since their benchmark 
period (1989-1993) used is similar to mine (1989-1995). The benchmark period chosen by Ferris et al. (2009) is 1994-1997, which 
is more different from that used in my study. 
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lower probability to be acquirers, but conversely, the UK counterparts have higher 
probability to be acquirers. In the US and the UK, dividend-paying firms are more 
likely to be acquired, while repurchasing firms have higher probability to be acquirers. 
These results imply that the relation between payout policies and M&A factors is not 
uniform among countries, maybe due to the discrepancy in motivations, regulations and 
patterns of M&A operations among different countries. The interrelation between 
dividend decisions and M&A activity remains an open direction for future research. The 
results show that firms facing the risk of being de-listed are less likely to be dividend 
payers. The behind explanation might be attributed to agency conflicts and/or financial 
distress. Beside, the results demonstrate that repurchases and dividends are at least not 
perfect substitutes as share repurchases are primarily implemented by dividend payers. 
Additionally, there is little evidence to suggest that payout decisions are influenced by 
market sentiment, as argued by Baker and Wurgler (2004a).  
I also contribute to the literature by investigating the amounts of both dividend 
and share repurchases. I show that profitability, growth rate of total assets and leverage 
remain important factors in determining dividend amounts, and the associated signs are 
the same as those made in respect to the decision to pay dividends. The effects of size 
and the fraction of retained earnings on dividend amount are mixed117. The results 
illustrate that firms with high market to book ratio or high cash holdings are less likely 
to opt for cash dividends, but if they did pay out, they paid out more118
Furthermore, using the method of comparison, the analysis reveals that firms 
that increased dividends are larger and have higher profitability
. In addition, 
there is strong evidence that market to book ratio is positively associated with the 
amount of repurchases. 
119, growth opportunities, 
the fraction of retained earnings120
                                                 
117 For example, the signs of coefficients on size and the fraction of retained earnings are negative for the US but positive for the UK. 
 and higher cash holdings than firms that decreased 
dividends. They are also less likely to operate in high technology sector and have lower 
delisting rate than firms in other control groups. The only consistent evidence found in 
this section to support the catering theory is that US dividend-increasing firms have a 
greater value-weighted dividend premium (EDP) than dividend-decreasing firms. In 
addition, the comparisons show that firms in start-paying group are of smaller size, 
higher growth rate, lower fraction of retained earnings and higher leverage level than 
118 Similarly, Aivazian and Booth (2003) observe a positive relation between market to book ratio and dividend amount. In addition, 
their results also show a mixed effect of size on dividend amount.  
119 US companies are exceptional for this case. 
120 Hong Kong companies are exceptional for this case. 
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stop-paying group. These findings are consistent with the maturity hypothesis.  
Using Lintner’s (1956) model, I find that the relation between dividends and 
earnings weakened across countries and this conclusion is in line with Skinner (2008), 
and Eije and Megginson (2008). In addition, over the past two decades, the US 
companies rather than companies in other parts of the world sped up the adjustment of 
dividends.  Moreover, I use the method developed by Grullon and Michealy (2002) to 
examine the choices of payout methods. Overall, companies in the sample preferred 
stability in their choice of payout method, and preferred not to change payout methods 
frequently. US and Canada companies are more likely to distribute their first payouts in 
the form of repurchases relative to the firms in counterpart countries.A considerable 
percentage of companies switched from using single payout methods to using mixed or 
dual payout methods, implying that single payout channels cannot fulfill the complete 
needs of market participants. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the sample 
and describes the data. Section 3 reports the evolution of dividend payments and share 
repurchases. Section 4 explores the propensity to pay dividends. Section 5 presents 
advance evidence on dividend policy and repurchase policy. Section 6 examines firm 
characteristics of companies that paid dividends. Section 7 examines the relationship 
between dividend payouts and earnings, and the speed of adjustment of dividends. 
Section 8 examines changes in payout methods. The summary and conclusions are 
presented in the last section.  
 
5.2 Sample and Data  
5.2.1 Sample Selection  
The initial sample data includes all non-financial, non-utility firms listed on the public 
market in the US, the UK, Japan, Canada, Germany, France, and Hong Kong. 
Following precedents set in other recent dividend studies121
                                                 
121Fama and French (2001), DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz (2006), Denis and Osobov (2008), and Renneboog and Trojanowski 
(2011) 
, this study excludes firms in 
the financial and utility sectors because the dividend policies of these firms are different 
from industrial firms, and are highly constrained by external forces. These countries in 
sample are chosen because they are influential and established economies, for which 
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relevant financial data is complete. Of countries sampled in this research, the US, UK, 
Japan, Canada, Germany, and France are also included in the research of Denis and 
Osobov (2008), but this study adds Hong Kong to the list. The sample countries are 
representative since they include four common law countries and three civil law 
countries. However, unlike Ferris et al. (2009), this study does not focus primarily on 
comparing dividend patterns of firms in different law jurisdictions.  
A sample period covering 1989 to 2010122 is selected for the following reasons. 
First, it is known that company information published by Worldscope at early years is 
not suitable for empirical analysis123. Denis and Osobov (2008) and Eije and Megginson 
(2008), who sampled their research using Worldscope, set 1989 as their earliest cut off 
point for data collection124
In addition, in the following analysis in respect of repurchases, the sample 
covers the period from 1989 to 2010 in the US, and the shorter period of 1999 to 2010 
in respect of Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong because of the 
data availability. In fact, the operations of share repurchases were not popular globally 
except for in the US. Denis and Osobov (2008) note that the process of repurchasing is 
not launched in France, Germany, or in Japan until the late 1990s. Worldscope through 
Datastream Excel supplies all data applied in this study. The principles of data 
collection and sample inclusion used in this study are as follows. (1) Consecutive 
accounting data including total assets, market capitalisation, net income, common 
equity, dividend per share (DPS), earnings per share (EPS) and base date are available. 
(2) Annual rather than quarterly data is used, because dividend amounts are set in 
response to annual rather than quarterly earnings (Watts, 1973). (3) All firms with 
historical records in DataStream are included in the sample irrespective of status (i.e. 
active, dead or suspended). (4) Follow Eije and Megginson (2008), firms without usable 
International Security Identifying Number (ISIN) are excluded from the sample. 
Second, this study identifies firms as dividend payers only if 
corresponding ‘dividend payment dates’ are available in DataStream. I find that the item 
of ‘dividend payment dates’ has many missing data prior to 1988. Table 5-1 lists the 
numbers of firms for observed countries in the sample.  
 
                                                 
122 In calculating the growth rate of total assets, data on one year lagged total assets need to be used. Therefore, the data on total 
assets cover 1988-2010 actually. 
              123Denis and Osobov (2008) claimed that World Scope coverage is not complete prior to 1985.  Partington (2009) also discussed the 
issue of Worldscope data coverage. 
124 Ferris et al.(2009) begin their sample in 1994. 
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Table 5-1 Statistics of Sample 
“Payer” means the number of listed firms that paid cash dividends in each observed year. “Obs” means the total number of observed listed firms in each observed year. “Percent of Payers” means the 
percentage of dividend payers, which is calculated as the value of “Payer” divided by the value of “Obs”. 
 
Year 
US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 
Payer Obs % of 
 1989 940 1618 58.10% 86 137 62.77% 863 950 90.84% 156 197 79.19% 190 220 86.36% 949 1052 90.21% 60 64 93.75% 
1990 951 1656 57.43% 89 158 56.33% 905 996 90.86% 190 225 84.44% 214 245 87.35% 1202 1300 92.46% 61 71 85.92% 
1991 968 1867 51.85% 86 166 51.81% 875 1026 85.28% 211 245 86.12% 226 269 84.01% 1430 1547 92.44% 78 88 88.64% 
1992 984 2015 48.83% 82 162 50.62% 840 1039 80.85% 224 267 83.90% 241 288 83.68% 1431 1573 90.97% 96 106 90.57% 
1993 1009 2180 46.28% 90 176 51.14% 850 1085 78.34% 231 303 76.24% 230 300 76.67% 1374 1598 85.98% 94 108 87.04% 
1994 1081 2889 37.42% 91 180 50.56% 911 1144 79.63% 220 315 69.84% 218 316 68.99% 1370 1652 82.93% 125 133 93.98% 
1995 1122 3213 34.92% 98 204 48.04% 979 1173 83.46% 230 315 73.02% 244 325 75.08% 1405 1710 82.16% 189 216 87.50% 
1996 1116 3568 31.28% 95 212 44.81% 1065 1351 78.83% 251 359 69.92% 298 409 72.86% 1478 1766 83.69% 238 304 78.29% 
1997 1111 3755 29.59% 93 221 42.08% 1128 1461 77.21% 252 375 67.20% 316 480 65.83% 1523 1798 84.71% 249 330 75.45% 
1998 1064 3932 27.06% 98 308 31.82% 1085 1426 76.09% 283 395 71.65% 346 551 62.79% 1625 1964 82.74% 242 350 69.14% 
1999 992 3901 25.43% 103 375 27.47% 968 1319 73.39% 304 436 69.72% 382 595 64.20% 1541 2012 76.59% 190 367 51.77% 
2000 908 3834 23.68% 101 410 24.63% 827 1354 61.08% 321 575 55.83% 358 670 53.43% 1593 2040 78.09% 243 489 49.69% 
2001 843 3677 22.93% 101 454 22.25% 741 1371 54.05% 319 651 49.00% 377 675 55.85% 1656 2071 79.96% 263 634 41.48% 
2002 815 3599 22.65% 118 495 23.84% 705 1352 52.14% 258 603 42.79% 338 640 52.81% 1608 2098 76.64% 285 696 40.95% 
2003 921 3553 25.92% 141 516 27.33% 671 1293 51.89% 218 573 38.05% 318 597 53.27% 1676 2106 79.58% 319 736 43.34% 
2004 1000 3569 28.02% 160 563 28.42% 668 1362 49.05% 202 537 37.62% 302 574 52.61% 1798 2138 84.10% 383 779 49.17% 
2005 1059 3564 29.71% 184 614 29.97% 667 1507 44.26% 228 540 42.22% 304 575 52.87% 1870 2186 85.54% 435 800 54.38% 
2006 1070 3533 30.29% 198 636 31.13% 678 1600 42.38% 239 546 43.77% 320 610 52.46% 1915 2226 86.03% 456 835 54.61% 
2007 1070 3487 30.69% 174 617 28.20% 677 1571 43.09% 258 620 41.61% 327 619 52.83% 1938 2244 86.36% 477 892 53.48% 
2008 1061 3406 31.15% 171 592 28.89% 649 1429 45.42% 286 637 44.90% 335 598 56.02% 1916 2225 86.11% 510 921 55.37% 
2009 951 3313 28.71% 167 553 30.20% 508 1299 39.11% 250 601 41.60% 267 553 48.28% 1723 2178 79.11% 450 968 46.49% 
2010 974 3152 30.90% 160 515 31.07% 508 1135 44.76% 228 498 45.78% 263 480 54.79% 1721 2130 80.80% 532 969 54.90% 
218 
 
5.2.2 Data Description 
Table 5-2 Definitions of Variables 
The table provides the list of variables and their definitions. DataStream Codes are denoted in brackets 
 
Variable Definitions  
SIZE The percent of firms with smaller market capitalization [08001] in each stock market for every sample year (Fama and French 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008) 
LNMC Log (market capitalization [08001] in 2010 price) 
PROFIT (net income [07250] + interest expense if available [01075] + deferred taxes if available [03263]) / book value of total assets [07230]125
MTBV 
 
Market to Book Ratio = (Total Assets [07230] – Common Shareholders’ Equity [03501] + 
Market Capitalisation [08001] / Total Assets [07230])126
GOA 
 
(Total Assett [07230] - Total Assets t-1) / Total Assets
RETE 
 t-1 
Retained Earnings [03495] / total equity [07220] 
LEVERAGE Long-term debt [03251] / Total assets [07230] 
AGE The number of years between the base year and the observed year 
CTAT cash [02003] / total assets [07230], where cash represents the money available for use in the normal operations of the company, and it is the most liquid of all company assets 
R&D Research & Development (R&D) [01201] / Total Assets [07230] 
VDP 
Value weighted dividend premium, the difference between the logs of the value-weighted 
average market-to-book ratios of payers and non-payers, where the weight is the book value of 
total assets 
EDP 
Equally weighted dividend premium,  the difference between the logs of the equally-weighted 
average market-to-book ratios of payers and non-payers, where the weight is the book value of 
total assets 
HITECH A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if a sample firm is categorised as operating in the high technology industry and 0 otherwise 
ACQUIERER A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if a company in the sample became an acquirer between 1989 and October 2011, and 0 if otherwise, for all sample years 
TARGET A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if a company in this sample became a target firm between 1989 and October 2011 for all sample years and 0 otherwise 
TIN3 A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of the observed year for an acquirer, 0 otherwise 
TAKENIN3127 A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of the observed year for a target firm, 0 otherwise  
DLIN3 A dummy variable, taking on the value of 1  if an observed firm is de-listed within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise 
 
                                                 
125 This method of calculation is used by Fama and French (2001) and Dennis and Osobov (2008). 
126 This method of calculation is used by Fama and French (2001) and Dennis and Osobov (2008). 
127 One obstacle noted in data collection relates to the fact that DataStream only provides the last record of an M&A for an acquirer, 
whilst in reality it is common for an acquirer to takeover several different target companies. 
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5.3 International Trends in Dividend Payments and Share 
Repurchases 
5.3.1 Proportion of Firms that Pay Dividends 
My investigation presents the evolution and progression of dividend payments in seven 
developed economies between 1989 and 2010. First, contrary to the conclusion of Ferris 
et al. (2009) (P.520), the declining number of dividend payers is not a global 
phenomenon. Table 5-1 reports that three European countries, France, Germany and 
UK128
Second, the total numbers of exchange-listed firms increased substantially from 
1989 to the beginning of 2000s. For example, the number of observations in the US 
surged from 1618 in 1989 to 3932 in 1998, similar to the results provided by Julio and 
Ikenberry (2004) and Denis and Osobov (2008). Thereafter, the stock market population 
ceased growing across countries except Japan and Hong Kong.  
, has exhibited decrease in the population of payers since the early 2000s or the 
late 1990s. However, the number of dividend-paying firms remained constant in the US, 
ranging between 940 in 1989 and 974 in 2010. In Canada, Japan and Hong Kong, there 
is even a continuously increase in the number of dividend paying firms over the entire 
sample period.  
Third, Figure 5-1 shows that the overall proportion of dividend payers fell 
significantly from 1989 through to the early 2000s for companies in all sample countries 
except in Japan where the proportion remained relatively constant over the sample 
period, consistent with the findings reported in Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et 
al. (2009). Firms in the US and Canadian, two North-American countries, display 
similar synchronous trend in dividend payments.  In both countries, the proportion of 
payers decreased significantly from 1989 to 2000 and increased slightly thereafter. Over 
the same period, in France, Germany, Hong Kong, and the UK, the payer percent 
decreased from 90% to roughly 50%.  
Fourth, in line with Julio and Ikenberry’s (2004) “reappearing dividends” 
assertion, the percentage of payers is slightly restored in the US, Canada, Japan and 
Hong Kong in the 2000s. For example, in the US, the percent increased from 22.93% in 
                                                 
128 This declining trend may be related the abolishment of ACT in 1999, which had benefited dividend-payers by contributing tax 
credits in actual. 
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2001 to 30.9% in 2010. However, “reappearing dividends” cannot be observed in 
France, Germany, and the UK. In particular, in the UK, the proportion of dividend 
paying firms actually fell from 54.05% in 2001 to 44.74% in 2010. Intuitively, the 
declines in the proportion of dividend payers up to the outset of 21 century seem to be 
more influenced by the expansion of capital markets than the decrease of dividend 
payers. 
Fifth, I show that new listings appear to become more reluctant to pay dividends. 
Table 5-3 presents statistics on the proportion of newly listed firms that paid dividends. 
In this table, “Payer” refers to the newly listed companies that paid dividends after their 
IPO. In a comparable analysis, Ferris et al. (2009) only take into account firms that pay 
dividends in listing years. This table provides a more comprehensive explanation of the 
trends in dividend payments, as many firms distributed dividends after the first post-IPO 
year in practice. Table 5-3 shows that 64.62% of US listed firms that are issued before 
1989 eventually became dividend-payers. However, this percentage declines to 27.04% 
between 1989 and 1995, 16.57% between 1996 and 2000, 24.3% between 2001 and 
2005, and 19.63% between 2006 and 2010. A highly similar tendency is found for new 
listings in Canada. In the UK, Germany and France, the important turning point appears 
around the period 1996 to 2000. For example, in the UK, the percentage of newly 
listings that pay dividends after IPO is 81.12% for 1989 to 1995, but decreases to 52.72% 
for 1996 to 2000, and hits a low at 29.17% for 2006 to 2010. In contrast, companies in 
Japan and Hong Kong exhibit a relatively smaller decline. Additionally, newly listed 
firms in the US and in Canada showed a lower propensity to pay dividends than their 
counterparts in the UK, Germany, France, Japan and in Hong Kong. Over the entire 
period, the best dividend payers are firms in Japan (94.8%), while the lowest ones are in 
the US (35.17%). This reluctance by newly listed firms to pay dividends is generally 
consistent with the findings of previous studies, such as Fama and French (2001), and 
Denis and Osobov (2008), which attribute a reduction in the percentage of dividend 










Table 5-3 Proportion of Newly Listed Dividend-Paying Firms 
 “Payer” column displays the numbers of newly listed firms that paid cash dividends after IPO. “New List” column displays the numbers of firms that were issued during each individual period. “Rate” 
column displays the percentages of dividend payers where a percentage is calculated as the number shown in “Payer” divided by the corresponding number shown in “New List”.  
 
Period 
US CANADA UK GERMANY FRANCE JAPAN HONG KONG 
Payer New List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate Payer 
New 
List Rate 
Full period 2350 6682 35.17% 526 1537 34.22% 1958 3056 64.07% 660 1002 65.87% 802 1096 73.18% 2518 2656 94.80% 876 1076 81.41% 
<1989 1350 2068 65.28% 205 407 50.37% 987 1019 96.86% 282 294 95.92% 124 130 95.38% 1330 1362 97.65% 180 193 93.26% 
1989-1995 417 1542 27.04% 97 340 28.53% 318 392 81.12% 94 102 92.16% 270 289 93.43% 511 515 99.22% 177 209 84.69% 
1996-2000 297 1792 16.57% 81 348 23.28% 328 622 52.73% 197 375 52.53% 295 432 68.29% 283 295 95.93% 156 210 74.29% 
2001-2005 181 745 24.30% 106 294 36.05% 234 711 32.91% 31 73 42.47% 64 123 52.03% 287 335 85.67% 196 277 70.76% 







Figure 5-1 Percentage of Dividend-Paying Firms  
The percentage of dividend-paying firms is calculated as the number of dividend paying firms divided by the total 




5.3.2 Evolution of Dividend Payments and Share Repurchases 
Previous competing studies (Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris 
et al. 2009) do not explicitly contrast the historical changes in dividend payments and 
share repurchases. Figure 5-2 contributes to overcoming this gap in the literature by 
illustrating the evolution of dividend payouts and share repurchases for seven developed 
economies from 1989 through to 2010.  
Apart from firms in the US, firms in all sample countries display a limited 
number of cases of share repurchases prior to the late 1990s. Therefore, in respect of 
repurchases, the sample period selected covers 1999 to 2010 for Canada, the UK, 
Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong, and, 1989 to 2010 for the US. The real 
amounts of both dividend payouts and share repurchases are indicated in 2010 prices129
                                                 
129 For these calculations, the Consumer Price Index (CPI) is provided by World Bank database. 
. 
To illustrate the evolution of dividends and repurchases, I develop two measures: 
comparative value of payout, and relative frequency of payout (No.Rep/No.Div). 
Comparative value reflects the amounts of dividends and repurchases over time. For 
each country, the aggregate amount of real dividends in 1989 is set as unit. Then, the 
comparative value is calculated as the amount of real dividends or share repurchases in 
each of the following observed years, scaled by the amount of real dividends in 1989. 
For example, for the US in 2001, the comparative values of repurchases and dividends 





















2.37 times and 2.33 times the aggregate dividends in 1989, in terms of real amounts. 
No.Rep/No.Div represents the relative frequency of payout methods, which is 
calculated as the number of firms that repurchased share scaled by the number of firms 
that paid dividends for each observed year.  
The results show that the aggregate amount of dividends paid continuously 
increased in each country during the sample period, consistent with Eije and Megginson, 
(2008) and Ferris et al. (2009). This trend is most observable in Hong Kong for which 
the comparative value of dividends is about 30 in 2010. The smallest increase occurred 
in Japan where the range of competitive value fluctuates roughly between 3 and 4 over 
recent years, while in the UK it reached 7.87 in 2000. 
The patterns of stock repurchases differ among the countries in my sample. In 
accordance with Grullon and Michaely (2002) and Skinner (2008), amongst the US 
firms, share repurchases overwhelmed dividends to act as the dominant payout method 
in terms of absolute amounts. In 1999 and 2000, the amounts of repurchases made by 
US firms exceeded those of cash dividends. More significantly, the competitive values 
are 7.45, 10.57 and 9.3 for repurchases versus 4.63, 4.28 and 5.96 for dividends in 2006, 
2007 and 2008. In the meantime, the number of firms repurchasing shares also went up. 
The values of No.Rep/No.Div are 96.56% and 106.2% in 2001 and 2009 respectively, 
indicating that the number of repurchasing firms is almost equal to that of dividend-
paying firms. The increasing importance of share repurchases can also be observed in 
the UK as the competitive value of repurchases rose from 0.58 in 1999 to 6.61 in 2008, 
and accordingly, the relative frequency of repurchases rose from 13.53% in 1999 to 
28.74% in 2008. But unlike the US firms, UK firms persisted in distributing a large 
fraction of corporate payouts in the form of cash dividends. These results are 
comparable to the findings of Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011). In addition, for 
Canada, whilst the relative frequency of repurchases reached high in some years (e.g. 
No.Rep/No.Div equals 104.95% in 2001), the amount of repurchases is fairly lower 
than that of dividends. However, in other countries including Germany, France, Japan, 
and Hong Kong, share repurchases only accounted for a small fraction of corporate 
payouts. For example, the highest relative frequency in Germany is only 9.21% in 2010, 




Figure 5-2 Evolution of Dividends and Share Repurchases 
This figure illustrates the evolution of dividends paid for seven developed economies from 1989 through 2010. The 
sample period in respect of repurchases spans from 1999 to 2010 for Canada, the UK, Germany, France, Japan, and 
Hong Kong, and from 1989 to 2010 for the US. The real amounts of dividend payouts and share repurchases are 
calculated in 2010 prices using CPI (Consumer Price Index) provided by the World Bank database. “Repurchases” 
and “Dividends” represent the comparative values of share repurchases and dividends for each sample year. The 
comparative values amount to the real amounts of dividend payouts and share repurchases for each sample year 
scaled by the aggregate real dividend in 1989, which is regarded as a unit. No.Rep/No.Div represents the relative 
frequency of payout methods, which is calculated as the number of firms that repurchased share dividends by the 


















































































































5.3.3 Dividend Payout Ratio and Total Payout Ratio 
This section presents the evolutions of dividend payout ratios and total payout ratios 
across sample countries. A dividend payout ratio represents the percentage of a firm’s 
earnings that are paid out as dividends. A total payout ratio represents the percentage of 
a firm’s earnings that are paid out as dividends or repurchases. Following the method 
used by Julio and Ikenberry (2004), and Eije and Megginson (2008), dividend payout 
ratio and total payout ratio are set to 1 if earnings are negative or if firms paid more than 
100% of their earnings out as dividends130
Table 5-4 Panel A. reports the mean and median dividend payout ratios for the 
dividend payers. The results indicate that dividend payout ratios are relatively stable in 
all main economies during the sample period in contrast to the fraction of dividend 
payers. For instance, in the US payout ratios maintained in a narrow range between 
34.18% and 49.3%, and the standard deviation of mean payout ratios (σ) is only 3.96%. 
In addition, the observed countries do not materially differ in the magnitude of dividend 
payout ratios. The highest dividend payout ratio (51.73%) is observed in Germany and 
the lowest is observed in Japan (39.16%). Table 5-4 Panel B. reports the mean and 
median total payout ratios of firms that paid dividends or repurchased shares. There are 
no significant fluctuations in total payout ratios across all of the countries. The highest 
total payout ratio (55.12%) is observed in the US, whilst the lowest (40.89%) is 
observed in Japan. In general, similar to dividend payout ratios, the total payout ratios 
follow a stable trend, in line with the result in Eije and Megginson (2008) who sampled 
15 European countries.  
. This method has the advantage of avoiding 
meaningless payout ratios in economic sense. For example, Ferris et al (2009) produce 




                                                 
130 When calculating dividend payout ratios, such cases account for 10.0%, 21.13%, 6.81%, 13.47%, 8.32%, 8.44% and 7.63% of 
observations for US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, Japan, Hong Kong respectively. When calculating total payout ratio, such cases 
account for 27.67%, 27.04%, 10.08%, 15.91%, 10.53%, 10.49%, and 8.87% of observations for US, Canada, UK, Germany, France, 
Japan, and Hong Kong respectively. 
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Table 5-4 Dividend and Total Payout Ratios (%) 
Year US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK Mean Median Mean Median Mean Media
 
Mean Median Mean Media
 
Mean Median Mean Median 
Panel A. Dividend Payout Ratio (%) 
1989 37.38 31.01 37.63 31.64 34.92 32.51 51.42 47.10 37.15 26.77 39.22 33.32 51.77 51.61 
1990 38.23 32.25 38.6 32.21 39.38 35.35 54.51 48.04 35.85 28.57 34.70 30.10 54.57 53.29 
1991 42.82 37.10 45.41 37.5 45.06 39.47 55.30 47.17 37.39 27.32 32.40 27.01 50.94 46.93 
1992 47.67 41.07 44.51 42.48 54.74 48.20 56.04 49.38 41.60 32.35 34.09 26.68 55.09 50.00 
1993 46.77 40.13 51.81 48.28 55.69 50.10 57.07 50.00 42.95 34.78 38.63 29.47 56.32 50.53 
1994 44.91 37.93 43.86 37.5 53.86 49.20 57.98 53.56 47.64 38.08 45.14 34.82 54.82 50.00 
1995 41.52 34.74 34.49 28.0 48.87 44.20 58.28 53.26 48.71 37.32 48.63 38.55 47.57 43.33 
1996 38.65 31.53 34.4 25.18 48.35 43.87 54.25 48.94 43.61 35.45 45.21 34.79 45.69 41.67 
1997 37.73 31.28 39.3 25.64 46.15 41.96 54.68 50.00 46.03 37.86 43.37 33.48 43.63 37.94 
1998 36.13 28.57 35.6 24.14 42.94 40.11 55.34 48.71 40.36 34.18 40.43 30.62 44.90 38.46 
1999 36.56 27.45 38.23 24.57 41.78 38.66 49.50 41.58 40.22 34.70 43.84 33.95 46.21 42.55 
2000 37.20 28.57 35.56 23.81 44.35 39.60 52.38 45.69 39.12 30.88 46.85 36.43 47.79 41.67 
2001 34.18 26.98 37.96 26.31 45.49 40.71 53.83 50.00 38.85 32.87 39.84 30.42 44.78 38.00 
2002 41.07 32.79 36.98 22.92 47.60 42.43 51.22 44.67 36.60 30.95 36.23 26.20 48.15 43.79 
2003 39.97 31.65 41.88 26.67 45.12 40.37 53.14 48.00 40.52 33.56 39.23 28.36 45.02 40.00 
2004 40.26 30.80 40.88 33.33 45.94 41.63 47.40 42.86 42.70 34.75 38.38 29.67 44.85 40.00 
2005 37.07 28.37 42.44 37.98 43.07 40.00 44.77 37.92 41.52 33.33 32.82 24.49 37.63 33.33 
2006 37.84 28.55 51.06 38.57 41.76 37.99 42.42 35.45 39.92 33.27 31.32 24.34 38.35 33.33 
2007 38.13 28.99 51.45 42.08 42.03 36.20 43.12 35.31 41.30 36.13 30.45 24.03 36.74 32.25 
2008 39.82 28.95 51.51 45.18 42.46 38.14 43.98 38.09 41.27 34.88 32.74 25.99 39.82 33.33 
2009 39.84 28.44 48.68 38.38 39.69 37.67 43.95 36.84 41.90 35.33 39.03 30.53 36.46 30.77 
2010 49.30 40.43 54.97 40.88 41.60 38.27 57.52 55.01 52.33 44.49 48.97 39.67 39.72 33.33 
Mean 40.14 32.16 42.60 33.33 45.04 40.76 51.73 45.80 41.71 33.99 39.16 30.59 45.95 41.19 
Median 39.23 31.15 41.38 32.77 44.70 40.05 53.49 47.58 41.29 34.44 39.12 30.26 45.35 40.83 
σ 3.96 4.46 6.52 8.06 5.07 4.35 5.22 5.96 4.06 3.87 5.69 4.57 6.18 6.94 
Panel B Total Payout Ratio (%) 
1989 56.20 49.45 41.78 32.35 35.53 32.67 54.32 50.00 38.62 27.31 39.63 33.56 51.77 51.61 
1990 51.49 42.78 42.53 34.92 41.00 36.06 55.02 48.04 35.95 28.08 35.17 30.29 54.57 53.29 
1991 56.98 50.00 53.16 45.45 46.12 39.84 56.46 50.00 38.00 27.78 33.06 27.28 53.02 52.37 
1992 57.47 51.11 47.84 44.30 55.15 48.32 56.10 49.38 42.59 32.81 34.92 27.05 55.09 50.00 
1993 54.09 46.53 54.27 48.89 56.08 50.66 57.10 50.05 43.66 36.22 39.73 30.04 57.63 51.02 
1994 54.54 45.61 51.13 45.98 54.13 49.37 58.02 53.26 48.21 38.20 46.11 36.02 55.71 50.00 
1995 52.16 43.10 38.23 30.54 49.25 44.26 62.08 58.33 48.67 37.32 51.71 40.61 49.34 44.24 
1996 51.99 41.62 38.85 29.36 48.77 44.26 54.49 48.94 43.90 35.77 45.50 35.01 46.68 41.96 
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1997 52.98 45.21 43.49 28.91 47.27 42.20 55.25 50.08 47.53 39.48 44.13 34.25 44.82 38.55 
1998 53.56 44.44 43.73 29.27 44.61 40.69 55.86 48.72 41.66 35.65 42.17 31.65 45.43 39.13 
1999 56.93 52.93 45.09 29.53 45.03 39.34 50.28 42.11 42.13 35.80 48.89 38.11 47.00 42.93 
2000 57.67 55.46 47.96 32.36 47.89 41.21 52.64 45.88 42.23 32.82 50.47 39.88 49.20 42.26 
2001 53.88 48.23 50.75 32.52 50.48 43.58 53.71 50.00 41.98 34.13 44.54 32.65 46.13 38.46 
2002 57.78 55.03 48.48 39.00 52.18 45.07 52.92 45.02 38.51 31.02 40.86 29.14 48.81 44.24 
2003 51.76 44.71 51.87 41.56 48.82 42.00 54.99 50.69 44.30 34.77 41.65 30.18 46.96 41.67 
2004 56.13 50.47 58.70 49.60 51.82 45.86 51.88 46.95 45.82 35.51 39.71 30.37 46.21 41.18 
2005 51.49 41.65 56.59 47.73 47.84 41.68 46.77 38.46 44.09 34.48 33.76 24.87 38.84 33.33 
2006 57.15 53.02 63.67 49.98 47.21 40.39 44.87 38.81 43.21 35.02 32.56 24.94 38.77 33.33 
2007 60.22 60.24 65.41 49.14 48.37 39.30 46.67 37.89 44.17 37.63 31.18 24.20 37.70 32.14 
2008 61.21 61.54 66.00 52.39 49.68 41.89 47.43 41.43 44.20 37.44 33.70 26.18 40.42 33.33 
2009 52.66 47.59 58.42 48.36 43.75 38.84 49.30 42.87 46.86 40.07 40.80 31.17 38.51 32.00 
2010 61.00 61.67 68.25 59.13 43.68 38.94 64.00 61.92 54.40 48.31 49.94 40.96 40.32 33.33 
Mean 55.12 49.08 51.65 40.97 47.64 41.96 53.51 47.55 43.62 35.25 40.89 31.71 46.76 41.79 
Median 55.13 48.20 50.94 42.93 47.85 41.62 54.40 48.83 43.76 35.58 40.82 30.77 46.34 41.61 




5.4 Propensity to Pay Dividends 
5.4.1 Determinants on Propensity to Pay Dividends 
The methodology of examining a firm’s propensity to pay dividends is initially 
proposed by Fama and French (2001). As the first step, the logistic panel regressions for 
base period are estimated for each observed country to obtain the baseline estimates. 
The dependent variables are given a value of 1 if a firm paid dividends and 0 otherwise 
and the factors chosen in explaining the propensity to pay dividends include firm size, 
profitability, growth opportunities, ratio of retained earnings to total book equity, and 
leverage.  
I expect that dividend propensity is positively affected by size (SIZE and LNMC) 
and profitability (PROFIT) and negatively affected by growth opportunity (MTBV and 
GOA). As discussed previously, firm size, profitability and growth opportunities are 
broadly used as the explanatory factors in analysing dividend propensity. According to 
the free cash flow and lifecycle hypotheses, firms at a mature stage tend to be more 
profitable, but may face limited investment opportunities, and, therefore, they may need 
to distribute dividends in order to control the agency costs of free cash flow. Denis and 
Osobove (2008) argue that large firms have less of a need to communicate information 
to shareholders through the payment of dividends according to signaling theory.  
I also expect that dividend propensity is positively affected by the fraction of 
retained earnings to total equity (RETE). DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) argue 
that mature companies tend to have higher level of retained earnings and they report a 
significant positive relationship between the decision to pay dividends and the 
earned/contributed capital mix131
Finally, I expect that dividend propensity is negatively affected by debt level. 
Eije and Megginson (2008) and Renneboog and Trojanowski (2011) find that a firm’s 
tendency to pay dividends is negatively influenced by leverage. Jensen (1986) argue 
that leverage and cash dividend payouts can be substitutes for controlling agency costs 
since debt serves as a strong commitment to decipline the behavior of managers. 
, controlling for other firm characteristics. Denis and 
Osobov (2008) find the similar results but Eije and Megginson (2008) find no relevant 
evidence.  
                                                 
131 The term “earned/contributed capital mix” is identical to another term “fraction of retained earnings to total equity” in literature. 
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However, recent studies do not consider leverage as a determinant when using the 
method of Fama and French (2001) to measure the propensity to pay dividends. 
Table 5-5 reports the descriptive statistics relating to firm characteristics for the 
full sample period between 1989 and 2010, and for two sub-periods between 1991 and 
2000, and 2001 and 2010. Based on the basic model suggested by Jungqvist and 
Wilhelmy (2003), this research applies random-effects generalised least-squares (GLS) 
regressions, with corrected cluster error, to test the significance of changes in key firm 
characteristics over time. For a GLS regression, the dependent variables are the values 
of a certain characteristic, and the explanatory variables are the natural logarithm of 
annual time t. The estimated values of significance levels are reported in the last column 
of the table. The means and medians of size (LNMC) fall from the first sub-period 
(1991-2000) to the second sub-period (2001-2010) except in the US. LNMC is time 
sensitive across all countries. Profitability (PROFIT) declines in all countries except 
Hong Kong and it is also time dependent. It is especially notable that earnings in 
Canada, the UK and in Germany over the sub-period 2001-2010 and over the entire 
sample period are on average negative. Similarly, retained earnings (RETE) decline 
significantly except in Japan for which the time trend of RETE is not significant. 
Growth opportunities (MTBV and GOA) increase in Canada, in the UK and in Hong 
Kong, but decrease in the US, Germany, France and in Japan. Time trends of MTBV and 
GOA are not significant in Canada, and time trend of MTBV is not significant in Hong 
Kong. LEVERAGE declines in all countries except in Germany. However, the associated 
time trend in the US, Canada and France is not significant. Overall, most of the 
examined characteristics change significantly over time, and companies across countries 
experienced a decline in size, profitability and earned equity in general. Relatively, there 




Table 5-5 Descriptive Statistics on Firm Characteristics Used for Baseline Estimation 
This table shows the means and medians of firm characteristics used in the test on the propensity to pay dividends for 
full sample period 1989-2010 and two sub-periods 1991-2000 and 2001-2010. The last column reports the 
significance of changes in firm characteristics over time, which is estimated from random-effects, generalized least 
squares (GLS) regressions with corrected cluster error and the original model developed by Jungqvist and Wilhelmy 
(2003). LNMC, a proxy of firm size, is the nature logarithm of market capitalization in 2010 price. PROFIT, the 
proxy of profitability, is calculated as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of 
equity)/book value of total assets. MTBV, a proxy of growth opportunities, is measured as the market value of total 
capital scaled by the book value of total assets. GOA, a proxy of growth opportunities, is the annual growth rate of 
total assets. RETE refers to ratio of earned equity, which is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. 
LEVERAGE is measured as long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% 
and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable 1989-2000  2001-2010  1989-2010  Significance Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
 US  
 N=31154 N=34853 N= 69281  LNMC 11.962 11.821 12.617 12.625 12.291 12.220 *** 
PROFIT 0.091 0.055 0.023 0.037 0.057 0.047 *** 
MTBV 2.139 1.516 2.039 1.569 2.089 1.543 *** 
GOA 0.205 0.090 0.118 0.053 0.159 0.071 *** 
RETE 0.252 0.305 0.068 0.291 0.160 0.300 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.173 0.129 0.157 0.093 0.165 0.112  
 Canada  
 N=3477 N=7875 N=11779  LNMC 11.496 11.523 11.320 11.248 11.378 11.340 *** 
PROFIT 0.020 0.054 -0.063 0.013 -0.036 0.033 ** 
MTBV 1.583 1.189 1.941 1.419 1.822 1.316  GOA 0.195 0.055 0.321 0.061 0.279 0.059  RETE 0.025 0.128 -0.279 -0.099 -0.178 -0.008 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.197 0.174 0.119 0.028 0.145 0.076  
 UK  
 N=12392 N=13979 N=28319  LNMC 10.457 10.252 10.518 10.244 10.487 10.248 *** 
PROFIT 0.034 0.061 -0.078 0.020 -0.022 0.046 *** 
MTBV 1.782 1.369 1.859 1.367 1.820 1.368 *** 
GOA 0.183 0.063 0.224 0.041 0.204 0.054 * 
RETE 0.292 0.330 -0.095 0.073 0.101 0.236 *** 
LEVERAGE 0.111 0.066 0.111 0.035 0.111 0.054 *** 
 Germany  
 N=3585 N=5806 N=9813  LNMC 11.461 11.307 11.054 10.774 11.220 11.017 *** 
PROFIT 0.019 0.027 -0.044 0.015 -0.018 0.021 ** 
MTBV 1.752 1.306 1.500 1.194 1.603 1.244 *** 
GOA 0.115 0.039 0.049 0.008 0.076 0.022 *** 
RETE 0.097 0.176 -0.209 0.050 -0.084 0.127 ** 
LEVERAGE 0.098 0.060 0.123 0.062 0.113 0.061 *** 
 France  
 N=4203 N=5921 N=10589  LNMC 11.403 11.186 11.108 10.794 11.233 10.973 *** 
PROFIT 0.037 0.041 0.009 0.032 0.021 0.037 *** 
MTBV 1.600 1.209 1.517 1.245 1.554 1.231 *** 
GOA 0.187 0.069 0.098 0.037 0.137 0.051 *** 
RETE 0.312 0.336 0.252 0.399 0.278 0.369 * 
LEVERAGE 0.129 0.098 0.126 0.085 0.127 0.091  
 Japan  
 N=17660 N=21602 N=41614  LNMC 17.612 17.510 17.061 16.867 17.326 17.193 *** 
PROFIT 0.015 0.015 0.0127 0.017 0.014 0.016 *** 
MTBV 1.396 1.249 1.208 1.015 1.298 1.124 *** 
GOA 0.040 0.020 0.032 0.010 0.036 0.015 *** 
RETE 0.196 0.222 0.200 0.321 0.198 0.264  LEVERAGE 0.136 0.116 0.099 0.064 0.116 0.090 *** 
 HK  
 N=2491 N=8230 N=10856  LNMC 13.804 13.597 13.345 13.111 13.459 13.245 *** 
PROFIT 0.031 0.044 0.002 0.044 0.009 0.044  MTBV 1.159 0.928 1.447 1.045 1.378 1.011  GOA 0.103 0.021 0.234 0.089 0.203 0.074 *** 
RETE 0.130 0.160 -0.033 0.216 0.007 0.196 ** 
LEVERAGE 0.088 0.045 0.082 0.023 0.083 0.029 *** 
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5.4.2 Logistic Panel Regressions for the Base Period 1989-1995 
Previous comparable studies set relatively short base periods132
In estimating the logistic panel regressions, it is important to address clustering 
problem issues. Petersen (2009) notes that the clustering of residuals across firms or 
across time is very likely for regression analysis basing on panel data, and this will lead 
to biased standard errors. Previous studies do not really deal with this issue properly, 
nor do they specify or suggest a solution to this problem. Both Fama and French (2001) 
and Denis and Osobov (2008) use Fama and MacBeth’s (1973) approach to estimate 
logistic regressions for time-series cross-sectional data, and this has the potential to 
understate standard errors. Ferris et al (2009) do not specify what correction measures 
they take in their pooled data analysis. As suggested by Petersen (2009), this study 
corrects two-dimensional clustered standard errors across firms and across years in its 
estimation of logistic panel regressions
. A weakness is that 
short base period may lead to inaccurate calculations because of noisy time effect, thus 
extending the period enables tests to the capture more reliable dividend patterns.  In 
addition, Denis and Osobov (2008) highlight that Worldscope tend to only cover the 
dividend-paying firms in early years, and the sample periods for recent studies start later 
than 1989. Due to above considerations, the test in this study use a base period covering 
7 years from 1989 to 1995. 
133
Table 5-6 details the results from estimating the logistic panel regressions. In 
line with Denis and Osobov (2008), Eije and Megginson (2008) and Ferris, Jayaraman 
and Sabherwal (2009), the coefficients of firm size, profitability are all positive and 
highly significant. The results show a positive relation, which is robust for each country 
in my sample, between the likelihood of paying dividends and earned/contributed equity 
mix. This finding supports the relevant conclusion in Denis and Osobov (2008) but 
contrary to Eije and Megginson (2008). Moreover, leverage is found to have a 
significantly negative influence on the decision to pay dividends in my sample countries, 
with the exception of in Germany and in Hong Kong, in line with with Eije and 
Megginson (2008). However, the results relating to growth opportunities (MTBV and 
GOA) are somewhat mixed, in line with Denis and Osobov (2008). Specifically, market 
to book ratio has significantly negative coefficients in regressions for all countries apart  
. 
                                                 
132 The base period is 1989-1993 for Denis and Osobov (2008), Eije and Megginson (2008) and 1994-1997 for Ferris et al (2009). 
133 Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) also use the similar method in their panel data analysis 
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Table 5-6 Logistic Panel Regressions for Base period 1989-1995 
This table presents results from estimating logistic panel regressions for seven economies over a base period 1989-
1995. Suggested by Petersen (2009), standard errors are corrected in two dimensions of firm and year. The dependent 
variable equals one if the firm pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise. The definitions of explanatory variables 
are as follows. SIZE is a measure of firm size that represents the percent of firms with smaller market capitalization 
in each stock market for every sample year. PROFIT, the proxy of profitability, is calculated as (book value of total 
assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. MTBV, a proxy of growth 
opportunities, is measured as the market value of total capital scaled by the book value of total assets. GOA, a proxy 
of growth opportunities, represents the annual growth rate of total assets. RETE refers to ratio of earned equity, which 
is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. LEVERAGE is measured as long-term debt scaled by 
book value of total assets. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. *denotes 
significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Intercept -1.06*** -0.25 2.11*** 0.51 0.62** 1.99*** 0.97* 
 (0.00) (0.38) (0.00) (0.14) (0.04) (0.00) (0.06) 
SIZE 3.33*** 3.67*** 3.15*** 1.55*** 1.74*** 1.89*** 4.33*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PROFIT 0.47*** 3.43*** 6.17*** 3.19*** 10.90*** 39.38*** 15.15*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MTBV -0.48*** -1.06*** -0.96*** -0.03 -0.44** -0.82*** -1.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.76) (0.04) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -1.32*** -1.04*** -0.28** 1.70** 0.02 2.91*** -0.09 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.03) (0.98) (0.00) (0.85) 
RETE 1.03*** 0.98*** 0.75*** 1.25*** 2.00*** 2.42*** 3.12*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAG
E 
-0.64** -0.99* -2.34*** -0.90 -2.09*** -1.67*** -2.02 
 (0.02) (0.09) (0.00) (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.11) 
Obs 13561 1718 7419 1867 1963 10432 786 
χ2 2583.57 342.26 785.80 211.69 232.52 1193.36 100.65 
Pseudo R 21.65% 2 24.94% 28.05% 16.73% 19.17% 33.21% 39.97% 
 
from Germany. The estimated coefficients of GOA are only negative and significant in 
regressions calculated for the US, Canada and the UK.  
5.4.3 Estimation of the Propensity to Pay Dividends 
Following the method of Fama and French (2001), the expected percent of dividend-
paying firms in year t is computed by applying the estimated coefficients reported in 
Table 5-6 to actual firm characteristics in year t, averaging over firms. The forecast 
error, which is measured as the expected percent of dividend payers minus the actual 
percent of dividend payers, represents the propensity to pay dividends. My test here is 
different from the existing competing studies that examine the dividend propensity in 
the following ways. First, as detailed above, I choose a longer base period in order to 
strengthen the robustness of the baseline estimates. Second, in estimating the logistic 
panel regressions, I follow Petersen (2009) to correct two dimensional clustered 
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standard errors in order to avoid biased estimates. Third, I add debt ratio, which is 
absent in competing studies, as control variable when estimating regression for base 
period. Fourth, my forecast period (1996-2010) covers the years that are more recent 
comparing with those used in competing studies134
Table 5-7 shows the expected percentage of payers, actual percentage of payers 
and the forecast errors for each country by year.  First, controlling for key firm 
characteristics, a lower propensity to pay dividends is generally confirmed in all sample 
countries, apart from in Japan, in line with preceding evidence
, so that we can observe the updated 
dividend propensity. 
135Positive forecast errors 
are predominant with the exception of several years in the UK and in Japan. The 
smallest mean forecast error (0.58%) is observed in Japan. In other countries, the mean 
forecast errors range from 13.51% in UK to 19.89% in Canada. It may be reasonable to 
compare my results with the results in Denis and Osobov (2008) who apply a similar 
base period (1989-1993) to mine (1989-1995)136. In the communal forecast years (1996-
2002) of two studies, the propensity to pay dividends observed in my study is primarily 
higher than the corresponding observation in Denis and Osobov (2008)137
Second, the propensity of paying dividends declined remarkably in around 2000 
in most countries in the sample, especially Hong Kong and the three European countries. 
For example, the forecast error for the UK increases from 4.01% in 2000 to 12.39% in 
2001.  
. In particular, 
the mean forecast errors for US and Canada in my study are 16.36% and 19.2% 
comparing with 8.08% and 8.33% in Denis and Osobov (2008).  
Third, for most countries in my sample, the dividend propensity declines have 
become moderate for the recent years.  For example, the forecast error for the US 
decreases from 23.97% in 2002 to 12.39% in 2001. However, on the contrary, the 
dividend propensity decline tends to be larger in the UK in the recent years, consistent 
with Ferris et al (2009).  
Fourth, the patterns of the change in the propensity to pay dividends changed 
                                                 
134 The forecast period is 1994-2002 for Denis and Osobov (2008), 1994-2005 for Eije and Megginson (2008) and 1998-2007for 
Ferris et al (2009). 
135 Exceptionally, Ferris et al. (2009) find that the actual percentage of dividend payers is on average higher than the expected 
percentage for Canada and Japan. 
136 I do not compare my results in this section with the relevant results in Ferris et al. (2009) since they apply a very different base 
period (1994-1997) which will have distinctive effect on results. Further, Eije and Megginson (2008) do not examine their sample 
countries individually. 
137 In detail, the observed mean forecast errors during the communal forecast period (1996-2002) in my study are: 16.36% in US, 
19.2% in Canada, 4.45% in UK, 9.8% in Germany, 10.8% in France and 1.79% in Japan. The corresponding results in Denis and 
Osobov (2008) are: 8.08% in US, 8.33% in Canada, 2.96% in UK, 8.8% in Germany, 6.11% in France and 5.05% in Japan.  
234 
 
differ across countries. The standard deviations (σ) of forecast errors are 3.92% and 2.9% 
for the US and Japan, respectively, suggesting that both countries experienced steady 
change in the propensity to pay dividends over the sample period. In contrast, the 
standard deviations of forecasted errors in the UK and in Germany are high at 10.17% 
and 8.07%, indicating that firms in both these European countries underwent relatively 
pronounced turbulence in their propensity to pay dividends.  
Fifth, I find that the percentage of actual dividend payers is more volatile than 
that of expected payers. This intensifies the argument of Fama and French (2001) that 
companies’ propensity of paying dividends is changing essentially, but this is not 
consistent with Denis and Osobov (2008) who do not rule out a possibility that 
companies in their sample countries do not substantially change their dividend policies 




Table 5-7 Estimated Propensity to Pay Dividends for Forecast Period 1996-2010 (%) 
Fama and French (2001) originally propose this method of measuring the propensity to pay dividends. Exp refers to the expected percent of dividend payers in year t, which is estimated by applying the 
coefficients (listed in Table 5-6) from the logistic panel regression for base period of 1989-1995 to the values of the explanatory variables for each firm in year t, averaging over firms. Actual refers to 
















Year Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error Exp Actual Error 
1996 42.49 30.69 11.80 45.51 1.17 5.66 80.96 81.14 -0.17 74.51 69.92 4.59 75.84 72.86 2.98 86.59 83.69 2.90 83.16 78.29 4.87 
1997 41.38 29.29 12.10 43.02 1.90 8.88 79.35 78.61 0.75 74.88 67.20 7.68 74.87 65.83 9.04 87.88 84.71 3.17 83.82 75.45 8.37 
1998 42.40 26.70 15.70 43.73 12.21 18.48 78.00 78.31 -0.31 75.12 71.65 3.47 73.88 62.79 11.09 86.61 82.74 3.87 76.23 69.14 7.09 
1999 37.98 25.04 12.94 42.58 14.84 22.26 75.75 75.93 -0.18 74.77 69.72 5.05 72.30 64.20 8.09 81.62 76.59 5.03 72.91 51.77 21.14 
2000 40.19 23.32 16.87 40.74 16.30 25.56 68.68 64.68 4.01 73.81 55.83 17.98 68.19 53.43 14.75 80.94 78.09 2.85 71.08 49.69 21.39 
2001 43.65 22.55 21.11 40.23 18.26 28.04 70.32 57.93 12.39 63.33 49.00 14.33 69.28 55.85 13.43 78.56 79.96 -1.41 65.26 41.48 23.78 
2002 46.53 22.56 23.97 41.07 16.57 25.51 69.88 55.24 14.64 58.86 42.79 16.07 69.03 52.81 16.22 72.79 76.64 -3.86 63.75 40.95 22.80 
2003 42.46 25.95 16.50 38.29 10.82 22.53 68.86 54.12 14.73 60.58 38.05 22.54 70.35 53.27 17.08 77.36 79.58 -2.23 64.41 43.34 21.07 
2004 40.28 27.84 12.43 34.39 6.51 22.13 67.55 50.73 16.82 63.74 37.62 26.12 71.05 52.61 18.44 84.85 84.10 0.76 68.35 49.17 19.18 
2005 41.36 29.47 11.90 33.52 3.47 19.94 65.97 45.71 20.27 65.33 42.22 23.10 70.70 52.87 17.83 86.19 85.54 0.65 70.64 53.08 17.56 
2006 40.76 29.88 10.88 34.84 3.04 18.19 64.86 44.06 20.80 65.68 43.71 21.97 70.47 52.46 18.01 86.92 86.03 0.90 70.30 52.03 18.27 
2007 41.17 30.13 11.04 34.91 6.06 21.15 66.51 44.52 21.99 68.76 41.61 27.14 70.64 52.83 17.81 87.93 86.36 1.56 71.07 53.48 17.59 
2008 48.44 30.80 17.64 43.13 13.90 20.77 72.09 46.87 25.22 64.61 44.90 19.71 68.59 56.02 12.57 84.62 86.11 -1.49 71.48 55.37 16.11 
2009 46.81 28.42 18.38 42.81 12.72 19.91 71.98 47.32 24.66 62.65 41.60 21.06 67.56 48.28 19.28 73.96 79.11 -5.15 70.89 46.49 24.40 
2010 44.43 30.58 13.84 37.59 6.96 19.37 72.85 45.80 27.05 68.53 45.78 22.75 70.71 54.79 15.91 81.92 80.80 1.13 74.17 54.90 19.27 
Mean 42.69 27.55 15.14 39.76 9.65 19.89 71.57 58.06 13.51 67.68 50.77 16.90 70.90 56.73 14.17 82.58 82.00 0.58 71.84 54.31 17.53 
Median 42.40 28.42 13.84 40.74 10.82 20.77 70.32 54.12 14.73 65.68 44.90 19.71 70.64 53.43 15.91 84.62 82.74 0.90 71.07 52.03 19.18 
σ 2.84 3.01 3.92 3.90 5.81 5.85 4.98 13.96 10.17 5.67 12.56 8.07 2.42 6.63 4.65 4.99 3.51 2.90 5.85 11.43 6.07 
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5.5 Determinants on Dividends and Share Repurchases 
5.5.1 Explanatory Variables 
In this section, I investigate more factors influencing the dividend patterns. Unlike 
previous studies that focus on only cash dividends, I also analyse share repurchases. I 
focus on two aspects of payout policies: (1) whether to pay dividends and to repurchase 
shares; (2) the amounts of dividends and repurchases.  
In addition to the variables used to explain the propensity to pay dividends, more 
variables are included to investigate payout policies. In particular, I expect that cash 
holdings (CTAT) have negative effect on cash dividends and positive effect on 
repurchase. Eije and Megginson (2008) provide results that are consistent with this 
prediction while they do not detail relevant argument. If companies require high 
liquidity of cash flows, they will be less likely to use dividend payout as a payout 
channel, and thus cash holdings are negatively connected with dividend distribution. On 
the contrary, larger cash holdings may lead to higher likelihood to repurchase shares 
because share repurchasing is a flexible means of distributing temporary free cash flows 
(Lee and Suh, 2011). Consistent with this concept, DeAngelo, DeAngelo and Stulz 
(2006) and Lee and Suh (2011) find that share repurchases are significantly associated 
with large cash holdings. I also expect that R&D activities (R&D) have negative effect 
on cash dividends and repurchases. Free cash flow theory predicts that R&D 
expenditure reduces the residual capital and will adversely affect corporate payouts. 
Finally, following the catering theory, I expect companies to be more likely to pay 
dividends when investors put a price premium (VDP and EDP) on dividend-paying 
firms. However, relevant evidence in prior research is controversial. Eije and 
Megginson (2008) find that the catering proxy has a negative relationship with the 
probability of paying dividends, in line with the predictions of catering theory. In 
contrast, Ferris, Jayaraman and Sabherwal (2009) present evidence that supports 
catering theory.  
I also use several innovative dummy variables, which are not used in competing 
studies, to examine cash dividends and share repurchases. According to the free cash 
flow theory, high technology intensity (HITECH) should have a substantially negative 
effect on excess capital, and firms operating in the high technology sector are 
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traditionally expected to be reluctant to pay dividends or to repurchase shares, as most 
of their capital is used to sustain high growth.  
Moreover, few previous studies have tried to link merger and acquisition (M&A) 
practices to dividends and share repurchases. Jeon, Ligon and Soranakom (2010) 
discussed how the pre-merger dividend policies of acquirer and target affect the choice 
of payment method of M&A between stock takeover and cash takeover138
To test for the impact of M&A on dividends, I construct four variables. 
ACQUIERER takes on the value of 1 if a sample company became an acquirer between 
1989 and the end of 2011 and 0 otherwise for its all sample years. TARGET takes on the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise for its all sample years if a company in my sample became a 
target firm between 1989 and the end of 2011. TIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place 
. However, to 
my knowledge, preceding literature lacks the analysis concerning the effect of dividends 
and repurchases on the incidence of M&A. Several conjectures may be raised. It is 
interesting to investigate whether dividend payers face a greater or smaller risk of being 
taken over relative to non-dividend payers. It could be argued that target companies 
obtain final dividends in the form of an acquisition premium, and, accordingly, M&A is 
a substitute for dividends. This conjecture implies that listed firms that do not pay 
dividends are more likely to become targets of acquisitions. On the other hand, M&A 
operation may be considered as an expansionary investment that reduces the likelihood 
of acquirers paying out excess cash flows. Those listed firms with long-term strategy to 
acquire other firms would prefer repurchases to dividends in order to maintain sufficient 
cash flow which can be flexibly used since, as Jeon et al. (2010) argued, internally 
generated cash flow should be first-order choice according to pecking order theory of 
Myers (1984). This argument suggests that the incidence of becoming an acquirer is 
negatively associated with dividends but positively associated with repurchases. In 
addition, the alternative supposition could be that dividend payments attached with 
acquirers would ease the acceptance of M&A offer in some circumstances where 
investors (especially target shareholders) welcome dividends. Following this idea, the 
incidence of becoming an acquirer is positively associated with dividends.  
                                                 
138 Jeon, Ligon and Soranakom (2010) set out two main hypotheses. First, if the acquirer and the target take very different dividend 
policies prior to an M&A case, the acquisition payment would be in form of cash. The underlying reason is as following. In a stock-
based takeover, the dissimilarity in dividend policies will bring about pronouncing liquidity demand of investors due to dividend 
clientele. The change of clientele base is costly because of transaction cost and probably come with adverse effect on price 
movement. Conversely, if the pre-merger dividend policies being taken by involved firms are quite similar, stock takeover would be 
more favorable than cash takeover. The second hypothesis is that the announcement return will be negatively affected by the extent 




within 3 years of observed year for an acquirer. TAKENIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes 
place within 3 years of observed year for a target firm. ACQUIERER and TARGET are 
designed to measure the long-term effect, while TIN3 and TAKENIN3 are degined to 
measure the short-term effect. However, Datastream only provides the last record of 
M&A for an acquirer, while it is practically common for an acquirer to takeover several 
different target companies in practice. Consequently, TIN3 is not an accurate variable 
and therefore I mainly employ ACQUIERER and TARGET in multivariate regressions.  
Previous studies also do not relate payout policies to the practice of delisting. 
The common reasons of delisting can be attributable to the intention to move away from 
the regulations of capital market, the change of business strategy, the failure to meet the 
requirement of capital market, bankrupt or M&A. However, the data used in this study 
do not identify the real motivations of delisting for each individual delisted firm.  If the 
delisting risk results mainly from financial distress, it is expected that delisting to be 
negatively related the probability of dividend payment and share repurchases. As 
DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1992) argued, firms facing 
financial distress tend to cut dividends. If listed firms leave public market on their own 
for avoiding external monitoring, a low probability of paying dividends is expected as 
well because prior to delisting the management may dislike dividends which force firms 
to be censored by the market (Easterbrook, 1984). To indicate delisting risk, I add a 
dummy variable, DLIN3, which is equal to 1 if an observed firm is delisted (the cases of 
mergers or takeovers are excluded) within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise. 
Table 5-8 presents the descriptive statistics of the variables used to explain 
firms’ decisions of dividends and share repurchases over the full sample period 1989-
2010 and two sub-periods 1989-2000 and 2001-2010. In estimating the significance of 
changes in firm characteristics over time, I use the method developed by Jungqvist and 
Wilhelmy (2003) which has been detailed in section 5.4.1. The results show that 
changes over time are significant for the majority of variables with the exceptions of 
cash (CTAT) in Germany and R&D in Hong Kong. Except for in the UK, firm age 
(AGE）in the second sub-period 2001-2010 is on average greater than in the first sub-
period 1991-2000. CTAT shows a general increasing trend, except for in Japan. Besides, 
the most noticeable finding is that investment in R&D increases across all countries. 
There are no uniform time trends for dividend caterings, VDP and EDP. 
In addition, Table 5-8 shows that high technology firms (HITECH) accounted 
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for a higher fraction of firms in all countries from the sub-period 1989-2000 to the sub-
period 2001-2010. In particular, the most distinct increase in high-technology firms 
occurred in the three European countries, France, Germany and the UK. However, the 
frequency of ACQUIERER and TARGET decreases significantly across all countries, 
with the exception of France, where the average percentage of acquirers went up. Both 
in the US (from 31.68% to 2.99%) and in Canada (from 26.11% to 1.31%) companies 
experienced the steepest decline of target firms. Similarly, TIN3 and TAKENIN3 
showed a significant declining trend in the US and in Canada. Contrastingly, there are 
insignificant increasing values for TIN3 and TAKENIN3 in the UK. One remarkable 
finding is that all countries uniformly experienced the great increase in de-listing rates 
(DLIN3). For instance, the value of DLIN3 rose from 0.68% to 8.91% in the U.S., and 




Table 5-8 Descriptive Statistics on Further Firm Characteristics  
This table shows the means and medians of firm characteristics used in the test on the propensity to pay dividends for 
two sub-periods 1989-2000 and 2001-2010 and full sample period 1989-2010. The numbers reported under 
“Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%)” represent the proportions of the firm-year observations that are 
associated with a certain characteristics over a period. For example, 42.24% of the US firm-year observations are 
from high technology industries over 1989-2000. The last column reports the significance of changes in firm 
characteristics over time, which is estimated from random-effects, generalized least squares (GLS) regressions with 
corrected cluster error and the original model developed by Jungqvist and Wilhelmy (2003). The definitions of 
variables are as following: AGE represents the number of years between base year and the observed year. CTAT is the 
ratio of cash to total assets in which cash represents the money available for use in the normal operations of the 
company. R&D is the proxy of R&D expenditure, measured as the amount of R&D divided by total assets. Following 
Baker and Wurgler (2004a), dividend premium is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of the market to 
book value of dividend payers and that of non-dividend payers. VDP means the value-weighted dividend premium 
and EDP means equally weighted dividend premium. ACQUIERER takes on the value of 1 and 0 otherwise for its all 
sample years if a sample company became an acquirer between 1989 and the end of 2011. TARGET takes on the 
value of 1 and 0 otherwise for its all sample years if a company in my sample became a target firm between 1989 and 
the end of 2011. TIN3 equals to 1 if M&A occurs within 3 years of observed year for an acquirer. TAKENIN3 equals 
to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for a target firm. DLIN3 equals 1 if an observed firm is 
delisted within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise. A notable flaw in data is that DataStream only provides the last 
record of M&A for an acquirer, while it is common for an acquirer to takeover several different target companies in 
practice. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
 1989-2000  2001-2010  1989-2010   Significance Variable Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
US 
 N=31154 N=34853 N= 69281  AGE 11.271 9.000 14.507 12.000 12.890 10.000 *** 
CTAT 0.050 0.000 0.084 0.012 0.067 0.004 *** 
R&D 0.039 0.000 0.050 0.000 0.044 0.000 *** 
VDP 0.035 0.024 0.0307 0.0312 0.0327 0.0240 *** 
EDP -0.208 -0.186 -0.1221 -0.1475 -0.1652 -0.1636 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 42.24 47.54 44.89  ACQUIRER 11.98 10.41 11.20  TARGET 32.39 2.99 17.69  TIN3 3.36 0.63 1.99  TAKENIN3 13.38 2.07 7.72  DLIN3 0.65 8.91 4.78  Canada 
 N=3477 N=7875 N=11779  AGE 10.974 10.000 12.207 11.000 11.799 11.000 *** 
CTAT 0.021 0.000 0.051 0.000 0.041 0.000 *** 
R&D 0.013 0.000 0.029 0.000 0.024 0.000 *** 
VDP 0.015 0.0004 -0.0992 -0.0725 -0.0615 -0.0407 *** 
EDP -0.263 -0.1942 -0.3917 -0.4326 -0.3490 -0.3598 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 20.80 21.85 21.50  ACQUIRER 4.30 1.92 2.71  TARGET 27.79 1.31 10.09  TIN3 1.05 0.18 0.47  TAKENIN3 10.71 0.99 4.21  DLIN3 1.95 15.89 11.27  UK 
 N=12392 N=13979 N=28319  AGE 15.567 12.000 13.865 8.000 14.727 10.000 *** 
CTAT 0.086 0.037 0.156 0.077 0.121 0.055 *** 
R&D 0.010 0.000 0.026 0.000 0.018 0.000 *** 
VDP 0.046 0.052 0.1089 0.1084 0.0772 0.0744 *** 
EDP -0.269 -0.207 -0.3027 -0.2901 -0.2858 -0.2828 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 22.19 29.57 25.83  ACQUIRER 6.97 4.15 5.58  TARGET 8.12 4.27 6.22  TIN3 0.32 1.12 0.72  TAKENIN3 1.12 2.27 1.69  DLIN3 10.52 17.93 14.18  Germany 
 N=3585 N=5806 N=9813  
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AGE 11.133 9.000 11.763 9.000 11.506 9.000 *** 
CTAT 0.059 0.032 0.072 0.025 0.067 0.029  R&D 0.009 0.000 0.021 0.000 0.016 0.000 *** 
VDP -0.048 -0.014 -0.0573 -0.0616 -0.0533 -0.0427 *** 
EDP -0.131 -0.041 -0.0166 -0.0259 -0.0632 -0.0259 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 26.004 42.59 35.82  ACQUIRER 0.724 0.28 0.46  TARGET 1.123 0.28 0.62  TIN3 0.025 0.00 0.01  TAKENIN3 0.374 0.14 0.23  DLIN3 4.018 5.67 4.99  France 
 N=4203 N=5921 N=10589  AGE 7.972 6.000 10.942 9.000 9.632 8.000 *** 
CTAT 0.044 0.03 0.055 0.034 0.050 0.032 *** 
R&D 0.005 0.000 0.014 0.000 0.010 0.000 *** 
VDP 0.041 0.043 0.0458 -0.0314 0.0435 0.0434 *** 
EDP -0.071 -0.003 -0.0662 -0.0641 -0.0685 -0.0641 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 26.82 40.23 34.32  ACQUIRER 1.03 1.15 1.10  TARGET 1.44 1.03 1.21  TIN3 0.02 0.25 0.15  TAKENIN3 0.09 0.49 0.31  DLIN3 7.41 9.04 8.32  Japan 
 N=17660 N=21602 N=41614  AGE 13.913 12.000 19.172 18.000 16.643 16.000 *** 
CTAT 0.107 0.090 0.097 0.071 0.102 0.081 *** 
R&D 0.007 0.000 0.014 0.004 0.011 0.001 *** 
VDP 0.077 0.053 0.0583 0.0351 0.0671 0.0530 *** 
EDP -0.016 -0.015 -0.1404 -0.1038 -0.0805 -0.0326 *** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 32.60 34.89 33.78  ACQUIRER 1.68 1.48 1.58  TARGET 2.14 0.36 1.22  TIN3 0.19 0.27 0.23  TAKENIN3 0.32 0.28 0.30  DLIN3 0.99 4.97 3.06  HK 
 N=2491 N=8230 N=10856  AGE 9.276 8.000 11.004 10.000 10.586 9.000 *** 
CTAT 0.089 0.047 0.149 0.105 0.135 0.091 *** 
R&D 0.001 0.000 0.004 0.000 0.003 0.000  VDP -0.141 -0.091 -0.0610 -0.0698 -0.0803 -0.0698 *** 
EDP -0.037 -0.029 -0.2417 -0.2156 -0.1922 -0.2118 ** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 













5.5.2 Likelihood to Pay Dividends and Likelihood to Repurchase Shares 
This part of study investigates the likelihood of dividends and repurchases. In contrast 
to previous studies139
Table 5-9, Panel A. presents the results of logistic panel regressions concerning 
the decision to pay dividends. The estimated coefficients for size, profitability and the 
earned/contributed capital mix are statistically significant and show positive signs in all 
countries. Again, in line with Denis and Osobov (2008), the effect of growth 
opportunities on the decision of firms to pay dividends is relatively mixed. The slope 
coefficients of MTBV and GOA are not significant in Germany and Japan, respectively, 
but negative and significant in the other countries as expected. In line with Eije and 
Megginson (2008), leverage proved to have a significantly negative effect on the 
decision of a firm to pay dividends in all countries except in Canada. In line with the 
predictions of life cycle theory, firm age (LNAGE) had a positive effect in regressions 
for the majority of the observed countries. In the US, Canada, UK and in Germany cash 
holdings (CTAT) are observed to be negatively related the decision to pay dividends, 
consistent with expectation. High technology firms are generally less likely to pay 
dividends in the US, Germany, France and in Hong Kong, while the effect of 
technology intensity (HITECH) is not significant in Canada, the UK and in Japan. 
Furthermore, when equally weighted dividend premium (EDP) is used as proxy, the 
impact is relatively weak. It is only in Hong Kong that the coefficient is positive and 
significant. 
, I follow Petersen (2009) and use the logistic panel regressions 
corrected clustered standard errors in two dimensions of firm and year to strengthen 
robustness for panel data analysis. The dependant variable takes value of 1 if a firm paid 
dividend in a year t and 0 otherwise. 
The effects of M&A factors on dividend decisions differ across countries. US 
acquirers appeared to be reluctant to pay dividends, as the coefficient of ACQUIRER is 
significantly negative, unlike the corresponding results in the UK and in Germany. 
Moreover, the results show that target firms in the US and in the UK are more likely to 
pay dividends. In contrast, the estimated coefficients of TARGET are significant and 
negative in Canada and Japan. Therefore, overall, there did not seem to be a consistent 
relationship between M&A and dividend policy across different countries. Evidence in 
                                                 
139 Eije and Megginson (2008) use random-effects logistic panel regression with bootstrapping 500 times to examine the influential 
factors of the decisions of dividends and repurchases. More recently, Lee and Suh (2011) use tobit regression model to examine a 
series of variables in determining the amount of repurchase. 
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respect of the effects of de-listing risk on dividend policy is clear and uniform in all 
sample countries. The associated coefficients are significantly negative for all 
economies except in the UK, for which the coefficient is negative but not significant. 
Table 5-9, Panel B. shows the results of logistic panel regressions concerning 
the decision of share repurchase. Because all countries apart from the US had a limited 
number of repurchases observations before the late of 1990s, the sample period is 1989-
2010 for the US, and 1999-2010 for Canada, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Hong 
Kong. The results show that the overall explanatory power of repurchase regressions is 
lower than that of dividends regressions, as can be seen from the smaller values of χ2
The results show that, whilst the coefficients of firm size (SIZE) are positive and 
significant in the UK, Germany, France and Japan, the results indicate that it is not a 
strong determinant of share repurchases in the US. The results also indicate that 
profitable (PROFIT) firms in the US, Canada and in the UK tend to repurchase shares. 
High growth (MTBV) firms in the US, Canada and in Japan are less likely to repurchase 
shares. For the UK and France, a higher growth rate of total assets (GOA) leads to a 
lower likelihood of repurchasing shares. Fraction of retained earnings to total equity 
(RETE) is positively related to the decision to repurchase shares in the US, Canada and 
in the UK.  
 in 
repurchase regressions than those in dividend regressions. Meanwhile, there are fewer 
significant covariate coefficients in Panel B as shown in Panel A. This may be because 
the number of observations of repurchases is relatively small except for the US.  
Regression results suggest that debt ratio (LEVERAGE) is negatively related to 
the decision to repurchase shares in the US, France and in Japan. Established firms are 
more likely to repurchase shares, as the coefficients of age (LNAGE) are significant and 
positive for all countries except in Japan. In line with Lee and Suh (2011), and Eije and 
Megginson (2008), the likelihood of repurchases is positively associated with cash 
holdings (CTAT) for Canada, the UK and Hong Kong, while the coefficient for the US 
is positive but insignificant. Whilst the slope coefficients for technology focus 
(HITECH) are significantly positive for Canada, Germany and France, the effect of high 
technology is not statistically significant for the US and in the UK. 
The effects of M&A factors on repurchase decisions are heterogeneous across 
countries. In the US and in the UK, acquirers (ACQUIRER) are more likely to 
repurchase shares. In contrast, acquirers in Japan are reluctant to repurchase shares if 
they are defined as acquirers. In the US and in the UK, there is no evidence to suggest 
244 
 
that the likelihood to repurchase shares is related to whether or not a firm is an M&A 
target (TARGET). Besides, the coefficients of TARGET are significantly positive for 
Germany but significantly negative for France and Japan. The negative effect of a 
delisting risk (DLIN3) on the propensity to repurchases can be seen in Germany and in 
Japan. In addition, in this part of the study, the dummy variable IFDIV is used as an 
additional explanatory factor. The results indicate that firms that repurchase shares tend 
to be dividend payers at the same time as the coefficients of IFDIV are significantly 
negative, with the exception of Germany and France for which the relevant significance 





Table 5-9 Logistic Panel Regressions on the Likelihood to Pay Dividends and Repurchase Shares 
This table presents results from estimating logistic panel regressions for seven economies over sample period 1989-
2010. Suggested by Petersen (2009), standard errors are corrected in two dimensions of firm and year. The dependent 
variable equals one if the firm pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise in Panel A. The dependent variable equals 
one if a firm repurchases shares in year t and zero otherwise in Panel B. The specifications of explanatory variables 
are as follows. SIZE is a measure of firm size, which represents the percent of firms with smaller market 
capitalization in each stock market for every sample year. PROFIT, the proxy of profitability, is calculated as (book 
value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. MTBV, a proxy of 
growth opportunities, is measured as the market value of total capital scaled by the book value of total assets. GOA, a 
proxy of growth opportunities, represents the annual growth rate of total assets. RETE refers to ratio of earned equity, 
which is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. LEVERAGE is measured as long-term debt scaled 
by book value of total assets. LNAGE represents the logarithm of the number of years between base year and the 
observed year. CTAT is the ratio of cash to total assets in which cash represents the money available for use in the 
normal operations of the company. HITECH takes on the value of 1 if a sample firm is categorized to high technology 
industry and 0 otherwise. ACQUIERER takes on the value of 1 if a sample company became an acquirer between 
1989 and the end of 2011 and 0 otherwise for its all sample years. TARGET takes on the value of 1 and 0 otherwise 
for its all sample years if a company in my sample became a target firm between 1989 and the end of 2011. TIN3 
equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for an acquirer. TAKENIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes 
place within 3 years of observed year for a target firm. DLIN3 equals 1 if an observed firm is delisted within 3 years 
of year t and 0 otherwise. EDP, dividend premium, is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of the 
average market to book value of dividend payers and that of non-dividend payers (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). IFDIV 
equals 1 if a repurchasing company is paying dividends and 0 otherwise. The p-values are reported in parentheses and 
significance levels are indicated. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Panel A. Logistic Panel Regressions on the Likelihood to Pay Dividends 
Intercept -3.454*** -1.136*** -0.766** -1.285*** -0.356 2.191*** -0.139 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.01) (0.29) (0.00) (0.49) 
SIZE 2.906*** 2.867*** 2.27*** 2.173*** 2.913*** 2.59*** 2.918*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PROFIT 0.356*** 4.999*** 5.349*** 4.356*** 9.37*** 11.542*** 6.519*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MTBV -0.191*** -0.512*** -0.285*** -0.066 -0.394*** -0.91*** -0.464*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.3) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.425*** -0.821*** -0.475*** -0.325** -0.322*** 0.473 -0.457*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.00) (0.22) (0.00) 
RETE 0.633*** 0.534*** 0.771*** 0.843*** 1.044*** 2.244*** 1.346*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.39* 0.963** -0.698** -0.702* -0.976** -2.068*** -2.012*** 
 (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.09) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) 
LNAGE 0.856*** 0.052 0.665*** 0.369*** 0.045 -0.244*** 0.116* 
 (0.00) (0.65) (0.00) (0.00) (0.71) (0.01) (0.07) 
CTAT -2.826*** -2.594*** -2.301*** -0.872** -1.04 0.913* 0.631** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.05) (0.24) (0.07) (0.05) 
HITECH -0.884*** -0.179 -0.11 -0.256** -0.454*** 0.136 -0.434*** 
 (0.00) (0.31) (0.19) (0.03) (0.00) (0.16) (0.00) 
ACQUIRER -0.191* -0.262 0.548*** 1.161** 0.021 -0.453 - 
 (0.08) (0.46) (0.00) (0.05) (0.97) (0.18) - 
TARGET 0.315*** -0.521*** 0.422** -0.371 -0.406 -0.657*** - 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.18) (0.28) (0.01) - 
DLIN3 -0.388*** -0.725*** -0.174 -0.355* -0.41*** -1.276*** -0.465** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.15) (0.06) (0.01) (0.00) (0.05) 
EDP 1.159 0.945 0.223 -0.95* 0.949 -1.961*** 3.479*** 
 (0.17) (0.17) (0.78) (0.06) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) 
Obs 64261 11779 28319 9813 10589 41614 10856 
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χ2 14301.98 1911.54 5459.33 2117.19 2066.48 5699.97 2173.81 
Pseudo R-sq 0.315 0.314 0.418 0.273 0.295 0.339 0.376 
Panel B. Logistic Panel Regressions on the Likelihood to Repurchase Shares 
Intercept -2.241*** -2.352*** -4.242*** -5.601*** -5.701*** -3.014*** -3.705*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.293 -0.258 0.666*** 1.182* 1.591*** 1.672*** 0.253 
 (0.12) (0.35) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) 
PROFIT 0.121*** 0.966*** 1.521*** -0.059 1.21 -0.929 0.023 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.94) (0.23) (0.42) (0.95) 
MTBV -0.162*** -0.299*** -0.029 -0.102 -0.213 -1.385*** -0.323*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.47) (0.36) (0.17) (0.00) (0.01) 
GOA -0.839*** -0.55*** -0.84*** -0.48 -0.837*** -1.572** -0.131 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.19) (0.00) (0.02) (0.46) 
RETE 0.548*** 0.398*** 0.169*** 0.154 0.186 0.268** 0.097 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.32) (0.12) (0.05) (0.22) 
LEVERAGE -0.41*** 0.323 0.361 -0.688 -1.156* -0.945* -0.225 
 (0.00) (0.37) (0.35) (0.36) (0.08) (0.1) (0.71) 
LNAGE 0.343*** 0.266*** 0.427*** 0.433** 0.752*** 0.108 0.342*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.44) (0.00) 
CTAT 0.392 1.615*** 0.586** 1.352 -0.006 0.329 1.572*** 
 (0.16) (0.00) (0.03) (0.31) (0.997) (0.49) (0.00) 
HITECH -0.079 0.644*** -0.005 0.535*** 0.328*** -0.068 -0.1 
 (0.19) (0.00) (0.96) (0.01) (0.01) (0.5) (0.52) 
ACQUIRER 0.132** -0.263 0.276* - - -0.606*** - 
 (0.03) (0.26) (0.099) - - (0.01) - 
TARGET -0.115 0.172 -0.017 2.258*** -0.627* -0.759* - 
 (0.13) (0.42) (0.9) (0.00) (0.08) (0.07) - 
DLIN3 0.044 0.007 0.011 -0.827** 0.18 -0.369* -0.31 
 (0.49) (0.96) (0.9) (0.03) (0.57) (0.07) (0.59) 
IFDIV 0.311*** 0.522*** 0.62*** -0.091 0.187 0.648*** 0.632*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.62) (0.45) (0.00) (0.00) 
Obs 59790 8291 15760 6320 6409 24348 7292 
χ2 4572.06 367.52 780.62 53.58 265.44 527.77 129.76 













5.5.3 Amounts of Dividends and Repurchases 
In this section, I use OLS panel regressions to explore whether the determinants of the 
propensity for firms to pay dividends can also be used to explain the amounts of 
dividends and repurchases. Again, as suggested by Petersen (2009) the clustered 
standard errors for the two elements of firm and year, are corrected in the estimations. 
This sample for this section consists of firms that paid cash dividends or repurchased 
shares. Firms without payouts are excluded. The specification of OLS pooled regression 
model is given as: 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑖𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡                                                                                                           (5 − 1) 
The dependent variable  𝑦𝑖𝑡  is the dividend ratio which is the cash dividends 
paid scaled by total assets, or the repurchase ratio which is the share repurchases scaled 
by total assets 140 . 𝑋𝑖𝑡  represents the vector of control variables for each firm-year 
observation.  𝜀𝑖𝑡 represents unobserved random factors including firm-specific and time-
specific shocks141
Table 5-10 Panel A shows the results from regressions in respect of dividends. 
The dependent variable used is dividend ratio, which is cash dividends paid scaled by 
total assets for a firm-year observation. The results indicate that profitability (PROFIT) 
and growth rate of total assets (GOA) are important factors in determining dividend 
amounts. The coefficients of market to book ratio (MTBV) are uniformly positive in all 
countries, indicating that firms with high market to book ratio did not pay dividends, but 
when they did they paid more. This finding is consistent with Aivazian and Booth 
(2003), Chay and Suh (2009) and Alzahrania and Lasfer (2012) who also find the 
positive effect of market to book ratio on dividend amount. This may imply market to 
book ratio (MTBV) and growth rate of total assets (GOA), which is the alternative proxy 
variable of growth opportunity, carry different information essentially. An interesting 
finding is that large US companies (SIZE) are less likely to pay high dividends, 
consistent with Aivazian and Booth (2003) who find the negative relation between the 
ratio of dividends to total assets and size in some countries A possible explanation is 
that US firms prefer to distribute substantial amounts of cash through repurchases. On 
the contrary, firm size is still positively related the dividend amounts paid by UK 
.  
                                                 
140 Aivazian and Booth (2003), Lee and Suh (2011) and Alzahrania and Lasfer (2012) have used the same measure to investigate 
dividends or repurchases. 




The sign of the coefficient of LEVERAGE is consistently negative in each 
regression except for in the US for which the significance is lower than standard, 
indicating that firms with high leverage are less likely to distribute large amount of 
dividends. Firm age had a significantly negative impact on the ratio of dividends to total 
assets in the US and in Canada, whilst it had a positive impact in the UK. Cash holding 
(CTAT) is significantly positive in most regressions, which contrasted with indicators 
relating to the decision to pay dividends. This result suggests that firms with high cash 
holdings are reluctant to pay dividends, but if they did, they paid more. The effect of 
high technology is significant only in the UK and in Japan.  
In addition, there is weak statistical evidence to show whether a firm’s decision 
to become an acquirer affect the amounts paid out in dividends. However, one exception 
is Japan where a significantly negative coefficient is recorded. US target firms are 
shown to prefer to pay lower dividends, and Japanese firms had the same tendency. The 
OLS regressions did not produce significant evidence to show whether the risk of de-
listing (DLIN3) affected dividend amounts. Regression results for the US for equally 
weighted dividend premium (EDP) recorded a significantly positive coefficient, which 
is consistent the predictions of catering theory. However, the significance the catering 
effect could not be proved in regressions for other countries. 
Table 5-10 Panel B. shows the results for repurchases. The dependent variable 
used is the repurchase ratio, which is the amount of repurchased shares scaled by total 
assets for a firm-year observation, as used by Lee and Suh (2011). Due to the data 
unavailability problems previously outlined, the sample period is 1989-2010 for the US, 
and 1999-2010 for Canada, UK, Germany, France, Japan and Hong Kong. The 
explanatory power of repurchase regressions is lower than that of dividends regressions 
because the values of F and R2 are smaller (except R2
Market to book ratio (MTBV) is the only explanatory variable that is significant 
in the regressions for all countries. Interestingly, the coefficients of market to book ratio 
are all positive, which is similar to the findings of Lee and Suh (2011) who use the 
Tobit model to show that the amount of repurchases is positively related to market to 
book ratio for US companies. The other interesting finding is that firm size is a 
significantly positive coefficient in the US. This may indicate that large US firms prefer 
repurchases to paying dividends since Table 5-10 Panel A. shows that firm size has 
 for Germany). Consequently, 
there are less significant coefficients shown in Table 5-10 Panel A. 
249 
 
negative impact on the amount of dividends. Profitability is not proven to be a strong 
determinant of repurchase amounts; it is only associated with significant coefficient in 
regressions in France and Hong Kong. In addition, changes in total assets (GOA) 
recorded a significantly negative coefficient in the US results, whilst the coefficient of 
GOA in Hong Kong is positive and significant. The amounts of repurchases increased 
with retained earnings in the US, France and Japan, but not in Hong Kong, which 
showed an opposite trend.  
Leverage has a relatively homogeneous effect in the different countries, in that 
firms with heavy debts are reluctant to repurchase large amounts of shares, as seen in 
the US, Canada, Japan and in Hong Kong. The relationship between the amount of 
repurchases and firm age is negative in the US but positive in Hong Kong. The UK is 
the only country where cash holdings (CTAT) had a significant influence on the amount 
of repurchased shares. However, the decision to repurchase is not affected by 
technology orientation (HITECH) in all sample countries. 
Finally, M&A factors are not observed to have any effect on the repurchase ratio. 
The significant and positive coefficients of DLIN3 in the US and in the UK suggest that 
firms facing de-listing risk tended to raise the repurchase ratio. In the US, if 
repurchasing firms are dividend payers, the amount of repurchases are comparatively 
lower, probably due to a substitute mechanism. 
Furthermore, I estimate extra regressions to test for robustness of my results 
using alternative definitions of the explanatory variables. The results are reported in 
Appendix 5-1. In these regressions, High technology dummy (HITECH) is replaced 
with the ratio of R&D to total assets (R&D). ACQUIRER is replaced with a dummy 
variable taking on the value of 1 if a company merger or takeover other firm within 3 
years since observed year (TIN3). TARGET is replaced with a dummy variable taking 
on the value of 1 if a company is taken over by other firm within 3 years since observed 
year (TAKENIN3). Like HITECH, R&D has strongly effect on the decision of whether 
to pay dividends. TAKENIN3 has negative on the probabilities to pay dividends and the 
amount of dividends paid for some country. The effect of TIN3 on dividend policy is 
weak, due to the data flaw142
 
 of this variable. 
  
                                                 
142 Datastream only provides the last record of M&A for an acquirer, while it is common for an acquirer to takeover several different 
target companies in practice. 
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Table 5-10 OLS Panel Regressions on the Amount of Dividends and Share Repurchases 
This table presents results from estimating OLS panel regressions for seven economies over sample period 1989-2010. 
Suggested by Petersen (2009), standard errors are corrected in two dimensions of firm and year. The specifications of 
explanatory variables are as follows. SIZE is a measure of firm size, which represents the percent of firms with 
smaller market capitalization in each stock market for every sample year. PROFIT, the proxy of profitability, is 
calculated as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. 
MTBV, a proxy of growth opportunities, is measured as the market value of total capital scaled by the book value of 
total assets. GOA, a proxy of growth opportunities, represents the annual growth rate of total assets. RETE refers to 
ratio of earned equity, which is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. LEVERAGE is measured 
as long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets. LNAGE represents the logarithm of the number of years 
between base year and the observed year. CTAT is the ratio of cash to total assets in which cash represents the money 
available for use in the normal operations of the company. HITECH takes on the value of 1 if a sample firm is 
categorized to high technology industry and 0 otherwise. ACQUIERER takes on the value of 1 and 0 otherwise for its 
all sample years if a sample company became an acquirer between 1989 and the end of 2011. TARGET takes on the 
value of 1 if a company in my sample became a target firm between 1989 and the end of 2011 and 0 otherwise for its 
all sample years. TIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for an acquirer. TAKENIN3 
equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for a target firm. DLIN3 equals 1 if an observed firm 
is delisted within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise. EDP, dividend premium, is calculated as the difference between 
the logarithm of the average market to book value of dividend payers and that of non-dividend payers (Baker and 
Wurgler, 2004a). IFDIV equals 1 if a repurchasing company is paying dividends and 0 otherwise. p-values are 
reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% 
respectively.   
 
Variable US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Panel A. The dependent variable is cash dividends over total assets 
Intercept 0.023*** 0.034*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.006** -0.001 0.003*** -0.003 -0.002 -0.0003 -0.001 
 (0.03) (0.91) (0.01) (0.42) (0.28) (0.39) (0.64) 
PROFIT 0.006*** 0.097*** 0.04*** 0.087*** 0.109*** 0.016*** 0.106*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MTBV 0.01*** 0.01*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.016*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.018*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.023*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RETE -0.005*** -0.04*** 0.004*** -0.012** -0.006*** 0.004*** -0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.09) 
LEVERAG
E -0.004 -0.05*** -0.014*** -0.026*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.055*** 
 (0.29) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LNAGE -0.002** -0.004** 0.001*** 0.001 0.002*** 0.0002 0.001 
 (0.05) (0.04) (0.00) (0.38) (0.01) (0.23) (0.56) 
CTAT 0.044*** -0.013 0.021*** 0.036*** 0.009 0.006*** 0.03*** 
 (0.00) (0.53) (0.00) (0.01) (0.31) (0.00) (0.00) 
HITECH -0.0003 -0.00032 -0.0029*** 0.001 -0.001 0.0004** -0.001 
 (0.79) (0.93) (0.00) (0.66) (0.39) (0.02) (0.52) 
ACQUIRER -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 0.001 -0.001*** - 
 (0.34) (0.87) (0.44) (0.39) (0.78) (0.01) - 
TARGET -0.003** -0.004 0.0004 -0.004 -0.002 -0.001** - 
 (0.04) (0.48) (0.68) (0.4) (0.49) (0.04) - 
DLIN3 0.002 0.003 0.0001 -0.005 0.002 0.0005 0.008 
 (0.26) (0.54) (0.93) (0.19) (0.11) (0.24) (0.16) 
EDP 0.015*** -0.035* -0.001 0.004 0.002 -0.002 0.013 
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 (0.00) (0.07) (0.58) (0.52) (0.45) (0.11) (0.14) 
Obs 20908 3818 18573 5359 6414 34742 5975 
F 106.77 43.71 213.55 15.15 52.07 468.76 111.60 
R-sq 0.182 0.292 0.270 0.058 0.231 0.210 0.303 
Panel B. The dependent variable is share repurchases over total assets 
Intercept 0.024*** 0.055** 0.025 0.058 0.054*** -0.002 -0.037* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.12) (0.41) (0.00) (0.75) (0.06) 
SIZE 0.01*** -0.012 0.003 -0.125 -0.029*** 0.002 -0.011 
 (0.01) (0.38) (0.7) (0.12) (0.00) (0.79) (0.34) 
PROFIT 0.001 -0.029 0.018 -0.106 0.069** -0.019 -0.131** 
 (0.57) (0.16) (0.45) (0.45) (0.05) (0.38) (0.04) 
MTBV 0.019*** 0.025*** 0.017*** 0.052** 0.017*** 0.022*** 0.035*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.015*** 0.013 -0.005 -0.028 0.031 -0.014 0.021** 
 (0.01) (0.4) (0.48) (0.81) (0.3) (0.25) (0.04) 
RETE 0.007*** -0.007 0.001 -0.022 0.016* 0.004* -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.21) (0.73) (0.4) (0.07) (0.1) (0.01) 
LEVERAG
E -0.01* -0.064* 0.003 -0.016 -0.021 -0.016** -0.063** 
 (0.08) (0.09) (0.69) (0.84) (0.54) (0.03) (0.02) 
LNAGE -0.005*** -0.01 -0.004 -0.011 -0.011 -0.001 0.012*** 
 (0.00) (0.12) (0.5) (0.67) (0.11) (0.34) (0.01) 
CTAT 0.02 -0.074 0.044** 0.2 0.05 0.013 -0.005 
 (0.13) (0.12) (0.04) (0.36) (0.5) (0.13) (0.86) 
HITECH 0.0004 -0.007 0.001 0.038 -0.001 -0.001 0.001 
 (0.78) (0.38) (0.88) (0.27) (0.89) (0.24) (0.9) 
ACQUIRER 0.0005 0.006 -0.004 - - -0.004 - 
 (0.79) (0.67) (0.53) - - (0.3) - 
TARGET -0.003 -0.011 -0.005 0.019 -0.003 -0.004 - 
 (0.26) (0.45) (0.47) (0.52) (0.83) (0.46) - 
DLIN3 0.005* 0.012 0.009* 0.137 0.026 0.003 0.002 
 (0.1) (0.48) (0.1) (0.24) (0.21) (0.13) (0.68) 
IFDIV -0.013*** 0.004 -0.007 0.022 -0.014 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.00) (0.56) (0.49) (0.56) (0.38) (0.65) (0.34) 
Obs 12132 946 1342 126 273 1483 469 
F 85.84 4.84 4.99 2.05 3.25 9.27 1.85 








5.6 Firm Characteristics on Various Dividend Behaviors 
This section begins with comparing a range of firm characteristics among three control 
groups: dividend increase, dividend decrease and dividend constant. Benartzi, Michaely 
and Thaler (1997) defined a dividend change as the difference in annual dividends 
between two continuous years, where the annual dividends are calculated as four times 
the last quarterly dividend per share for each observed year. Slightly different, the 
annual dividend is calculated by Guay and Harford (2000) as the sum of all quarterly 
dividends in each observed year. Accordingly, a dividend change in this study is defined 
to occur when a firm i exhibited change (i.e. increase, decrease or constant) in dividend 
per share from year t-1 to year t. Dividend initiation and dividend omission are not 
included as dividend changes. Table 5-11-A, summarizes the means and medians of 
firm characteristics across these groups. The t-statistics of the difference in means 
between dividend increase group and dividend decrease group are displayed in the last 
row. The results show that the number of companies decreasing dividends is much 
smaller than that of companies increasing dividends, consistent with the suggestion of 
Lintner (1956) that companies pursue stable dividend policy and avoid dividend cut. For 
example, in the US, the number of the US firms is 630 for decrease dividends group 
versus 8793 for dividend increase group and 7470 for dividend constant group.  
Some universal relations between dividend changes and firm characteristics 
across countries are found from the results. Firms that increase dividends are larger 
(SIZE), more profitable (PROFIT), and have higher growth opportunities (MTBV and 
GOA), retained earnings to total equity ratios (RETE) and cash holdings (CTAT) than 
other firms. One exception is that, for the US, although the mean profitability of 
dividend increase group is lower than that of dividend decrease group, the 
corresponding difference in means is not significant (t-stat = -1.23). Accordingly, 
dividend constant group are associates with greater values of SIZE, PROFIT, MTBV, 
GOA, RETE and CTAT than dividend decrease group across sample countries apart from 
the US where dividend-decreasing companies have relatively higher market to book 
ratio (MTBV). The most interesting finding in this section is that higher MTBV and 
higher CTAT are associated with greater incidence of increasing dividends among the 
dividend payers, in contrast with the results presented in previous section showing that 
both measures are associated with lower probability of paying dividends.  
In contrast, the results show that the effects of some firm characteristics, such as 
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firm age (AGE), LEVERAGE and R&D expenditures (R&D), on dividend changes are 
not constant for different countries. For example, in the US and Japan, the average 
LEVERAGE of dividend-increasing companies is significantly lower than that of 
dividend-decreasing companies. However, such relation is not applicable for companies 
in the remaining sample countries. Besides, the US dividend-increasing group has 
greater value-weighted dividend premium (EDP) than dividend-decreasing group. 
However, this is the only evidence supporting dividend catering theory resulted from 
this section.  
Table 5-11-A also presents the results regarding the frequency distribution of 
some binomial variables and the findings are as following Firstly, dividends increase 
events are more likely to happen to high technology firms in comparison to the events 
of dividends decrease or dividends constant, for all sample countries apart from Canada. 
For example, for the US, 28.66% of dividend-increasing observations are related to high 
technology firms. However, in contrast, a lower fraction of dividend-decreasing 
observations (19.68%) and constant dividends observations (26.49%) are observed to be 
related high technology firms. One possible explanation is that technology-oriented 
firms usually face rapid shifts in their financial conditions and need to transition from 
low dividends to high dividends more frequently, consistent with the implication of 
lifecycle hypothesis. 
Secondly, dividend-increasing firms have lower chance to be delisted in the US, 
Canada, Germany and France. However, a contrary relation is found for firms in the UK, 
Japan and Hong Kong. For example, in the UK, the delisting rate is 7.86% for dividend-
increasing firms versus 7.59% for dividend-decreasing firms. Thirdly, the evidence on 
the relation between dividend changes and M&A factors is mixed among sample 
countries. For the US and UK, the companies in dividend increase group has higher 
proportion of becoming acquirers (ACQUIRER) than those in comparative groups. 
Consistently, for both countries, the frequency of a measure to indicate a firms will 
merger or takeover other targets within 3 years (TIN3) is higher for firms in dividend 
increase group than those in control groups. However, the relevant findings are not 
clear-cut for other sample countries. For example, the percentage of Japanese dividend-
increasing firms that become acquirers is 1.72%, whilst the percentage of Japanese 
dividend-decreasing firms that become acquirers is higher at 2.14%.  
Finally, for the US and Canada, a lower percent of dividend-increasing firms 
became target firms (TARGET) or were taken over within following 3 years (TAKENIN3)  
254 
 
Table 5-11-A Firm Characteristics for Groups of Dividends Increase, Decrease and Constant 
This table reports the firm characteristics for groups of dividends increase, decrease and constant over the period 
1989-2010 for each sample countries. Follow Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) and Guay and Harford (2000), a 
dividend increase is defined as an event in which dividend per share increases from year t-1 to year t for a firm i. A 
dividend decrease is defined as an event in which dividend per share decreases from year t-1 to year t for a firm i. If 
there is no change in dividend per share from year t-1 to year t for a firm i, it is defined as an event of dividend 
constant. “N” is meant to the total number of firm-year observations. T-statistics of the difference in means between 
dividend increase group and dividend decrease group are displayed in the last row. The numbers reported under 
“Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%)” represent the proportions of the firm-year observations that are 
associated with a certain characteristics. For example, in the US, 28.66% of dividends increase observations are of 





Increase (N=8793) Decrease (N=630) Constant (N=7470) 
t-stat of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.7200 0.7927 0.5493 0.5718 0.6310 0.6773 14.75*** 
PROFIT 0.1347 0.0806 0.1528 0.0517 0.1236 0.0553 -1.23 
MTBV 1.9932 1.6358 1.6798 1.2668 1.5997 1.3380 6.17*** 
GOA 0.1140 0.0749 0.0449 0.0174 0.0860 0.0455 7.87*** 
RETE 0.7840 0.7719 0.4712 0.4350 0.6338 0.6448 9.85*** 
AGE 20.36 21.00 17.76 19.00 19.87 20.00 6.83*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1791 0.1633 0.1973 0.1806 0.1956 0.1868 -2.61*** 
CTAT 0.0363 0.0005 0.0271 0.0000 0.0321 0.0000 3.77*** 
R&D 0.0161 0.0000 0.0109 0.0000 0.0160 0.0000 4.91*** 
VDP 0.0335 0.0240 0.0471 0.0350 0.0412 0.0350 -5.30*** 
EDP -0.1460 -0.1533 -0.1604 -0.1602 -0.1613 -0.1636 2.95*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 28.66 19.68 26.49  
ACQUIRER 19.33 10.00 17.36  
TARGET 15.96 21.43 20.25  
TIN3 2.92 1.27 2.82  
TAKENIN3 3.76 4.29 5.44  
DLIN3 1.66 2.22 1.93  
Canada 
Variable 
Increase (N=1204) Decrease (N=232) Constant (N=1256) 
t-stat of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.7319 0.7946 0.6465 0.6967 0.6856 0.7509 4.68*** 
PROFIT 0.1113 0.1021 0.0762 0.0803 0.0846 0.0806 3.86*** 
MTBV 1.5136 1.3039 1.2416 1.1150 1.3022 1.1456 6.74*** 
GOA 0.1863 0.0866 0.0789 0.0219 0.1132 0.0480 3.90*** 
RETE 0.3161 0.3401 -0.0718 0.0289 0.2518 0.3080 8.56*** 
AGE 15.05 14.00 12.65 11.00 16.25 17.00 4.00*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1947 0.1774 0.2063 0.1997 0.1980 0.1844 -0.89 
CTAT 0.0224 0.0000 0.0120 0.0000 0.0195 0.0000 3.53*** 
R&D 0.0044 0.0000 0.0031 0.0000 0.0041 0.0000 1.21 
VDP -0.0418 -0.0407 -0.0281 -0.0349 -0.0282 -0.0386 -1.96** 
EDP -0.3343 -0.3271 -0.3103 -0.3063 -0.3010 -0.2872 -2.20*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 13.54 15.52 15.84  
ACQUIRER 4.65 6.03 5.73  
TARGET 10.63 11.64 12.10  
TIN3 0.25 0.43 1.19  
TAKENIN3 2.24 5.17 3.34  
DLIN3 3.49 6.03 3.26  
UK 
Variable 
Increase (N=10664) Decrease (N=1212) Constant (N=1839) 
t-stat of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.6374 0.6820 0.5003 0.4669 0.5178 0.5216 15.46*** 
PROFIT 0.0809 0.0767 0.0339 0.0417 0.0485 0.0538 15.48*** 
MTBV 1.6648 1.4079 1.2778 1.0886 1.3214 1.1822 16.75*** 
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GOA 0.1741 0.0972 0.0414 0.0007 0.0704 0.0274 15.04*** 
RETE 0.5165 0.4955 0.3794 0.3550 0.3902 0.4046 7.12*** 
AGE 19.15 18.00 20.46 22.00 20.38 22.00 -3.64*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1221 0.0844 0.1166 0.0792 0.1081 0.0745 1.41 
CTAT 0.0853 0.0464 0.0763 0.0411 0.0785 0.0424 3.02*** 
R&D 0.0089 0.0000 0.0081 0.0000 0.0092 0.0000 1.12 
VDP 0.0717 0.0720 0.0802 0.0744 0.0800 0.1036 -2.68*** 
EDP -0.2774 -0.2828 -0.2580 -0.2110 -0.2399 -0.2067 -3.61*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 20.46 18.65 20.50  
ACQUIRER 7.77 7.18 7.67  
TARGET 7.93 7.76 6.42  
TIN3 1.01 0.33 0.71  
TAKENIN3 1.27 1.07 1.58  
DLIN3 7.86 7.59 7.07  
Germany 
Variable 
Increase (N=1879) Decrease (N=384) Constant (N=1268) 
t-stat of difference 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.6830 0.7348 0.5647 0.5820 0.6145 0.6733 7.74*** 
PROFIT 0.0549 0.0463 0.0416 0.0322 0.0452 0.0391 3.31*** 
MTBV 1.5819 1.2763 1.4683 1.1886 1.5195 1.2450 2.01** 
GOA 0.1252 0.0666 0.0542 0.0252 0.0862 0.0401 5.68*** 
RETE 0.4022 0.4172 0.2550 0.2689 0.3628 0.3804 4.88*** 
AGE 14.49 12.00 13.49 11.00 14.72 12.00 2.12** 
LEVERAGE 0.1168 0.0746 0.1027 0.0653 0.1089 0.0605 2.01** 
CTAT 0.0718 0.0440 0.0606 0.0345 0.0602 0.0334 2.45** 
R&D 0.0165 0.0000 0.0159 0.0000 0.0112 0.0000 0.29 
VDP -0.0652 -0.0616 -0.0516 -0.0383 -0.0495 -0.0383 -2.52** 
EDP -0.0912 -0.0680 -0.0525 0.0247 -0.0656 -0.0408 -3.64*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 33.58 24.22 26.74  
ACQUIRER 0.64 0.52 1.03  
TARGET 0.85 0.00 0.87  
TIN3 0.00 0.00 0.00  
TAKENIN3 0.05 0.00 0.24  








 t-stat of difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.6393 0.6992 0.5892 0.6233 0.5047 0.5102 4.46*** 
PROFIT 0.0620 0.0544 0.0491 0.0403 0.0539 0.0461 6.10*** 
MTBV 1.5346 1.2560 1.3529 1.1100 1.3677 1.1096 5.35*** 
GOA 0.1251 0.0689 0.0838 0.0377 0.0909 0.0445 4.12*** 
RETE 0.5527 0.5658 0.4598 0.4692 0.4934 0.5168 6.10*** 
AGE 12.51 10.00 12.33 10.00 10.94 9.00 0.55 
LEVERAGE 0.1302 0.1037 0.1396 0.1056 0.1232 0.0854 -1.75 
CTAT 0.0551 0.0394 0.0493 0.0341 0.0532 0.0337 2.50** 
R&D 0.0080 0.0000 0.0061 0.0000 0.0066 0.0000 2.15** 
VDP 0.0358 0.0434 0.0184 -0.0314 0.0308 0.0302 3.76*** 
EDP -0.0697 -0.0641 -0.0542 -0.0616 -0.0423 -0.0194 -3.39*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 27.37 21.59 27.40  
ACQUIRER 1.51 0.99 0.81  
TARGET 1.44 0.14 0.99  
TIN3 0.14 0.00 0.09  
TAKENIN3 0.31 0.00 0.18  








) t-stat of difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
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SIZE 0.5948 0.6261 0.5444 0.5549 0.5311 0.5328 9.27*** 
PROFIT 0.0350 0.0310 0.0112 0.0117 0.0140 0.0136 29.79*** 
MTBV 1.4515 1.2589 1.2151 1.0887 1.1793 1.0830 19.95*** 
GOA 0.0707 0.0492 0.0253 0.0109 0.0293 0.0165 18.41*** 
RETE 0.3489 0.3522 0.3007 0.3070 0.2993 0.3031 9.23*** 
AGE 16.04 15.00 16.68 17.00 17.58 17.00 -3.49*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1000 0.0705 0.1181 0.0987 0.1155 0.0921 -8.31*** 
CTAT 0.1198 0.0988 0.1088 0.0895 0.0994 0.0812 5.67*** 
R&D 0.0125 0.0022 0.0108 0.0017 0.0103 0.0011 4.50*** 
VDP 0.0531 0.0530 0.0800 0.0695 0.0745 0.0695 -13.33*** 
EDP -0.1128 -0.0754 -0.0511 -0.0231 -0.0693 -0.0231 -26.46*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 37.37 34.20 33.19  
ACQUIRER 1.72 2.14 1.75  
TARGET 0.95 0.96 1.05  
TIN3 0.13 0.28 0.39  
TAKENIN3 0.09 0.12 0.17  







Constant (N=1046) t-statistics of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.6876 0.7474 0.5810 0.5971 0.6011 0.6183 10.03*** 
PROFIT 0.0963 0.0842 0.0600 0.0482 0.0757 0.0648 12.50*** 
MTBV 1.3457 1.0512 0.9634 0.8224 1.0954 0.9134 13.65*** 
GOA 0.1824 0.1264 0.1046 0.0509 0.1394 0.0822 6.34*** 
RETE 0.3694 0.3757 0.3447 0.3387 0.3264 0.3412 1.78 
AGE 12.40 11 12.58 11.00 13.11 11.00 -0.54 
LEVERAGE 0.0812 0.0423 0.0853 0.0464 0.0751 0.0330 -0.98 
CTAT 0.1261 0.0904 0.1084 0.0781 0.1149 0.0833 3.64*** 
R&D 0.0023 0.0000 0.0015 0.0000 0.0018 0.0000 2.67*** 
VDP -0.0749 -0.0769 -0.0879 -0.0769 -0.0705 -0.0698 1.71* 
EDP -0.1717 -0.2118 -0.1516 -0.1916 -0.1803 -0.2156 -3.16*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 12.67 9.42 11.09  
ACQUIRER 0.00 0.00 0.00  
TARGET 0.00 0.00 0.00  
TIN3 0.00 0.00 0.00  
TAKENIN3 0.00 0.00 0.00  
DLIN3 1.70 1.26 0.86  
 
comparing with firms in control groups. It might be explained that firms increase 
dividends merely when they are financially healthy and thus the resistance of being 
taken over is great. However, this finding is not consistent in other countries.  
Table 5-11-B summarizes the results from the comparisons among three control 
groups: start paying, stop paying and continue to pay. According to Deshmukh (2003), 
“start paying” represents a change from a dividend of zero in year t-1 to some positive 
amount in year t for firm i. Similarly, “stop paying” represents a change from some 
positive amount in year t to a dividend of zero in year t+1 to for firm i and ‘continue to 
pay’ refers to a firm i continues to pay dividends in two consecutive year t-1 and year t. 
Again, the values of t-statistics of the difference in means between start paying group 




Firstly, the finding about the difference between control groups in relation to 
some company characteristics appears to be in line with the maturity explanation. It is 
shown that start-paying firms are generally younger than both stop-paying firms and 
continue to pay firms. For example, for the US, the average firm age is 11 for “start 
paying” group versus 20.27 for “stop paying” group. Correspondingly, more observed 
firm characteristics are closely related with the maturity of firms. Specifically, the 
results show that firms in start-paying group are of smaller size (SIZE), higher growth 
rate (MTBV and GOA) and lower ratio of retained earnings to total equity (RETE) than 
stop-paying group.  
Secondly, the leverage level of stop-paying companies is on average higher than 
that of start-paying companies. One possible reason is stop-paying companies are 
relatively older than start-paying companies since Eije and Megginson (2008) 
hypothesized that older companies might be associated with higher leverage. The other 
explanation can be that debts and dividends are substitutes for providing monitoring as 
suggested by Jensen (1986) and thus firms with higher leverage tend to stop paying 
dividends.  
Thirdly, the rest of firm characteristics including profitability (PROFIT), cash 
holdings (CTAT), R&D expenditures (R&D) are proven country-specific among control 
groups. For example, for the UK, start-paying firms have higher cash holdings (CTAT) 
and lower R&D expenditures comparing with remaining firms. However, such relations 
do not hold for the US and Canada.  
Fourthly, the evidence is partly consistent with dividend catering hypothesis. For 
the US, Canada, the value-weighted dividend premium (VDP) of start-paying firms is 
significantly greater than that of stop-paying firms. For the UK and Hong Kong, the 
equally weighted dividend premium (EDP) of start-paying firms is significantly greater 
than that of stop-paying firms. 
Moreover, the results on the frequency distribution of firm characteristics for 
control groups are presented in Table 5-11-B. Firstly “start-paying” group is more likely 
to be associated with technology factor than “stop-paying” group and “continue to pay” 
group, for all sample countries with the exception of Japan. Secondly, a distinctive 
finding is that start-paying companies have lower delisting rate (DLIN3). This may 
indicate that companies confronting delisting risk have lower chance to start paying 
dividend, and instead they have higher chance to terminate paying. Thirdly, again, the  
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Table 5-11-B Firm Characteristics for Groups of Start Paying, Stop Paying and Continue to Pay 
This table reports the firm characteristics for groups of start paying, stop paying, and continue to pay covering the 
period 1989-2010 for each sample countries. According to Deshmukh (2003), ‘start paying’ represents a change from 
a dividend of zero in year t-1 to some positive amount in year t for firm i. Similarly, ‘stop paying’ represents a change 
from some positive amount in year t to a dividend of zero in year t+1 to for firm i and ‘continue to pay’ refers to a 
firm i continues to pay dividends in two consecutive year t-1 and year t. “N” is meant to the total number of firm-year 
observations. T-statistics of the difference in means between dividend increase group and dividend decrease group 
are displayed in the last row. The numbers reported under “Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%)” 
represent the proportions of the firm-year observations that are associated with a certain characteristics. These 




Start Paying (N=1773) 
 
Stop Paying (N=2220) 
 
Continue toPay (N=17142) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.5241 0.5351 0.6008 0.6412 0.6732 0.7355 -8.69*** 
PROFIT 0.1174 0.0647 0.0888 0.0491 0.1300 0.0687 2.58*** 
MTBV 1.8018 1.4308 1.6304 1.3317 1.8047 1.4749 4.90*** 
GOA 0.1549 0.0827 0.0695 0.0365 0.1007 0.0607 8.70*** 
RETE 0.3100 0.3053 0.5963 0.6468 0.6991 0.7042 -11.79*** 
AGE 11.00 9.00 20.27 19.00 19.79 20.00 -28.22*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1897 0.1506 0.2169 0.2006 0.1879 0.1744 -4.76*** 
CTAT 0.0493 0.0000 0.0457 0.0017 0.0339 0.0000 1.25 
R&D 0.0151 0.0000 0.0152 0.0000 0.0157 0.0000 -0.08 
VDP 0.0299 0.0179 0.0120 -0.0168 0.0374 0.0312 9.60*** 
EDP -0.1437 -0.1602 -0.1204 -0.1274 -0.1535 -0.1602 -6.48*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 28.71 26.85 27.27  
ACQUIRER 9.14 12.07 17.93  
TARGET 18.61 25.54 18.11  
TIN3 1.69 0.77 2.79  
TAKENIN3 5.44 4.29 3.76  
DLIN3 5.08 9.23 1.81  
Canada 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=505) 
 
Stop Paying (N=523) 
 
Continue to Pay (N=2790) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.4366 0.4473 0.6379 0.6844 0.6999 0.7646 -10.67*** 
PROFIT 0.0856 0.0836 0.0475 0.0633 0.0946 0.0887 4.57*** 
MTBV 1.4038 1.1605 1.3172 1.1397 1.3892 1.2073 1.86* 
GOA 0.1881 0.0061 0.0715 0.0341 0.1415 0.0620 4.12*** 
RETE 0.0995 0.0866 0.0665 0.1675 0.2425 0.2837 0.86 
AGE 8.88 7.00 14.93 14.00 14.97 15.00 -11.37*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1656 0.1357 0.2062 0.2038 0.1958 0.1802 -3.92*** 
CTAT 0.0303 0.0000 0.0300 0.0000 0.0197 0.0000 0.08 
R&D 0.0060 0.0000 0.0054 0.0000 0.0040 0.0000 0.39 
VDP -0.0589 -0.0567 -0.1208 -0.1405 -0.0357 -0.0386 7.59*** 
EDP -0.3529 -0.3598 -0.3321 -0.3592 -0.3207 -0.3254 -2.43** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 16.83 16.63 14.7  
ACQUIRER 3.76 3.82 5.2  
TARGET 10.10 15.30 11.33  
TIN3 0.99 0.57 0.72  
TAKENIN3 3.34 5.17 2.24  
DLIN3 7.72 15.87 3.94  
UK 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=1741) 
 
Stop Paying (N=2170) 
 
Continue  (N=13857) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.4732 0.4543 0.5121 0.5151 0.6088 0.6501 -4.56*** 
PROFIT 0.0745 0.0709 0.0129 0.0416 0.0727 0.0709 14.84*** 
MTBV 1.8651 1.4908 1.3767 1.1458 1.5906 1.3408 13.70*** 
GOA 0.2931 0.0893 0.0672 0.0255 0.1502 0.0782 14.29*** 
RETE 0.0711 0.1432 0.2811 0.3040 0.4859 0.4665 -9.24*** 
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AGE 9.09 3.00 18.06 14.00 19.26 19.00 -23.76*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1112 0.0550 0.1354 0.0902 0.1197 0.0823 -5.20*** 
CTAT 0.1065 0.0480 0.0795 0.0385 0.0836 0.0454 6.48*** 
R&D 0.0076 0.0000 0.0091 0.0000 0.0089 0.0000 -1.81* 
VDP 0.0590 0.0517 0.0944 0.1036 0.0735 0.0720 -10.37*** 
EDP -0.2807 -0.2866 -0.2892 -0.2828 -0.2705 -0.2828 1.83* 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 22.00 20.88 20.34  
ACQUIRER 5.05 6.87 7.7  
TARGET 6.09 7.10 7.73  
TIN3 0.86 0.37 0.91  
TAKENIN3 1.58 1.07 1.27  
DLIN3 13.33 35.16 7.72  
Germany 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=978) 
 
Stop Paying (N=789) 
 
Continue to Pay (N=3531) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.5032 0.5162 0.5673 0.5974 0.6455 0.6964 -5.02*** 
PROFIT 0.0345 0.0366 0.0000 0.0115 0.0500 0.0423 6.34*** 
MTBV 1.6637 1.3086 1.5077 1.2357 1.5471 1.2594 3.13*** 
GOA 0.1282 0.0455 0.0407 0.0148 0.1034 0.0505 6.14*** 
RETE 0.0750 0.1432 0.1911 0.2467 0.3720 0.3886 -3.50*** 
AGE 9.25 7.00 14.66 13.00 14.47 12.00 -13.15*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1041 0.0592 0.1209 0.0753 0.1124 0.0679 -2.63*** 
CTAT 0.0679 0.0311 0.0666 0.0324 0.0664 0.0389 0.30 
R&D 0.0118 0.0000 0.0141 0.0000 0.0145 0.0000 -1.47 
VDP -0.0392 -0.0221 -0.0350 -0.0221 -0.0581 -0.0427 -0.74 
EDP -0.0682 -0.0259 -0.0554 0.0247 -0.0778 -0.0408 -1.47 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 32.72 30.29 30.1  
ACQUIRER 0.61 0.63 0.76  
TARGET 0.82 1.01 0.76  
TIN3 0.10 0.00 0．  
TAKENIN3 0.31 0.51 0.11  
DLIN3 3.68 14.45 3.85  
France 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=775) 
 
Stop Paying (N=699) 
 
Continue to Pay (N=4940) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.4205 0.3978 0.5281 0.5375 0.5836 0.6314 -7.34*** 
PROFIT 0.0558 0.0497 0.0142 0.0194 0.0586 0.0507 10.14*** 
MTBV 1.7107 1.3540 1.3097 1.1132 1.4701 1.1988 8.62*** 
GOA 0.1978 0.0906 0.0691 0.0322 0.1146 0.0617 7.24*** 
RETE 0.2996 0.3153 0.3928 0.4293 0.5163 0.5279 -3.41*** 
AGE 6.03 3.00 11.91 10.00 11.66 9.00 -15.22v 
LEVERAGE 0.1206 0.0829 0.1391 0.1118 0.1294 0.0998 -2.84*** 
CTAT 0.0404 0.0222 0.0501 0.0322 0.0538 0.0374 -3.18*** 
R&D 0.0073 0.0000 0.0085 0.0000 0.0072 0.0000 -0.87 
VDP 0.0473 0.0828 0.1095 0.1514 0.0308 0.0171 -8.42*** 
EDP -0.0870 -0.0804 -0.0419 0.0010 -0.0591 -0.0616 -8.17*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 34.84 32.33 26.54 34.84 
ACQUIRER 1.42 1.29 1.23 1.42 
TARGET 1.68 1.14 1.09 1.68 
TIN3 0.13 0.14 0.1 0.13 
TAKENIN3 0.18 0.00 0.31 0.18 
DLIN3 7.87 10.87 6.74 7.87 
Japan 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=2662) 
 
Stop Paying (N=3117) 
 
Continue to Pay (N=28583) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.3849 0.3330 0.5083 0.5109 0.5544 0.5690 -16.94*** 
PROFIT 0.0314 0.0270 0.0072 0.0078 0.0217 0.0190 19.23*** 
MTBV 1.6151 1.3524 1.0657 0.9801 1.2898 1.1409 29.40*** 
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GOA 0.0879 0.0063 0.0158 0.0050 0.0452 0.0270 15.69*** 
RETE 0.0759 0.1005 0.2844 0.3335 0.3166 0.3194 -21.07*** 
AGE 9.95 4.00 20.30 20.00 16.73 16.00 -37.40*** 
LEVERAGE 0.1137 0.0839 0.1145 0.0847 0.1100 0.0845 -0.27 
CTAT 0.1048 0.0779 0.0959 0.0726 0.1083 0.0879 3.18*** 
R&D 0.0075 0.0000 0.0127 0.0030 0.0111 0.0014 -11.04*** 
VDP 0.0448 0.0351 0.0568 0.0256 0.0667 0.0695 -4.82*** 
EDP -0.0949 -0.0754 -0.0711 -0.0864 -0.0835 -0.0233 -8.69*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 32.83 33.21 34.88  
ACQUIRER 1.28 1.64 1.77  
TARGET 1.24 1.32 1  
TIN3 0.23 0.06 0.28  
TAKENIN3 0.17 0.12 0.09  
DLIN3 2.03 10.14 1.22  
Hong Kong 
Variable 
Start Paying (N=1172) 
 
Stop Paying (N=893) 
 
Continue to Pay (N=3910) 
 
t-stat of 
difference Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
SIZE 0.4677 0.4781 0.5587 0.5668 0.6410 0.6784 -7.40*** 
PROFIT 0.0826 0.0738 0.0487 0.0548 0.0839 0.0709 6.59*** 
MTBV 1.3316 1.0675 1.2302 0.9598 1.2074 0.9560 2.67*** 
GOA 0.2360 0.0817 0.1742 0.1265 0.1562 0.0999 3.23*** 
RETE 0.1634 0.1929 0.3063 0.3520 0.3531 0.3581 -7.50*** 
AGE 6.82 4.00 11.89 10.00 12.46 11.00 -14.99*** 
LEVERAGE 0.0690 0.0194 0.0796 0.0379 0.0799 0.0386 -2.40** 
CTAT 0.1499 0.1079 0.1352 0.0998 0.1201 0.0864 2.32** 
R&D 0.0029 0.0000 0.0028 0.0000 0.0020 0.0000 0.02 
VDP -0.0700 -0.0698 -0.0389 0.0670 -0.0761 -0.0769 -4.17*** 
EDP -0.1571 -0.2118 -0.1769 -0.1578 -0.1703 -0.2118 3.37*** 
Frequency Distribution of Firm Characteristics (%) 
HITECH 19.03 17.81 11.56  
ACQUIRER 0.00 0.00 0  
TARGET 0.00 0.00 0  
TIN3 0.00 0.00 0  
TAKENIN3 0.00 0.00 0  
DLIN3 1.62 4.82 1.36  
 
effects of the M&A factors (ACQUIRER, TIN3, TARGET, and TAKENIN3) on 
investigated dividend behaviors in this section are heterogeneous among sample 
countries. For most sample countries including US, Canada, UK, Germany, and Japan, 
start-paying companies are less likely to be acquirers (ACQUIERER) than other 
companies. For US, Canada and UK, start-paying companies are less likely to be targets 













5.7 Relationship between Dividend s and Earnings & 
Adjustment Speed of Dividends 
Choe (1990) and Brav, Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005) find that the linkage 
between cash dividends and earnings has weakened. Consistently, Skinner (2008) use 
Lintner (1956) model to investigate a sample of 351 firms listed on CompuStat from 
1980- 2005 and finds that the both the coefficients of earnings and lagged dividends 
become less significant. Skinner (2008) argues that this is owing to share repurchases 
are increasingly used in place of dividends. This argument is consistent with Grullon 
and Michaely (2002) who argue that share repurchases substitute for dividends as the 
method of distributing earnings. In an empirical investigation basing on a sample of 291 
listed European companies from 1989-2005, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that 
dividends are still more responsive to earnings comparing with repurchases. In addition, 
Eije and Megginson (2008) show that both the impact of earnings on cash dividends 
paid and the speed of adjustment of dividends decline slightly.  
This section focuses on the evolution of the sensitivity of dividends to earnings 
and the speed of adjustment of dividends and extends the investigation to multinational 
markets for full period 1989-2010, and for two sub-periods 1989-2000, and 2001-2010. 
Different from the tests of Skinner (2008), and Eije and Megginson (2008) which are 
based on small samples, the test in this section utilises a large pooled sample comprising 
all firm-year observations in case the consecutive data on dividend per share (DPS) and 
earnings per share (EPS) is available. The tests follow the following Lintner model 
regressions: 
∆𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 = 𝛼 + 𝛿𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 − 𝛾𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                (5 − 2) 
Rearranging Equation (5-2) gives the following estimated dividend equation: 
𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐷𝑃𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡                                                                     (5 − 3)  DPS𝑖𝑡 is the current dividend per share, 𝐸𝑃𝑆𝑖 the current earnings per share,   DPS𝑖,𝑡−1 
the previous dividend per share, 𝛽1 = δ is the target payout ratio indicating the 
sensitivity to earnings, γ = 1 − 𝛽2 is the speed of adjustment, and 𝜀𝑖,𝑡 is the error term. 
Random-effects generalized least- squares (GLS) estimation with AR (1) disturbance 
with standard errors clustered at the firm level is applied. 
The results in Table 5-12 show that in all regressions in different sample periods, 
the coefficients of earnings and lagged dividends are strongly significant with an 
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exception in Hong Kong (p-value of DPSt-1 is 0.12 for sub-period 1989-2000). 
Moreover, for each sample country, the earnings coefficients are statistically significant. 
The earnings coefficients are uniformly smaller over sub-period 2001-2010 comparing 
with the results over sub-period 1989-2000, in line with the results reported by Eije and 
Megginson (2008). For example, for the UK, the coefficient of EPSt
  
 is 0.0213 in 2001-
2010 versus 0.0912 in 1989-2000. Moreover, the speed of adjustment increases in the 
US from 0.06 in 1989-2000 to 0.66 in 2001-2010 but declines in the remaining 
countries. This finding is consistent with Skinner (2008) who finds that the speed of 
adjustment increases in the US from 0.18 in 1980-2000 to 0.29 in 1995-2005. In 
contrast, using EU-based data, Eije and Megginson (2008) find that the speed of 
adjustment decreases from 0.547 in 1996-2000 to 0.392 in 2001-2005. Overall, the 
results show that dividends still response to earnings but the sensitivity weakens, in line 
with with Brav et al. (2005), and Eije and Megginson (2008). Apart from in the US, the 
speed of dividend adjustments decreases in the remaining sample countries. 
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Table 5-12 Tests Using Lintner Model  
This table reports results using Linter (1956) model for a full sample period of between 1989 and 2010, and for two 
sub-periods between 1989 and 2000, and 2001 and 2010. The random-effects GLS estimation with AR (1) 
disturbance is applied. The dependent variable is current dividend payments (DPSt), whilst independent variables are 
current earnings (EPSt) and the lagged dividend payments (DPSt-1
 
). SOA refers to the speed of adjustment of 
dividends. p-values are reported in parentheses. *denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 1989-2000 2001-2010 1989-2010   1989-2000 2001-2010 1989-2010 
US  Canada 
C 0.0117*** 0.4112*** 0.3018***  C -0.0377*** 0.0345*** 0.0364*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
EPS
 
t 0.0315*** 0.011*** 0.0109***  EPS
 
t 0.1112*** 0.0322*** 0.0602*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DPS 0.9361*** t-1 0.3355*** 0.4506***  DPS 0.8468*** t-1 0.9236*** 0.8592*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SOA 0.06 0.66 0.55  SOA 0.15 0.08 0.14 
N 8918 8030 18563  N 705 1148 1998 
R-sq: 88.39% 53.06% 62.79%  R-sq: 91.28% 87.76% 87.18% 
UK  Germany 
C 1.1501*** 1.5271*** 0.4144***  C 1.0563*** 0.8557*** 0.349*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
EPS
 
t 0.0912*** 0.0213*** 0.0791***  EPS
 
t 0.0323*** 0.0092*** 0.0133*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
DPS 0.6571*** t-1 0.8205*** 0.7933***  DPS 0.3494*** t-1 0.5915*** 0.8338*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SOA 0.34 0.18 0.21  SOA 0.65 0.41 0.17 
N 5956 4082 11150  N 1085 1242 2475 
R-sq: 87.01% 78.03% 89.10%  R-sq: 65.23% 54.41% 87.04% 
France  Japan 
C 0.2639** 0.2757 0.2614  C -0.0389 7.1878*** 5.731*** 
 (0.02) (0.44) (0.13)   (0.82) (0.00) (0.00) 
EPS
 
t 0.0623*** 0.185*** 0.0972***  EPS
 
t 0.056*** 0.0446*** 0.0457*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
DPS 0.7888*** t-1 0.6694*** 0.7748***  DPS 0.8244*** t-1 0.8631*** 0.8536*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SOA 0.21 0.33 0.23  SOA 0.18 0.14 0.15 
N 1555 1656 3358  N 11422 12964 25844 
R-sq: 76.51% 70.15% 94.63%  R-sq: 97.06% 94.62% 98.18% 
Hong Kong      
C 0.1906*** 0.0117*** 0.0973***      
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
EPS
 
t 0.1956*** 0.0265*** 0.1099***      
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)      
DPS -0.0354 t-1 0.909*** 0.1651***      
 (0.12) (0.00) (0.00)      
SOA 1.04 0.09 0.83      
N 1042 2288 3412      






 5.8 Changes in Payout Methods 
In this section, I trace the changes in payout methods using the transition matrix, which 
a method proposed by Grullon and Michealy (2002) and used by Lee and Suh (2011) 
recently. All firm-year observations are categorised into four groups: (I) No dividends 
and no repurchases; (II) Only dividends; (III) Only repurchases, and; (IV) Both 
dividends and repurchases. A transition refers to a change in payout method between 
two consecutive years made by a company in my sample. Due to the data availability, 
the sample period is 1989 to 2010 for the US and 1999 to 2010 for the remaining 
sample countries.  
The findings are shown in Table 5-13. Firstly, in accordance with the results 
presented by Grullon and Michealy (2002) and Lee and Suh (2011), companies in all the 
sample countries did not change payout methods frequently from year to year if they 
neither paid dividends nor repurchased shares (DIV=0, REP=0), or only paid dividend 
(DIV>0, REP=0). In each sampled country, the percentage of companies that did not 
pay dividends or repurchased (DIV=0, REP=0) in last year T-1 and continued to do so 
in T is high at above 80% (e.g. 90.3% in the UK and 81.35% in Japan). Similarly, firms 
that only paid dividends (DIV>0, REP=0) in T-1 have the great chance to persist in the 
same decision in T (e.g. 85.19% in the UK and 91.2% in Japan). Accordingly, the 
likelihood that dividend-paying firms (DIV>0, REP=0; DIV>0, REP>0) in T-1 
converting to non dividend-paying firms (DIV=0, REP=0; DIV=0, REP>0) in T is very 
low. These findings are consistent with the implication of Linter (1956) that companies 
should be very conservative to initiate dividend payout, but once they begin, they tend 
to continue. The other implication is that dividend payment is a stable and long-term 
strategy for companies. 
By contrast, repurchasing shares is not a regular means of distributing cash 
flows relative to cash dividends, as the percentage of firms that only repurchased shares 
(DIV=0, REP>0) in T-1 continued to do so in T is relatively low in most sample 
countries (e.g. 90.3% in the UK and 81.35% in Japan). The corresponding percentage is 
higher in the US (40.75%) and Canada (29.56%). It is rare for firms that only paid out 
dividends (DIV>0, REP=0) switch to firms that only repurchased shares (DIV=0, 
REP>0). The corresponding percentage following this transition pattern is 0.75 in the 
US (1989-2010), 0.97 in Canada, 0.22 in the UK, 0.22 in Germany, 0.23 in France, 0.18 
in Japan and 0.92 in Hong Kong. In contrast, firms that only repurchased shares (DIV=0, 
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REP>0) are more likely to switch directly to firms that only paid dividends (DIV>0, 
REP=0). The corresponding percentage following this transition pattern is 2.35% in the 
US (1989-2010), 2.77% in Canada, 7.65% in the UK, 9.76% in Germany, 13.33% in 
France, 22.68% in Japan, and 12.5% in Hong Kong. These results are in line with Guay 
and Harford (2000) who document that dividend increases relate to relatively permanent 
cash flow shocks and repurchases relate to transient shocks. 
The results also show that a considerable percentage of companies switched 
from using single payout method (i.e. only dividends, or only repurchases) to using dual 
payout methods (i.e. both dividends and repurchases). In the US, Canada, the UK and in 
Hong Kong, the probability that firms with only dividends (DIV>0, REP=0) 
transitioned to firms with both dividends and repurchases (DIV>0, REP>0) is 20.41%, 
11.86%, 9.64% and 5.7%, respectively. In Japan and Hong Kong the probability that 
firms with only repurchases (DIV=0, REP>0) transitioned to firms with both dividends 
and repurchases (DIV>0, REP>0) is 11.34% and 7.81%, respectively. These results 
imply that dividends and repurchases cannot work as perfect substitutes, and that any 
single payout channel cannot fulfill all the needs of market participants. 
Additionally, the results show that US firms are more likely to distribute their 
first payouts as repurchases (10.89% over the full period) instead of dividends (1.85% 
over the full period), and in Canada firms seemed to follow a similar pattern. However, 
in non-US countries, dividend disbursement is more likely than stock buyback to be 
used as a method of the first payout. For example, 6.54% of UK companies disgorging 
earnings initiated payout in the form of dividends whilst only 2.96% initiated using 











Table 5-13 Transition of Payout Methods 
Grullon and Michealy (2002) propose the basic method of transition matrices used here. This analysis looks as the 
transition of payment channels for companies in the US during the period from 1990-2010, and in the other countries 
over the period from 1999 to 2010. A transition probability is equal to the number of firms switching to a certain 
payout policy at time T divided by the total number of firms with a certain payout policy at time T - 1. DIV 
represents the amount of cash dividend paid and REP represents the amount of repurchased shares. 
 
US 1990-2000 










  1991-2000 
 DIV=0,REP=0 87.58% 1.62% 10.50% 0.30% 
 DIV>0,REP=0 3.16% 76.15% 0.62% 20.07% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 58.95% 1.72% 38.09% 1.23% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 1.57% 46.84% 1.21% 50.38% 
  2001-2010 
 DIV=0,REP=0 86.44% 1.92% 11.08% 0.56% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 4.08% 73.95% 0.92% 21.05% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 52.83% 2.62% 42.13% 2.41% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 2.21% 39.51% 1.75% 56.53% 
  1990-2010 
 DIV=0,REP=0 86.81% 1.85% 10.89% 0.46% 
 DIV>0,REP=0 3.54% 75.29% 0.75% 20.42% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 54.89% 2.35% 40.75% 2.01% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 1.97% 43.35% 1.51% 53.17% 
Canada 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 90.84% 1.88% 6.90% 0.38% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 4.30% 82.88% 0.97% 11.86% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 63.97% 2.77% 29.56% 3.70% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 2.63% 43.78% 2.15% 51.44% 
UK 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 90.30% 6.54% 2.96% 0.19% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 4.96% 85.19% 0.22% 9.64% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 81.12% 7.65% 9.69% 1.53% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 2.62% 55.87% 0.19% 41.32% 
Germany 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 88.30% 10.04% 1.36% 0.31% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 11.90% 85.87% 0.22% 2.00% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 80.49% 9.76% 7.32% 2.44% 
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 DIV>0,REP>0 6.78% 74.58% 3.39% 15.25% 
France 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 87.25% 10.78% 1.70% 0.28% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 10.29% 84.86% 0.23% 4.63% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 83.33% 13.33% 3.33% 0.00% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 1.33% 70.67% 2.00% 26.00% 
Japan 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 81.35% 17.20% 1.09% 0.36% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 4.46% 91.20% 0.18% 4.16% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 49.48% 22.68% 16.49% 11.34% 
 DIV>0,REP>0 1.82% 53.04% 0.84% 44.30% 
Hong Kong 1999-2010 










 DIV=0,REP=0 85.72% 10.63% 2.77% 0.87% 
T-1 DIV>0,REP=0 12.41% 80.98% 0.92% 5.70% 
 DIV=0,REP>0 67.97% 12.50% 11.72% 7.81% 

















5.9 Findings and Conclusions 
This chapter examines international trends in dividend payments across seven 
developed economies from 1989 to 2010, and looks at the extent to which repurchases 
play a role in dividend policy as well. My results corroborate some findings reported in 
previous studies. In line with Julio and Ikenberry (2004), and Denis and Osobov (2008), 
the total numbers of exchange-listed firms increased substantially from 1989 to the 
beginning of 2000s and ceased growing across countries except Japan and Hong Kong 
thereafter. In line with Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009), the overall 
proportion of dividend payers fell significantly from 1989 through to the early 2000s for 
companies in all sample countries except in Japan. Consistent with Eije and Megginson, 
(2008) and Ferris et al. (2009), the aggregate amount of dividends paid continuously 
increased in each country during the sample period. 
More importantly, my investigation reveals incremental findings. Contrary to the 
conclusion of Ferris et al. (2009) (P.520), the declining number of dividend payers is 
actually not a global phenomenon. The number of dividend-paying firms remained 
relatively constant in the US and even continuously increased in Canada, Japan and 
Hong Kong over the entire sample period. This finding is partially consistent with Denis 
and Osobov (2008) whose sample period is covered by a part of my sample period. 
Further, the percentage of payers slightly restored in the US, Canada, Japan and Hong 
Kong from the beginning of 2000s to 2010, in support of the assumption of 
“reappearing dividends” proposed by Julio and Ikenberry (2004). However, the data is 
unable to document if this is a kind of sustainable trend since the scale of the increase in 
percentage payers is small and “reappearing dividends” is not evident in the UK, France, 
and Germany. In addition, there is clear evidence that new listings appear to become 
more reluctant to pay dividends, lending support for Fama and French (2001) and Denis 
and Osobov (2008) who argue that the reduction in percentage of payers is resulted 
from the soaring number of newly listed firms that do not pay dividends. 
The patterns of stock repurchases differ among the countries in my sample. In 
accordance with Grullon and Michaely (2002) and of Skinner (2008), amongst the US 
firms, share repurchases have overwhelmed dividends to act as the dominant payout 
method in terms of absolute amounts. In constrast, the increasing real amount of share 
repurchases can also be observed in the UK, but a larger fraction of corporate payouts 
are still distributed in the form of cash dividends. In addition, the increasing importance 
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of share repurchases can be observed in Canada in terms of the number of repurchasing 
firms. However, in other countries including Germany, France, Japan, and Hong Kong, 
share repurchases are far less important than cash dividends. Moreover, I find that 
companies in all countries retained stable dividend payout ratios and total payout ratios 
during the sample period, consistent with Lintner (1956) and Brav et al. (2005) who 
suggest that managers prefer dividend smoothing. This finding is comparable to Eije 
and Megginson (2008), but different from the findings of Ferris et al. (2009) who report 
that aggregate payout ratios generally increased across countries. 
This research also examines the international trend in propensity to pay 
dividends and reveals several significant findings. The likelihood of paying dividends is 
positively related to firm size and profitability. In particular, my results strongly support 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008) who document 
that the earned/contributed capital mix has the significant effect on the likelihood to pay 
cash dividends. This finding contradicts Eije and Megginson (2008) who focus on a 
sample of European firms. In line with Denis and Osobov (2008), the impact of growth 
opportunities is somewhat mixed. The coefficient of market to book ratio is negative but 
not significant for Germany. The coefficients of total assets growth are of “wrong” 
signs or insignificant for some countries such as Germany and Japan. Moreover, in line 
with Eije and Megginson (2008), leverage is an important influencing factor, and it has 
an adverse effect on a firm’s decision to pay dividends in the majority of sample 
countries. Even when controlling for these key characteristics, a declining propensity to 
pay dividends is confirmed in all sample countries, apart from Japan. Over 1996 to 2010, 
UK and German firms are different from US and Japan in terms of propensity to pay 
dividends. The percentage of actual dividend payers is more volatile than that of 
expected payers, implying that there are unobserved factors could possibly influence 
dividend-paying trends. 
Previous studies, apart from Eije and Megginson (2009), are in dearth of 
evidence on the influential factors of share repurchases.  I use country-specific data to 
examine the determinants of both dividend decisions and repurchases decisions. In the 
empirical tests examining the probability of paying dividends and the probability of 
repurchasing shares, I have the following findings. First, both the decisions of paying 
dividends and repurchasing shares are influenced by lifecycle-related firm 
characteristics including firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, earned equity, 
and leverage. However, similar to the finding of Eije and Megginson (2008), 
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repurchases regressions show fewer significant coefficients than dividend regressions. 
These results generally suggest that the likelihood of paying out cash flows increases 
with the extent to which a firm matures. The other suggestion is that there are not 
differences in the effects of these lifecycle factors on the choice of payout method 
between dividends or repurchases. Second, there is some evidence that cash holdings 
are negatively related the decision to pay dividends, but positively related the decision 
to buy back shares, in line with Eije and Megginson (2008) and Lee and Suh (2011). 
R&D expenditure and technology intensity have a negative but country dependent 
influence on a firm’s tendency to pay dividends. Third, the effect of M&A on the 
incidence of payouts is highly country-specific. It would be more meaningful to discuss 
the results for the US and the UK where more M&A observations are available. US 
acquirers are reluctant to pay dividends, possibly because acquisition as a form of 
investment reduces excess cash. Contrarily, dividend payers in the UK are more 
frequently to be acquirers. The gap between the US and the UK might be due to the 
different frequency of M&A cases in the two countries. By contrast, target firms in both 
the US and in the UK are more likely to pay dividends. This may indicate that 
companies tend to pay dividend when lacking profitable projects and thus confront a 
greater chance of being taken over. Fourth, acquirers in the US and in the UK have a 
greater inclination to repurchase shares, and this suggests that they wanted to use a 
flexible way of distributing cash. Fifth, firms that faced the risk of being de-listed are 
less likely to be dividend payers, consistent with the findings of DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1992). Sixth, there is little evidence to suggest 
that payout decisions are influenced by market sentiment, as argued by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a). Finally, most repurchasing firms tend to be dividend payers as well, 
suggesting that repurchases and dividends are not perfect substitutes at least. 
This chapter also examines the determinants of the amounts of corporate payouts 
by using dividends ratio and repurchases ratio as dependant variables. The results can be 
summarized as follows. First, repurchases regressions had a smaller number of 
statistically significant coefficients than dividend regressions. Market to book ratio is 
the only explanatory variable to have a significant effect on both dividend amounts and 
the repurchase amounts. The associated coefficients of market to book ratio suggest that 
firms with high market to book ratio are less likely to payout using dividends and 
repurchases, but if they did pay out, they paid out more. Lee and Suh (2011) present 
similar findings to show that the amount of repurchases is positively related to market to 
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book ratio for US companies. Second, profitability, growth rate of total assets, and 
retained earnings are important factors in determining dividend amounts, and the 
associated signs are same as those made in respect of decisions to pay dividends.  Firms 
with high cash holdings are reluctant to pay dividends, but if they determined to pay 
they will paid out more. One interesting finding is that large US companies are less 
likely to pay high dividends. Nevertheless, firm size remained as one of the strongest 
positive influencers on the dividend amounts paid out by UK companies. This might be 
because US firms distributed a substantial amount of cash through repurchases. 
However, there is weak evidence that M&A and catering factors influence the amounts 
of dividends paid and share repurchases. 
To fill a gap in the existing literature, this part of study further investigates 
various changes in dividends. The relevant findings are as follows. First, firms that 
increased dividends are larger, have higher profitability, growth opportunities, retained 
earnings, and cash holdings than firms that did not change their dividend policy. Second, 
dividend-increasing firms are more likely to operate in the high technology sector in 
comparison to other control groups. In the US, firms that increase their dividend are 
more often to be acquirers, and less likely to be targets. In the majority of countries, 
dividend-increasing firms have a lower de-listing rate compared with firms in the other 
control groups. Third, dividend-increasing companies are associated with higher growth 
opportunities and cash holdings comparing with dividend-decreasing companies. The 
only consistent evidence found to support catering theory is that US dividend-increasing 
firms have a greater value-weighted dividend premium (EDP) than dividend-decreasing 
firms. Fourth, firms that started to pay dividends and firms that stopped paying differed 
in their life-cycle related characteristics, such as firm size, growth opportunities and 
earned/contributed equity mix. This is caused by the difference of age between control 
groups. In addition, there are several robust findings. Stop-paying companies burden 
heavier debt than the start-paying companies, confirming the expected negative relation 
between leverage and dividends. Start-paying companies are more likely to belong to 
the technology industry, and start-paying companies are less likely to be de-listed in the 
short-term. The findings in relation to US firms suggested that M&A activity could 
trigger a bigger chance of dividend initiation, and a small chance of dividend 
termination. 
The empirical tests using Lintner model indicate that the link between cash 
dividends and earnings has weakened, in support of Choe (1990) and Brav, Graham, 
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Harvey, and Michaely (2005). In line with Eije and Megginson (2008), the data 
demonstrate that dividends are still responsive to earnings and thereby international 
dividend patterns still reflect the relation suggested by Lintner model. We cannot rule 
out the possibility that the changes in the sensitivity of dividends to earnings and the 
adjustment speed of dividends are partially accounted for by the repurchases changes. 
I use transition matrix to analyze the choice of payout methods made by firms. 
The results are generally in accordance with those presented by Grullon and Michealy 
(2002) and Lee and Suh (2011). Consistent with the implication of Linter (1956), 
companies should be very conservative to initiate dividend payout, but once they begin, 
they tend to continue. In addition, the results are in line with Guay and Harford (2000) 
who document that dividend increases relate to relatively permanent cash flow shocks 
and repurchases relate to transient shocks. I find that firms in the US and Canada are 
more likely to initiate payout in the form of repurchases comparing wity firms in other 
countries. This reinforces the notion that the substitution of repurchases for dividends is 






Logistic Panel Regressions for Explaining the Likelihood to Pay Dividends and Repurchase Shares 
This table presents results from estimating logistic panel regressions for seven economies over sample period 1989-
2010. Suggested by Petersen (2009), standard errors are corrected in two dimensions of firm and year. The 
specifications of explanatory variables are as follows. SIZE is a measure of firm size, which represents the percent of 
firms with smaller market capitalization in each stock market for every sample year. PROFIT, the proxy of 
profitability, is calculated as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value 
of total assets. MTBV, a proxy of growth opportunities, is measured as the market value of total capital scaled by the 
book value of total assets. GOA, a proxy of growth opportunities, represents the annual growth rate of total assets. 
RETE refers to ratio of earned equity, which is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. 
LEVERAGE is measured as long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets. LNAGE represents the logarithm of 
the number of years between base year and the observed year. CTAT is the ratio of cash to total assets in which cash 
represents the money available for use in the normal operations of the company. R&D is the proxy of R&D, 
measured as the amount of R&D divided by total assets. TIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of 
observed year for an acquirer. TAKENIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for a 
target firm. DLIN3 equals 1 if an observed firm is delisted within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise. EDP, dividend 
premium, is calculated as the difference between the logarithm of the average market to book value of dividend 
payers and that of non-dividend payers (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). IFDIV equals 1 if a repurchasing company is 
paying dividends and 0 otherwise. p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. *denotes 
significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Panel A. The dependent variable equals one if the firm pays dividends in year t and zero otherwise 
Intercept -3.568*** -1.433*** -0.654*** -1.346*** -0.513 2.539*** -0.535** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.14) (0.00) (0.04) 
SIZE 2.747*** 2.826*** 2.437*** 2.281*** 2.923*** 2.642*** 2.879*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
PROFIT 0.32*** 4.79*** 5.158*** 4.231*** 9.571*** 11.227*** 6.574*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MTBV -0.149*** -0.468*** -0.305*** -0.035 -0.431*** -0.918*** -0.492*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.61) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.575*** -0.844*** -0.541*** -0.3* -0.396*** 0.707* -0.556*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) 
RETE 0.599*** 0.535*** 0.768*** 0.841*** 1.022*** 2.203*** 1.32*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LEVERAGE -0.516** 0.815* -0.769*** -0.769* -0.847** -2.45*** -1.748*** 
 (0.02) (0.06) (0.01) (0.07) (0.05) (0.00) (0.00) 
LNAGE 0.84*** 0.044 0.678*** 0.373*** 0.081 -0.198** 0.051 
 (0.00) (0.7) (0.00) (0.00) (0.51) (0.04) (0.46) 
CTAT -2.471*** -2.21*** -2.127*** -0.836* -0.611 0.547 0.071 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.52) (0.24) (0.85) 
R&D -10.878*** -7.16** -4.556*** -4.87*** -7.128*** -3.641 -7.83** 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.23) (0.04) 
TIN3 -0.097 -0.217 0.133 - -1.376 0.48 - 
 (0.42) (0.69) (0.68) - (0.14) (0.24) - 
TAKENIN3 -0.085 -0.667*** 0.036 -1.556*** -0.774 -1.334*** - 
 (0.36) (0.00) (0.85) (0.01) (0.27) (0.00) - 
DLIN3 -0.43*** -0.731*** -0.29** -0.264 -0.437*** -1.158*** -0.571*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.17) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) 
EDP 0.244 0.371 -1.756 -0.035 -0.806 -2.664*** 0.902 
 (0.9) (0.55) (0.2) (0.97) (0.32) (0.00) (0.17) 
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Obs 64261 11779 28319 9812 10589 41614 10856 
χ2 13540.38 1930.99 5421.04 2098.99 2091.11 5817.55 2097.29 
Pseudo R-sq 0.31 0.32 0.42 0.27 0.29 0.34 0.36 
Panel B. The dependent variable equals one if a firm repurchases shares in year t and zero otherwise 
Intercept -2.275*** -2.179*** -4.251*** -5.238*** -5.573*** -3.088*** -3.787*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE 0.336* -0.24 0.698*** 1.221* 1.509*** 1.668*** 0.25 
 (0.1) (0.39) (0.00) (0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.52) 
PROFIT 0.1*** 1.04*** 1.493*** -0.102 1.288 -1.045 0.06 
 (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.9) (0.2) (0.35) (0.87) 
MTBV -0.147*** -0.313*** -0.027 -0.101 -0.248* -1.351*** -0.336*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.49) (0.38) (0.1) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.886*** -0.559*** -0.846*** -0.454 -0.82*** -1.59** -0.126 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.02) (0.47) 
RETE 0.536*** 0.411*** 0.165*** 0.137 0.209* 0.275** 0.095 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.36) (0.08) (0.04) (0.23) 
LEVERAGE -0.439*** 0.245*** 0.43*** 0.361** 0.743*** 0.125 0.363*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.04) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) 
LNAGE 0.35*** 0.281 0.404 -0.731 -1.095 -1.001* -0.148 
 (0.00) (0.45) (0.29) (0.29) (0.11) (0.07) (0.8) 
CTAT 0.529** 1.693*** 0.606** 1.102 -0.345 0.383 1.531*** 
 (0.05) (0.00) (0.03) (0.44) (0.8) (0.41) (0.00) 
R&D -1.354*** 2.571*** -0.463 2.336 5.579*** -3.515* 6.231 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.69) (0.23) (0.00) (0.1) (0.11) 
TIN3 0.073 -0.711 0.325 - - -1.029* - 
 (0.56) (0.21) (0.21) - - (0.07) - 
TAKENIN3 -0.11 0.321* -0.208 1.972** -0.271 -0.316 - 
 (0.13) (0.09) (0.3) (0.05) (0.79) (0.41) - 
DLIN3 0.054 -0.007 0.002 -0.822** 0.175 -0.367* -0.318 
 (0.43) (0.96) (0.98) (0.03) (0.57) (0.08) (0.57) 
IFDIV 0.291*** 0.487*** 0.618*** -0.066 0.209 0.657*** 0.644*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.73) (0.4) (0.00) (0.00) 
Obs 59790 8291 15760 6341 6475 24348 7292 
χ2 4509.43 329.71 777.67 45.42 251.85 537.43 131.05 






OLS Panel Regressions for Explaining the Amounts of Dividends and Repurchases 
This table presents results from estimating OLS panel regressions for seven economies over sample period 1989-2010. 
Suggested by Petersen (2009), standard errors are corrected in two dimensions of firm and year. The specifications of 
explanatory variables are as follows. SIZE is a measure of firm size, which represents the percent of firms with 
smaller market capitalization in each stock market for every sample year. PROFIT, the proxy of profitability, is 
calculated as (book value of total assets - book value of equity + market value of equity)/book value of total assets. 
MTBV, a proxy of growth opportunities, is measured as the market value of total capital scaled by the book value of 
total assets. GOA, a proxy of growth opportunities, represents the annual growth rate of total assets. RETE refers to 
ratio of earned equity, which is measured as retained earnings scaled by total book equity. LEVERAGE is measured 
as long-term debt scaled by book value of total assets. LNAGE represents the logarithm of the number of years 
between base year and the observed year. CTAT is the ratio of cash to total assets in which cash represents the money 
available for use in the normal operations of the company. R&D is the proxy of R&D, measured as the amount of 
R&D divided by total assets.TIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for an acquirer. 
TAKENIN3 equals to 1 if M&A takes place within 3 years of observed year for a target firm. DLIN3 equals 1 if an 
observed firm is delisted within 3 years of year t and 0 otherwise. EDP, dividend premium, is calculated as the 
difference between the logarithm of the average market to book value of dividend payers and that of non-dividend 
payers (Baker and Wurgler, 2004a). p-values are reported in parentheses and significance levels are indicated. 
*denotes significance at 10%, ** at 5% and *** at 1% respectively.   
 
Variable US Canada UK Germany France Japan HK 
Panel A. The dependent variable is cash dividends paid scaled by total assets 
Intercept 0.021*** 0.044*** 0.008*** 0.014*** 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.011*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) 
SIZE -0.006** -0.0002 0.003*** -0.005 -0.002 -0.001** -0.002 
 (0.02) (0.98) (0.00) (0.14) (0.3) (0.05) (0.54) 
PROFIT 0.006*** 0.097*** 0.04*** 0.088*** 0.109*** 0.018*** 0.107*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
MTBV 0.01*** 0.011*** 0.008*** 0.006*** 0.007*** 0.002*** 0.015*** 
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.019*** -0.013*** -0.013*** -0.017*** -0.015*** -0.007*** -0.023*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
RETE -0.005*** -0.04*** 0.004*** -0.012** -0.006*** 0.004*** -0.005* 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.01) (0.00) (0.07) 
LEVERAGE -0.004 -0.053*** -0.014*** -0.024*** -0.017*** -0.011*** -0.053*** 
 (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
LNAGE -0.002** -0.005** 0.001*** 0.001 0.002** 0.0002 0.0003 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.00) (0.39) (0.03) (0.34) (0.69) 
CTAT 0.047*** -0.013 0.02*** 0.035** 0.01 0.006*** 0.026*** 
 (0.00) (0.54) (0.00) (0.02) (0.26) (0.00) (0.00) 
R&D -0.012 -0.045 -0.014 0.076* -0.004 0.028*** 0.103 
 (0.55) (0.54) (0.23) (0.06) (0.86) (0.00) (0.36) 
TIN3 -0.002 0.025 -0.001 - 0.002 -0.002*** - 
 (0.21) (0.29) (0.58) - (0.42) (0.00) - 
TAKENIN3 -0.004*** -0.008** -0.001 -0.003 -0.003* 0.0001 - 
 (0.00) (0.05) (0.25) (0.71) (0.07) (0.93) - 
DLIN3 0.002 0.005 0.0003 -0.006 0.002* 0.001 0.008 
 (0.19) (0.23) (0.79) (0.13) (0.1) (0.13) (0.19) 
VDP -0.013 -0.034*** 0.0001 -0.008 0.004 0.001 -0.002 
 (0.21) (0.01) (0.99) (0.39) (0.25) (0.73) (0.76) 
Obs 20908 3818 18573 5359 6414 34742 5975 
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F 103.05 42.88 212.14 17.05 52.54 473.71 109.49 
R-sq 0.179 0.29 0.27 0.06 0.23 0.21 0.30 
Panel B. The dependent variable is the amount of repurchases over total assets 
Intercept 0.022*** 0.055** 0.025 0.072 0.054*** -0.001 -0.037* 
 (0.00) (0.02) (0.14) (0.3) (0.00) (0.85) (0.06) 
SIZE 0.011*** -0.012 0.001 -0.115* -0.029*** 0.001 -0.011 
 (0.00) (0.41) (0.89) (0.1) (0.00) (0.89) (0.34) 
PROFIT 0.002 -0.034* 0.022 -0.108 0.069* -0.017 -0.131** 
 (0.35) (0.09) (0.33) (0.43) (0.06) (0.45) (0.05) 
MTBV 0.018*** 0.025*** 0.016*** 0.049** 0.017*** 0.021*** 0.035*** 
 (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.02) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
GOA -0.013*** 0.012 -0.004 -0.033 0.03 -0.014 0.021** 
 (0.01) (0.46) (0.59) (0.76) (0.32) (0.25) (0.03) 
RETE 0.008*** -0.007 0.001 -0.025 0.016** 0.004 -0.02*** 
 (0.00) (0.2) (0.63) (0.36) (0.04) (0.12) (0.01) 
LEVERAGE -0.006 -0.011 -0.004 -0.01 -0.011* -0.002 0.012** 
 (0.26) (0.12) (0.49) (0.71) (0.1) (0.22) (0.02) 
LNAGE -0.005*** -0.067* 0.005 -0.008 -0.021 -0.015** -0.064** 
 (0.00) (0.09) (0.54) (0.93) (0.57) (0.04) (0.02) 
CTAT 0.013 -0.071 0.042** 0.198 0.051 0.014 -0.005 
 (0.27) (0.11) (0.05) (0.36) (0.59) (0.11) (0.86) 
R&D 0.07*** -0.084 0.094 -0.009 -0.011 0.037 -0.073 
 (0.00) (0.31) (0.29) (0.97) (0.93) (0.48) (0.75) 
TIN3 -0.005 -0.002 -0.016* - - -0.003 - 
 (0.36) (0.92) (0.07) - - (0.86) - 
TAKENIN3 -0.001 -0.008 -0.004 - - -0.003 - 
 (0.69) (0.61) (0.62) - - (0.54) - 
DLIN3 0.005* 0.014 0.01* 0.14 0.026 0.003 0.002 
 (0.1) (0.41) (0.09) (0.24) (0.17) (0.2) (0.72) 
IFDIV -0.012*** 0.003 -0.006 0.023 -0.014 -0.001 0.007 
 (0.00) (0.6) (0.55) (0.5) (0.41) (0.59) (0.32) 
Obs 12132 946 1342 126 273 1483 469 
F 87.81 5.02 5.35 2.22 3.47 9.12 1.90 








Summaries and Conclusions 
 
This thesis primarily aims to contribute to the literature of corporate dividend decisions 
by providing new insights into the main dividend theories. The first and second 
empirical chapters investigate the dividend behavior of IPOs by relating a number of 
company characteristics and IPO-specific factors to dividend decisions made by IPOs. 
The third empirical chapter analyses international trends in dividend payment and 
explores the determinants of various corporate payout activities. 
 
6.1 Chapter 3  
This empirical study examines two aspects of post-IPO decision-making behavior: the 
decision to initiate dividends and the timing of dividend initiation. I investigate how 
firm characteristics and IPO-related factors affect dividend decision making of IPOs 
through theoretically motivated empirical tests basing on large UK-based samples. 
Although existing US-based studies (Bulan, Subramanian and Tanlu, 2007; Jain, 
Shekhar and Torbey, 2009; Kale, Kini and Payne, 2012) contribute to researching into 
the relation between IPO and aftermarket dividend decisions, the empirical evidence 
provided is often controversial. 
My sample consists of 1707 London Stock Exchange-based companies issued 
during the period 1990 to 2010. In developing testable hypotheses, I explore the 
theoretical links between IPO characteristics and dividend policy by combining the 
theories underlying dividends and IPOs. I use univariate analysis, cross-sectional 
logistic regression model and logistic unbalanced panel regression model to examine the 
determinants of IPOs’ decision to pay dividends. I use univariate analysis and Cox 
Proportional Hazard (CPH) model to examine the determinants of the timing of 
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dividend initiation. In addition, I estimate linear probability model (LPM) regressions 
and ordinal regression model to check the robustness of the results gained. 
The main findings of Chapter 3 can be summarised as follows. The overall 
results show that the factors that causing greater (smaller) incidence to initiate dividends 
are associated with shorter (longer) time intervals between IPO and dividend initiation. 
The most homogeneous results are associated with the life cycle theory and catering 
theories. There are also some empirical results in support of signaling and agency theory. 
The empirical tests do not negate any of the major dividend theories.  
Consistent with the prediction of dividend signaling theory, both managerial 
ownership and underwriter reputation are positively associated with the likelihood of 
initiating dividends. The line of argument is that IPOs with superior intrinsic value have 
the capability and need to pay dividends (Allen and Faulhaber, 1989). On the other hand, 
high-quality firms tend to have high managerial ownership (Pyle, 1977; Ross, 1977), 
and be sponsored by prestigious underwriters (Booth and Smith, 1986). However, by 
contrast, inconsistent with signaling, VC backing is found to be a factor with negative 
effect on the likelihood to pay dividends, and the impact of the institutional ownership 
on the decision to initiate dividends of IPOs is not significant. 
The negative effect of underpricing on dividend initiation does not align with 
Allen and Faulhaber’s (1989) IPO signaling which suggest IPOs signal intrinsic value 
by discounting offer price and are more likely to pay dividends. Instead, this finding can 
be explained by Rock’s “winner’s curse” (1986) and the implication of Dividend 
Discount Model. A line of argument is that paying no dividends or postponing the 
dividend payment means the information asymmetry is substantial, and the issuing 
firms would intentionally lower the offer price to compensate the uninformed investors. 
Similarly, the observed negative relation between the full lockup restriction period and 
the propensity to pay dividends may suggest that the information asymmetry would 
become more serious if no dividends are paid out and in such case the more restrictive 
lock-in provisions will be required. 
According to substitute hypothesis of agency costs, weak corporate governance 
leads to higher demand of dividend payouts (Rozeff, 1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith and 
Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 2000; Officer, 2006). The results 
show that propensity of dividend initiation is negatively influenced by the full lockup 
restriction period, VC backing and managerial stock option. My test contributes to 
literature by confirming the negative relation between lockup length and dividends. In 
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preceding literature, only Brav and Gompers (2003) report a negative but insignificant 
relationship. The negative relation between lockup length and dividends is in line with 
the finding of Jain et al. (2009). This implies that venture capitalists enhance the 
monitoring for the backed companies (Chan, 1983; Barry et al., 1990; Megginson and 
Weiss, 1991; Bergloff, 1994; Hellmann, 2002; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Cumming and 
Johan; 2008; Krishnan et al., 2011) and, as a result, the demand of dividends declines. 
The negative effect of managerial options is consistent with the findings reported by 
Smith and Watts, (1992), Yermack (1995), Weisbenner (2000), and Fenn and Liang 
(2001).  
By contrast, consistent with the complement assumption of agency costs which 
suggests that dividend payment is a complement for corporate governance (LaPorta et 
al., 2000; Fenn and Liang, 2001; Grinstein and Michaely, 2005), managerial ownership 
and leverage are observed to have positive association with the inclination of dividend 
initiation. In addition, the results show that IPOs’ preference to initiate dividends is 
adversely influenced by the growth opportunities of IPOs, technology intensity and 
issuing on AIM, consistent with free cash flow hypothesis.  
Consistent with the suggestion of life cycle theory (Grullon et al., 2002; 
DeAngelo et al., 2006), VC backing and lock-in agreement have negative effect on the 
dividend policy of IPOs. According to lifecycle theory, dividend policy is positively 
affected by the maturity. Venture capitalists are assumed to prefer early-stage companies 
(Lerner, 1994; Gompers, 1995; Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers and Lerner, 2000, 
2003; Lee and Wahal, 2004; Cumming and Johan, 2008 and Krishnan, 2011). Lock-in 
agreements tend to be more restrictive for young firms (Brav and Gompers, 2000, 2003).  
Furthermore, consistent with lifecycle theory, IPO firms with larger size, higher 
profitability and lower growth opportunities are found to be more likely to initiate 
dividends and pay earlier, In line with previous studies (Fama and French, 2001; Bulan, 
et al., 2007; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Eije and Megginson, 2008; Ferris et al., 2009 and 
Kale et al., 2012). The other findings in support of lifecycle theory include the negative 
effects of technology focus and AIM issuance on initiation propensity. In addition, as 
Eije and Megginson (2008) argued, the positive effect of leverage is consistent with life 
cycle hypothesis since mature firms may be associated with high leverage. 
Finally, the tests show that the IPOs issued in years when markets put a price 
premium on dividend paying payers are more likely to become dividend payers and tend 
to initiate dividends earlier, consistent with the implication of catering theory (Baker 
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and Wurgler, 2004). 
 
6.2 Chapter 4  
This empirical chapter focuses on investigating the determining factors of the dividend 
policies presented in IPO prospectuses. This study is original to examine the dividend 
policy declared in IPO prospectuses using pre-IPO data, which have never been used in 
preceding literature. 
In this investigation, 932 UK IPO prospectus statements published between 
1996 and 2010 are examined. Two categories of variables are employed in this part of 
study: pre-IPO financial performance and a fraction of IPO-related factors, which are 
used in Chapter 3. Historical financial records relating to pre-IPO financial performance 
are hand collated from profit and loss statements, balance sheets, and statements of cash 
flow for 3 consecutive pre-IPO years as reported in the offering prospectuses. All the 
sample firms are classified into four control groups according to the decision makers’ 
attitudes toward dividend payment as stated in the IPO prospectuses. Type 1 and Type 2 
firms have stronger willingness to initiate dividends, comparing with Type 3 and Type 4 
firms, in terms of the proportion of payers and the timing of dividend initiation. Key 
firm characteristics are then compared between the groups using unique categorical 
analyses, cross-sectional binary logistic regression and ordinal logistic regression 
analyses. In general, the results suggest that the pre-IPO financial position of a firm 
appears to exert substantial influence on IPO policy. The empirical tests in general 
support lifecycle theory, but the evidence on the signaling and the agency theory is 
relatively mixed. The results of binary logistic regression do not support catering theory.  
The main findings are as follows. 
IPOs with superior performance (measured by last fiscal year ratios, 3-year 
averages and growth ratios) in pre-IPO profitability and cash inflow from operating 
activities tend to make active dividend policies such as Type 1 or Type 2. This finding is 
consistent with the implication of Lintner (1956) model in which dividend policy 
follows shifts in long run, sustainable levels of earnings and managers are prudent to 
draw the initial dividend policies in order to prevent from reversing dividend changes. 
These findings are also consistent with Miller (1987), Healy and Palepus (1988) and 
Benartzi, Michaely and Thaler (1997) who document that there is a strong past link 
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between a firm’s earnings and changes in dividend policies. In this sense, the dividend 
policy presented in IPO prospectuses signal the past financial performance of firms. 
In line with signaling, IPOs associated with prestigious underwriters are more 
inclined to specify active dividend policies. Jain et al. (2009) also present a similar 
result. Specifically, prestigious underwriters provide certification to high quality IPOs 
who have the ability and demand to undertake high dividend payments. Consistent with 
the argument of Kale et al. (2012) which is derived from signaling, higher institutional 
ownership significantly lead IPOs to choose relatively conservative dividend strategies 
when going public. Specifically, IPOs are more likely to initiate dividends when the 
current level of institutional ownership is lower than what it should be so that they can 
attract informed institutional investors firms.  
I only find weak evidence in support of signaling which predicts a positive 
relation between the likelihood of undertaking active dividend policy and the level of 
underpricing. There is strong evidence that IPOs stating active dividend in prospectuses 
are more likely to be subject to longer full lockup restriction period, implying that the 
length of lockup period may be a substitute for dividends to deal with the information 
asymmetry between insiders and outside investors at the time of IPO. Inconsistent with 
signaling, the relation between IPOs’ dividend policy and managerial ownership is not 
significant. Contrary to signaling, VC backing has a negative impact on choosing active 
dividend policy. 
Consistent with the substitute assumption of agency costs that suggests that 
enhanced corporate governance leads to lower demand of dividend payouts (Rozeff, 
1982; Jensen, 1986; Smith and Watts, 1992; Gaver and Gaver, 1993; LaPorta et al., 
2000; Officer, 2006), the length of full lockup restriction period negatively influences 
on the decision of choosing active dividend policy. Similarly, consistent with the 
substitute assumption of agency costs, IPOs with VC backing, high institutional 
ownership or high level of managerial stock options tend to be relatively conservative in 
stating dividend policy in prospectuses.  
Consistent with the predictions of free cash flow hypothesis (Jensen, 1986; Lang 
and Litzenberger, 1989; Grullon, Michaely and Swaminathan, 2002), the results show 
that IPOs with higher cash flows and lower capital expenditures tend to choose active 
dividend policies when going public. In addition, IPOs in high technological sectors or 
IPOs issued on AIM are less likely to specify more active dividend policies in 
prospectuses. In sum, the most results support agency theory, except for the findings 
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that the effect of managerial ownership is not significant and the results in relation to 
leverage is mixed. 
Consistent with the predictions of the lifecycle theory, venture-capital backed 
IPOs tend to declare relatively conservative dividend policies in prospectuses. This 
finding is also in line with the argument that venture capitalists tend to pursue capital 
gains from short-term investments rather than long-term dividend streams (Lerner, 1994 
and Field and Hanka, 2001). In addition, consistent with the implications of lifecycle 
theory, the severity of lock-in agreements adversely affects initial dividend initiation. 
This argument suggests that the degree of a firm’s maturity has a negative relation with 
the severity of lock-in agreements (Brav and Gompers, 2000, 2003). In accordance with 
Fama and French (2001) and Deshmukh (2003), larger IPOs are more progressive in 
choosing dividend policies at the time of IPO assuming firm size proxies for the 
maturity of firms. IPOs in high technological sectors and IPOs issued on AIM are less 
likely to make active dividend policies. 
In addition, the coefficients of dividend premium in binary logistic regressions 
are not significant, inconsistent with the prediction of dividend catering theory. Finally, 
more findings need to be noticed as well. There is a positive relation between the asset 
turnover ratio and the acceptance of active dividend policies. IPOs issued in the 
‘internet bubble’ period opt for relatively conservative dividend strategies. IPOs issued 
in 2000s are less likely to adopt active dividend policies than those issued in the 1990s.   
Furhtermore, I find that Type1 IPOs have lower cumulative abnormal returns to 
dividend initiation announcements compared with non-Type1 counterparts. This 
supports the conjecture that Type1 IPOs release sufficient information through dividend 
policies declared in offering prospectuses and therefore their formal dividend initiations 
fail to shock the market. While TYPE2 has the significant CARs over the major event 
windows, neither TYPE3 nor TYPE4 has the statistically significant CARs. A possible 
explanation is that investors do not regard the dividend disbursement made by TYPE3 
are TYPE4 firms, which are more likely technology focused companies, as good news. 
Dividend-paying companies outperform non-dividend paying counterparts during three 
post-IPO years, indicating that non-dividend initiating IPOs rather than dividend-
initiating ones account for the decline in long-run underperformance. The additional 
remarkable finding is that Type1 IPOs do not exhibit declining long-run performance. 
The cumulative average market-adjusted returns for Type1 IPOs remain positive during 
the 36 holding months after IPO. Long-run performance descends orderly from Type1 to 
283 
 
Type4 in the most of observed post-IPO months. This finding supports the argument 
that the dividend policies stated in prospectuses communicate the information, and thus 
reduce the possibilities that outside investors are overoptimistic over the prospect of the 
invested companies and that managers overstate the pre-IPO financial data at IPO stage. 
 
6.3  Chapter 5  
This chapter examines international trends in dividend payments across seven 
developed economies from 1989 to 2010, and looks at the extent to which repurchases 
play a role in dividend policy as well. My results corroborate some findings reported in 
previous studies. In line with Julio and Ikenberry (2004) and Denis and Osobov (2008), 
the total numbers of exchange-listed firms increased substantially from 1989 to the 
beginning of 2000s and ceased growing across countries except Japan and Hong Kong 
thereafter. In line with Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009), the overall 
proportion of dividend payers fell significantly from 1989 through to the early 2000s for 
companies in all sample countries except in Japan. Consistent with Eije and Megginson, 
(2008) and Ferris et al. (2009), the aggregate amount of dividends paid continuously 
increased in each country during the sample period. 
Contrary to the conclusion of Ferris et al. (2009) (P.520), the declining number 
of dividend payers is actually not a global phenomenon. The number of dividend-paying 
firms remained relatively constant in the US and even continuously increased in Canada, 
Japan and Hong Kong over the entire sample period. This finding is partially consistent 
with Denis and Osobov (2008) whose sample period is covered by a part of my sample 
period. Further, the percentage of payers slightly restored in the US, Canada, Japan and 
Hong Kong from the beginning of 2000s to 2010, in support of the assumption of 
“reappearing dividends” proposed by Julio and Ikenberry (2004). However, the data is 
unable to document if this is a kind of sustainable trend since the scale of the increase in 
percentage payers is small and “reappearing dividends” is not evident in the UK, France, 
and Germany. In addition, there is clear evidence that new listings appear to become 
more reluctant to pay dividends, lending support for Fama and French (2001) and Denis 
and Osobov (2008) who argue that the reduction in percentage of payers is resulted 
from the soaring number of newly listed firms that do not pay dividends. 
The patterns of stock repurchases differ among the countries in my sample. In 
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accordance with Grullon and Michaely (2002) and of Skinner (2008), amongst the US 
firms, share repurchases have overwhelmed dividends to act as the dominant payout 
method in terms of absolute amounts. In constrast, the increasing real amount of share 
repurchases can also be observed in the UK, but a larger fraction of corporate payouts 
are still distributed in the form of cash dividends. In addition, the increasing importance 
of share repurchases is observable in Canada. However, in other countries including 
Germany, France, Japan, and Hong Kong, share repurchases are far less important than 
cash dividends. Moreover, I find that companies in all countries retained stable dividend 
payout ratios and total payout ratios during the sample period, consistent with Lintner 
(1956) and Brav et al. (2005) who suggest that managers prefer dividend smoothing. 
This finding is comparable to Eije and Megginson (2008), but different from the 
findings of Ferris et al. (2009) who report that aggregate payout ratios generally 
increased across countries. 
This research also examines the international trend in propensity to pay 
dividends and reveals several significant findings. The likelihood of paying dividends is 
positively related to firm size and profitability. In particular, my results strongly support 
DeAngelo, DeAngelo, and Stulz (2006) and Denis and Osobov (2008) who document 
that the earned/contributed capital mix has the significant effect on the likelihood to pay 
cash dividends. This finding contradicts Eije and Megginson (2008) in which European 
data are used in tests. In line with Denis and Osobov (2008), the impact of growth 
opportunities is somewhat mixed. The coefficient of market to book ratio is negative but 
not significant for Germany. The coefficients of total assets growth are of “wrong” signs 
or insignificant for some countries such as Germany and Japan. Moreover, in line with 
Eije and Megginson (2008), debt ratio is an important influencing factor with an 
adverse effect on a firm’s decision to pay dividends in the majority of sample countries. 
Even when controlling for these key characteristics, a declining propensity to pay 
dividends is confirmed in all sample countries, apart from Japan. During the period 
1996-2010, firms in UK and German differ from the counterparts in US and Japan in 
terms of propensity to pay dividends.  
Previous studies, apart from Eije and Megginson (2009), and Alzahrani and 
Lasfer (2012), did not consider fully the drivers of share repurchases.  I use country-
specific data to examine the determinants of both dividend decisions and repurchases 
decisions. In the empirical tests examining the probability of paying dividends and the 
probability of repurchasing shares, I have the following findings. First, lifecycle-related 
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firm characteristics including firm size, profitability, growth opportunities, earned equity, 
and debt have influences on both the decisions of paying dividends and repurchasing 
shares. However, similar to the finding of Eije and Megginson (2008), and Alzahrani 
and Lasfer (2012), repurchases regressions show fewer significant coefficients than 
dividend regressions. These results generally suggest that the likelihood of paying out 
cash flows increases with the extent to which a firm matures. The other suggestion is 
that there are not differences in the effects of these lifecycle factors on the choice of 
payout method between dividends or repurchases. Second, there is some evidence that 
cash holdings are negatively related the decision to pay dividends, but positively related 
the decision to buy back shares, in line with Eije and Megginson (2008) and Lee and 
Suh (2011). R&D expenditure and technology intensity have a negative but country 
dependent influence on a firm’s tendency to pay dividends. Third, the effect of M&A on 
the incidence of payouts is highly country-specific. It would be more meaningful to 
discuss the results for the US and the UK where more M&A observations are available. 
US acquirers are reluctant to pay dividends, possibly because acquisition as a form of 
investment reduces excess cash. Contrarily, dividend payers in the UK are more 
frequently to be acquirers. The gap between the US and the UK might be due to the 
different frequency of M&A cases in the two countries. By contrast, target firms in both 
the US and in the UK are more likely to pay dividends. This may indicate that 
companies tend to pay dividend when lacking profitable projects and thus confront a 
greater chance of being taken over. Fourth, acquirers in the US and in the UK have a 
greater inclination to repurchase shares, and this suggests that they wanted to use a 
flexible way of distributing cash. Fifth, firms that faced the risk of being de-listed are 
less likely to be dividend payers, consistent with the findings of DeAngelo and 
DeAngelo (1990) and DeAngelo et al. (1992). Sixth, there is little evidence to suggest 
that payout decisions are influenced by market sentiment, as argued by Baker and 
Wurgler (2004a). Finally, most repurchasing firms tend to be dividend payers as well, 
suggesting that repurchases and dividends are not perfect substitutes at least. 
This chapter also examines the determinants of the amounts of corporate payouts 
by using dividends ratio and repurchases ratio as dependant variables. The results can be 
summarized as follows. First, repurchases regressions had a smaller number of 
statistically significant coefficients than dividend regressions. Market to book ratio is 
the only explanatory variable to have a significant effect on both dividend amounts and 
the repurchase amounts. The associated coefficients of market to book ratio suggest that 
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firms with high market to book ratio are less likely to payout using dividends and 
repurchases, but if they did pay out, they paid out more. Lee and Suh (2011) present 
similar findings to show that the amount of repurchases is positively related to market to 
book ratio for US companies. Second, profitability, growth rate of total assets, and 
retained earnings are important factors in determining dividend amounts, and the 
associated signs are same as those made in respect of decisions to pay dividends.  Firms 
with high cash holdings are reluctant to pay dividends, but if they determined to pay 
they will paid out more. One interesting finding is that large US companies are less 
likely to pay high dividends, while firm size has positive effect on the dividend amounts 
paid out by UK companies. This might be because US firms distributed a substantial 
amount of cash through repurchases. However, there is weak evidence that M&A and 
catering factors influence the amounts of dividends paid and share repurchases. 
To fill a gap in the existing literature, this part of study further investigates 
various changes in dividends. The relevant findings are as follows. First, firms that 
increased dividends are larger, have higher profitability, growth opportunities, retained 
earnings, and cash holdings than firms that did not change their dividend policy. Second, 
dividend-increasing firms are more likely to operate in the high technology sector. In 
the US, firms that increase their dividend are more likely to be acquirers or firms that 
merged with other firms within 3 years. In the majority of countries, dividend-
increasing firms have a lower de-listing rate compared with firms in the other control 
groups. Third, growth opportunities and cash holdings of dividend-increasing 
companies are relatively higher. The only consistent evidence found to support catering 
theory is that US dividend-increasing firms have a greater value-weighted dividend 
premium (EDP) than dividend-decreasing firms. Fourth, firms that started to pay 
dividends and firms that stopped paying differed in their life-cycle related 
characteristics, such as firm size, growth opportunities and earned/contributed equity 
mix. This is caused by the difference of age between control groups. In addition, there 
are several robust findings. Stop-paying companies burden heavier debt than the start-
paying companies, confirming the expected negative relation between leverage and 
dividends. Start-paying companies are more likely to belong to the technology industry, 
and start-paying companies are less likely to be de-listed in the short-term. Findings in 
relation to US firms suggested that M&A activity could trigger a bigger chance of 
dividend initiation, and a small chance of dividend termination. 
The empirical tests using Lintner model indicate that the link between cash 
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dividends and earnings has weakened, in line with the findings of Choe (1990) and Brav, 
Graham, Harvey, and Michaely (2005). Nevertheless, in line with Eije and Megginson 
(2008), the results show that dividends are still responsive to earnings and thereby 
international dividend patterns still reflect the relation suggested in Lintner model. We 
cannot rule out the possibility that the changes in the sensitivity of dividends to earnings 
and the adjustment speed of dividends are partially accounted for by the repurchases 
changes. 
I use transition matrix to analyze the choice of payout methods made by firms. 
The results are in accordance with those presented by Grullon and Michealy (2002), and 
Lee and Suh (2011). Consistent with the implication of Linter (1956), companies should 
be very conservative to initiate dividend payout, but once they begin, they tend to 
continue. In addition, the results are in line with Guay and Harford (2000) who 
document that dividend increases relate to relatively permanent cash flow shocks and 
repurchases relate to transient shocks. I find that the firms in the US and Canada are 
more likely to initiate payout in the form of repurchases. This reinforces the notion that 
the substitution of repurchases for dividends is merely evident in the US or Canada. 
 
Limitations and ways for further research 
My thesis also enlightens a number of other promising areas for future research. 
A potential interesting topic would be to trace the market reaction caused if IPO firms 
with certain characteristics change their initial dividend policy. For example, assuming 
firms with rigorous lockup agreements suffer more serious information asymmetry or 
agency conflicts than other firms, dividend initiation/omission for these firms will carry 
more information and the market shock is expected to more significant accordingly. I 
can also research the short and long-term aftermarket performance in respect of IPOs’ 
dividend policy. For example, it is interesting to compare the short/long performance 
between IPOs with different preferences of paying dividends at stage of IPO. In such 
comparisons, I can control particular IPO characteristics such as high technology focus. 
In addition, future research may go in depth into the impact of ownership structure (e.g. 
venture capitalists stakes and ownership of institutions), coporate incentives (e.g. stock 
options and executives’ bonus) on dividend policy. Such research may focus on the 
main dividend theories and use time-series or multinational data. Furthermore, by 
reviewing literature I find that the investigation on the interrelationship between M&A 
practice and dividend policy need to be explored in the future research. In order to 
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investigate this issue more deeply, researcher would better concentrate on established 
markets such as UK or US. 
In this thesis, I attempted to contribute to the literature on dividends by 
providing some new insights into the dividend policy of newly listed firms and by 
comparing dividends and share repurchases across a number of countries. The literature 
is extensive on these issues, but I attempted to disentangle my research by focusing on 
new factors that might influence dividends and by collecting by hand a large number of 
data from prospectuses of a sample of UK IPOs. Although I extended the sample to 
2010, I was unable to assess fully the impact of the recent global financial crisis that is 
likely to affect firms’ dividend policy, as I was focusing on other fundamental issues. 
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